Com. v. Wolak, T. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S06038-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :             IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                   PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                  :
    :
    :
    THOMAS PATRICK WOLAK,        :
    :
    Appellant      :                   No. 2322 EDA 2017
    :
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered July 10, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County,
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000835-2017
    BEFORE: BOWES, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                           FILED MARCH 22, 2018
    Thomas Patrick Wolak (“Wolak”), pro se, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence imposed after the trial court convicted him of accidents involving
    damage to attended vehicle (hereinafter “leaving the scene of an accident”),
    vehicle entering or crossing roadway, and duty to give information and render
    aid (hereinafter “failure to render aid”).1 We affirm.
    On December 28, 2016, at approximately 5:15 p.m., David Stack
    (“Stack”) was driving his car on Route 512 South in Northampton County,
    Pennsylvania.2      At the same time, Wolak was backing his car out of the
    driveway of his brother’s home (hereinafter “the driveway”), and onto Route
    512. Stack saw the taillights of Wolak’s car while it was backing into Stack’s
    ____________________________________________
    1   See 75 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3743(a), 3324, 3744(a).
    2   Stack’s wife was riding in the passenger seat.
    J-S06038-18
    lane of travel. Stack attempted to avoid an accident by swerving to the left,
    but Wolak’s car struck the right rear of Stack’s car.
    Stack then immediately stopped his car and turned it around to return
    to the scene of the accident and exchange information with the other driver.
    Upon returning to the scene, Stack noticed that Wolak’s vehicle was no longer
    there. However, Stack heard tires squealing and saw the taillights of a vehicle,
    which he suspected might be Wolak’s. Stack attempted to follow this vehicle
    on Route 512 North, but was unable to catch up with it or discern its license
    plate number.
    While driving, Stack noticed a police car parked in a nearby business’s
    parking lot. Stack entered this lot and parked next to the police car to report
    the incident to the officer, Bushkill Township Police Officer Ryan Vresics
    (“Officer Vresics”). Officer Vresics and Stack then traveled back to the scene
    of the accident; however, Wolak was no longer there.3 In the driveway, Officer
    Vresics discovered plastic debris from the collision. Officer Vresics then spoke
    with the homeowner of the driveway, Wolak’s brother, who reported that
    Wolak had recently left the driveway in a dark-colored SUV.
    Shortly thereafter, Officer Vresics, who was familiar with Wolak, drove
    to the property at which Wolak was residing and noticed, parked inside an
    open garage on the property, a black Jeep SUV that had fresh damage to its
    taillight and bumper. This damage matched the plastic debris Officer Vresics
    ____________________________________________
    3Notably, Officer Vresics stated that they returned to the scene approximately
    10 to 15 minutes after he first encountered Stack.
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    recovered from the driveway.           Wolak then came out of the house with a
    telephone in his hand, approached Officer Vresics, and alleged that he was on
    the phone with the 911 center and reporting the accident.4 Officer Vresics
    asked Wolak why he went home instead of staying at the scene of the
    accident, to which Wolak replied that the other vehicle left the scene first.
    Wolak testified that after the collision, he pulled his vehicle off to the
    shoulder of Route 512, turned on his flashers, and took a moment to compose
    himself. According to Wolak, he then returned to the scene of the accident,
    which was very close, but no one was there. Thus, Wolak called his brother,
    the owner of the driveway, and asked him to alert Wolak if the other driver or
    the police returned to the scene.5 Wolak then left in his car. However, Wolak
    testified that he stayed at the scene for approximately ten minutes, but no
    one returned during that time. Shortly thereafter, Wolak’s brother sent him
    a text message stating that a police car had arrived at the scene. In response,
    Wolak called 911 to report the accident.
    The   Commonwealth         thereafter     charged Wolak   with   the   above-
    mentioned violations of Pennsylvania’s Vehicle Code (the “Code”). The matter
    proceeded to a non-jury trial on July 10, 2017, at the close of which the trial
    court found Wolak guilty on all counts.           The court immediately sentenced
    Wolak to nine months of probation and ordered him to pay $300 in fines and
    ____________________________________________
    4Officer Vresics testified that this interaction took place approximately 45
    minutes after Stack had first reported the incident to him.
    5 Wolak testified that he also called his father, the owner of the black Jeep, to
    inform him of the accident. Wolak’s father testified at trial.
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    costs. Wolak timely filed a pro se Notice of Appeal. In response, the trial
    court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of errors
    complained of on appeal. Wolak timely filed a pro se Concise Statement, after
    which the trial court issued an Opinion.
    Wolak now presents the following questions for our review:
    I.    Did the [trial] court err[] in [its] judgment that [Wolak]
    violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a) …?
    II.   Did the [trial] court err[] in [its] judgment that [Wolak]
    violated 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744(a) …?
    III. Did the [trial] court incorrectly understand [] 75 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 3744(a), 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3744(b) and 75 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 3746(a)[, and] [t]herefore, improperly rule that [Wolak]
    was required to inform police of the accident before leaving
    the scene?
    IV. Was previous case law, regarding [section] 1027
    (predecessor of the current hit and run laws) of the []
    [C]ode[,] incorrectly applied when arriving at the [trial]
    court’s decision?
    V.    Does sufficient evidence, as described in the [trial court’s]
    Opinion, support the trial court’s findings that [Wolak] did not
    comply with 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a) and 75 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 3744(a)?
    Brief for Appellant at 4-7 (Wolak’s “answers” to the questions omitted). We
    will address Wolak’s issues together, as they all claim that the evidence is
    insufficient to sustain his convictions of leaving the scene of an accident and
    failure to render aid.6
    ____________________________________________
    6 Wolak does not challenge his conviction of vehicle entering or crossing
    roadway.
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    We apply the following standard of review when considering a challenge
    to the sufficiency of the evidence:
    The standard we apply … is whether[,] viewing all the evidence
    admitted at trial in the light most favorable to the verdict winner,
    there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to find every
    element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. In applying the
    above test, we may not weigh the evidence and substitute our
    judgment for [that of] the fact-finder. In addition, we note that
    the facts and circumstances established by the Commonwealth
    need not preclude every possibility of innocence. Any doubts
    regarding a defendant’s guilt may be resolved by the fact-finder
    unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that[,] as a matter
    of law[,] no probability of fact may be drawn from the combined
    circumstances. The Commonwealth may sustain its burden of
    proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt by
    means of wholly circumstantial evidence. Moreover, in applying
    the above test, the entire record must be evaluated and all
    evidence actually received must be considered. Finally, the finder
    of fact[,] while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the
    weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none
    of the evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Melvin, 
    103 A.3d 1
    , 39-40 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation
    omitted).
    The Code defines the offense of leaving the scene of an accident, in
    relevant part, as follows:
    The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident[,] resulting only
    in damage to a vehicle or other property which is driven or
    attended by any person[,] shall immediately stop the vehicle at
    the scene of the accident[,] or as close thereto as possible[,] but
    shall forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the
    scene of the accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of
    section 3744 (relating to [failure to] render aid).
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3743(a).
    Section 3744 of the Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:
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    The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident[,] resulting in …
    damage to any vehicle or other property which is driven or
    attended by any person[,] shall give his name, address and the
    registration number of the vehicle he is driving, and shall[,] upon
    request[,] exhibit his driver’s license and information relating to
    financial responsibility to … the driver or occupant of or person
    attending any vehicle or other property damaged in the accident
    ….
    
    Id. § 3744(a).
    Wolak summarizes his challenge to his convictions as follows:
    [] Wolak did his best to fully comply and did substantially fulfill his
    duties as required. Immediately after the accident with the
    vehicle driven by [] Stack, and to not further obstruct traffic, []
    Wolak promptly pulled off to the shoulder of the road and stopped
    his vehicle safely[,] and as close thereto as possible[,] while
    remaining at the scene in an attempt give information and render
    aid. He takes a moment to collect himself[,] and then turns on
    his flashers and begins to inspect the scene. He is unable to locate
    any signs of the other driver or other vehicle involved. Unable to
    rouse any other participants or bystanders, [] Wolak finds no way
    to further his legal requirements. After 21 minutes, [Wolak]
    logically and reasonably concludes that the other driver is not
    returning to the scene.[7] [Wolak] then calls the homeowner at
    the address where the accident occurred. The homeowner …
    comes outside, verifies the other driver is no longer present and
    is given all information needed to get someone in touch with []
    Wolak should they return. … In addition, upon completion of his
    safe return home, [Wolak] phones the Bushkill Police Department
    to report the accident and facilitate its resolution.
    Brief for Appellant at 19-20 (footnote added). According to Wolak, neither of
    his convictions is sustainable because the evidence establishes that “it is the
    other driver, [] Stack[,] who spe[d] away from the scene of the accident
    immediately following the collision.” 
    Id. at 24.
    Wolak contends that the trial
    ____________________________________________
    7 We note that Wolak’s instant contention that he stayed at the scene of the
    accident for 21 minutes is contrary to his trial testimony that he stayed at the
    scene for approximately 10 minutes.
    -6-
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    court’s reasoning supporting its determination that the convictions are
    supported by sufficient evidence “is based upon misinterpreted and/or
    misconstrued statements of testimony.”        
    Id. at 21;
    see also 
    id. at 23
    (asserting that the trial court made “several inferences regarding the events
    and the timeline in which they occurred that are simply incorrect.”); see also
    
    id. at 25
    (citing to the Criminal Complaint and arguing that, contrary to the
    trial court’s finding, Stack and Officer Vresics did not return to the scene of
    the accident until 40 minutes thereafter). Finally, Wolak argues that “previous
    cases regarding the … [C]ode have determined that the statutes in discussion
    are aimed at hit-and-run drivers who hide their identity. Therefore, courts
    should take into consideration the intent and efforts made to substantially
    comply with the laws.” 
    Id. at 22-23.
    In its Opinion, the trial court addressed Wolak’s sufficiency challenge as
    follows:
    Although [Wolak] testified that he remained on the scene of the
    accident, th[e trial c]ourt[, sitting as the fact-finder,] found such
    testimony to be not credible. [] Stack, the driver of the vehicle
    that was hit by [Wolak], testified [that] his vehicle was struck by
    [Wolak] as [Wolak] was backing from a driveway onto the
    roadway on which [] Stack was traveling. N.T.[,] 7/10/17[,] at 5-
    6. [] Stack testified that he immediately stopped and turned his
    vehicle around within a few hundred feet to return to the scene of
    the accident, and he observed [Wolak] squeal his tires and drive
    away. 
    Id. at 6-7.
    [] Stack attempted to catch up to [Wolak] while
    his wife dialed 911. 
    Id. at 8.
    [] Stack then immediately made
    contact with … Officer [Vresics], who was parked in a nearby
    shopping center, about the incident. 
    Id. at 10.
    Officer [] Vresics
    returned to the scene of the accident with [] Stack approximately
    10 to 15 minutes after the accident, and [Wolak] was not on the
    scene. 
    Id. at 20,
    30. Based on the foregoing, the [trial c]ourt
    had sufficient basis to find [Wolak’s] testimony that he remained
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    at the scene for 10 to 15 minutes after the accident, with his
    flashers on, to be not credible. 
    Id. at 31,
    36. There was sufficient
    evidence from which the [c]ourt could conclude that [Wolak]
    violated [section] 3743[, i.e., leaving the scene of an accident,]
    by failing to remain at the scene of the accident.
    ***
    [Concerning Wolak’s conviction of failure to render aid], based on
    the testimony presented at trial, there was sufficient evidence for
    the [trial c]ourt to conclude that [Wolak] failed to remain at the
    scene following the accident and[,] therefore[,] also failed to
    comply with the requirements of [section] 3744 by not providing
    his information to the other driver, [] Stack. Moreover, [Wolak]
    testified that the accident occurred at approximately 5:25 p.m.,
    based upon his cell phone records, and that he called his father at
    5:34 p.m. 
    Id. at 31,
    36, 38. [Wolak’s] father testified that when
    he received that call from [Wolak], [Wolak] was already at home.
    
    Id. at 61-62.
    Thus, nine minutes after the accident, [Wolak] was
    no longer at the scene and had returned to his residence.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/6/17, at 2-3.     The trial court’s foregoing analysis is
    supported by the record, and we agree with its determination that sufficient
    evidence supports Wolak’s convictions.
    Moreover, contrary to Wolak’s assertion, there is no indication that the
    trial court misapprehended the facts. Rather, the court merely discredited
    Wolak’s version of the incident, and credited the testimony presented by Stack
    and Officer Vresics. See Commonwealth v. Karl, 
    490 A.2d 887
    , 888 (Pa.
    Super. 1985) (rejecting defendant’s sufficiency challenge to his conviction of
    leaving the scene of an accident where the trial court, as the fact-finder,
    discredited the defendant’s version of the accident that he returned to the
    scene minutes after the accident but no one was there). To the extent that
    there were conflicts in the testimony, the trial court acted within its sole
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    province in discrediting Wolak’s version of the events, and we may not
    reexamine the fact-finder’s credibility determinations or substitute our
    judgment for that of the fact-finder. See Commonwealth v. Mitchell, 
    135 A.3d 1097
    , 1101 (Pa. Super. 2016).
    Thus, we conclude that the evidence presented at trial, viewed in the
    light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, was amply
    sufficient to establish, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the elements of
    leaving the scene of an accident and failure to render aid.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 3/22/18
    -9-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2322 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 3/22/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/22/2018