Mertira, E. v. Camelback Lodge ( 2023 )


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  • J-S31018-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ELSA MERTIRA                               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant               :
    :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CAMELBACK LODGE AND INDOOR                 :   No. 1193 EDA 2022
    WATERPARK AND CMBK RESORT                  :
    OPERATIONS, LLC                            :
    Appeal from the Order Entered March 31, 2022
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Monroe County Civil Division at No(s):
    002031-CV-2021
    BEFORE:      BOWES, J., NICHOLS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                  FILED JANUARY 24, 2023
    I am constrained to concur in the Majority’s holding pursuant to the well-
    entrenched line of cases in which “the appellate courts of this Commonwealth
    have already applied the doctrine of hills and ridges to situations in which
    business invitees have fallen on ice[-]covered private parking areas or walks.”
    Wentz v. Pennswood Apartments, 
    518 A.2d 314
    , 316 (Pa.Super. 1986);
    see also Wilson v. Howard Johnson Restaurant, 
    219 A.2d 676
    , 678 (Pa.
    1966) (precluding liability where business invitee slipped and fell on an icy
    sidewalk in the “parking area” of a restaurant operating during freezing rain
    storm); Morin v. Traveler’s Rest Motel, Inc., 
    704 A.2d 1085
    , 1087
    ____________________________________________
    *   Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S31018-22
    (Pa.Super. 1997) (holding summary judgment warranted against business
    invitee who slipped and fell in the ice-covered parking lot of a hotel despite
    evidence that business noticed the slippery conditions and unsuccessfully
    attempted to treat the property with salt); Roland v. Kravoc, Inc., 
    513 A.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Pa.Super. 1986) (upholding summary judgment awarded against
    business invitee who slipped and fell in shopping center parking lot since
    “there were no ridges and elevations of ice that caused [defendant] to fall”).
    To my mind, the result here is largely compelled by the uncontroverted
    meteorological evidence in the certified record.1 See Amended Exhibit I to
    Motion for Summary Judgment, 3/3/22, at 1-12. An expert report submitted
    by Appellees indicates that, throughout the community, “[f]reezing rain fell
    from approximately 3:30 PM through 8:00 PM EST with occasional freezing
    rain, freezing drizzle and/or sleet falling from approximately 8:00 PM EST
    through the end of the day.” Id. at 5. This conclusion is corroborated by the
    depositions of Appellant, her family members, and Appellees’ representative,
    which uniformly indicated that precipitation was still falling at the time of
    Appellant’s unfortunate accident.              See Motion for Summary Judgment,
    ____________________________________________
    1 The fact that this case concerns conditions produced by natural precipitation
    precludes application of several exceptions to the doctrine. Cf. Tonik v. Apex
    Garages, Inc., 
    275 A.2d 296
    , 298 (Pa. 1971) (“Where . . . a specific, localized
    patch of ice exists on a sidewalk otherwise free of ice and snow, the existence
    of ‘hills and ridges’ need not be established.”); Harmotta v. Bender, 
    601 A.2d 837
    , 842 (Pa.Super. 1992) (“Nor is proof of hills and ridges required
    where an icy condition is caused by the defendant’s neglect, as where a city
    maintains a defective hydrant, water pipe, drain, or spigot.” (cleaned up)).
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    J-S31018-22
    2/14/22, at Exhibit F at 28 (deposition of Appellant); 
    id.
     at Exhibit G at 27
    (deposition of Appellant’s daughter Edita Mertira); 
    id.
     at Exhibit H at 33
    (deposition of Appellant’s daughter Alba Mertira); see also Response in
    Opposition to Summary Judgment, 3/15/22, at Exhibit G at 30 (deposition of
    Appellees’ representative Shawn Hilbert).
    As the Majority has aptly noted, “a landowner has no duty to correct or
    take reasonable measures with regard to storm-created snowy or icy
    conditions until a reasonable time after the storm has passed.” Collins
    v. Philadelphia Suburban Dev. Corp., 
    179 A.3d 69
    , 76 (Pa.Super. 2018)
    (emphasis added); see also Biernacki v. Presque Isle Condominiums
    Unit Owners Ass’n, Inc., 
    828 A.2d 1114
    , 1117 (Pa.Super. 2003) (holding it
    was unreasonable to expect a landlord to clear a parking lot of accumulated
    snow by the “early morning” after an overnight storm).              Since natural
    precipitation was still falling at the time of Appellant’s accident, Appellees were
    not yet under a duty to address the slippery conditions.
    Furthermore, while I generally disapprove of summary judgment
    entered before the completion of all relevant discovery, Appellees’ arguable
    practices in clearing snow and ice on their property are of no moment pursuant
    to Morin, 
    supra.
     Therein, a hotel was operating during a period of “freezing
    precipitation” and took notice of “the icy and slippery condition of the parking
    lot.” 
    Id. at 1086-87
    . The hotel voluntarily treated certain areas of the ice-
    slicked property with salt and sand, while leaving other portions of the parking
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    J-S31018-22
    lot unmitigated. Ultimately, the plaintiff slipped, fell, and injured herself on
    an untreated patch. The trial court entered summary judgment in favor of
    the hotel based upon the hills and ridges doctrine.      This Court upheld the
    ruling and concluded that a business that “voluntarily undertakes to salt and
    sand an icy area where no duty exists” does not create a duty merely by doing
    an incomplete job. 
    Id. at 1088-89
    . Pursuant to Morin, any supplemental
    evidence regarding Appellees’ regular practices in treating surfaces on its
    property for ice and snow would not create a material issue of fact as a matter
    of law.2 Id.; see also Collins, 
    supra at 76
     (indicating no duty upon property
    owners to clear snow and ice produced by an ongoing storm).
    Nonetheless, I must express my concern regarding the continued
    application of this doctrine to business invitees like Appellant. Indeed, my
    review of relevant case law has revealed a persistent uneasiness with respect
    to this specific issue amongst my fellow appellate jurists. See Wilson, supra
    at 679 (Roberts, J.; concurring) (declining to approve extension of the “ridged
    ice rule” to business invitees); Morin, 
    supra at 1089-90
     (Olszewski, J.;
    concurring) (objecting to the continue application of the doctrine to business
    ____________________________________________
    2   The alacrity with which Appellees were able to respond to Appellant’s
    accident and treat the surrounding surfaces to permit an ambulance to access
    the scene seems fairly definitive regarding Appellees’ ability to rapidly respond
    to problematic winter weather on its property. See Response in Opposition
    to Summary Judgment, 3/15/22, at Exhibit G at 67-70. Indeed, Appellees’
    representative reported observing such treatments taking place “at all hours
    of the day and night” on the grounds of the resort. Id. at 51.
    -4-
    J-S31018-22
    invitees, noting:    “I see no reason to shield private business owners from
    liability where an injured business invitee proves a business owner’s failure to
    exercise reasonable care.”).
    As Judge Olszewski aptly wrote, the doctrine of hills and ridges was
    originally devised “to protect municipalities from unreasonable exposure to
    liability for injuries caused by climactic conditions.” Morin, 
    supra
     at 1089
    (citing Kohler v. Penn. Tp., 
    157 A. 681
     (Pa. 1931)). Due to the “practical
    difficulty of maintaining vast areas of public land, it is sound policy to limit the
    liability of those responsible for the maintenance of such land.” 
    Id.
     However,
    “[i]n contrast, private business owners do not encounter the same practical
    difficulty maintaining their land.” 
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    Furthermore, private property owners typically owe a maximal duty of
    care to invitees. As this Court recently reiterated, “[t]he duty of care owed to
    a business invitee . . . is the highest duty owed to any entrant upon land. The
    landowner must protect an invitee not only against known dangers, but also
    against   those     which   might   be    discovered    with   reasonable    care.”
    Shellenberger v. Kreider Farms, ___ A.3d ___, 
    2023 WL 29338
     at *6
    (Pa.Super. Jan. 4, 2023) (cleaned up). Moreover, such individuals enter a
    landowner’s premises “with implied assurance of preparation and reasonable
    care for [her] protection and safety while [she] is there.”        Treadyway v.
    Ebert Motor Co., 
    436 A.2d 994
    , 999 (Pa.Super. 1981). Finally, it is also well-
    established that “[i]n determining the extent of preparation to which an invitee
    -5-
    J-S31018-22
    is entitled to expect to be made for his protection, the nature of the land and
    the purposes for which it is used are of great importance.” 
    Id.
    From the certified record, it seems undisputed that Appellees operate a
    private business that is particularly susceptible to, and largely dependent
    upon, inclement winter weather occurring upon its property. Thus, it would
    seem reasonable and prudent to expect them to take some additional,
    affirmative effort to shield its patrons from such foreseeable hazards. Instead,
    application of the instant doctrine has evolved to such a point that our
    precedent incentivizes property owners like Appellees to take no action to
    protect their patrons until compelled to do so by necessity.3
    Overall, private businesses in Pennsylvania are empowered to remain
    open for business to all potential invitees irrespective of potentially dangerous
    winter weather conditions. During such inclement time periods, businesses
    are not required to take any ameliorative actions until a “reasonable” time
    after natural precipitation ends.        See Collins, 
    supra at 76
    . Furthermore,
    businesses may not be held liable for incomplete or lacking attempts at
    ____________________________________________
    3 Indeed, current Pennsylvania law provides that private property owners who
    choose to respond quickly to accumulations of snow and ice upon their
    property may interfere with natural processes of precipitation and freezing,
    thereby exempting them from the protections of the hills and ridges doctrine.
    See Harvey v. Rouse Chamberlin, Ltd., 
    901 A.2d 523
    , 527 (Pa.Super.
    2006) (concluding that the doctrine was inapplicable where formation of black
    ice on a roadway was “influenced by human intervention,” i.e., early-morning
    snow plowing undertaken in response to an overnight snow). Thus, private
    property owners are not only exempted from swift action in this specific
    context, they are arguably encouraged to rest upon their laurels.
    -6-
    J-S31018-22
    treating slick surfaces during the same period of time. See Morin, 
    supra at 1088-89
    .    Despite the axiomatic, heightened duty of care applicable to
    business invitees, when the snow begins to fall, Pennsylvania law largely
    leaves such individuals out in the cold.     While I join my past brethren in
    questioning the continued wisdom of this legal paradigm, I am constrained to
    agree that it controls the result of the instant case.
    Based on the foregoing, I reluctantly concur.
    -7-