Com. v. Hill, C. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
CORY ALAN HILL : No. 574 MDA 2022
Appeal FROM the PCRA Order Entered March 18, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-06-CR-0000373-2018
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
DISSENTING MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:FILED FEBRUARY 15,
2023
The Court of Common Pleas granted Cory Alan Hill’s Post Conviction
Relief Act (“PCRA”) petition because, in its view, trial counsel were ineffective
for failing to move to suppress on the ground that the traffic stop was illegal.
Because I do not believe Hill carried his burden as a PCRA petitioner to plead
and prove that he was entitled to PCRA relief, I would reverse.
Hill filed an amended PCRA petition claiming that trial counsel were
ineffective in failing to file a timely suppression motion challenging the traffic
stop. He maintains that such a motion would have had arguable merit because
“there is no clear authority requiring a driver to use a turn signal during the
negotiation of a traffic circle.” Amended PCRA Petition at 4, ¶ 24.
At a hearing, PCRA counsel explained that the evidence giving rise to
the charges against Hill was seized during a traffic stop. Counsel said that
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police stopped the car in which Hill was riding after observing the driver
“entering a roundabout and then exiting the roundabout on the other side of
the roundabout without making a signal when the car exited the roundabout.”
N.T. PCRA Hearing, 2/15/22, at 5. According to PCRA counsel, the car “had
not changed roads but simply been on one road, entered the roundabout and
continued on the same road after going around half of the roundabout.” Id.;
see also id. at 23. Counsel argued that “it’s not at all clear” that a driver must
“use a turn signal when proceeding down a particular roadway that happens
to have a roundabout in the middle of it.” Id.
Hill did not present any evidence at the PCRA hearing but did ask the
court to take judicial notice of the contents of the notes of testimony from his
bench trial. Id. at 4. The Commonwealth said it had no objection to the court’s
doing so. Id. at 8.
The Commonwealth pointed out that while there was no testimony at
the pretrial motion hearing, at Hill’s bench trial, the arresting trooper testified
that he first saw the subject vehicle on one road, Museum Road, and then
observed it go from that road into the traffic circle. The trooper said that the
car then took the third right off the traffic circle, which put it on Reading
Avenue, giving only a “quick, partial signal.” Id. at 19; see also N.T. Trial,
8/27/19, at 24. The trooper stopped the car, and during the stop, Hill fled the
vehicle and led the trooper on a foot chase. The trooper apprehended Hill and
recovered controlled substances, paraphernalia, $1450 in cash, and a loaded
gun and ammunition.
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The Commonwealth argued at the PCRA hearing that the trooper’s
testimony showed, contrary to Hill’s argument, the car had changed roads.
See N.T. PCRA Hearing at 19. The Commonwealth further maintained that, in
any event, the applicable statute requires a turn signal when moving from one
traffic lane to another, and the car had not signaled properly here. Id. at 21.
Because the vehicle did not adequately signal before leaving the traffic circle,
the Commonwealth maintained, the trooper had probable cause to stop it. Id.
The PCRA court granted relief. It found that the underlying issue – the
suppression motion – had arguable merit because there was “no clear
authority established in this [C]ommonwealth as to whether a driver is
required to use a turn signal during the negotiation of a traffic circle.” PCRA
Opinion, filed 3/18/22, at 4. It stated, however, that numerous other states
have not required a turn signal when navigating a roundabout “because the
statute for use of turn signals is too ambiguous[.]” 1925(a) Opinion, filed
5/12/22, at 5 (citing People v. McBride, 490 P.3d 810, 816 (Colo. Ct. App.
2020), rev’d on other grounds, 511 P.3d 613 (Colo. 2022); Noble v. State,
357 P.3d 1201, 1201 (Alaska Ct. App. 2015); and State v. Davis, 143 N.E.3d
343, 346 (Ind. Ct. App. 2002)). It did not determine whether the Pennsylvania
statute governing the use of turn signals, 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3334, was
ambiguous. Finding the remaining elements of an ineffectiveness claim
satisfied, the court granted relief.
The majority takes a similar approach. It reviews the cases from other
states that the PCRA court cited and found the lower court’s assessment of
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them to be accurate. It then concludes that Hill demonstrated that the
underlying claim had arguable merit and counsel should have sought
suppression on that basis, and that Hill sustained prejudice.
I do not agree that Hill was entitled to relief. His argument below was
that there was no clear authority requiring a turn signal because the car did
not turn or change lanes when using the traffic circle. Rather, he contended
that when car went through the circle, it began and ended on the same road.
But that argument is not based on any evidence. Hill, as the PCRA
petitioner, bore the burden of presenting evidence to prove his right to relief.
Neither he nor the Commonwealth presented any evidence before the PCRA
court. The only evidence before the court was the record, which included the
trial transcripts. Although trial counsel had filed a pretrial motion, the court
dismissed it as untimely without taking evidence. The trial testimony of the
trooper showed that the vehicle had, in fact, entered the traffic circle on one
road and left on a different one. There was no evidence that it had “stayed”
on the same road. In the absence of any evidence to support his core
argument, I cannot agree that the lower court properly granted his PCRA
petition. Hill’s argument fails on its own terms.
I also have some difficulty with the majority’s statutory construction
analysis. Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law. Our standard
of review of them is de novo, and our scope of review is plenary. SEPTA v.
City of Phila., 101 A.3d 79, 87 (Pa. 2014).
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When we engage in statutory interpretation and construction, we must
“ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General Assembly” in enacting
the statute at issue and give effect to all the statute’s provisions. 1 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 1921(a); Crown Castle NG E. LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 234 A.3d
665, 674 (Pa. 2020). If statutory language is “clear and free from ambiguity,
the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.”
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Crown Castle, 234 A.3d at 674. In ascertaining the
plain meaning, we consider the statutory language in context and give words
and phrases their common and approved usage. Crown Castle, 234 A.3d at
674.
If the words of a statute are not explicit, we discern the legislative intent
by considering outside factors. Id. Permissible considerations include:
(1) The occasion and necessity for the statute.
(2) The circumstances under which it was enacted.
(3) The mischief to be remedied.
(4) The object to be attained.
(5) The former law, if any, including other statutes upon the
same or similar subjects.
(6) The consequences of a particular interpretation.
(7) The contemporaneous legislative history.
(8) Legislative and administrative interpretations of such
statute.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c).
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Neither the majority nor the PCRA court explicitly found Section 3334
ambiguous. They therefore lacked a proper foundation for turning to materials
outside the statute’s text to decide whether Section 3334 requires a turn
signal when “negotiating” a traffic circle. Moreover, even if they had expressly
found an ambiguity, I do not believe we may resort to decisions of another
state to decide the meaning of Section 3334. Although the General Assembly
has directed us to construe uniform acts in such a way as “to make uniform
the laws of those states which enact them,” Section 3334 is not a uniform law.
1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1927. Indeed, the turn signal laws of the states the majority
cites employ different wording than Section 3334.
The plain language of the statute is sufficient to resolve this appeal. The
relevant portion of Section 3334 provides, “Upon a roadway no person shall
turn a vehicle or move from one traffic lane to another . . . without giving an
appropriate signal in the manner provided in this section.” 75 Pa.C.S.A. §
3334(a).
As above, Hill argued that because he proceeded through the traffic
circle without changing roads, the statute did not apply. But, as also explained
above, there was no evidentiary basis before the PCRA court to support his
contention that the car did not change roads. To the contrary, the only
evidence was that he entered on one road and left on another. He has not
presented any evidence to support his claim that the vehicle went “straight.”
The only evidence was that it made a “turn.” In that circumstance, the plain
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language of the statute requires a signal. I cannot say on this record that Hill’s
underlying claim had arguable merit.
Perhaps apprehending this difficulty, the majority adds a footnote
stating that even if Section 3334 requires a driver to signal when leaving a
traffic circle, the record was insufficient to determine whether the vehicle had
signaled within the required distance before leaving.1 See Majority at 13 n.5.
The majority appears to conclude that such an argument would have had
arguable merit. It states that “this is an alternative argument” that trial
counsel could have raised in a timely motion to suppress. Id.
The problem here is that the majority has put the burden on the wrong
party. This is a PCRA proceeding, not a suppression motion. Hill therefore bore
the burden of creating a record sufficient to prove his claim. If the factual
record was insufficient to establish whether or not a turn signal was properly
used, at the PCRA stage, that failure went against Hill, not the Commonwealth.
The absence of sufficient evidence to decide the merits of any such argument
– which Hill does not appear to have made – means Hill failed to prove that
the claim had arguable merit.
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1 See 75 Pa.C.S.A. 3334(b) (“Signals on turning and starting.--At speeds of
less than 35 miles per hour, an appropriate signal of intention to turn right or
left shall be given continuously during not less than the last 100 feet traveled
by the vehicle before turning. The signal shall be given during not less than
the last 300 feet at speeds in excess of 35 miles per hour. The signal shall
also be given prior to entry of the vehicle into the traffic stream from a parked
position.”).
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Furthermore, even assuming, arguendo, that Section 3334 is ambiguous
as applied to traffic circles, Hill’s suppression claim still lacks arguable merit.
Section 3334’s obvious purpose is to give others using the roadway sufficient
advance notice of a vehicle’s intended movement in order to foster roadway
safety. See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)(4). Requiring the use of a signal in traffic
circles will further that goal. Indeed, the Department of Transportation has
taken the position that a signal is required, regardless of whether the driver
is “going straight” or “turning” in a traffic circle. See “Multi-Lane
Roundabouts,” Pa. Dep’t of Transp. Pub. 580 (5-13), available at
https://www.dot.state.pa.us/public/PubsForms/Publications/PUB%20580.pdf
(last visited 1/20/23). See 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(c)(8). I would reverse and
therefore respectfully dissent.
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