Com. v. Midgley, M. ( 2023 )

J-S28019-22
2023 PA Super 18COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL MIDGLEY :
:
Appellant : No. 166 MDA 2022
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered December 10, 2021
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lackawanna County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-35-CR-0001781-2018
BEFORE: OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and KING, J.
OPINION BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 7, 2023
Michael Midgley appeals the denial of his petition for relief under the
Post-Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546. He claims
that his petition raised meritorious claims. He also maintains that the court
erred in denying his request to proceed pro se, appointing counsel, and not
responding to his motion to dismiss the appointment. He further claims that
PCRA counsel was ineffective. We affirm.
Midgley pleaded guilty in January 2019 to two counts of simple assault
and one count of terroristic threats.1 Paragraph 13 of the written guilty plea
reads as follows:
13. State specifically in detail any plea agreement with the
District Attorney
Plea (M2), (M2), (M1) all other charges NP’d
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2701(a)(2) and 2706(a)(1), respectively.
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(M1) stipulated
C/W does not oppose a probationary sentence on
terroristic threats
Guilty Plea Colloquy, dated 1/31/19, at ¶ 13. Midgley also signed “Yes” to the
question in the colloquy that read “Do you understand that the Court is not
bound by the agreement you made with the District Attorney?” Id. at ¶ 14.
At the guilty plea hearing, the Commonwealth stated that it “would have
no objection to the terroristic threats [being] treated as a long tail of
supervision if the Court believes that that’s appropriate.” N.T., Guilty Plea
Hearing, 1/31/19, at 2. Counsel for Midgley stated that the parties had
stipulated that the Commonwealth “is not going to ask for [prison] time on
the terroristic threats.” Id. at 3. The court noted that the guilty plea colloquy
form read “stipulated probation” but asked for clarity regarding whether that
meant the Commonwealth did not oppose probation. Id. The Commonwealth
agreed that as to the charge of terroristic threats, it did not oppose probation.
Id. Relevant to this appeal, the court engaged in an oral colloquy with Midgley
regarding the stipulation.
Q [The Court]: The attorneys have just stated on the record
that it’s their belief based on the way the information is
charged there is no merger and that I have the ability to run
the sentences consecutive, so if I did that your maximum
exposure here today, sir, is nine years and/or $20,000. Do
you understand that?
A [Midgley]: I do, your Honor. When I spoke with my
attorney he said that that would be stipulated for the
terroristic threats.
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Q: That’s what we are here to talk about it. It’s no longer
stipulated. There is no guarantee of probation as a tail on
the terroristic threats, do you understand that?
A: I do understand it now.
[Defense Counsel]: It’s not a closed agreement, it’s that
[the Commonwealth] is not - - -
[The Commonwealth]: If the judge disagrees - -
[Defense Counsel]: You can’t hold a judge to an agreement.
Q [Court]: I’m not bound by it. I don’t have to do it, and if
I don’t do it you have no recourse, do you understand?
A [Midgley]: Yes.
Q: I just want to make sure if you think, like, I’m
guaranteeing - - I’m pleading guilty because I’m guaranteed
a probationary tail on terroristic threats we don’t have [sic]
deal. Do you understand that?
A: Yes.
***
Q [Court]: Sir, has anyone made any promises or threats to
you in exchange for your guilty plea here today?
A [Midgley]: No.
Q: We just talked about you thought, oh, I’m going to be
guaranteed a probationary tail on the terroristic threats, but
you now know that there is no guarantee of that even if you
plead guilty. Do you understand that?
A: Yes.
Id. at 6, 7. The court then continued with an oral colloquy with Midgley. The
court imposed an aggregate term of four and one half to nine years’
incarceration. We affirmed the judgment of sentence, and our Supreme Court
denied his petition for allowance of appeal, in August 2020. See
Commonwealth v. Midgley, No. 873 MDA 2019, 2020 WL 1249451-3-
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(Pa.Super. Mar. 16, 2020) (unpublished memorandum), appeal denied, No.
173 MAL 2020, 237 A.3d 980 (Pa. filed Aug. 18, 2020).
Midgley filed the instant petition, his first, on March 30, 2021. He raised
the following claims:
a. Ineffective assistance of counsel, intentional
misrepresentation and violations of the defendant’s due
process rights by Attorney Douglas Vanston[;]
b. Malicious prosecution, violations of due process, coerce [sic]
tactics and breach of plea agreement by ADA Gene
Riccardo[;]
c. Errors by the court in sentencing and or information used to
support an aggravated sentence[;]
d. Errors within the [judge’s] opinion to the Superior Court[;]
e. Errors within the pre[-]sentence report as stated by
defendant’s counsel that [went] uncorrected, and defendant
did not get to review the pre-sentence report in violation of
due process[.]
Pro-Se PCRA Petition, at ¶ 12(a)-(e).
Midgley attached a brief to his PCRA petition, raising an additional claim
that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge Midgley’s arrest and
the search of his home without a warrant. See Brief in Support of PCRA, at
32. The court appointed counsel, and Midgley filed a “Petition to Re-Appoint
Counsel,” on April 26, asking for new PCRA counsel due to an alleged conflict
of interest. The PCRA court did not rule on the motion at that time. PCRA
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counsel filed a Turner/Finley letter in August 2021, and a petition to
withdraw, which the court granted.2
The court then, in September 2021, appointed new PCRA counsel, who
filed a Turner/Finley letter and a request to withdraw. The Turner/Finley
letter listed the issues from Midgley’s pro se petition and explained counsel’s
conclusion that the issues were meritless. See id. at 3-5. The court granted
counsel’s petition to withdraw on November 4 and issued notice of its intent
to dismiss the petition without a hearing. See Order, filed 11/4/21.
The following day, the court docketed Midgley’s “Motion to Dismiss
Counsel and Proceed Pro Se.” Although the motion was docketed November
5, Midgley dated it November 1, 2021, and the certified record contains an
envelope attached to the motion bearing postage dated November 3, 2021.
Midgley’s motion asked the court to remove PCRA counsel and allow him to
proceed pro se. He also claimed that he had previously filed a petition to
proceed pro se on June 14, 2021. See Motion, filed 11/5/21, at ¶ 15.
The court dismissed Midgley’s PCRA petition, on December 10; it did not
rule on Midgley’s motion to represent himself. See Order, filed 12/10/21. The
docket reflects that the order was served on PCRA counsel, even though he
had withdrawn his appearance, on December 10. The docket does not reflect
that the order was served on Midgley personally. It consequently does not
show the date on which he was served.
____________________________________________
2 See Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988);
Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.Super. 1988) (en banc).
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Midgley appealed, and the trial court docketed his notice of appeal on
January 24, 2022. That date is more than 30 days after December 10, and a
notice of appeal must be filed within 30 days after the entry of the order from
which the appeal is taken (barring exceptions not relevant here). See
Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).3 The certified record does not contain sufficient information
for us to determine whether the prisoner mailbox rule – which deems an
inmate’s pro se filing as filed on the date the inmate delivers it to prison
authorities for mailing4 – renders the appeal timely. There is no need for
proceedings to resolve that question because the time for Midgley to file an
appeal never began to run.
The time for the filing of a notice of appeal runs from the order’s “entry.”
Id. “Entry” of an order in a criminal case occurs for present purposes on the
day the clerk of the trial court “mails or delivers copies of the order to the
parties[.]” Pa.R.A.P. 108(a)(1), (d)(1). Where, as here, the court dismisses a
PCRA petition without a hearing, the judge must advise the petitioner of
certain things by specified means and effectuate service “as provided in Rule
of Criminal Procedure 114.” Pa.R.Crim.P. 907(4). Rule 114 requires the trial
court to serve copies of the order “on each party’s attorney, or the party if
____________________________________________
3“Except as otherwise prescribed by this rule, the notice of appeal required
by Rule 902 (manner of taking appeal) shall be filed within 30 days after the
entry of the order from which the appeal is taken.” Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
4See Pa.R.A.P. 121(f); Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 266 A.3d 1128, 1132
n.8 (Pa.Super. 2021).
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unrepresented,” and record the date of service on the docket. See
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1), (C)(2)(c).
We have previously considered the proper treatment of an appeal where
the lower court docket does not include a notation stating that a copy of the
order under appeal has been provided to the appellant. See Commonwealth
v. Jerman, 762 A.2d 366, 368 (Pa.Super. 2000). There, although the notice
of appeal was dated less than 30 days after the date on the order at issue,
the notice of appeal was not docketed until after the appeal period had
expired. Id. at 367. At the time Jerman was decided, the relevant provisions
of the Rules of Criminal Procedure bore a different rule number, Rule 9025,
than the present rule, Rule 114. Rule 9025 provided:
Upon receipt of an order from a judge, the clerk of courts shall
immediately docket the order and record in the docket the date it
was made. The clerk shall forthwith furnish a copy of the
order, by mail or personal delivery, to each party or
attorney, and shall record in the docket the time and
manner thereof.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 9025 (repealed) (emphasis added).
In Jerman, we reviewed the docket entries and found no indication that
the trial court clerk had furnished a copy of the order to the appellant. We
therefore concluded that the time in which to take an appeal had never begun
to run and treated the appeal as timely. Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368.
Since Jerman, the provision of the criminal rules requiring the clerk to
note service on the parties on the docket has been moved to Rule 114. Rule
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114 now includes matters that Rule 9025 did not cover, and the portions
corresponding to Rule 9025 have different wording. The relevant portions
state:
(B) Service
(1) A copy of any order or court notice promptly shall be
served on each party’s attorney, or the party if
unrepresented.
(2) The clerk of courts shall serve the order or court notice,
unless the president judge has promulgated a local rule
designating service to be by the court or court
administrator.
***
(C) Docket Entries
(1) Docket entries promptly shall be made.
(2) The docket entries shall contain:
(a) the date of receipt in the clerk's office of the order
or court notice;
(b) the date appearing on the order or court notice;
and
(c) the date of service of the order or court notice.
Pa.R.Crim.P. 114(B)(1), (2); (C)(1), (2).
Nonetheless, unpublished decisions of this Court applying Rule 114 have
cited Jerman and found appeals timely where the trial court’s docket did not
include the information required by Rule 114. See, e.g., Commonwealth v.
Cash, No. 1294 WDA 2021, 2022 WL 1515833, at *4 (Pa.Super. May 13,
2022) (unpublished memorandum); Commonwealth v. Martin, No. 970
WDA 2021, 2022 WL 1639538, at *5 (Pa.Super. May 24, 2022) (unpublished
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memorandum). We find these decisions persuasive. The differences between
Rule 9025 and Rule 114 are not material to our decision here and do not
compel a different result. Both rules require a docket notation recording
service on each party and the date thereof. We therefore continue to follow
Jerman. Where the trial court docket in a criminal case does not indicate
service on a party or the date of service, we will not quash the appeal or
require further proceedings. Rather, we will treat the time in which to take an
appeal as never having started to run and treat the appeal as timely.
Here, the trial court docket states that the order dismissing Midgley’s
petition was sent to prior PCRA counsel, even though by that point Midgley
was proceeding pro se. The docket contains no corresponding notation
recording service of the order upon Midgley (or the date of service). These
failings contravened Rule 114. We will therefore consider his appeal timely.
See Jerman, 762 A.2d at 368.
We now turn to the substance of Midgley’s appeal. He raises the
following issues before this Court:
I. Whether the trial court erred when it dismissed
[Midgley’s] petition for Post Conviction Relief when
[Midgley] raised meritorious claims within his brief in
support of his Post Conviction Relief petition.
II. Whether the trial court erred when it denied [Midgley]
his right to proceed pro-se (unrepresented) by
counsel when it ignored [Midgley’s] petition to
proceed pro-se filed on June 14, 2021.
III. Whether the trial court erred when it appointed
attorney Matthew Perry on September 14, 2021 to
represent [Midgley] in his PCRA after [Midgley]
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petitioned [the] court to proceed pro-se on June 14,
2021.
IV. Whether the trial court erred when it did not respond
to [Midgley’s] petition filed on November 1, 2021 to
dismiss appointed counsel attorney Matthew Perry
due to a conflict of interest.
V. Whether the trial court erred when it allowed
appointed counsel for [Midgley] to file an untimely
Turner/Finley letter on or about November 4, 2021
when the trial court, on September 14, 2021, granted
an order stating in it, that PCRA counsel was to file an
amended petition or in the alternative, a
Turner/Finley on or before October 15, 2021.
VI. Whether court appointed counsel attorney Matthew
Perry was ineffective counsel due to the following
reasons:
a. For refusing to dismiss him self [sic] as [Midgley’s]
counsel as [Midgley’s] on or about October 20,
2021, during a phone conference, requested him
to do so, due to a conflict of interest and the fact
[Midgley] wanted to proceed pro-se
(unrepresented).
b. For filing an untimely Turner/Finley letter.
c. For failing to recognize meritorious claims within
[Midgley’s] case and or [Midgley’s] brief in support
of his claims for Post Conviction Relief filed on April
7, 2021.
Midgley’s Br. at 2-3.
When reviewing the denial of PCRA relief, we consider whether “the
determination of the PCRA court is supported by the evidence of record and is
free of legal error. The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there
is no support for the findings in the certified record.” Commonwealth v.
Larkin, 235 A.3d 350, 355 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc) (citation omitted).
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In his first issue, Midgley argues that the court erred in denying his PCRA
petition because he raised meritorious issues. He states that the court
incorrectly determined that the issues raised in his petition had been
previously litigated on direct appeal. He argues that none of his claims have
been raised previously.
Rule 2119 of Pennsylvania Appellate Procedure requires that an
appellant’s brief identify the issue or issues to be reviewed by this Court,
followed by citations to legal authority supporting the claim. See Pa.R.A.P.
2119(a). Where the appellant fails to develop an issue or cite legal authority,
we will find waiver of that issue. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 959 A.2d
1252, 1258 (Pa.Super. 2008). However, we will not find waiver if the
appellant’s failure to provide citation to legal authority or develop an issue
does not impede “our ability to conduct meaningful appellate review[.]”
Commonwealth v. Hardy, 918 A.2d 766, 771 (Pa.Super. 2012).
Here, Midgley’s entire brief is devoid of any citation to legal authority.
However, Midgley’s failure to do so on this specific issue does not impede our
review. We therefore do not find his first issue waived.
To be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must plead and prove
several things, including “[t]hat the allegation of error has not been previously
litigated or waived.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(a)(2). An issue is waived for
purposes of the PCRA “if the petitioner could have raised it but failed to do so
before trial, at trial, during unitary review, on appeal or in a prior state
postconviction proceeding.” 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9544(b).
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On direct appeal, Midgley argued that the Commonwealth violated the
plea agreement and the court erred in denying his request to withdraw his
guilty plea. In his PCRA petition, Midgley challenged his guilty plea and argued
that the terms of the plea “were not clear and unambiguous.” Brief in Support
of PCRA at 5. He also raised claims that his trial counsel was ineffective. He
argued counsel was ineffective for misinforming him of the terms of the plea
agreement, notably that the Commonwealth was not going to ask for “time”
on the crime of terroristic threats. Id. at 10. He maintained that counsel led
him to believe that the Commonwealth would recommend probation. Midgley
also claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to withdraw his guilty plea,
failing to explain to the court his reasons for wanting to withdraw the plea,
refusing to withdraw as counsel, and not informing him that a deadly weapon
enhancement would apply. Id. at 20, 26, 29. He also claimed that counsel
failed to argue that Midgley was taken into custody without a warrant. The
PCRA court concluded that Midgley’s PCRA claims “were all addressed in his
direct appeal[.]” 1925(a) at 6.
We agree that the court erred in determining that all Midgley’s claims
had been previously addressed in his direct appeal. Though Midgley’s PCRA
petition challenged his plea and sentence, it also raised claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. To the extent that Midgley challenged counsel’s
effectiveness, such claims were not previously litigated. An ineffectiveness
claim is analytically separate from the underlying issue, and an ineffectiveness
claim pertaining to issues raised on direct appeal is not subject to dismissal
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as having been previously litigated. See Commonwealth v. Collins, 888
A.2d 564, 573 (Pa. 2005) (“[I]neffectiveness claims are distinct from those
claims that are raised on direct appeal.”).
Nonetheless, because Midgley’s ineffectiveness claims are meritless, we
affirm the dismissal of his petition.
Counsel is presumed to be effective. See Commonwealth v.
Patterson, 143 A.3d 394, 398 (Pa.Super. 2016). To overcome this
presumption, the petitioner must plead and prove: “(1) the underlying claim
is of arguable merit; (2) that counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his
or her action or inaction; and (3) but for the errors and omissions of counsel,
there is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the proceedings would
have been different.” Id. at 397-98 (citation omitted). A failure to satisfy any
of the three prongs is fatal to the claim. See Commonwealth v. Meadows,
787 A.2d 312, 319 (Pa. 2001). “In the context of a plea, an ineffectiveness
may provide relief only if the alleged ineffectiveness caused an involuntary or
unknowing plea.” See Commonwealth v. Thomas, 270 A.3d 1221, 1226
(Pa. Super. 2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 1274,
1281 (Pa. Super. 2017)).
Midgley’s ineffectiveness claims regarding counsel’s alleged assurance
that the Commonwealth would not ask for prison time and instead would
recommend probation is meritless in light of Midgley’s plea colloquy. The court
specifically asked Midgley whether he understood “that there is no guarantee”
that probation would be imposed if he plead guilty. N.T., Guilty Plea Hearing,
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at 7. Midgley responded, “Yes.” Furthermore, that court explained that it was
not bound by any sentencing agreement. See id. at 6. Midgley replied that he
understood. Id. Therefore, Midgley’s claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
fails because the underlying claim lacks arguable merit. Meadows, 787 A.2d
at 319.
Midgley also claimed that counsel was ineffective for failing to seek to
withdraw his guilty plea and for not telling the court Midgley’s reasons for
seeking to withdraw it. This claim also fails because the underlying claim lacks
arguable merit. Following the court’s imposition of sentence, counsel told the
court that Midgley wanted to file a motion to withdraw his plea. N.T.,
Sentencing, 4/26/19, at 15. The court stated that counsel could file a motion
and that it would address it at a separate hearing. Id. Counsel stated that he
would add it to his motion for reconsideration. Id. Counsel put such a request
in the motion for reconsideration. The motion stated that the Commonwealth
had violated the terms of the plea agreement by requesting a period of
incarceration and, as relief, asked that the court allow Midgley to be heard
regarding the imposed sentence or allow him to withdraw his plea. Petition for
Reconsideration of Sentence, filed 5/3/19, at ¶ 6. Though counsel did not file
a motion to withdraw Midgley’s guilty plea, he did ask to withdraw the plea in
the motion for reconsideration and gave the reasons for the withdrawal, i.e.,
that the Commonwealth had violated the plea agreement.
Midgley also challenged counsel’s alleged refusal to withdraw as counsel
despite Midgley’s alleged request and counsel’s alleged failure to inform
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Midgley that the court would impose the deadly weapon enhancement. See
Brief in Support of PCRA at 20. Midgley supported his claim by including an
exhibit to his brief in support of his PCRA petition. See id. However, the exhibit
is not in the certified record. Although the clerks of courts are responsible for
maintaining and transmitting records in cases, it ultimately is the duty of the
appellant to ensure that the certified record is complete. See
Commonwealth v. Preston, 904 A.2d 1, 7 (Pa.Super.2006) (en banc). The
appellant’s failure to carry out that duty results in waiver of any claim for
which a needed item is absent from the certified record. See Commonwealth
v. Powell, 956 A.2d 406, 423 (Pa. 2008). This claim is thus waived.
As to the claim regarding the deadly weapon enhancement, Midgley
failed to show prejudice. Midgley demonstrated his understanding during the
plea colloquy that there was no agreement as to sentencing and that his
maximum total sentencing exposure was nine years. Because the court
imposed an aggregate sentence of four and a half to nine years, we cannot
say that his plea was unknowing or involuntary.
Midgley’s final ineffectiveness claim dealt with counsel’s failure to argue
that police illegally took Midgley into custody without a warrant. This issue is
meritless. By pleading guilty, Midgley waived any procedural challenges
including any issues with the presentation of a warrant before his placement
into custody. See Commonwealth v. Jones, 929 A.2d 205, 212 (Pa. 2007)
(“A plea of guilty constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects and
defenses”) (citation omitted); Commonwealth v. Morrison, 173 A.3d 286,
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290 (Pa.Super. 2017) (“a plea of guilty amounts to a waiver of all defects and
defenses except those concerning the jurisdiction of the court, the legality of
the sentence, and the validity of the guilty plea”). Trial counsel was not
ineffective for failing to raise the meritless issue. See Commonwealth v.
Spotz, 896 A.2d 1191, 1222 (Pa. 2006) (“counsel will not be deemed
ineffective for failing to raise a meritless claim”). As Midgley’s ineffectiveness
claims of ineffective assistance were all meritless, the court did not err in
dismissing the petition.
Midgley’s second issue addresses the trial court’s denial of his request
to proceed pro se. Midgley maintains that he petitioned the court on June 14,
2021, to represent himself. See Midgley’s Br. at 19. He attached to his brief
a copy of the petition he claims he submitted. This copy is not included in the
certified record, and the copy attached to his brief does not contain a
timestamp of filing by the Lackawanna Clerk of Courts. This issue is waived.
His third issue is waived for like reasons. Midgley claims that the trial
court erred in appointing PCRA counsel instead of granting his June 2021
petition to proceed pro se. Because the petition is not in the certified record,
this issue is waived.
In his fourth issue, Midgley claims that the trial court erred in failing to
respond to his November petition to dismiss PCRA counsel. However, he fails
to provide any argument on this issue. See Midgley’s Br. at 19. As such, the
issue is waived. See Williams, 959 A.2d at 1258. Furthermore, even if
Midgley had properly argued this issue, we would find the claim meritless.
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Though Midgley’s petition to remove counsel was dated November 1, it was
not filed until November 5. By that time the court had already permitted
counsel to withdraw. See Order, 11/4/21.
Midgley’s next issue addresses whether the court erred in allowing PCRA
counsel to file an untimely Turner/Finley letter. He argues that the court
directed counsel to file the letter by October 20, 2021, and that counsel did
not file the letter until November 4, 2021. Midgley cites no legal authority that
supports that the court abused its discretion by accepting the filing later than
the date it had imposed. Nor does he cite or discuss any authority that would
entitle him to relief. This claim is waived. See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
985 A.2d 915, 924 (Pa. 2009).
Midgley’s final issue is that PCRA counsel was ineffective. This issue has
three sub-parts. The first is that PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to
withdraw due to an alleged conflict of interest. This issue fails because the
PCRA court in fact allowed PCRA counsel to withdraw and appointed new PCRA
counsel.
The second sub-part is that PCRA counsel was allegedly ineffective for
filing an untimely Turner/Finley letter. As the court accepted the letter
despite its lateness, this claim is meritless. The third and final subpart is that
PCRA counsel was ineffective for failing to “recognize meritorious claims.”
Midgley’s Br. at 3. This also lacks merit. As noted above, many of Midgley’s
claims addressed his guilty plea. Counsel explained that the record established
that Midgley voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered his guilty plea.
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He also noted that as to Midgley’s challenge to his sentence, this Court “upheld
the [t]rial [c]ourt’s above aggravated range sentence on the M-1 Terroristic
Threat conviction.” No Merit Letter at 3. Counsel also addressed Midgley’s
claim that there were errors in the PSI and found this to be meritless because
Midgley did not “specify the errors and claims that he did not review the pre-
sentence report but believes it does contain errors.” Id. at 4. The only issues
that counsel did not address were Midgley’s ineffectiveness claims. Having
determined that the ineffectiveness claims were meritless, see above, we
conclude PCRA counsel was not ineffective for failing to address these claims.
Spotz, 896 A.2d at 1222. We affirm the denial of Midgley’s PCRA petition.
Order affirmed.
Judge Olson joins the Opinion.
Judge King concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/07/2023
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