Com. v. Hares, R. ( 2016 )

J. S22023/16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
ROBERT HARES, :
:
Appellant : No. 1040 MDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 28, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division No(s): CP-35-CR-0002460-2014
BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED MAY 26, 2016
Appellant, Robert Hares, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County, following his
jury convictions for Aggravated Assault, Simple Assault, and Recklessly
Endangering Another Person (REAP).1 After careful review, we affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The trial court set forth the factual history of this case as follows:
On November 3, 2014, an argument broke out at the home of
Bessie Hares, [Appellant]’s former wife. Around 5:00 p.m. on
that date, Bessie Hares and her paramour, James Clark, the
victim in this case, had a discussion regarding [Appellant] still
residing in Bessie Hares’ home and how Ms. Hares lacked the
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1
18 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S. § 2701(a)(1), and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705,
respectively.
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funds to evict [Appellant]. During the course of this
conversation, according to the testimony of Ms. Hares, she
became upset, and asked Mr. Clark to leave the home.
According to the testimony of Ms. Hares, while Mr. Clark was
packing his belongings to leave, [Appellant] returned home
around 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. with two other individuals, Crystal
Macomber and Dallas Zipatelli. Ms. Hares testified that while Mr.
Clark was gathering his belongings, [Appellant] approached Mr.
Clark and asked him to leave the home. Mr. Clark “mumbled”
something to [Appellant] in response. Mr. Clark testified that no
one had asked him to leave, but when [Appellant] arrived home
[Appellant] approached him, grabbed him, lifted his chin, stated
“you deserve this” and began to strike him from the right hand
side. At that point, Mr. Zipatelli struck Mr. Clark from the other
side. [Appellant], along with Mr. Zipatelli, punched Mr. Clark
about “five (5) times.” Mr. Clark did not attempt to fight back.
At the end of the fight, Defendant informed Mr. Clark that he
had “two minutes to get the rest of [his] stuff and leave.” Mr.
Clark stated he was surprised by the attack from the [Appellant].
As a result of the attack, Mr. Clark suffered a fractured jaw, one
of his teeth was knocked out, and he had severe bruising to his
face. As a result of the fractured jaw, Mr. Clark had surgery,
and his jaw was wired shut for about six (6) weeks. This led to
Mr. Clark losing about twenty five (25) to thirty (30) pounds,
bringing his weight down to about one hundred thirty five (135)
pounds. During this period of time, Mr. Clark could not speak.
He also had to carry a pair of pliers with him at all times in case
he had to snip the wires himself if he became nauseous and had
to vomit.
Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/27/15, at 2-3 (internal citations omitted).
At a pre-trial conference on February 6, 2015, the Commonwealth
made an oral motion to exclude reference to a prior allegation of Rape
against Mr. Clark. In response, Appellant argued that in July of 2014, Ms.
Hares accused Mr. Clark of rape and that this accusation should be
admissible during cross-examination of Ms. Hares as well as to prove
Appellant’s state of mind at the time that Appellant attacked Mr. Clark. N.T.,
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Pre-Trial, 2/6/15, at 18-20. The trial court ruled “there shall be no mention
of this rape allegation at any point unless and until [Appellant] takes the
stand . . . We will have a hearing on the merits at that time.” Id. at 22.
On February 11, 2015, the jury convicted Appellant of Aggravated
Assault, Simple Assault, and REAP. On May 8, 2015, the trial court
sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of four to eight years’
incarceration for the Aggravated Assault conviction, and a term of one year
of special probation for the REAP conviction. The court merged the Simple
Aassault conviction for sentencing.
Appellant filed timely Post-Trial Motions, which the trial court denied
on May 28, 2015. On June 12, 2015, Appellant filed a timely Notice of
Appeal. Both Appellant and the trial court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Appellant raises the following eight issues on appeal:
(1) Whether the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdicts?
(2) Whether the verdicts were against the weight of the
evidence since the Commonwealth failed to rebut the
Appellant’s defense of property?
(3) Whether the trial court erred when it barred the Appellant
from introducing evidence that he was aware of the fact
that Bessie, his wife, had accused the victim of raping her
earlier that year, thus precluding evidence relevant to his
state of mind when striking the victim?
(4) Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error when,
over Appellant’s objection, it permitted the victim’s sister
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to testify as her testimony was cumulative, irrelevant, and
inflammatory?
(5) Whether the jury instructions regarding the Appellant’s
decision not to call eye-witnesses was prejudicial,
unconstitutional, and contrary to the law, since the
Appellant bears no burden in a criminal trial?
(6) Whether the trial court acted outside of the scope of its
authority when it, sua sponte, objected to defense
counsel’s closing argument and instructed the jury on the
Appellant’s failure to call eye-witnesses as the
Commonwealth made no such objection?
(7) Whether the trial court committed reversible error by
refusing to give the Appellant’s requested jury instruction
pertaining to the defense of self-defense?
(8) Whether the trial court erred by failing to merge the
sentences for aggravated assault, and for recklessly
endangering another person?
See Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
Issues 1 and 2
Appellant’s arguments presented in his first two issues pertaining to
the sufficiency and weight of the evidence essentially challenge the jury’s
decision not to believe his defense that the use of force was justified to
defend his property, i.e., to prevent an unlawful trespass. He avers that the
Commonwealth failed to present sufficient evidence to rebut his claims.
Appellant’s Brief at 20. We address these issues together, as did the trial
court.
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Our Pennsylvania Supreme Court has set forth the appropriate
standards of review: “[w]hen reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, an
appellate court must determine whether the evidence, and all reasonable
inferences deducible from that, viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth as verdict winner, are sufficient to establish all of the
elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Commonwealth v.
Weiss, 776 A.2d 958, 963 (Pa. 2001) (citation omitted).
The standard of review applied to a challenge to the weight of the
evidence is as follows:
A motion for a new trial alleging that the verdict was against the
weight of the evidence is addressed to the discretion of the trial
court. An appellate court, therefore, reviews the exercise of
discretion, not the underlying question whether the verdict is
against the weight of the evidence. The factfinder is free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses. The trial court will award a new trial
only when the jury's verdict is so contrary to the evidence as to
shock one's sense of justice. In determining whether this
standard has been met, appellate review is limited to whether
the trial judge's discretion was properly exercised, and relief will
only be granted where the facts and inferences of record disclose
a palpable abuse of discretion.
Commonwealth v. Cousar, 928 A.2d 1025, 1035-36 (Pa. 2007).
“[C]onduct which would otherwise constitute a crime can be excused
when necessary to prevent a greater harm or crime.” Commonwealth v.
Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1985). The use of force to protect
property is allowed “when the actor believes that such force is immediately
necessary [] to prevent or terminate an unlawful entry or other trespass
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upon land.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 507(a). However, before resorting to force a
property owner must first request that the trespasser leave, unless:
(i) such request would be useless;
(ii) it would be dangerous to himself of another person to
make the request; or
(iii) substantial harm will be done to the physical condition of
the property which is sought to be protected before the
request can effectively be made.
18 Pa.C.S. § 507(c)(1)(i-iii).
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) Opinion, the trial court thoroughly reviewed
the facts and applicable law before concluding that Appellant’s first and
second issues are without merit. The trial court stated that there was
sufficient evidence to rebut Appellant’s defense of property defense, that the
trial testimony presented two factual scenarios, that the jury was free to
believe and weight either scenario, that neither scenario demonstrated a
need to use force, and that the verdicts were not contrary to the weight of
the evidence. See Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/27/15, at 4-8. Our review of the
certified record, the briefs of the parties, and the applicable law, supports
the well-reasoned Trial Court Opinion. Accordingly, we adopt that portion of
the Opinion pertaining to Appellant’s first two issues as our own.
Issues 3 and 4
Appellant’s third and fourth issues challenge the trial court’s
evidentiary rulings. Appellant argues in his third issue that the trial court
erred when it granted the Commonwealth’s motion to exclude evidence that
Ms. Hares had accused Mr. Clark of raping her many months prior to the
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incident. Appellant avers that “his knowledge of the allegation would be
admissible as to his state of mind” and “was essential in order to establish
his defense of property” defense. Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant also
argues that he should have been able to impeach Ms. Hares on cross-
examination regarding the allegation. Appellant’s Brief at 28.
In his fourth issue, Appellant argues that the trial court erred when it
permitted Mr. Clark’s sister, Ms. Jenkins, to testify because her testimony
regarding her brother’s injuries, his going to the hospital, and his filing a
report at the police station was “cumulative, irrelevant, and inflammatory” in
light of photographs of and Clark’s testimony about his injuries. Appellant’s
Brief at 4, 29.
The admission or exclusion of evidence “is vested in the sound
discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed on appeal absent an
abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 839 A.2d 433, 435 (Pa.
Super. 2003) (citation omitted). A trial court abuses its discretion when it
“overrides or misapplies the law, or exercises judgment which is manifestly
unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will.” Id.
(citation omitted).
We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the
parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned Trial Court Opinion. We
conclude that Appellant’s third issue and fourth issues merit no relief. The
trial court properly found that Appellant’s attorney could not cross-examine
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Ms. Hares regarding the allegation pursuant to Pa.R.E. 608(b)(1), that the
issue of whether the allegation was relevant to Appellant’s state of mind was
moot as Appellant never testified, and that Ms. Jenkins’ testimony was
relevant to demonstrate the serious injuries suffered by Mr. Clark and was
not prejudicial, cumulative, or inflammatory. See Trial Ct. Op., filed
8/27/15, at 8-9, 16-18. The comprehensive Trial Court Opinion properly
disposes of the issues and we adopt that portion of the Trial Court’s Opinion
as our own. See id.
Issue 5
In his fifth issue, Appellant avers that the trial court’s instruction to the
jury regarding Appellant’s decision not to call eyewitnesses was prejudicial,
unconstitutional, and contrary to the law since Appellant bears no such
burden in a criminal trial. Appellant’s Brief at 4. Our review indicates that
Appellant did not properly preserve this issue and, therefore, it is waived.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide that “[n]o
portions of the charge nor omissions from the charge may be assigned as
error, unless specific objections are made thereto before the jury retires to
deliberate.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 647(C). Further, “the mere submission and
subsequent denial of proposed points for charge…will not suffice to preserve
an issue, absent a specific objection or exception to the charge or the trial
court's ruling respecting the points.” Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 82 A.3d
943, 978 (Pa. 2013) (citation omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(b).
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In the instant case, at no point did Appellant object to the jury
instructions. See N.T. Trial, 2/11/15, at 26-36. At the conclusion of the
trial, the trial court asked, “any additions or corrections to the charge?” to
which Appellant’s attorney answered, “[n]o.” Id. at 82. Because Appellant’s
attorney failed to object, Appellant waived this issue for appellate review.
See Pa.R.A.P. 302(b); Sanchez, supra.
Issue 6
Appellant’s sixth issue is that the trial court acted outside of the scope
of its authority when it, sua sponte, gave a cautionary instruction during
closing arguments after Appellant’s attorney alluded to a witness who did
not testify and made inflammatory comments. Appellant’s Brief at 5. This
argument is without merit.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure provide the trial court
with the authority to give instructions to the jury “before taking of evidence
or at anytime during the trial as the judge deems necessary and
appropriate for the jury’s guidance in hearing the case.” Pa.R.Crim.P.
647(E) (emphasis added). Further, a trial court may sua sponte give a
cautionary instruction to the jury to disregard remarks by a prosecutor or
defense attorney in order to cure potential prejudice. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 524 A.2d 913, 924 (Pa. Super. 1987).
We have thoroughly reviewed the certified record, the briefs of the
parties, the applicable law, and the well-reasoned Trial Court Opinion. The
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trial court properly concluded that it had had the authority to give the
instruction to cure potential prejudice caused by defense attorney’s
comments during closing statements. See Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/27/15, at
10-15. The comprehensive Trial Court Opinion properly addresses and
disposes of the issue, and we adopt that portion of the trial court’s opinion
as our own. See id.
Issue 7
In his seventh issue, Appellant avers that the trial court committed
reversible error by refusing to give Appellant’s requested jury instruction
pertaining to self-defense. Appellant’s Brief at 5. This is a curious argument
as Appellant’s attorney withdrew the request for that jury instruction during
trial, stating: “Judge, I’m going to rest. And I’m going to withdraw my
request for a self-defense instruction[.]” N.T., Trial, 2/10/15, at 245. Later,
Appellant’s attorney stated: “I’m agreeing with the instruction. I’m not
objecting to it. So it wouldn’t be preserved for error anyway because I’m
agreeing to it.” Id. at 254.
We agree with the trial court that Appellant did not preserve this issue
for appeal. In fact, Appellant’s attorney specifically withdrew this issue for
consideration on appeal. As stated above, issues not raised in the lower
court are waived. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a). Appellant failed to object to the charge
and therefore, failed to preserve this issue for review. See Sanchez, 82
A.3d at 978.
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Issue 8
Lastly, Appellant argues that the trial court erred by failing to merge
the sentences for Aggravated Assault and REAP. Appellant’s Brief at 5. We
disagree.
“A claim that crimes should have merged for sentencing purposes
raises a challenge to the legality of the sentence. Therefore, our standard of
review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Quintua, 56 A.3d 399, 400 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal citation omitted).
Further, “merger is a nonwaivable challenge to the legality of the sentence.”
Commonwealth v. Pettersen, 49 A.3d 903, 911 (Pa. Super. 2012)
(citation omitted).
The Sentencing Code dictates that two crimes should merge for
sentencing purposes if (1) the crimes arise from a single criminal act and
(2) all of the statutory elements of one offense are included in the statutory
elements of the other offense. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9765 (emphasis added). In the
instant case, the act supporting the offenses of Aggravated Assault and
REAP is the same – Appellant punched Mr. Clark in the face causing his jaw
to break. Accordingly, we must next compare the statutory elements of
each offense.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code defines Appellant’s Aggravated Assault
offense as follows: “A person is guilty of aggravated assault if he…attempts
to cause serious bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally,
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knowingly or recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme
indifference to the value of human life.” 18 Pa.C.S. §2702 (a)(1). REAP is
defined as follows: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree
if he recklessly engages in conduct which places or may place another
person in danger of death or serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. §2705.
This Court has recently held that Aggravated Assault and REAP do not
merge for purposes of sentencing because “each offense requires proof of an
element that is absent from the other offense, and one offense can be
committed without committing the other offense.” Commonwealth v.
Ciani, 130 A.3d 780, 783 (Pa. Super. 2015). In Ciani, we reasoned that
“[a]ggravated assault contains an element missing from REAP – serious
bodily injury or an attempt to cause serious bodily injury.” Id. at 782. We
concluded that “unlike aggravated assault, REAP requires the element of
actual danger of death or serious bodily injury. An individual could attempt
to cause serious bodily injury to another person without placing that person
in actual danger, which would support a conviction for aggravated assault
but not REAP.” Id. at 783.
Accordingly, Aggravated Assault and REAP do not merge for
sentencing purposes. The trial court properly sentenced Appellant to an
aggregate term of four to eight years’ incarceration for Aggravated Assault,
merging the sentence for Simple Assault, plus a consecutive term of one
year special probation for REAP. Trial Ct. Op., filed 8/27/15, at 1, 23.
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Because we adopt the Trial Court Opinion filed 8/27/15 with respect to
issues 1 through 4 and 6, the parties are directed to include that opinion
with any future filings.
Judgment of sentence affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Strassburger joins this Memorandum.
Judge Mundy concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/26/2016
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Circulated 04/29/2016 09:42 AM
COMMONWEALTH OF
PENNSYLVANIA
vs. CRIMINAL DIVISION
ROBERT HARES No. 2014 CR 2460
OPINION PURSUANT TO Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
BISIGNANI MOYLE, J.
I. INTRODUCTION/PROCEDURALHISTORY
Defendant Robert Hares (hereinafter referred to as "Defendant") has
appealed various rulings made by this Court during the course of his trial,
as a result of which he was convicted of one (1) count of Aggravated
Assault, (18 Pa.C.S.A §2702(a)(l)) one (1) count of Simple Assault, ill
Pa.C.S.A § 2701(a)(l)) and one (1) count of Recklessly Endangering
Another Person (18 Pa.C.S.A § 2705). On May 8, 2015 this court
sentenced Defendant to an aggregate term of four years (4) to eight (8)
years at a State Correctional Institute plus one (1) year of special
probation.
Defendant filed various post-sentence motions, which included a
Motion for Judgment of Acquittal and/or New Trial and Motion for New
Trial. This Court issued an Order on May 28, 2015 denying Defendant's
post-sentence motions. Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal on June 12,
2015. This Court issued an Order on June 24, 2015, directing Defendant to
file a Concise Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to
1
Pa.R.A.P .1025(b ). Defendant issued his Concise Statement of Matters
Complained of on Appeal on July 1, 2015. The Court will address each
issue per Pa.R.A.P. 1025(a).
II. FACTUAL HISTORY
The evidence at trial demonstrated as follows:
On November 3, 2014, an argument broke out at the home of Bessie
Hares, Robert Hares' former wife. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 54, 64. Around 5:00
p.m. on that date, Bessie Hares and her paramour, James Clark, the victim in
this case, had a discussion regarding Defendant still residing in Bessie Hares'
home and how Ms. Hares lacked the funds to evict Defendant. N.T. 2/10/15 at
~- During the course of this conversation, according to the testimony of
Ms. Hares, she became upset, and asked Mr. Clark to leave the home. N.T.
2/10/15 at pg. 55. According to the testimony of Ms. Hares, while Mr. Clark
was packing his belongings to leave, Defendant returned home around 9:30 or
10:00 p.m. with two other individuals, Crystal Macomber and Dallas Zipatelli.
N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 55. Ms. Hares testified that while Mr. Clark was gathering
his belongings, Defendant approached Mr. Clark and asked him to leave the
home. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 63. Mr. Clark "mumbled" something to Defendant
in response. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 55. Mr. Clark testified that no one had asked
him to leave, but when Defendant arrived home he approached him, grabbed
him, lifted his chin, stated "you deserve this" and began to strike him from the
right hand side. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 55, 150. At that point, Mr. Zipatelli struck
Mr. Clark from the other side. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 122, 123. Defendant, along
2
with Mr. Zipatelli, punched Mr. Clark about "five (5) times." N.T. 2/10/15 at
pg. 66. Mr. Clark did not attempt to fight back. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 55. 125. At
the end of the fight, Defendant informed Mr. Clark that he had "two minutes
to get the rest of [his] stuff and leave." N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 125. Mr. Clark
stated he was surprised by the attack from the Defendant. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg._
150.
As a result of the attack, Mr. Clark suffered a fractured jaw, one of his
teeth was knocked out, and he had severe bruismg to his face. N.T. 2/10/15 at
pg. 136. 137. 139. As a result of the fractured jaw, Mr. Clark had surgery, and
his jaw was wired shut for about six (6) weeks. N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 139. This
led to Mr. Clark losing about twenty five (25) to thirty (30) pounds, bringing
his weight down to about one hundred thirty five (135) pounds. N.T. 2/10/15
at pg. 139.141. During this period of time, Mr. Clark could not speak. N.T.
2/10/15 at pg. 140. He also had to carry a pair of pliers with him at all times in
case he had to snip the wires himself if he became nauseous and had to vomit.
N.T. 2/10/15 at pg. 144.
III. MATTERS COMPLAINED OF ON APPEAL
Defendant has raised eight (8) matters complained of on appeal. They
are as follows:
1. Whether the evidence presented was insufficient to support the
verdicts when the Commonwealth provided sufficient evidence to
establish the basic elements of each of the charged offenses but
failed to rebut the Defendant's defense of defense of property?
2. Whether the verdicts were against the weight of the evidence and
thereby any finding by the jury that the Defendant did not act in
defense of property was contrary to the weight of the evidence?
3
3. Whether the trial court erred when it barred the Defendant from
introducing evidence that he was aware of the fact that his ex-wife
had accused Clark of raping her earlier that year, thus precluding
evidence relevant to the Defendant's state of mind when striking
him?
4. Whether the jury instructions regarding Defendant's decision not
to call eye witnesses was prejudicial, unconstitutional, and contrary
to the law, based on the fact the Defendant bears no burden in a
criminal trial?
5. Whether the trial court acted outside of its authority and prejudiced
the jury, when without any objection on behalf of the
Commonwealth, it sua sponte objected to defense counsel's
closing argument and instructed the jury on Defendant's failure to
call eye witnesses?
6. Whether the trial court committed prejudicial error when, over
Defendant's objection, the court permitted Clark's sister to testify
since her testimony was irrelevant, inflammatory and cumulative?
7. Whether the trial court committed reversible error when the court
failed to give the jury instruction requested by the Defendant
pertaining to the defense of self-defense?
8. Whether the trial court erred by failing to merge the sentences of
Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A §2702(a)(l), and Recklessly
Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705?
IV. DISCUSSION
Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1025(a), the Court will address each issue
complained of on appeal by Defendant.
A. The Commonwealth Presented Sufficient Evidence to Rebut
Defendant's Defense of Defense of Property and The Verdicts of
Guilty Returnedbv the Jurv that Defendant did not Act in Defense of
PropertyWere Not Contraryto the Weight of the Evidence.
Defendant's first two errors complained of on appeal regard Defendant's
defense of property justification defense and shall be addressed by this Court
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m tandem. During the course of Defendant's trial, this Court allowed
Defendant to present evidence in support of his defense of Defense of
Property. This Court subsequently instructed the jury regarding the Defense of
Property. Because this Court allowed Defendant to present evidence of
justification, it became the Commonwealth's burden, beyond a reasonable
doubt,. to prove that Defendant did not act in justifiable defense of property.
Defendant alleges, on appeal, that the Commonwealth did not meet this
burden and did not provide sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant's defense
of defense of property.
The Pennsylvania Crimes Code "embraces the concept that conduct which
would otherwise constitute a crime can be excused when necessary to prevent
a greater harm or crime." Com. v. Berrigan, 501 A.2d 226, 229 (Pa. 1985).
However, Section 507 of the Crimes Code provides in relevant part:
.. (a) Use of force justifiable for protection of
property.-The use of force upon or toward the
person of another is justifiable when the actor
believes that such force is immediately necessary:
( 1) to prevent or terminate an unlawful
entry or other trespass upon land or a
trespass against or the unlawful
carrying away of tangible movable
property, if such land or movable
property is, or is believed by the actor
to be, in his possession or in the
possession of another person for whose
protection he acts ....
(c) Limitations on justifiable use of force.-
(1) The use of force is justifiable under this
section only if the actor first requests
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the person against whom such force is
used to desist from his interference
with the property, unless the actor
believes that:
(i) such request would be
useless;
(ii) it would be dangerous to
himself or another person to
make the request; or
(iii) substantial harm will be
done to the physical condition
of the property which is sought
to be protected before the
request can effectively be
made."
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 507
The evidence at trial demonstrated that the Commonwealth presented
sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant's defense of defense of property.
Defendant's argument that the Commonwealth did not meet its burden fails
for several reasons.
The jury was presented with two factual scenanos regarding the
incident that resulted in Mr. Clark's injuries. The jury was free to believe
either Mr. Clark had been asked to leave by Bessie Hares, as she testified, and
was packing his belongings to leave, or that, as Mr. Clark testified, he had not
been asked by anyone to leave.
Under the first scenario, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 507 (a)(l) provides that the
use of force to stop an unlawful trespass must be immediately necessary. If
Mr. Clark was packing his belongings, there was no immediate need for the
use of force. Mr. Clark was welcomed in Defendant's home for several
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months pnor to the attack. Mr. Clark was not a stranger and was not
destructive. There was no immediate need to use force to expel Mr. Clark
from the property.
Under the second scenario, even if Mr. Clark was not packing his
things to leave and had not been asked to leave, there was no immediate threat
that required force to eject Mr. Clark to the property. Under 18 Pa.C.S.A. §
507(c)(l), "the use of force is justifiable under this section only if the actor
first requests the person against whom such force is used to desist from his
interference with the property." Thus, Defendant had to ask Mr. Clark to
vacate the premises unless one of the following three (3) exceptions applied:
"(i) such request would be useless; (ii) it would be dangerous to
himself or another person to make the request; or (iii) substantial harm
will be done to the physical condition of the property which is sought
to be protected before the request can effectively be made."
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 507(c)(l)(i):(ii):(iii)
There is no indication that asking Mr. Clark to leave would have been
useless. Further, no evidence was presented to suggest that it would be
dangerous to make such request. Finally, no evidence was presented to
establish any harm would be done to the property if a request for Mr. Clark to
vacate the premises was made. If Mr. Clark had not been asked to leave, he
could not have known that any individual in the home did not want him there,
as he had been a welcome guest for months. A simple request to leave could
have alleviated any need to use force. Under both scenarios, there was no
need to use force on Mr. Clark to eject him from the property.
7
Therefore, it is clear to this Court that based on the evidence presented,
the Commonwealth presented sufficient evidence to rebut Defendant's
defense of defense of property and the verdicts of guilty returned by the Jury
that Defendant did not act in defense of property were not contrary to the
weight of the evidence.
B. The Trial CourtDid Not Err in PrecludingEvidence that Defendant's
Ex-Wife had accused the Victim, James Clark, of Defendant's
Assault, of Rape.
At the pretrial conference on February 6, 2015 before this Court, the
Commonwealth made a motion to exclude any reference of a rape allegation
by Defendant's former wife, Bessie Hares, against the victim in this case,
James Clark. Defendant opposed the Commonwealth's motion, and argued
two (2) possible scenarios of how the allegation made by Ms. Hares would be
admissible. N.T. 2/06/15 at pgs. 18-22. First, Defense counsel argued that he
should be able to impeach Ms. Hares on cross examination by questioning her
about the allegation of rape. N.T. 2/06/15 at pgs. 15-16. Second, Defense
counsel argued that should the Defendant testify, the testimony would be
admissible as to his state of mind at the time he hit the victim. N.T. 2/06/15 at
pg. 20. Defense counsel argued the rape allegation has probative value
because it was in Defendant's mind at the time of the attack and argued that
Defendant discussed the rape allegation with the police the day after the
alleged crime. N.T. 2/06/15 at pg. 22.
The first step in determining whether the rape allegation made by Ms.
Hares is admissible at trial is determining whether the allegation is relevant
8
under Pa. R.E. 401, and if so does its probative value, under Pa.R.E. 403,
outweigh a danger of one or more of the following: "unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or
needlessly presenting cumulative evidence."
In the case at hand, the rape allegation may have been relevant to show
the Defendant's state of mind at the time of the attack on the victim, Mr.
Clark. However, the next step in determining the admissibility of this
evidence is to determine whether any rules of evidence preclude the admission
of this evidence.
This Court ruled that Defendant would not be permitted cross-examine
Ms. Hares regarding the rape allegation pursuant Pa. R.E. 608(b); which
provides:
( 1) the character of a witness for truthfulness may not be attacked or
supported by cross-examination or extrinsic evidence concerning
specific instances of the witness' conduct; however,
(2) in the discretion of the court, the credibility of a witness who
testifies as to the reputation of another witness for truthfulness or
untruthfulness may be attacked by cross-examination concerning
specific instances of conduct (not including arrests) of the other
witness, if they are probative of truthfulness or untruthfulness; but
extrinsic evidence thereof is not admissible
Pa.R.E. 608(b)
Therefore, before defense counsel would be permitted to cross-
examine a witness regarding Ms. Hares' alleged claim of rape, that witness
would have to be vouching for Ms. Hares credibility. Under those
circumstances, it would be potentially permissible to question the witness
9
about the false rape allegations. However, no witness was called to vouch for
Ms. Hares' veracity.
Regarding the second scenario proffered by the Defendant, this Court
ruled if Defendant decided to take the stand, this Court would then entertain
Defendant's motion to introduce the prior rape allegation as evidence of the
Defendant's state of mind. N. T. 2/06/15 at pg. 22.. However, Defendant never
testified, so the issue is moot. Therefore, Defendant's argument is without
merit.
In conclusion, Defendant's claim of error regarding this issue ts
without merit.
C. The Jurv Instructions Given bv this Courtregarding Defendant's
Decision Not to Call Witnesses Were Not Prejudicial,
Unconstitutional, or Contrarv to the Law and the Trial CourtDid Not
Act Outside of its Authoritywhen the Court Called a Sidebar During
Defendant's Closing Argument and Subsequently issued Jury
Instructions based on Defendant's Closing Argument.
Defendant's fourth and fifth matters complained of on appeal both
regard this Court's jury instructions given as a result of statements made by
Defense Counsel during his closing argument. Therefore, they shall be
addressed in tandem.
During Defense counsel's closing argument, he stated:
"I didn't have to put on any evidence. I chose to call Crystal.
Okay. They didn't call these other eyewitnesses to the stand.
They didn't call Dallas and they didn't call Brian.
Now, Attorney Lafferty might tell you, well, neither did
Attorney Parkins. But, yeah, not my burden. They have the
burden. It's their responsibility to put on the evidence.
10
So what's the inference as to why they didn't call those
witnesses? Bad for them. They support justification."
N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 22.
Further, Defense counsel stated:
"Punching him a few times to get him to leave the house is not
unreasonable. I mean if it were my house, he might be leaving
with a gunshot wound."
N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 25.
At the completion of Defense Counsel's closing argument, this Court
called Defense Counsel and the Assistant District Attorney for a sidebar
conference. This Court expressed concern during the conference because
Defense counsel had listed Dallas Zipatelli as a witness on his witness list, but
did not call him because Mr. Zipatelli was a co-defendant and he had stated it
was his (Dallas Zippatelli) intent to invoke his fifth amendment right to
remain silent. N.T. 2/11/15 at pgs. 27-28. Further, the Court expressed
concern that Defense Counsel made the above statement regarding the
gunshot. N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 30. The Court expressed concern that this
statement would leave the jurors with the impression that any amount of force,
even deadly force, can be used to stop an unlawful trespass. N.T. 2/11/15 at
pg. 30. After the sidebar conference, the Court instructed the jurors as follows:
"Ladies and gentleman, before we tum to the District
Attorney's closing argument, there are two matters that I just
want to give you some instruction on.
During closing argument, Attorney Parkins referenced two
witnesses who were not called: Dallas Zipatelli and Brian
Belles. And his argument was that the Commonwealth didn't
call them as witnesses, and, therefore, you, the jury, may
properly draw, from their failure to call those two witnesses, an
11
inference. That if they were called, their testimony would be
adverse to the Commonwealth.
My instruction to you, with respect to that line of argument,
is, with respect to Dallas Zipatelli, you are to disregard the
comment and the argument regarding drawing any adverse
inference against the Commonwealth's failure to call Dallas
Zipatelli. Okay.
The second point that I need to raise with you, is, in my final
instructions, I'm going to read to you the entire law on
justification.
And as I mentioned earlier, the final instructions are
complicated. We stayed here last night long after you left,
ironing out word-for-word, to make sure that the jury
instruction I'm going to read to you this morning is in
accordance with Pennsylvania Law.
Attorney Parkins touched on it during his closing argument,
and I can imagine Attorney Lafferty will touch on it in her
closing argument.
What I must tell you, is, it's my version of the statute, when I
read it to you, is what will control you. But the attorneys are
permitted to touch upon the law and tell you what the law is.
So I'm not suggesting that you shouldn't listen to that aspect of
it. But I do need to make a point of clarification about a point
that was made.
Under the law in Pennsylvania, for justification, if you are in
your own home, there are two types of defenses available to
you - or two different sets of circumstances contemplated by
the law: Use of deadly force to protect your property; and use
of non-deadly force to protect your property.
Two separate laws. Each one concerns two very different sets
of circumstances.
So everyone agrees, the only circumstances, in this case, that
apply are the use of non-deadly force. So I'm going to ask you
to disregard the comment, because it would tend to confuse
you on this issue, that 'if it were me, I would have used a gun,'
because that is when you use deadly force in protecting your
property, which has a whole host of other requirements before
a homeowner can resort to non-deadly force.
12
So, in giving you this instruction, I do not want you to be left
with the impression that anyone can use deadly force, under
any circumstances, in protecting their home. That's not the
case.
There are two different sets of circumstances. If a person used
deadly force, you have to look at those circumstances to see
that it's justifiable. But if you try to put them in the same
category, it's confusing and can be misleading.
So just disregard the comment about the firearm. It has
nothing to do with this case. It has nothing to do with the
circumstances."
N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 32-36.
Defense Counsel then asked for a clarification from this Court:
"Judge, just as a clarification to the first one, is that they can't
draw an inference from the Commonwealth's failure to call
Dallas, but they may draw an inference from the failure to call
Brian Belles"
N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 36.
This Court responded:
"And the Commonwealth may properly argue that the jury may
call an adverse inference from the Defendant's failure to call
him as well. .... but, as far as Dallas Zipatelli, the jurors are not
to call an adverse inference to either side for the failure to have
him called as a witness.
N.T. 2/11/15 at pg. 36.
The Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure clearly state that "[tjhe
trial judge may give instructions to the jury before the taking of evidence or at
anytime during the trial as the judge deems necessary and appropriate for the
jury's guidance in hearing the case.·· Pa. R.Crim.P No 64 7(0) ( emphasis
13
added.). Further, a trial court may sua sponte give a cautionary instruction to
the jury to disregard remarks made by a prosecutor or defense attorney in
order to cure potential prejudice. Commonwealth v. Chimenti, 524 A.2d 913,
924 (Pa.Super. 1987), appeal denied 533 A.2d 711 (Pa. 1987).
Moreover, a missing witness instruction is only available in certain
circumstances. This instruction allows the jury to draw an adverse inference
from the absence from a potential material witness who is available.
Commonwealth v. Culmer, 604 A.2d 1090, l 098 (Pa. 1992). "In order for the
instruction to be invoked against the Commonwealth[,] the witness must be
available only to the Commonwealth." Id. In order to determine whether a
witness was "available" only to a party, the trial court must ascertain whether
the witness was "peculiarly within the knowledge and reach" of that party.
_Commonwealth v. Boy_c1, 514 A.2d 623, 626 (Pa.Super. 1986) appeal denied,
531 A.2d 427 (1987); Commonwealth v. Newmiller. 409 A.2d 834, 839 (Pa.
1979).
In Newmiller, counsel for both parties, in their summation, argued the
issue of a missing witness to the jury and the trial court explained the missing
witness rule to the jury during its charge. evmliller, 409 A.2d at 839. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held:
"as no evidence was presented to the jury that the witness was
within either parties' reach, the court should, as a matter of law,
have instructed the jury to disregard counsels' arguments and
not apply the missing witness rule." Id. Thus, by charging as it
did, the court permitted the jury to speculate on whether or not
to draw the adverse inference. As such that portion of the
charge was erroneously given. We further can find no
reasonable basis for trial counsel's failure to object to the
14
charge. As we believe appellant was denied effective assistance
of trial counsel, he is entitled to a new trial. Id.
In the case at hand. no evidence was presented to show that either
witness was only available to the Commonwealth. Culmer, 604 A.2d at 1098.
In fact, Defense Counsel indicated he would be calling Dallas Zipatteli as a
witness, so the Commonwealth chose not to. But then informed the Court that
they would not be calling Mr. Zippatelli, because he intended to invoke his
right to remain silent. Furthermore, after a thorough review of the record, we
are unable to find any evidence which establishes that Brian Belles was
'peculiarly within the knowledge and reach' of the Commonwealth such that
the jury might be permitted to draw the inference that Mr. Belles' testimony
would have been unfavorable to the Commonwealth. Newmiller, 409 A.2d at
839; BentivogJio v. Ralston, 288 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa. 1972). According to the
Assistant District Attorney, Mr. Belles was subpoenaed by the District
Attorney's office but she did not have a reason to call him. N.T. 2/10/15 at p.
173. There was no indication that Mr. Belles was out of reach of the defense
or that the defendant could not call him as a witness. Absent such evidence
that the potential witnesses must be 'available to only one of the parties' has
not been satisfied.
Further, Mr. Ziparteli expressed his intention to invoke his fifth
amendment right, so neither side could call him as a witness, further
prohibiting the inclusion of a missing witness instruction.
15
Finally, it is clear, based on the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure and
the relevant Pennsylvania Case Law, that the trial court may give a cautionary
instruction to the jury to disregard remarks made by a prosecutor or defense attorney
in order to cure potential prejudice. Chimenti, 524 A.2d at 924. Because Defense
Counsel's statements were misapplications of the law to the jury for the reasons
stated above, it was within this Court's purview to give cautionary instructions
regarding the remarks to the jury in order to cure any potential prejudice. Therefore,
in sum, Defendant's claim of en-or regarding these issues is without merit.
D. The Trial CourtDid Not Commit Error when the Trial Court
Permitted Mr. Clark's Sister to Testify.
During the Defendant's trial, the Commonwealth called the victim's
sister, Michelle Jenkins, to testify. N.T. 2/10/15 at p. 175. Ms. Jenkins
testified as to the condition her brother, Mr. Clark, was in after the assault by
Mr. Hares. During the course of her testimony, Defense Counsel objected to
the relevancy of the questioning. N.T. 2/10/15 at p. 181.
The first step in determining whether the testimony of Ms. Jenkins is
admissible at trial is determining whether the testimony is relevant under Pa.
R.E. 401, and if so is its probative value, under fa.R.E. 403, outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: "unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, wasting time, or needlessly
presenting cumulative evidence."
The testimony of Ms. Jenkins was clearly relevant to the case at hand.
In order to prove Aggravated Assault under 18 PA. C.S.A. 2702(1), the
Commonwealth must prove that the Defendant "atternpted to cause serious
16
bodily injury to another, or causes such injury intentionally, knowingly or
recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value
of human life." The Pennsylvania Standard Criminal Jury Instructions define
serious bodily injury as "bodily injury that creates a substantial risk of death
or that causes serious, permanent disfigurement, or protracted loss or
impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ." 15.2702B (Crim)
Aggravated Assault--Causing Serious Bodily I_piury. Pa. SSJI (Crim),
§15.2702B (201~. Therefore, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the
injury suffered by the victim rose to the level of serious bodily injury, as
defined by Pennsylvania law.
The testimony of Ms. Jenkins was offered as evidence of the serious
bodily injury Mr. Clark suffered. For example, Ms. Jenkins testified, speaking
about Mr. Clark's injuries the day after the assault, as follows:
Assistant District Attorney: "[W[hat, if anything, did you
notice about the injuries in comparison to what you had seen
earlier in the day?"
Ms. Jenkins: ..They were worse. The swelling in the jaw, in
particular was worse. Yes.
Assistant District Attorney: "So that prompted you to take him
to the Police Department?"
Ms. Jenkins: "Yes."
N.T. 2/10/15 at p. 178
Ms. Jenkins further testified:
"[Mr. Clark] had to carry wire clippers with him because of
the fact that he had to puree his food and if at some point he
started to choke, he would have to use these clippers .... because
of the mesh caging.
17
N.T. 2/10/15 at p. 183
The testimony of Ms. Jenkins was relevant to demonstrate the injuries
suffered by the victim, Mr. Clark, constitute serious bodily injury. This
testimony established the pain and suffering of the victim. The testimony was
not prejudicial, cumulative or inflammatory. The testimony was offered for
the limited purpose of establishing the serious injuries suffered by the victim.
Therefore, Defendant's claim of error regarding this issue is without merit.
E. The Trial Court Did Not Commit Error when the Trial CourtDid not
Instruct the Jurv Regarding the Defendant's Requested Jurv
InstructionregardingSelf-Defense.
On appeal, Defendant argues that this Court did not give Defendant's
requested jury instruction regarding self-defense and defense of property.
However, during a lengthy discussion on the record with Defense Counsel, the
Defendant, the Assistant District Attorney and this Court, out of the presence
of the jury, the Defendant stipulated to the jury instruction given by this Court
regarding defense of property. N.T. 2/10/15 at pgs. 251- 320. This Court put
together a jury instruction with input from both attorneys, who stipulated to
this Court reading that instruction.
"[T]he failure to make a timely and specific objection before the trial
court at the appropriate stage of the proceedings will result in waiver of the
issue." Com. v. Houck, 102 A.3d 443, 451 (Pa.Super. 2014), reargument
denied (Nov. 25, 2014). In Commonwealth v. Pressley, 887 A.2d 220, 224
(Pa.Super. 2006), the Court stated, that:
18
"The pertinent rules, therefore, require a specific objection to
the charge or an exception to the trial court's ruling on a
proposed point to preserve an issue involving a jury instruction.
Although obligating counsel to take this additional step where
a specific point for charge has been rejected may appear
counterintuitive, as the requested instruction can be viewed as
alerting the trial court to a defendant's substantive legal
position, it serves the salutary purpose of affording the court an
opportunity to avoid or remediate potential error, thereby
eliminating the need for appellate review of an otherwise
correctable issue."
Pressley. 887 A.2d at 224
The record reflects that Defendant agreed to and assisted the court in
drafting the jury instruction. This discussion spans almost seventy (70) pages
of transcript. N.T. 2/10/15 at pgs. 251- 320. Defense Counsel is precluded
from now objecting to the jury instruction. As the Pennsylvania Superior
Court stated in Pressley, "a specific objection is required .... , it serves the
salutary purpose of affording the court an opportunity to avoid or remediate
potential error, thereby eliminating the need for appellate review of an
otherwise correctable issue. Pressley. 887 A.2d at 224. This Court consulted
with the attorneys and the Defendant to come to a mutually agreeable
instruction that would not burden the appellate courts on review, and now
Defendant raises an objection to the instruction. Defendant's "failure to make
a timely and specific objection before the trial court at the appropriate stage of
the proceedings will result in waiver of the issue." .Houc_k, 102 A.3d at 451.
Defendant failed to object to the instruction at the appropriate time during
trial. Therefore, his ability to appeal this issue is waived and this issue on
appeal is without merit.
19
However, if it is found that Defendant has not waived this objection, it is
still without merit, because no evidence was presented to set forth a self-
defense theory for Defendant.
In a criminal matter, the defendant does not have the burden of proving a
claim of self-defense. Commonwealth v. Black, 376 A.2d 627, 630 (Pa.
1977); Commonwealth v. Mayfield 585 A.2d 1069, 1071 (Pa. Super. 1991).
However, before a claim of self-defense may be placed before the trier of fact,
there must be some evidence, from whatever source, to justify a finding of
self-defense. Commonwealth v. Torres. 766 A.2d 342, 345 (Pa. 1999); If there
is such evidence, then the burden is placed upon the Commonwealth to
disprove the claim of self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth
v. Samuels. 590 A.2d 1245, 1247 (Pa. 1991).
There was no evidence presented at trial, from any source, that suggested
Defendant was acting in self-defense. The evidence demonstrated that
Defendant and Dallas Zipatteli approached James Clark and began punching
him in the face and body. There was no evidence to suggest that Mr. Hares
was defending himself. Therefore, if it is determined that Defendant did not
waive his objection, this issue on appeal is still without merit, because no
evidence was presented to set forth a self-defense theory for Defendant.
F. The Trial Court Did Err by Failing to Merge the Sentences of
Aggravated Assault and Recklessly EndangeringAnotherPerson and
asks This Courtto Remand for Resentencing.
Defendant alleges on appeal that the trial court erred by failing to
merge the sentences of Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa. C.S.A §2702(a)(l), and
Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa. C.S.A. §2705
20
Section 9765 of the crimes code, Merger of Sentences, provides:
No crimes shall merge for sentencing purposes unJess the
crimes arise from a single criminal act and all of the statutory
elements of one offense are included in the statutory elements
of the other offense. Where crimes merge for sentencing
purposes, the court may sentence the defendant only on the
higher graded offense.
42 Pa. C. S. A. § 9765
This Court recognizes that after the enactment of section 9765 of the
Crimes Code, Pennsylvania law requires a "pure statutory elements approach"
to evaluating merger for sentencing purposes. Commonwealth v. Yeomans. 24
A.3d I 044, 1050 (Pa.Super. 2011 ). "The statute's mandate is clear. It prohibits
merger unJess two distinct facts are present: 1) the crimes arise from a single
criminal act; and 2) all of the statutory elements of one of the offenses are
included in the statutory elements of the other." Commonwealth v. Collins.
764 A.2d 1056, 1057-1058 (Pa. 2001). The test is "whether the elements of
the lesser crime are all included within the elements of the greater crime, and
the greater offense includes at least one additional element which is different,
in which case the sentences merge. or whether both crimes require proof of at
least one element which the other does not, in which case the sentences do not
merge." Id.
Presently, Defendant challenges his sentences for Recklessly
Endangering Another Person and Aggravated Assault. The Crimes Code
defines appellant's offenses in pertinent part as follows:
2502. Recklessly Endangering Another Person
21
A person commits a misdemeanor of the second degree if he recklessly
engages in conduct which places or may place another person in
danger of death or serious bodily injury.
18 Pa. C. S. A.§ 2502
2702. Aggravated Assault
(a) Offense defined.--A person is guilty of aggravated assault ifhe:
( 1) attempts to cause serious bodily injury to another. or causes such
injury intentionally, knowingly or recklessly under circumstances
manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life
18 Pa. C. S. A.§ 2702
The Pennsylvania Superior Court and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
have ruled that "[rjeckless endangerment is a lesser included offense of
aggravated assault and where the evidence is sufficient to support a claim of
aggravated assault it is also sufficient to support a claim of recklessly
endangering another person." Commonwealth v. Smith. 956 A.2d 1029, 1036
(Pa. Super. 2008), citing Commonwealth v. Thompson 739 A.2d 1023, 1028
n. 13 (Pa. 1999). In consideration of the cases above, the critical point in
evaluating Defendant's claim is whether the offenses of REAP and
Aggravated Assault arose from a single criminal act. If so, the offenses merge
for sentencing purposes. Collins, 764 A.2d at 1057-1058.
The charges of Aggravated Assault and Recklessly Endangering
Another Person of which Defendant was convicted did arise from a single
incident, namely, Defendant's attack on James Clark. This Court
acknowledges that this sentence is improper in light of the above authority.
22
This Court recogmzes that an illegal sentence must be vacated.
Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This Court imposed a sentence of one (1) year of special probation for the
crime of Recklessly Endangering Another Person. This sentence was imposed
consecutively to the sentence imposed for Aggravated Assault. In light of the
negation of the REAP sentences and disruption of the trial court's sentencing
scheme, the trial court should be provided the opportunity- to fashion a
sentence that is equal to or comparable in length to the original sentences, but
based upon the remaining charges. This Court recognizes that when the
sentence as to one count of a multi-count case should merge, then sentences
for all counts should be vacated so that the court can restructure its entire
sentencing scheme. Commonwealth v. Williams, 871 A.2d 254, 266 (Pa.
Super. 2005). If permitted upon remand, this Court will immediately
resentence Defendant.
V. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's request for relief should be
DENIED except as to the sentence imposed by this Court. Upon remand, a
new sentence shall be issued by this Court. An appropriate Order is attached.
23