Com. v. Beaumont, J. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
JUSTIN BEAUMONT
Appellant No. 1649 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 1, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-35-CR-0002435-2015
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., BENDER, P.J.E., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.: FILED MAY 05, 2017
Appellant, Justin Beaumont, appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered in the Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, following his
open guilty plea to corruption of minors and disorderly conduct.' We affirm.
The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
Appellant sexually abused his stepdaughter ("Victim") from approximately
October 2014 to October 2015. After Victim told her mother about the
abuse on November 3, 2015, Appellant exhibited suicidal tendencies and
checked himself into the hospital. On November 4, 2015, Appellant
confessed to the sexual abuse of Victim in a voluntary statement to police.
Police subsequently arrested Appellant, and the Commonwealth charged
' 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6301(a)(1)(ii) and 5503(a)(1), respectively.
*Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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Appellant with two counts each of involuntary deviate sexual intercourse and
sexual assault, and one count each of unlawful contact with minor, indecent
assault, corruption of minors, and indecent exposure on December 23, 2015.
On June 6, 2016, Appellant entered an open guilty plea to corruption of
minors and disorderly conduct, in exchange for the Commonwealth's request
that the court dismiss the remaining charges against Appellant. After
accepting Appellant's plea, the court deferred sentencing pending the
preparation of a pre -sentence investigation ("PSI") report.
On September 1, 2016, the court sentenced Appellant to a term of
eighteen (18) to thirty-six (36) months' imprisonment for the corruption of
minors conviction and a consecutive term of one (1) year probation for the
disorderly conduct conviction. Both sentences are above the aggravated
range of the sentencing guidelines. The court explained it imposed these
sentences for Appellant's convictions due to: (1) the gravity of the offense;
(2) Appellant's minimization of his involvement; (3) Appellant's failure to
accept responsibility for his action by placing blame on Victim; (4) the
impact on Victim, who feels responsible for ending the relationship between
Appellant and Victim's mother; and (5) Appellant's need for sex offender and
mental health treatment.
On September 6, 2016, Appellant timely filed a post -sentence motion,
which the court denied on September 19, 2016. Appellant timely filed a
notice of appeal on September 30, 2016. On October 19, 2016, the court
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ordered Appellant to file a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b), and Appellant timely complied on
October 25, 2016.
Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
WHETHER THE SENTENCES IMPOSED WERE
INAPPROPRIATELY HARSH AND EXCESSIVE AND AN
ABUSE OF DISCRETION, SINCE IT APPEARS THAT THE
SENTENCING COURT SENTENCED [APPELLANT] AS IF HE
HAD A PRIOR [RECORD] SCORE OF REFEL?
(Appellant's Brief at 4).
Appellant claims the court failed to consider Appellant's lack of criminal
background, steady employment, status as the provider for his family, and
expression of remorse at sentencing. Appellant also avers the court
misinterpreted his statement given to police during his hospitalization for
suicidal tendencies. Appellant asserts the court mistook Appellant's
statement as evidence of Appellant's failure to exhibit remorse or accept
responsibility for his actions. Appellant concludes the court's failure to
consider certain factors and its misinterpretation of his statement to police
resulted in a harsh and excessive sentence, and we should vacate and
remand for resentencing. As presented, Appellant challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence.2 See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 793
2 "[W]hile guilty plea which includes sentence negotiation ordinarily
a
precludes a defendant from contesting the validity of his...sentence other
than to argue that the sentence is illegal or that the sentencing court did not
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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A.2d 949 (Pa.Super. 2002) (stating claim that sentence is manifestly
excessive challenges discretionary aspects of sentencing).
Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not entitle an
appellant to an appeal as of right. Commonwealth v. Sierra, 752 A.2d
910, 912 (Pa.Super. 2000). Prior to reaching the merits of a discretionary
aspects of sentencing issue:
[W]e conduct a four-part analysis to determine: (1)
whether appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal, see
Pa.R.A.P. 902 and 903; (2) whether the issue was properly
preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and
modify sentence, see [Pa.R.Crim.P. 720]; (3) whether
appellant's brief has a fatal defect, Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and
(4) whether there is a substantial question that the
sentence appealed from is not appropriate under the
Sentencing Code, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9781(b).
Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super. 2006), appeal
denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006). Objections to the discretionary
aspects of sentence are generally waived if they are not raised at the
sentencing hearing or raised in a motion to modify the sentence imposed at
that hearing. Commonwealth v. Mann, 820 A.2d 788, 794 (Pa.Super.
2003), appeal denied, 574 Pa. 759, 831 A.2d 599 (2003).
When appealing the discretionary aspects of a sentence, an appellant
(Footnote Continued)
have jurisdiction, open plea agreements are an exception in which a
defendant will not be precluded from appealing the discretionary aspects of
the sentence." Commonwealth v. Tirado, 870 A.2d 362, 365 n.5
(Pa.Super. 2005) (emphasis in original). "An 'open' plea agreement is one
in which there is no negotiated sentence." Id. at 363 n.1. Here, Appellant's
guilty plea included no negotiated sentence.
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must invoke the appellate court's jurisdiction by including in his brief a
separate concise statement demonstrating that there is a substantial
question as to the appropriateness of the sentence under the Sentencing
Code. Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 571 Pa. 419, 812 A.2d 617 (2002);
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f). "The requirement that an appellant separately set forth
the reasons relied upon for allowance of appeal furthers the purpose evident
in the Sentencing Code as a whole of limiting any challenges to the trial
court's evaluation of the multitude of factors impinging on the sentencing
decision to exceptional cases." Commonwealth v. Phillips, 946 A.2d 103,
112 (Pa.Super. 2008), appeal denied, 600 Pa. 745, 964 A.2d 895 (2009),
cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1264, 129 S.Ct. 2450, 174 L.Ed.2d 240 (2009).
The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
evaluated on a case -by -case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830
A.2d 1013 (Pa.Super. 2003). A substantial question exists "only when the
appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge's actions
were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing
Code; or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the
sentencing process." Sierra, supra at 913. A claim of excessiveness can
raise a substantial question as to the appropriateness of a sentence under
the Sentencing Code, even if the sentence is within the statutory limits.
Mouzon, supra at 430, 812 A.2d at 624. "A substantial question is raised
where an appellant alleges the sentencing court erred by imposing an
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aggravated range sentence without consideration of mitigating
circumstances." Commonwealth v. Hyland, 875 A.2d 1175, 1183
(Pa.Super. 2005), appeal denied, 586 Pa. 723, 890 A.2d 1057 (2005).
Here, Appellant properly preserved his discretionary aspects of
sentencing claim in his post -sentence motion and Rule 2119(f) statement;
and his claim that the court imposed an above -aggravated range sentence
without consideration of certain mitigating factors appears to raise a
substantial question as to the discretionary aspects of his sentence. See id.Our standard of review of a challenge to the discretionary aspects of
sentencing is as follows:
Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of
the sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed
on appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this
context, an abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an
error in judgment. Rather, the appellant must establish,
by reference to the record, that the sentencing court
ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its judgment for
reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or arrived at
a manifestly unreasonable decision.
Id. at 1184 (quoting Commonwealth v. Rodda, 723 A.2d 212, 214
(Pa.Super. 1999) (en banc)).
Pursuant to Section 9721(b), "the court shall follow the general
principle that the sentence imposed should call for confinement that is
consistent with the protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it
relates to the impact on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant." 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). "[T]he
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court shall make as part of the record, and disclose in open court at the time
of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons for the sentence
imposed." Id. Nevertheless, "[a] sentencing court need not undertake a
lengthy discourse for its reasons for imposing a sentence or specifically
reference the statute in question...." Commonwealth v. Crump, 995 A.2d
1280, 1283 (Pa.Super. 2010), appeal denied, 608 Pa. 661, 13 A.3d 475(2010). Rather, the record as a whole must reflect the sentencing court's
consideration of the facts of the case and the defendant's character. Id. "In
particular, the court should refer to the defendant's prior criminal record, his
age, personal characteristics and his potential for rehabilitation."
Commonwealth v. Griffin, 804 A.2d 1, 10 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal
denied, 582 Pa. 671, 868 A.2d 1198 (2005), cert denied, 545 U.S. 1148,
125 S.Ct. 2984, 162 L.Ed.2d 902 (2005).
Instantly, the record belies Appellant's contentions. The court had the
benefit of a PSI report at sentencing. Therefore, we can presume it
considered the relevant factors when it sentenced Appellant. See Tirado,
supra at 368 (holding where sentencing court had benefit of PSI, law
presumes court was aware of and weighed relevant information regarding
defendant's character and mitigating factors). Additionally, the court
explained its reasons for Appellant's sentence as follows:
This [c]ourt[']s imposition of sentence[s] above the
aggravated range was appropriate given 1) the nature and
gravity of the offense, 2) [Appellant's] failure to accept
responsibility for his actions, 3) the impact on [V]ictim,
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and 4) [Appellant's] serious rehabilitative needs.
First, this court considered the nature and gravity of the
offense in this matter. Here, [Appellant] preyed on
[Victim] over a year's time. [Appellant] reports that he
himself was also a victim of molestation, and yet he
continued to sexually abuse [Victim] even though he
understood the serious consequences of his actions.
Second, the court considered [Appellant's] failure to accept
responsibility for his actions. Here, [Appellant] blamed
[V]ictim as the initial instigator and minimized his actions
during the year he preyed on [Victim]. Third, the court
considered the impact on [V]ictim. Here, [V]ictim stated
that this abuse "has always had an emotional effect on
her." [V]ictim also stated that..."over the span of a year
she would not be able to sleep in fear that [Appellant]
would come into her room in the middle of the night."
[V]ictim had also stated that "it is her fault that
[Appellant] is no longer in the home" to be with [Victim's]
mother and sister. Lastly, the court considered
[Appellant's] serious rehabilitative needs. Here,
[Appellant] is in serious need of sex offender and mental
health treatment that can best be addressed in a State
Correctional Institution.
Therefore, the claim on appeal should be denied.
(See Trial Court Opinion, filed November 29, 2016, at 7-8) (internal
citations omitted). We accept the court's analysis. See Hyland, supra.Therefore, Appellant is not entitled to relief on his challenge to the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment
of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
J seph D. Seletyn,
Prothonotary
Date: 5/5/2017
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