In the Interest of: J.B., Appeal of: M.J. ( 2023 )


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  • J-A29037-22
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: M.J., FATHER                :
    :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 443 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
    Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.
    IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: ALLEGHENY COUNTY            :
    OFFICE OF CHILDREN, YOUTH, AND         :
    FAMILIES                               :
    :
    :
    :   No. 540 WDA 2022
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
    Family Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.
    IN THE INTEREST OF: J.B., A MINOR      :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    APPEAL OF: J.K.B., A/K/A J.B., A       :
    MINOR CHILD                            :
    :
    :
    :
    :   No. 541 WDA 2022
    J-A29037-22
    Appeal from the Order Entered April 13, 2022,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
    Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000057-2021.
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., OLSON, J., and KUNSELMAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.:                     FILED: FEBRUARY 3, 2023
    In this matter, M.J. (Father) appeals the order entered by the Allegheny
    County Orphans’ Court, which involuntarily terminated his rights to his three-
    year-old son, J.B. (the Child), pursuant to the Adoption Act. See 23 Pa.C.S.A.
    § 2511(a)(8) and (b). The Allegheny County Office of Children, Youth and
    Families (CYF or the Agency) had also petitioned for termination under Section
    2511(a)(2) and (a)(5), but the orphans’ court ruled that CYF had failed to
    meet its burden under these other subsections. CYF cross-appeals the denial
    of termination under Section 2511(a)(2) and (5).       The Child, through his
    appointed representation, also cross-appeals the court’s denial, but only as to
    Section 2511(a)(2).1 After review, we affirm the orphans’ court decision to
    terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b). Because we need
    only agree with the court’s decision as to any one subsection under Section
    2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), we dismiss the cross-appeals as moot.
    We summarize the factual and procedural history as follows: The family
    came to the attention of CYF when the Child tested positive for cocaine at
    birth. CYF removed the Child from parental care in July 2018 and petitioned
    ____________________________________________
    1The orphans’ court also involuntarily terminated the rights of C.B. (Mother).
    She did not appeal.
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    for dependency.       The juvenile court adjudicated the Child dependent on
    August 3, 2018 and placed the Child in foster care.          At the time of the
    adjudication, the identity of the Child’s father was unknown.
    Father became involved in this case in January 2019. The juvenile court
    ordered Father to achieve certain goals to aid with reunification. The goals
    were to: bolster parenting skills through coached parenting services; address
    intimate partner violence issues; engage in continued mental health treatment
    that addressed dual-diagnosis issues;2 and resolve his criminal matters.
    Father also had to address his alcohol issues by providing negative screens.
    Throughout the dependency proceedings, Father was cooperative with
    CYF.    Father was consistent with his medication management and his
    psychiatric care. Father also visited with the Child. By December 2019, Father
    was permitted unsupervised and overnight visitation. But that same month,
    Father was charged with multiple offenses following an incident of domestic
    violence, where Mother was the victim.           Father was charged with felony
    strangulation, misdemeanor simple assault, summary harassment and
    summary public drunkenness. Father was placed on probation for one year,
    prohibited from violent contact with Mother, ordered to complete DNA
    registration, prohibited from possessing a firearm, ordered to complete
    batterer’s intervention, and ordered to undergo a drug and alcohol evaluation.
    ____________________________________________
    2Father reported that his mental health issues included anxiety, depression,
    and post-traumatic stress disorder.
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    CYF filed a petition to terminate Father’s rights in March 2021. As Father
    complied with the dependency and criminal cases, he eventually achieved
    unsupervised visitation again.    However, in September 2021, Father was
    charged with driving under the influence following a car accident.        Father
    refused to provide a blood sample, and charges were apparently dropped, but
    the incident necessitated that the visits revert to being supervised.
    The orphans’ court held the hearing on March 29, 2022.        During the
    hearing, the court heard the testimony of Father, the CYF caseworker, and the
    psychologist who evaluated Father. Thereafter, the orphans’ court granted
    CYF’s petition to terminate Father’s rights under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b);
    the court determined that CYF had not met its burden under Section
    2511(a)(2) and (a)(5). Specifically, the court determined that CYF did not
    prove that Father “cannot or will not” remedy the causes that led to the Child’s
    dependency. These appeal and cross-appeals followed.
    Father’s appeal presents the following issues:
    1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in granting the petition to involuntarily
    terminate Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23
    Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8)?
    2. Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a
    matter of law in concluding that CYF met its burden of
    proving by clear and convincing evidence that
    termination of Father’s parental rights would best
    serve the needs and welfare of the Child pursuant to
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)?
    Father’s Brief at 7.
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    CYF’s cross-appeal presents the following issue:
    Did the Agency prove, by clear and convincing evidence, the
    grounds for the involuntary termination of Father’s parental
    rights to the Child, J.B., pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
    2511(a)(2) and (a)(5)?
    CYF’s Brief at 5.
    Through his representation, the Child’s cross-appeal presents the
    following issue:
    Whether the trial court abused its discretion and/or erred as
    a matter of law in denying CYF’s petition to terminate
    Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
    2511(a)(2) after CYF presented clear and convincing
    evidence that grounds for termination existed?
    Child’s Brief at 9.
    We begin with our well-settled standard of review:
    The standard of review in termination of parental rights
    cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact
    and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are
    supported by the record. If the factual findings are
    supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial
    court made an error of law or abused its discretion. A
    decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion only
    upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
    partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial court's
    decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
    the record would support a different result. We have
    previously emphasized our deference to trial courts that
    often have first-hand observations of the parties spanning
    multiple hearings.
    In re T.S.M., 
    71 A.3d 251
    , 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
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    Our Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that in termination cases,
    deference to the trial court is particularly crucial. In re Adoption of L.A.K.,
    
    265 A.3d 580
    , 597 (Pa. 2021); see also Interest of S.K.L.R., 
    265 A.3d 1108
    ,
    1124 (Pa. 2021) (“When a trial court makes a ‘close call’ in a fact-intensive
    case involving…the termination of parental rights, the appellate court should
    review the record for an abuse of discretion and for whether evidence supports
    that trial court’s conclusions; the appellate could should not search the record
    for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that of the trial court.”).
    The abuse-of-discretion standard in termination cases “is a highly deferential
    standard and, to the extent that record supports the court’s decision, we must
    affirm even though evidence exists that would also support a contrary
    determination.” In re P.Z., 
    113 A.3d 840
    , 849 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citation
    omitted).
    Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
    Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
    Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
    seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
    evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
    grounds for termination delineated in section 2511(a). Only
    if the court determines that the parent's conduct warrants
    termination of his or her parental rights does the court
    engage in the second part of the analysis pursuant to section
    2511(b): determination of the needs and welfare of the
    child[.]
    In re C.M.K., 
    203 A.3d 258
    , 261-262 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted).
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    Clear and convincing evidence is evidence that is so “clear, direct,
    weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear
    conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In re
    C.S., 
    761 A.2d 1197
    , 1201 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter of
    Adoption Charles E.D.M., II, 
    708 A.2d 88
    , 91 (Pa. 1998)).
    These appeals implicate Sections 2511(a)(2), (5), (8) and (b), which
    provide:
    (a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a
    child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
    following grounds:
    […]
    (2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
    or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
    essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
    his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
    causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
    will not be remedied by the parent.
    […]
    (5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency
    for a period of at least six months, the conditions which led
    to the removal or placement of the child continue to exist,
    the parent cannot or will not remedy those conditions within
    a reasonable period of time, the services or assistance
    reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
    the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
    child within a reasonable period of time and termination of
    the parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare
    of the child.
    […]
    (8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent
    by the court or under a voluntary agreement with an
    agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the date of
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    removal or    placement, the conditions which led to the
    removal or    placement of the child continue to exist and
    termination   of parental rights would best serve the needs
    and welfare   of the child.
    […]
    (b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the
    rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the
    developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare
    of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated
    solely on the basis of environmental factors such as
    inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and
    medical care if found to be beyond the control of the parent.
    With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection
    (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any efforts by
    the parent to remedy the conditions described therein which
    are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
    filing of the petition.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), (b).
    Critically, we may uphold a termination decision if any proper basis
    exists for the result reached. C.S., 761 A.2d at 1201. We need only agree
    with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
    as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d 380
    , 384 (Pa.
    Super. 2004) (en banc).
    We begin with Father’s appeal, and thus our focus turns to the orphans’
    court decision under Section 2511(a)(8). To terminate parental rights under
    Section 2511(a)(8), the petitioner must prove: (1) the child has been removed
    from parental care for 12 months or more from the date of the removal; (2)
    the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child continue to
    exist; and (3) termination of parental rights would best serve the needs and
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    welfare of the child. In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 759 (Pa. Super. 2008)
    (citation omitted).
    With respect to any petition filed pursuant to subsection (a)(8), “the
    court shall not consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions
    described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice
    of the filing of the petition.”    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).   Termination under
    Section 2511(a)(8) does not require the court to evaluate a parent’s current
    willingness or ability to remedy the conditions that initially caused the
    placement, or the availability or efficacy of the services provided by the local
    children and youth agency. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d at 759 (citation omitted).
    Here, there is no question that CYF satisfied the first prong of the
    analysis. The Child was removed from parental care at birth. Approximately
    45 months elapsed between the Child’s removal and the termination hearing
    – three times as long as the statutory mandate.
    The second prong asks whether the conditions which led to the Child
    removal continue to exist.        In its thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion the
    orphans’ court explained that it determined CYF satisfied the second prong,
    notwithstanding Father’s substantial compliance:
    At the time of adjudication, Father was not involved – upon
    his participation in the proceedings, the court entered
    numerous orders establishing his goal and setting attendant
    requirements. Initially, Father was to complete coached
    parenting and intimate partner violence classes, continue
    his mental health treatment, and comply with any
    recommended        drug       and     alcohol     treatment
    recommendations. As the case progressed and Father’s
    struggles with alcohol came to light, completing dual
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    diagnosis treatment and resolving his criminal matters were
    added as goals. [… T]wo months prior to the filing of the
    TPR petition […] Father’s compliance was listed as
    “substantial.” From that point forward, Father’s compliance
    was consistently reported as “substantial” until October of
    2021 when his compliance was downgraded to “moderate,”
    seemingly coinciding with Father’s criminal charges
    involving a DUI incident.
    In accordance with the showing of general compliance with
    his goals throughout the life of this case, the evidence
    revealed that Father had more or less complied with the
    orders of the court directing him to engage services.
    However, Father was noncompliant in one most important
    area – addressing his underlying substance abuse issues
    with alcohol. Compliance with drug and alcohol treatment
    was court ordered from the beginning of Father’s
    involvement in the case, and initially he was compliant.
    Importantly though, as time passed, Father’s struggles were
    revealed. He sounded intoxicated on phone calls with
    caseworkers, he appeared intoxicated during a domestic
    violence incident with Mother, and he was charged with a
    DUI offense to which he and counsel stipulated to the
    underlying facts. Father was also evasive about his alcohol
    use with Dr. Bliss [(the psychologist who conducted the
    evaluation)], which made it challenging for her to effectively
    evaluate his treatment needs. Father admitted that he was
    aware of the requirement that he complete substance abuse
    treatment. The only steps toward completing drug and
    alcohol or dual-diagnosis treatment that Father took were
    after the date of the first scheduled TPR hearing on March
    16, 2022. Father’s last ditch effort to comply with treatment
    for his alcohol use cannot be considered and is arguably
    irrelevant given the lengthy duration of this case – he had
    more than sufficient opportunity to address these concerns.
    It is unclear from the record what steps the Agency, through
    [the CYF caseworker], took to assist Father in engaging with
    dual-diagnosis treatment. Absent from [the caseworker’s]
    testimony was any discussion of how the Agency worked
    with Father to alleviate the circumstances that led to the
    Child’s removal and stood between Father and reunification.
    Whether the Agency had engaged in reasonable efforts
    throughout the life of the case is not a subject upon which
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    this [trial judge] can opine as it did not oversee the
    underlying dependency proceedings, but the testimony of
    the caseworker calls into question how much support was
    provided to Father.
    Nonetheless, given the above, the court justifiably
    concluded that the evidence established the first two
    elements required by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(8).
    TCO 16-18 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).
    On appeal, Father argues that CYF did not satisfy the second prong of
    the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, because it did not prove that the conditions
    which led to the Child’s placement continued to exist.      He claims he had
    participated in mental health treatment, and that the reason he did not
    accomplish his alcohol treatment goal was because the service provider could
    not provide treatment for his dual-diagnosis needs.      He explains that the
    service provider could not accommodate him, because of staffing shortages
    resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.          See Father’s Brief at 15-16.
    Moreover, Father alleges that his delay in treatment did not pose a concern
    for CYF, as evidenced by the fact that CYF never claimed that he was
    intoxicated during a visit with the Child. Id. Father concludes his argument
    by noting the Agency’s lack of assistance in helping him find suitable treatment
    in a timely manner.
    In our review, we observe that the orphans’ court was persuaded by
    Father’s argument that his delay in treatment was excusable and that perhaps
    CYF bore some of the blame. The court found that CYF did not meet its burden
    under Section 2511(a)(2), because that subsection asks whether the causes
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    of the Child’s dependency “cannot or will not” be remedied.          The court
    determined that CYF could not prove that element by clear and convincing
    evidence.   See T.C.O. at 20-21. Similarly, the court determined that CYF
    failed to meet its burden under Section 2511(a)(5). That subsection expressly
    inquires into the services or assistance that was reasonably available to Father
    to ask the larger question of whether the conditions leading to placement can
    be remedied.     The orphans’ court was not satisfied with the Agency’s
    testimony regarding its services and assistance.
    However, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s arguments
    as to its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8). The court was cognizant that the
    question of Father’s ability to remedy the conditions and of CYF’s reasonable
    efforts had limited applicability in a Section 2511(a)(8) analysis. We discern
    no issue with the court’s approach.
    As our Supreme Court noted in In re D.C.D., 
    105 A.3d 662
    , 672 (Pa.
    2014), neither Section 2511(a) nor (b) requires a court to consider the
    reasonable efforts provided to a parent prior to the termination of parental
    rights.
    The High Court explained:
    [T]his Court has observed that the provision or absence of
    reasonable efforts may be relevant to a court’s
    consideration of both grounds for termination and the best
    interests of the child.    For example, as applicable to
    subsection (a)(2), a court may find an agency’s lack of
    assistance to a parent relevant to whether a parent’s
    incapacity “cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.”
    […]
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    Further, while we acknowledge that other states have
    included reasonable efforts as either an element or merely
    a factor in their termination provisions, the Pennsylvania
    legislature has not incorporated reasonable efforts into the
    language of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), and it would be
    improper and, indeed, unwise for this Court to add such an
    element to the statute by judicial fiat. In contrast, we
    recognize that the legislature included consideration of the
    reasonable services available to the parent in regard to
    another ground for termination, subsection 2511(a)(5)
    (providing consideration of whether “the services or
    assistance reasonable available to the parent are not likely
    to remedy the conditions which led to the removal or
    placement of the child within a reasonable period of time.”).
    D.C.D., 105 A.3d at 672-73 (citations omitted); see also 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511
    cf. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(f)(9) (concerning matters to be determined at the
    permanency review hearing, including whether the agency has provided the
    family with necessary services).
    Having concluded that the orphans’ court’s approach to Section
    2511(a)(8) was proper, the question remains: did the conditions which led to
    the Child’s placement continue to exist? The orphans’ court determined that
    Father’s alcohol abuse was a condition that led to the Child’s placement and
    was the primary barrier to reunification. The court further determined that
    Father’s first meaningful steps toward alcohol treatment occurred days before
    the termination hearing. Thus, the court ruled that the conditions that led to
    the Child’s placement continued to exist.    To be sure, the orphans’ court
    carefully considered Father’s reasons for why he did not obtain appropriate
    treatment sooner. While the court apparently found Father’s reasons to be
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    persuasive insofar as Section 2511(a)(2) and (a)(5) were concerned, the court
    did not have to factor his reasons into its analysis of Section 2511(a)(8).
    Moreover, the orphans’ court was not persuaded by Father’s attempt to
    downplay the alcohol issue.      Father claimed that the Agency was not
    concerned about whether he appeared intoxicated during the visits with the
    Child. Father seems to argue that because he substantially complied with the
    rest of his permanency plan, and because his alcohol use was a minor issue,
    the court’s termination was unwarranted. The orphans’ court was not moved
    by this argument, and neither are we. To the extent that the Agency was
    confident Father would be appropriate during the visits, it does not follow that
    the Agency was unconcerned with Father’s alcohol abuse. Ultimately, we
    discern no abuse of discretion, nor error of law on this second prong of the
    Section 2511(a)(8) analysis.
    Having concluded that the orphans’ court properly determined that CYF
    established the first two prongs of the Section 2511(a)(8) analysis, we address
    the court’s conclusions under the third element: whether termination best
    served the needs and welfare of the Child. Father challenges the court’s best
    interest analysis under Section 2511(a)(8) contemporaneously with his
    challenge to the court’s best interest analysis under Section 2511(b). Thus,
    we do the same.
    Both analyses consider “intangibles such as love, comfort, security, and
    stability.” In re I.J., 
    972 A.2d 5
    , 12 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). The
    court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, paying
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    close attention to the effect of permanently severing the bond.” I.J., 
    972 A.2d at 12
     (citation omitted). In performing a “best interests” analysis:
    The court should also consider the importance of continuity
    of relationships to the child, because severing close parental
    ties is usually extremely painful. The court must consider
    whether a natural parental bond exists between child and
    parent, and whether termination would destroy an existing,
    necessary and beneficial relationship. Most importantly,
    adequate consideration must be given to the needs and
    welfare of the child.
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    This Court has explained further:
    [S]ection 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of
    parental rights would best serve the developmental,
    physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child.
    In In re C.M.S., 
    884 A.2d 1284
    , 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005),
    this Court stated, “Intangibles such as love, comfort,
    security, and stability are involved in the inquiry into the
    needs and welfare of the child.” In addition, we instructed
    that the trial court must also discern the nature and status
    of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention to the effect
    on     the     child  of    permanently     severing     that
    bond. 
    Id.
     However, in cases where there is no evidence of
    a bond between a parent and child, it is reasonable to infer
    that no bond exists. In re K.Z.S., 
    946 A.2d 753
    , 762-63
    (Pa. Super. 2008). Accordingly, the extent of the bond-
    effect analysis necessarily depends on the circumstances of
    the particular case. Id. at 763.
    In re Adoption of J.M., 
    991 A.2d 321
    , 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
    Concerning the bond, the question is not merely whether a bond exists,
    but whether termination would destroy this existing, necessary and beneficial
    relationship. See C.M.K., 203 A.2d at 264 (citation omitted); see also K.Z.S.,
    946 A.2d at 764 (holding there was no bond worth preserving where the child
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    had been in foster care for most of the child’s life, which caused the resulting
    bond to be too attenuated). Moreover, the court is not required to use expert
    testimony to resolve the bond analysis. In re Z.P., 
    994 A.2d 1108
    , 1121
    (citing In re K.K.R.-S., 
    958 A.2d 529
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
    “Common sense dictates that courts considering termination must also
    consider whether the children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they
    have a bond with their foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268.       Finally, we
    emphasize that “[w]hile a parent’s emotional bond with her and/or her child
    is a major aspect of the Section 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
    nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the court when
    determining what is in the best interest of the child.” In re N.A.M., 
    33 A.3d 95
    , 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation omitted).
    In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the orphans’ court thoroughly set forth its
    findings:
    The evidence in this matter supports this court’s conclusion
    that the Child’s bond with Father is not significant enough
    that the Child will suffer extreme emotional consequences
    from termination of Father’s parental rights. The only
    evidence regarding a bond between Father and the Child is
    found in Dr. Bliss’s report of June 21, 2021, which states
    that at that time, they did not have a close parent-child
    bond, but that they could very likely foster one over time.
    This court also gave great weight to Dr. Bliss’s testimony
    that there would be concerns with removing this Child from
    his primary attachment [with the foster mother]. In June of
    2021, Dr. Bliss stated that reunification remained a viable
    goal. [At the time of the termination hearing in March 2022,
    Dr. Bliss] no longer believes that to be the case.
    The timeline of this case as well as the uncontradicted
    expert testimony presented at the termination hearing drive
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    the analysis of this factor. By the date of the TPR hearing,
    the child had been in placement for approximately 45
    months. The Child’s primary bond, resembling that of a
    parent and child, is with his foster mother, D.M. Dr. Bliss
    further testified that based upon the interactional evaluation
    of Father and Child, there was not a significant bond
    between the two – despite Father’s demonstrated age-
    appropriate play and direction with the Child.
    In addition to the potential harm to the Child and separating
    him [from] the only parent figure that he has known, the
    Child’s need for permanency also militates in favor of
    termination. If reunification were to occur, Father’s history
    makes it unlikely that reunification would be permanent.
    This court must defer to the judgment of those who presided
    over this case during the dependency phase and could
    properly gauge the likelihood of success of any permanency
    strategy. During the three years that the Child was in care
    of a foster parent, Father never demonstrated to the
    satisfaction of the court that he was capable of unsupervised
    visits for any significant length of time. This court also gave
    great weight to Dr. Bliss’s opinions regarding Father’s
    inability to independently parent his Child.           Father’s
    inconsistent approach to his own health and safety
    demonstrate that he cannot provide the reliable support and
    attention that a child needs. The Child’s need for safety,
    permanency, and stability outweighs the potential benefit to
    him of maintaining his relationship with Father and, further,
    that termination of Father’s parental rights best serves the
    Child’s needs and welfare.
    T.C.O. at 25-27 (style adjusted) (citations to the record omitted).
    In his Brief, Father argues that the orphans’ court’s best interests
    analyses under Section 2511(a)(8) and (b) were erroneous.          In our view,
    Father takes primary aim at the weight that the court afforded certain aspects
    of Dr. Bliss’s testimony.   He highlights that portion of the testimony that
    indicates he is an appropriate parent, with whom the Child enjoys spending
    time. See Father’s Brief at 20-21.
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    J-A29037-22
    Father misunderstands our appellate function. The abuse-of-discretion
    standard in terminations cases is highly deferential, and we must affirm the
    lower court’s decision even when evidence exists that would support a
    contrary determination.   See P.Z., 
    113 A.3d at 849
    .       This Court may not
    search the record for contrary conclusions or substitute its judgment for that
    of the orphans’ court. See S.K.L.R., 265 A.3d at 1124. Rather, our function
    is merely to review the record to determine whether it supports the decision
    of the orphans’ court. Id.
    Upon such review, we conclude the record supports the determinations
    of the orphans’ court. The history of Father’s alcohol abuse supported the
    court’s determination that permanent reunification would not transpire any
    time soon. In other words, the court properly determined that the Child’s
    need for permanency was superior to whatever detrimental effect that
    termination might have. Moreover, the record supports the court’s weighted
    consideration of the relationship that the Child has with the foster parent. We
    do not overlook Father’s efforts, and we recognize the positive relationship he
    maintained with the Child. But Father’s efforts do not distract us from the fact
    that he has never been the Child’s caregiver. Instead, it is foster parent with
    whom the Child has developed a primary attachment.
    In sum, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not err or abuse its
    discretion when it determined that CYF proved termination was warranted
    under each prong of Section 2511(a)(8) as well as Section 2511(b). Having
    resolved that Father’s appeal lacks merit, we do not reach the claims made by
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    J-A29037-22
    CYF and the Child in their respective cross-appeals. As noted above, we need
    only agree with the orphans’ court as to any one subsection of Section
    2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. B.L.W., 
    843 A.2d at 384
    . Our disposition of Father’s appeal means that even if ruled in favor of
    CYF or the Child, such a ruling would not have any legal force or effect. For
    that reason, the cross-appeals are moot. See Interest of D.R.W., 
    227 A.3d 905
    , 917 (Pa. Super. 2020) (“An issue before a court is moot if in ruling upon
    the issue the court cannot enter an order that has any legal force or effect.”).
    Order affirmed. Cross-appeals dismissed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/3/2023
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