Com. v. Santos, M. ( 2014 )

J-S48042-14
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
MARCUS T. SANTOS,
Appellant No. 44 MDA 2014
Appeal from the Order December 12, 2013
in the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No.: CP-22-CR-0003262-2009
BEFORE: DONOHUE, J., JENKINS, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2014
Appellant, Marcus T. Santos, appeals pro se from the order denying his
petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the fines imposed in his
judgment of sentence as excessive. We affirm.
On March 9, 2010, Appellant pleaded guilty to three counts of
possession with the intent to deliver a controlled substance and one count of
criminal use of a communication facility. The trial court accepted the
negotiated guilty plea and imposed an aggregate term of incarceration of not
less than ten nor more than twenty years plus fines and costs totaling
$110,250.00. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
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*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S48042-14
On March 10, 2011, Appellant timely filed a pro se petition pursuant to
the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. The
PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed a motion to withdraw after
2011, the PCRA court granted the motion to withdraw and issued notice of
its intent to dismiss the petition pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal
Procedure 907(1). Appellant did not respond, and the PCRA court dismissed
his petition on September 6, 2011. Appellant did not appeal the dismissal.
On November 6, 2013, Appellant filed a pro se petition for writ of
habeas corpus, contending that the fines imposed in his sentence were
excessive. The court denied the petition on December 12, 2013, and
Appellant timely appealed.1
imposed by the court were [sic] constitutionally excessive and violated the
e the sole
means of obtaining collateral relief and encompasses all other common law
and statutory remedies for the same purpose that exist when this
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1
tement on
January 29, 2014. The court entered its Rule 1925(a) opinion on March 4,
2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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subchapter takes effect, including habeas corpus and coram nobis 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9542. The PCRA
constitutional rights connected with habeas corpus remedies may be
Commonwealth v. Lantzy, 736 A.2d 564, 570 n.4 (Pa. 1999);
see also Commonwealth v. Taylor, 65 A.3d 462, 466 (Pa. Super. 2013),
appeal denied
cognizable under the PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and
cannot be raised in a habeas corpus
Here, Appellant challenges his fines as unconstitutionally excessive, a
claim cognizable under the PCRA. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9543(a)(2)(i)
(providing, inter alia
. . . [a] violation of the Constitution of this Commonwealth or the
Constitution or laws of the United States . . Taylor, supra at 466.
Thus, the trial court should have addressed his claim pursuant to the PCRA.
See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542; Lantzy, supra
Commonwealth v.
McCulligan, 905 A.2d 983, 988 (Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 918 A.2d
743 (Pa. 2007) (citation omitted).
Our standard of review is well-settled:
When reviewing the propriety of an order granting or
denying PCRA relief, this Court is limited to determining whether
the evidence of record supports the determination of the PCRA
court and whether the ruling is free of legal error. Great
deference is granted to the findings of the PCRA court, and these
findings will not be disturbed unless they have no support in the
certified record.
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Commonwealth v. Rachak, 62 A.3d 389, 391 (Pa. Super. 2012), appeal
denied, 67 A.3d 796 (Pa. 2013) (citations omitted).
petition. See Taylor, supra at 466. The time limits imposed by the PCRA
are jurisdictional and must be strictly construed. See Commonwealth v.
Fahy
timeliness requirements of the PCRA, the PCRA court and this Court have no
jurisdiction to review the petition by fashioning an equitable exception to
Commonwealth v. Turner, 73 A.3d 1283, 1285 (Pa. Super.
2013), appeal denied, 91 A.3d 162 (Pa. 2014) (citation omitted).
A PCR
Pennsylvania law makes clear no court has jurisdiction to hear
an untimely PCRA petition. Statutory time restrictions are
mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and may not be altered
or disregarded to reach the merits of the claims raised in the
petition. . . .
The three statutory exceptions to the timeliness provisions
in the PCRA allow for very limited circumstances under which the
late filing of a petition will be excused. 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9545(b)(1). To invoke an exception, a petition must allege and
the petitioner must prove:
(i) the failure to raise a claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation
of the claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United
States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were
unknown to the petitioner and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence; or
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(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period
provided in this section and has been held by that court to
apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii). The PCRA specifically
provides that a petitioner raising one of the statutory exceptions
to the timeliness requirements must affirmatively plead and
prove the exception. Id. The statutory exceptions to the
timeliness requirements of the PCRA are also subject to a
separate time limitation and must be asserted within sixty (60)
days of the date the claim could have been first presented. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). As such, when a PCRA [petition] is not
filed within one year of the expiration of direct review, or not
eligible for one of the exceptions, or entitled to one of the
exceptions, but not filed within 60 days of the date that the
claim could have been first brought, the trial court has no power
Commonwealth v. Taylor, 933 A.2d 1035, 1038-39 (Pa. Super. 2007),
appeal denied, 951 A.2d 1163 (Pa. 2008) (footnote, quotation marks and
case citations omitted). Thus, when a petition is filed outside the one-year
proven that one of the three limited exceptions to the timeliness
Commonwealth v. Wilson, 824 A.2d
331, 335 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal denied, 839 A.2d 352 (Pa. 2003).
April 8, 2010,
when his time to appeal his sentence to this Court expired. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P. 903(a). Hence, in order to comply with
April 8, 2011. Because the underlying petition was filed on November 6,
2013, it is facially untimely and the court lacked jurisdiction to review it
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unless Appellant pleaded and proved one of the statutory exceptions to the
time bar under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1).
Appellant neither pleads nor proves any exceptions to the time bar,
ated
exception to the timeliness requirements of the PCRA applies.2 See Wilson,
supra at 335; see also Commonwealth v. Seskey, 86 A.3d 237, 243 (Pa.
Super. 2014) (finding Eighth Amendment challenge to imposition of fines in
collateral petition waived). Accordingly, the court did not err or abuse its
di
we are without jurisdiction to address the merits of his claim. 3 See Fahy,
supra at 315; Taylor, supra at 1038.
Order affirmed.
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2
We further observe that, even if Appellant had properly asserted an
exception to the time bar, his petition challenging the events of his
sentencing on March 9, 2010 was filed well after sixty days of the date the
claim could have been presented, and would therefore be untimely in this
respect as well. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2).
3
Moreover, after Appellant is paroled, he may not be committed to prison
for failure to pay his fines unless it appears after a hearing that he is
financially able to do so. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 706(A).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/8/2014
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