Com. v. Mumau, G. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S05042-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,             :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    GLENN MUMAU,                              :
    :
    Appellant               :    1485 WDA 2017
    Appeal from the Order September 21, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Jefferson County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-33-CR-0000014-2016
    BEFORE:     OLSON, OTT, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J.:          FILED MARCH 20, 2018
    Glenn Mumau (Appellant) pro se appeals from the order entered
    September 21, 2017, denying his motion for reconsideration of sentence nunc
    pro tunc.   Upon review, we vacate the order and remand for proceedings
    consistent with this memorandum.
    On August 31, 2016, Appellant entered a guilty plea to one count of
    corrupt organizations, one count of operation of a methamphetamine lab, and
    four counts of delivery of methamphetamine.       On September 7, 2016,
    Appellant was sentenced to an aggregate term of 86 months to 30 years of
    incarceration.   Appellant timely filed a post-sentence motion, which was
    denied on September 16, 2016. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
    On September 20, 2017, Appellant pro se filed a motion for
    reconsideration nunc pro tunc.     The trial court denied this motion on
    *Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S05042-18
    September 22, 2017. This timely-filed appeal followed. Both Appellant and
    the court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Before we address the issues raised by Appellant, we must first address
    whether Appellant is properly proceeding pro se in this Court.1 In doing so,
    we are mindful of the following.
    “[A]ll motions filed after a judgment of sentence is final are to be
    construed as PCRA[2] petitions.” Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    ,
    466 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 
    930 A.2d 586
    (Pa.
    Super. 2007) (collecting cases)). See also Commonwealth v. Jackson, 
    30 A.3d 516
    , 521 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    803 A.2d 1291
    , 1293 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“‘We have repeatedly held that ... any
    petition filed after the judgment of sentence becomes final will be treated as
    a PCRA petition.’”).
    Here, Appellant was sentenced on September 7, 2016, and his timely-
    filed post-sentence motion was denied on September 16, 2016. Pursuant to
    the PCRA, his judgment of sentence became final on October 17, 2016, when
    he failed to file a direct appeal.   See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545 (“[A] judgment
    1 Although Appellant has not specifically raised an issue regarding his lack of
    PCRA counsel, we observe that we may do so sua sponte. See
    Commonwealth v. Stossel, 
    17 A.3d 1286
    , 1290 (Pa. Super. 2011)
    (discussing the right of Superior Court to address an appellant’s lack of
    counsel sua sponte in PCRA matter).
    2   Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546.
    -2-
    J-S05042-18
    becomes final at the conclusion of direct review… or at the expiration of time
    for seeking the review.”).    Accordingly, the trial court should have treated
    Appellant’s September 20, 2017 motion as a first, timely-filed PCRA petition.
    Rule 904 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure requires the appointment of
    counsel for an indigent petitioner on his first PCRA petition.3   Pa.R.Crim.P.
    904(C); Order, 10/6/2017 (granting Appellant’s motion to proceed in forma
    pauperis).    Because this was Appellant’s first filing, he was entitled to the
    appointment of counsel. Therefore, we vacate the order denying the motion
    and remand to the trial court for the appointment of counsel. If Appellant
    wishes to proceed pro se, a Grazier4 hearing is required.
    Order vacated. Case remanded for proceedings consistent with this
    memorandum. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    3 This requirement applies irrespective of whether Appellant requested counsel
    to be appointed. See Commonwealth v. Auchmuty, 
    799 A.2d 823
    , 826
    (Pa. Super. 2002) (“[This Court] opined that clearly Rule [] 904 does not
    require petitioners to affirmatively request appointment of counsel and
    concluded it also was necessary to remand for appointment of counsel.”).
    4
    Commonwealth v. Grazier, 
    713 A.2d 81
    (Pa. 1998).
    -3-
    J-S05042-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/20/2018
    -4-