In the Interest of: A.J.W., Appeal of: A.J.W. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: A.J.W., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: A.J.W. :
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: No. 1489 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered August 22, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-JV-0000227-2018
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and COLINS*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JULY 16, 2019
Appellant, A.J.W., a minor, appeals from the dispositional order entered
after he was adjudicated delinquent on charges of receiving stolen property
and possession of a firearm by a minor.1 We affirm.
The juvenile court summarized the history of this case as follows:
The merit hearing transcript reveals the following facts.
[Appellant], an adjudicated delinquent, has been on probation
with the Washington County Juvenile Probation Office as of August
13, 2018. Jonathan Gould, the probation officer assigned to
[Appellant’s] case, decided to visit [Appellant] at his home in the
City of Washington for failing to comply with the terms of his
juvenile probation order. Specifically, [Appellant] had been failing
to attend the Jobs Program. Mr. Gould asked a fellow probation
officer, Josh Hanley, to accompany him to [Appellant’s] residence.
The two probation officers arrived at [Appellant’s] home and
knocked on the front door. Subsequently, [Appellant’s] father
answered the front door and the officers were invited into the
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1 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3925(a) and 6110.1, respectively.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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house. The probation officers and [Appellant’s] mother and father
went to the back porch of the house to discuss why [Appellant]
did not attend the Jobs Program. According to Mr. Hanley,
[Appellant’s] father told him that his son was refusing to wake up
in the mornings and not abiding by the rules of the home (i.e.,
missing curfews). [Appellant’s] father also indicated that he and
his son had a verbal altercation the morning of the visit regarding
a backpack. Thereafter, [Appellant] came downstairs from [the]
bedroom, located on the second story, and entered the back
porch. Mr. Gould confronted [Appellant] about the problems he
was having with his parents, but [Appellant] was not forthcoming
with any information.
At some point later, the probation officers asked to conduct
a search of [Appellant’s] room for the backpack, and [Appellant’s]
parents consented. [Appellant’s] mother led Mr. Hanley upstairs
to [Appellant’s] bedroom. Mr. Hanley informed [Appellant’s]
mother that he was going to conduct a search and she returned
downstairs to join Mr. Gould and the others on the back porch.
Mr. Hanley found the backpack behind a door inside [Appellant’s]
bedroom that leads to the attic. According to Mr. Hanley, the only
way to access the attic is through this door to [Appellant’s]
bedroom. The backpack was found just beyond the door leading
to the attic on the stairs. Within the backpack, Mr. Hanley found
a loaded .38 Special Revolver manufactured by Taurus located
under a pair of Air Jordan Nike Sneakers. Consequently, Mr.
Hanley went back downstairs and placed [Appellant] in custody.
On August 14, 2018, a delinquency petition was filed against
[Appellant] charging him with Receiving Stolen Property (F-2),
Firearms Carried Without a License (F-3), and Possession of
Firearm by a Minor (M-1). On August 21, 2018, this [c]ourt held
a merit hearing on the charges. On that date, [Appellant]
acknowledged the charge of Possession of a Firearm by a Minor,
but not the remaining two charges. Therefore, the [c]ourt held a
hearing to determine whether [Appellant] committed the
delinquent acts of Receiving Stolen Property and Firearms Carried
without a License. After taking testimony and hearing argument
by the attorneys, the [c]ourt ruled that the Commonwealth was
unable to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [Appellant]
committed the delinquent act of Firearms Carried without a
License, but concluded that the Commonwealth proved by beyond
a reasonable doubt that [Appellant] committed the delinquent act
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of Receiving Stolen Property. The [c]ourt then imposed a
consented disposition.2
Juvenile Court Order, 10/1/18, at 1-3.
On August 31, 2018, Appellant filed a timely post-dispositional motion
pursuant to Pa.R.J.C.P. 620. The Commonwealth filed a response to
Appellant’s motion on September 17, 2018. On October 1, 2018, the juvenile
court entered an order denying Appellant’s post-dispositional motion. This
timely appeal followed. The juvenile court did not direct Appellant to file a
statement pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b). Thereafter, the juvenile court
issued its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
I. Did the lower court err in adjudicating the minor delinquent as
to the charge of receiving stolen property (specifically a firearm)
beyond a reasonable doubt when it found that the evidence was
sufficient to prove the element of having knowledge or belief that
the firearm in question was probably stolen?
* * *
III. Did the lower err by adjudicating the minor delinquent as to
the charge of receiving stolen property (specifically a firearm)
beyond a reasonable doubt when the weight of the evidence was
against such an adjudication?
Appellant’s Brief at 8.3
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2 Appellant was ordered placed at Glenn Mills Schools. Order, 8/22/18.
3 Appellant has withdrawn the second issue from our consideration.
Appellant’s Brief at 8, 20.
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Appellant first argues that his adjudication of delinquency on the charge
of receiving stolen property was based upon insufficient evidence. Appellant’s
Brief at 15-20. Appellant asserts that the juvenile court improperly inferred
that Appellant knew or should have known that the firearm was stolen because
there was no evidence as to how Appellant came into possession of the gun.
Id. at 16-17. Also, Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence that the
gun was located in a hidden location and that there were scratches over the
serial number is not sufficient proof that Appellant had knowledge that it was
stolen. Id. at 17-20. We disagree.
We begin our review mindful of the following standard:
In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we must determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner, together
with all reasonable inferences therefrom, the trier of fact could
have found that each and every element of the crimes charged
was established beyond a reasonable doubt. In making this
determination, we must evaluate the entire trial record and
consider all the evidence actually received. It is within the
province of the fact finder to determine the weight to be accorded
each witness’s testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence introduced at trial.
In the Interest of J.C., 751 A.2d 1178, 1180 (Pa. Super. 2000). Moreover,
the Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the
crime beyond a reasonable doubt by wholly circumstantial evidence. In the
Interest of J.D., 798 A.2d 210, 212 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Receiving stolen property is defined as follows:
(a) A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally
receives, retains, or disposes of movable property of
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another knowing that it has been stolen, or believing
that it has probably been stolen, unless the property
is received, retained, or disposed with intent to
restore it to the owner.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a).
In order to establish that a person has committed the offense of
receiving stolen property, the Commonwealth must prove: “(1) the property
was stolen; (2) the defendant was in possession of the property; and (3) the
defendant knew or had reason to believe the property was stolen.”
Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d 1005, 1011 (Pa. Super. 2002).
[A] permissible inference of guilty knowledge
may be drawn from the unexplained possession of
recently stolen goods without infringing upon an
accused’s right of due process or his right against self-
incrimination, as well as other circumstances, such as
the accused’s conduct at the time of arrest.
Nonetheless, the mere possession of stolen property
is insufficient to prove guilty knowledge, and the
Commonwealth must introduce other evidence, which
can be either circumstantial or direct, that
demonstrates that the defendant knew or had reason
to believe that the property was stolen. This
additional evidence can include the nature of the
goods, the quantity of the goods involved, the lapse
of time between possession and theft, and the ease
with which the goods can be assimilated into trade
channels. Further, whether the property has
alterations indicative of being stolen can be used to
establish guilty knowledge. Finally, even if the
accused offers an explanation for his possession of
stolen property, the trier of fact may consider the
possession as unexplained if it deems the explanation
unsatisfactory.
Foreman, 797 A.2d at 1012-1013 (citations omitted).
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The Commonwealth can prove that the defendant in possession of the
property “knew or had reason to know” that the property was stolen by wholly
circumstantial evidence, such as “a short time between the theft and
defendant’s possession.” Commonwealth v. Marrero, 914 A.2d 870, 873
(Pa. Super. 2006). In addition, “[w]e have previously held that possession of
a vehicle twelve days after it had been stolen allowed for an inference of guilty
knowledge.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Williams, 362 A.2d 244, 250
(Pa. 1976)).
The juvenile court offered the following thorough analysis regarding the
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence claim raised by Appellant:
Herein, it was established that the backpack was located
behind a door leading to the attic in which [Appellant] resided (a
single-family dwelling) and that the door was only accessible
through [Appellant’s] bedroom. N.T., 10, 17-18, August 21,
2018. Mr. Hanley testified that he found the gun under a pair of
Air Jordan sneakers. See id. at 18. The serial numbers on the
gun had distinctive or intentionally made scratches on them. See
id. at 19; Exhibit 3. No other distinctive scratch marks appear on
the gun. See Exhibits 1 & 2. Additionally, the owner of the gun
reported it as missing to the City of Washington Police Department
on August 8, 2018 (6 days before it was recovered). See N.T.,
29-30, August 21, 2018.1 Further, upon [Appellant] being placed
into custody, Mr. Hanley asked [Appellant] if he wanted to inform
his mother why he was detained. See id. at 20. In response,
[Appellant] said to his mother, “They found a gun.” Id.
1 In his post-dispositional motion, [Appellant] argues
that the Commonwealth did not “invoke” the recency
inference to prove his knowledge or belief that the
weapon was stolen, citing Commonwealth v. Robinson
in support thereof. 128 A.3d 261, 264-65 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2015). This [c]ourt does not read the Robinson
case as requiring the Commonwealth to “invoke” the
recency inference. The [c]ourt can distill all the facts
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as testified to by the witnesses and make its own
determination of whether the facts, as a whole,
indicate whether a particular delinquent act was
committed.
The situation at hand is distinguishable from Commonwealth
v. Owens, 271 A.2d 230 (Pa. 1970). In that case, the Supreme
Court held that a conviction could not stand where a handgun had
been stolen approximately seven weeks prior to the appellant’s
arrest, without any other evidence of guilty knowledge from the
Commonwealth. See id. at 233. It is also different than the facts
in Robinson where the Commonwealth was unable to produce any
evidence of the recency requirement, as well as no evidence
supporting an inference of guilty knowledge. As the Superior
Court stated,
The handgun in Robinson’s possession was located in
an unremarkable location (his coat pocket), and it had
not been altered in any way to conceal its stolen
status, as the manufacturer’s serial number remained
plainly visible. Robinson’s conduct at the time of
arrest likewise provided no indicia of guilty
knowledge, as he merely stared “stone–faced” in
response to Officer Dinger’s inquiries, and he did not
offer any false explanation for his possession of the
handgun or make any effort to flee apprehension. In
sum, the Commonwealth introduced no evidence
whatsoever at trial regarding how, when, or where
Robinson acquired the handgun, or from whom.
Instead, the Commonwealth proved only that
Robinson possessed stolen property, which, as
indicated, by itself is not sufficient to prove guilty
knowledge.
Robinson, 128 A.3d at 269.
The [c]ourt finds instructive Commonwealth v. Williams,
362 A.2d 244 (Pa. 1976). In Williams, the defendant was charged
and convicted of receiving stolen property (car) that had been
stolen 11 days earlier. See id. at 247. In addition to the vehicle
being recently stolen, the Supreme Court found significant these
factors, which demonstrated circumstantial evidence of the
defendant’s knowledge of the car’s theft: (1) that the victim and
the defendant were unknown to each other and unrelated; (2) the
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defendant drove through a gas station while being pursued by the
police; and (3) and the interior of the car evidenced an attempt to
remove the radio. See id. at 250. Additionally, in Commonwealth
v. Hogan, 468 A.2d 493 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1983), the defendant was
charged and convicted of receiving stolen property (car) that had
been stolen 28 days earlier. In addition to the recency of the
vehicle being stolen, the [c]ourt found the circumstantial evidence
of the defendant’s knowledge of the car’s theft was that the
defendant was unable to produce an owner's registration card, nor
a driver’s license. Further, the owner of the car did not know the
defendant. See id. at 494.
In this case, the [c]ourt could find that the recency (6 days)
plus a lack of explanation as to how [Appellant] came to possess
the recently stolen property (gun) would have been sufficient to
adjudicate [Appellant] delinquent. See Williams.2 There was
other indicia, however, of guilty knowledge or belief that the
weapon was stolen aside from the mere recency of it being stolen,
such as how the gun was hidden or sequestered, that it was
located in an area only accessible through [Appellant’s] bedroom,
that there were distinct scratch marks over the serial numbers,
and that there were no similar scratch marks on other parts of the
gun.3
2 Once the Commonwealth proved the recency of the
thefts, the [finder of fact] was free to infer the
defendant’s guilt (that he could have been the thief)
unless the defendant could offer a satisfactory
alternative explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 362 A.2d 244(Pa. 1976) (citations omitted).
3 The serial numbers on the gun are located on the
outside of the gun and imprinted on it; they are
located in areas not requiring the gun to be
dismantled. See N.T., 26-27, August 21, 2018;
Exhibit 3.
Juvenile Court Order, 10/1/18, at 5-7.
Upon review of the record in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, we are likewise convinced that the juvenile court judge,
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sitting as the finder of fact, properly could infer that Appellant possessed the
requisite guilty knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Therefore, this
evidence permits the finder of fact to believe that Appellant either knew or
had reason to believe that the gun was stolen. Thus, we conclude that
Appellant’s sufficiency of the evidence claim with regard to the adjudication of
delinquency for receiving stolen property lacks merit.
Appellant next argues that his adjudication of delinquency on the charge
of receiving stolen property was against the weight of the evidence.
Appellant’s Brief at 21-24. Appellant contends that the juvenile court failed
to give proper weight to the evidence that he claims refutes the conclusion
that he had knowledge or belief that the firearm was stolen. Id. at 22. For
example, Appellant asserts that, although the firearm was reported missing
six days prior to its recovery in Appellant’s possession, the gun was not
reported as “stolen” until the same day that it was recovered from Appellant.
Id. Appellant also claims that, although there were scratch marks on the
serial numbers of the firearm, the identifying number was still visible. Id. at
23.
Our standard of review is as follows:
The determination of whether a verdict is against the weight of
the evidence is governed by the standard set forth in
Commonwealth v. Champney, 574 Pa. 435, 832 A.2d 403 (Pa.
2003):
The weight of the evidence is exclusively for the finder
of fact who is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence and to determine the credibility of the
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witnesses. An appellate court cannot substitute its
judgment for that of the finder of fact. Thus, we may
only reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so
contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s sense of
justice. Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on
the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is not
to consider the underlying question of whether the
verdict is against the weight of the evidence. Rather,
appellate review is limited to whether the trial court
palpably abused its discretion in ruling on the weight
claim.
Champney, 832 A.2d at 408 (citations omitted). This Court
applies the same standard for reviewing weight claims in juvenile
cases. McElrath v. Commonwealth, 405 Pa. Super. 431, 592
A.2d 740, 745 (Pa. Super. 1991). In considering weight of the
evidence claims, it is not the function of an appellate court to
substitute its judgment based on a cold record for that of the judge
who conducted the juvenile adjudication hearing. Id. Credibility
is for the trier of fact, who is free to believe all, part or none of
the evidence presented. Id. A challenge to the weight of the
evidence concedes that sufficient evidence exists to sustain the
verdict, but questions which evidence is to be believed.
Commonwealth v. Charlton, 2006 Pa. Super. 149, 902 A.2d 554,
561 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 590 Pa. 655, 911 A.2d 933(Pa. 2006). An appellate court reviews the trial court’s exercise
of discretion, not the underlying question of whether the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence. Commonwealth v.
Gibson, 553 Pa. 648, 720 A.2d 473, 480 (Pa. 1998).
In the Interest of: R.N., Jr., 951 A.2d 363, 370-371 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Here, the juvenile court judge, sitting as the finder of fact, was free to
believe all, part, or none of the evidence against Appellant and to make
inferences of guilty knowledge. The juvenile court weighed the evidence and
concluded Appellant perpetrated the crime of receiving stolen property. As
the juvenile court stated, “It cannot conclude that the adjudication would
shock the conscious.” Juvenile Court Order, 10/1/18, at 8. We agree that
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this determination is not so contrary to the evidence so as to shock one’s
sense of justice. We decline Appellant’s invitation to assume the role of
factfinder and reweigh the evidence. Accordingly, we conclude that the
juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in determining Appellant’s weight of
the evidence claim lacks merit.
Dispositional order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/16/2019
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