In Re: Secreti, J., Appeal of: Secreti, J. ( 2018 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: SECRETI, JUSTIN : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: JUSTIN SECRETI :
:
:
:
:
: No. 117 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Amended Order August 30, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-63-MD-0001637-1994
BEFORE: OTT, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY MURRAY, J.: FILED OCTOBER 30, 2018
Justin Secreti (Appellant) appeals from the amended order entered
following a re-sentencing hearing pursuant to Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460 (2012). After careful review, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court previously recited the facts and a partial
procedural history of Appellant’s case:
Appellant was born on June 23, 1977. On August 22, 1993,
when he was sixteen years old, Appellant and two co-defendants
committed a home invasion, and then robbed and murdered the
victims (husband and wife) in their home. Appellant pled guilty
on November 1, 1995, to two counts each of first-degree murder,
aggravated assault, and robbery, and one count each of burglary,
theft by unlawful taking or disposition, receiving stolen property,
and criminal conspiracy.[1] On January 5, 1996, the court
sentenced Appellant to automatic life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole on each murder offense, to be served
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2502(a), 2702(a)(1), 3701(a)(1)(i), 3502, 3921, 3925,
903.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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concurrently, with no further penalties on the remaining offenses.
Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
Appellant timely filed his first PCRA petition pro se on January
3, 1997. The PCRA court appointed counsel, who filed an
amended petition. On April 9, 1999, the PCRA court conducted a
hearing on Appellant’s amended petition, which the court denied
on June 18, 1999. This Court affirmed, and our Supreme Court
denied allowance of appeal on April 3, 2001. See
Commonwealth v. Secreti, 760 A.2d 433 (Pa.Super.2000),
appeal denied, 565 Pa. 642, 771 A.2d 1282 (2001). Appellant
filed a second PCRA petition pro se on April 29, 2005, which the
PCRA court ultimately denied on February 21, 2006. This Court
affirmed, and our Supreme Court denied allowance of appeal on
February 28, 2007. See Commonwealth v. Secreti, 913 A.2d
947 (Pa.Super.2006), appeal denied, 591 Pa. 700, 918 A.2d 745(2007).
Commonwealth v. Secreti, 134 A.3d 77, 78-79 (Pa. Super. 2016).
On August 15, 2012, Appellant filed his third PCRA petition, pro se.
Appellant, through appointed counsel, filed an amended petition on December
1, 2014, alleging that mandatorily sentencing a juvenile to a term of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole was unconstitutional, as held
by the United States Supreme Court in Miller. See Miller, 567 U.S. at 465(“We therefore hold that mandatory life without parole for those under the
age of 18 at the time of their crimes violates the Eighth Amendment’s
prohibition on ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”). The PCRA court denied his
petition, concluding that Miller was not to be applied retroactively on
collateral review, per Commonwealth v. Cunningham, 81 A.3d 1 (Pa.
2013). Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/18, at 2. Appellant appealed the PCRA court’s
decision on December 11, 2014.
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While Appellant’s appeal was pending, the United States Supreme Court
in Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S.Ct. 718 (2016), held that Miller
announced a substantive rule of law that is to be applied retroactively on
collateral review. See Montgomery, 136 S.Ct. at 736 (“The Court now holds
that Miller announced a substantive rule of constitutional law.”).
Consequently, this Court vacated Appellant’s sentence and remanded to the
trial court for a hearing and re-sentencing. Secreti, 134 A.3d at 83.
The trial court convened a hearing on August 30, 2017. At both
homicide counts, the trial court re-sentenced Appellant to 35 years to life
imprisonment. Amended Order, 8/30/17. The trial court imposed the
sentences concurrently and gave Appellant credit for time served from the
date of his arrest on August 31, 1994. Id. Appellant received no further
penalties for his additional convictions. Id.
Appellant filed a post-sentence motion on September 8, 2017, which
was denied by operation of law on January 1, 2018. This timely appeal
followed on January 18, 2018. Both the trial court and Appellant have
complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
On appeal, Appellant presents the following issues for review:
1. Whether the sentencing court erred in imposing an excessive
and disproportionate sentence of 35 years to life solely based on
the seriousness of the offense and to punish the [Appellant] where
it found that [Appellant] had been a model prisoner with the least
significant history of misconducts it had seen in its entire judicial
career, was no longer a danger to society, that his age and
dysfunctional family background contributed to his role in the
crimes, [Appellant] showed extreme remorse for his role in the
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crimes, and the uncontradicted evidence was that [Appellant] had
been rehabilitated?
2. Whether the sentencing court erred in finding that [Appellant]
took more of an active role in the homicides than did those
individuals in the cases cited by counsel during his argument who
received less than 35 year minimums where the evidence showed
that [Appellant] placed one victim in a sleeper hold but his co-
defendant stabbed and bludgeoned the victims to death and
[Appellant’s] culpability was more akin to that of second degree
murder?
3. Whether the sentencing court illegally sentenced [Appellant]
and violated his rights under the Eighth Amendment and Article
1, Section 13 of the Pennsylvania Constitution by imposing a
disproportionate 35-year minimum sentence solely to punish the
[Appellant] where no other penalogical purpose existed to require
[Appellant] to serve twelve more years of incarceration before
becoming eligible for parole as he has been successfully
rehabilitated and is not a danger to society?
4. Whether the court’s sentence is illegal and violates due process
as it imposed a 35-year minimum sentence without any statutory
authority for such a sentence?
5. Whether, to the extent that the sentencing court purported to
sentence [Appellant] under 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, that statute was
unconstitutional and not severable form the parole statute, 61
Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1), rendered illegal by Miller v. Alabama, 132
S.Ct. 2455 (2012), and Montgomery v. Louisiana, 132 S.Ct.
2455 (2012), [sic] and therefore [Appellant’s] sentence is illegal
and is in violation of due process?
6. Whether the imposition of a maximum term of life, regardless
of the minimum term, fails to reflect individualized sentencing, is
an abdication of judicial responsibility, ignores the Miller mandate
and results in an illegal sentence?
Appellant’s Brief at 4-5.
In his first, second, third, and sixth issues, Appellant challenges the
discretionary aspects of his sentence. “The right to appellate review of the
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discretionary aspects of a sentence is not absolute, and must be considered a
petition for permission to appeal.” Commonwealth v. Buterbaugh, 91 A.3d
1247, 1265 (Pa. Super. 2014), appeal denied, 104 A.3d 1 (Pa. 2014). “An
appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction when
challenging the discretionary aspects of a sentence.” Id. We conduct this
four-part test to determine whether:
(1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at the
time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2) the
appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the appellant set forth
a concise statement of reasons relied upon for the allowance of
appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises
a substantial question for our review.
Commonwealth v. Baker, 72 A.3d 652, 662 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation
omitted), appeal denied, 86 A.3d 231 (Pa. 2014). “A defendant presents a
substantial question when he sets forth a plausible argument that the
sentence violates a provision of the sentencing code or is contrary to the
fundamental norms of the sentencing process.” Commonwealth v. Dodge,
77 A.3d 1263, 1268 (Pa. Super. 2013) (quotations and citations omitted),
appeal denied, 91 A.3d 161 (Pa. 2014).
Here, Appellant has complied with the first three prongs of this test to
invoke our jurisdiction by raising his discretionary sentencing claims in a
timely post-sentence motion, filing a timely notice of appeal, and including in
his appellate brief a Rule 2119(f) concise statement. See Appellant’s Brief at
15-23. Therefore, we must determine whether Appellant’s discretionary
aspects of sentencing claims present substantial questions for our review.
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Because Appellant’s first, third, and sixth issues raise similar sentencing
claims, we address them together. For those issues, Appellant argues that
the trial court erred in sentencing him because it fashioned a sentence that
was excessive, that “disregarded [Appellant’s] rehabilitation, his rehabilitative
needs, and that continued incarceration was not necessary for protection of
the public,” and “fail[ed] to reflect individualized sentencing[.]” Appellant’s
Brief at 18, 31-35, 49. These arguments present a substantial question for
our review. See Commonwealth v. Derry, 150 A.3d 987, 992 (Pa. Super.
2016) (“An averment that the trial court failed to consider relevant sentencing
criteria, including the protection of the public, the gravity of the underlying
offense and the rehabilitative needs of Appellant, as 42 [Pa.C.S.A.] § 9721(b)
requires[,] presents a substantial question for our review[.]”).
In his second issue, Appellant argues that his sentence is excessive
because the trial court wrongly found that he played an active role in the
homicides. Appellant argues that his limited role in the homicides should have
been a mitigating factor at sentencing. This claim also raises a substantial
question for review. Dodge, 77 A.3d at 1272 (“[A]n excessive sentence claim,
in conjunction with an assertion that the court did not consider mitigating
factors, raise[s] a substantial question.”). Because Appellant has satisfied
each of the criteria for invoking our review of his discretionary aspects of
sentencing claims, we turn to the merits of his arguments.
The relevant standard of review is as follows:
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Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
sentencing judge. The standard employed when reviewing the
discretionary aspects of sentencing is very narrow. We may
reverse only if the sentencing court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law. A sentence will not be disturbed on
appeal absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an
abuse of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment.
Rather, the appellant must establish, by reference to the record,
that the sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised
its judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision. We must accord
the sentencing court’s decision great weight because it was in the
best position to review the defendant’s character, defiance or
indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the crime.
Commonwealth v. Cook, 941 A.2d 7, 11-12 (Pa. Super. 2007) (internal
quotations and citations omitted).
In Appellant’s first, third, and sixth issues, he asserts that the trial court
abused its discretion in fashioning his sentence.2 Specifically, Appellant
alleges that his sentence is excessive because the trial court failed to consider
relevant factors in fashioning his sentence, created his sentence without
regard for his full rehabilitation, imposed the sentence solely as punishment
for his crimes, and failed to create an individualized sentence. Appellant’s
Brief at 23, 31, 49.
The relevant portion of 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b) states:
In selecting from the alternatives set forth in subsection (a), the
court shall follow the general principle that the sentence imposed
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2 Appellant frames his third and sixth issues as legality of sentence claims.
However, substantively, these issues pertain to the discretionary aspects of
his sentence. See Commonwealth v. Caldwell, 117 A.3d 763, 768 (Pa.
Super. 2015) (en banc) (stating that a claim that the trial court did not
consider the appropriate factors in fashioning the appellant’s sentence
challenges the discretionary aspects of the sentence).
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should call for confinement that is consistent with the protection
of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact
on the life of the victim and on the community, and the
rehabilitative needs of the defendant. . . . In every case in which
the court imposes a sentence for a felony or misdemeanor . . . the
court shall make as a part of the record, and disclose in open court
at the time of sentencing, a statement of the reason or reasons
for the sentence imposed.
Id. This Court has also held, “[w]hen a sentencing court has reviewed a pre[-
]sentence investigation report, we presume that the court properly considered
and weighed all relevant factors in fashioning the defendant’s sentence.”
Baker, 72 A.3d at 663, (citing Commonwealth v. Fowler, 893 A.2d 758,
767 (Pa. Super. 2006)). Additionally:
[i]n imposing sentence, the trial court is required to consider the
particular circumstances of the offense and the character of the
defendant. The trial court should refer to the defendant’s prior
criminal record, age, personal characteristics, and potential for
rehabilitation. However, where the sentencing judge had the
benefit of a presentence investigation report, it will be presumed
that he or she was aware of the relevant information regarding
the defendant’s character and weighed those considerations along
with mitigating statutory factors. Additionally, the sentencing
court must state its reasons for the sentence on the record. 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The sentencing judge can satisfy the
requirement that reasons for imposing sentence be placed on the
record by indicating that he or she has been informed by the pre-
sentencing report; thus properly considering and weighing all
relevant factors.
Fowler, 893 A.2d at 767-68, (citing Commonwealth v. Boyer, 856 A.2d
149, 154 (Pa. Super. 2004)) (some internal citations omitted).
At Appellant’s August 30, 2017 re-sentencing hearing, the Washington
County Adult Probation Office provided the trial court with a pre-sentence
investigation report. N.T., 8/30/17, at 6-8. This report was an updated
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version of the one originally prepared on January 5, 1996. Id. at 8. The trial
court noted that the report included:
an interview the [Appellant] gave to the [district attorney] on
September 1, 1994 in the presence of his lawyer, the lead
investigator, two additional troopers and [Appellant’s] mother;
victim impact statements, statements from the [Appellant’s]
mother, [and] a friend. The pre[-]sentence investigator obtained
the [Appellant’s] records and other relevant information from the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/18, at 5 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Before imposing Appellant’s sentence in open court, the trial court
commented:
There are many, many different factors to weigh here. The Court
has heard all the testimony, and I have read the packet that was
previously submitted to me for review and all the letters of
reference, and the positive impact that [Appellant] has had on
numerous inmates, especially, were submitted and were very
touching. All of these factors that the Court has to consider, you
know, his age, at 16, you know, he was – the age at the time of
the crime, he was 16. He was very immature. Obviously, from
the testimony, he had a very traumatic childhood and he’s been
traumatized by the events in his life. Not given the benefit of
nurturing and love that many of us have had the privilege of
having as we were raised, and the chaos that his life was early on
attributed to his lack of maturity and these poor decisions that he
made. The crime itself cannot be understated. There’s certainly
– in terms of sophistication of the crime – there wasn’t a
sophisticated crime, there was no evidence of criminal enterprise
or any, you know, long-term planning. It seemed to be a total act
of senseless barbarity at the heat of the moment, but it had such
a strong and lasting impact on the family of [the victims], and of
the community, to have two people who were in the twilight of
their years really struggling to meet the demands of old age, and
[the male victim] was having some health problems and his wife
was caring for him, and that they had simple pleasures in life that
gave them joy, and then to have their end in such a violent and
horrendous way just cannot be minimized. . . . We have the
benefit at this time, however, that Judge Gladden didn’t have at
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that time, knowing about how is [Appellant] going to fare in
prison? He really has been a model prisoner. We’ve had that
benefit that behind bars he has been a model prisoner. He has
been exemplary. Four minor misconducts is pretty much a record
from what I’ve seen in my 23 years on the bench. So he really
has been rehabilitated in terms of what the Department of
Corrections can offer him. Can he continue, as he said? He admits
he’s a flawed individual. We’re all flawed. Can he continue to
improve? Absolutely. Can he continue to be of benefit to others
in his surroundings? Absolutely. I don’t believe that he poses a
threat when he would be released, but the question is when he
should be released? You know, if there was some change in
circumstances, I would be willing to look at something like 23
years, but when there’s two victims here, and two elderly victims,
that were just brutalized in their final hours, there’s no way I can
– I think any less sentence of 35 years to life would depreciate the
seriousness of that. I just cannot do that for their memory, for
their idea – of course, at the time, everyone who thought it was
life meant life, and it didn’t, and I think that’s a really positive step
in our society that we recognize that juveniles make decisions
without the benefit of a fully developed brain, and that they are
really the product of their environment and the people around
them, and that we’ve grown as a society and recognize that. It
still doesn’t mean that we just let it go at that. I believe that a
sentence of 35 to life concurrent on each homicide is the
appropriate sentence, and that is the sentence that I will impose.
N.T., 8/30/17, at 149-53.
Based on our review of the transcript of Appellant’s re-sentencing
hearing, including the trial court’s remarks cited above, we conclude that the
trial court considered the appropriate factors when determining Appellant’s
sentence. Specifically, the trial court discussed Appellant’s rehabilitation,
future rehabilitative needs, and whether there is a need for Appellant’s
continued incarceration. The trial court also indicated on the record that it
reviewed Appellant’s pre-sentence investigation report, as well as the entirety
of the evidence presented at the hearing. Despite evidence of Appellant’s
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good behavior in prison and his apparent rehabilitation, the trial court
ultimately, in its discretion, determined that the gravity of the crimes
necessitated a 35-year minimum sentence. Thus, the record reflects that the
trial court weighed the appropriate factors and properly fashioned an
individualized sentence for Appellant. Accordingly, his first, third, and sixth
issues are meritless.
For his second issue, Appellant argues that his sentence was excessive
because “the [trial] court erred in finding that [Appellant] took more of an
active role in the homicides[.]” Appellant’s Brief at 27. Appellant maintains
that his more limited role in the murders was a mitigating factor that
necessitated a lesser sentence.
At re-sentencing, the trial court made the following factual findings as
to Appellant’s role in the crimes:
The fact that [Appellant] was an active participant – I know some
of these cases I’ve read, numerous cases of juveniles who have
committed crimes, and many of these – it goes the gamut, but
there are many who receive more favorable sentences because
they didn’t participate fully in that crime, or they were the lookout
or, sort of, a more passive participant. Here, [Appellant], and
many of the statements given were – you know, he owned up to
it right away, but he was an active participant and the brutality of
it was inflected [sic] by [Appellant] along with [his co-defendant].
N.T., 8/30/17, at 151. The trial court further expanded in its opinion on its
determination that Appellant was an active participant:
The Court finds . . . that [Appellant] was an active and pivotal
participant in the crime and that [Appellant] continues to
downplay his involvement in the murders to some extent. First
and foremost, it was he that targeted the victims. He identified
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them as old people who had money which drew the three
conspirators to go to the victims’ home on August 22, 1993.
During the commission of the crime, he choked [the male victim]
until he thought he was dead. He retrieved a knife from the
kitchen for his co-defendant to use to stab [the female victim].
[Appellant] picked up the hammer to hit [the female victim]; while
he said he didn’t hit her with it, he had it in his hands and allowed
the co-defendant to use it.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/1/18, at 9-10 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Importantly, we emphasize that we must “defer to the findings of fact
made by the sentencing court as long as they are supported by competent
evidence.” Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 444 (Pa. 2017) (“Batts
II”) (internal citations omitted). Here, the transcript of Appellant’s re-
sentencing reveals that the trial court based its finding that Appellant was an
active participant in the murders on competent evidence of record. For
example, the record indicates that Appellant was the conspirator who
specifically targeted the victims as elderly people with money, choked the
male victim until he thought the victim was dead, and retrieved weapons for
his co-conspirators to use on the victims. See Transcript of Appellant’s
Interview, 9/1/94. Because the trial court’s finding is supported by competent
evidence of record, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that
Appellant’s role in the homicides was not a mitigating factor that necessitated
a lesser sentence. Appellant’s second issue is therefore meritless.
For his fourth and fifth issues, Appellant disputes the legality of his
sentence. We are mindful in addressing these claims that “[i]ssues relating
to the legality of a sentence are questions of law. Our standard of review over
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such questions is de novo and our scope is plenary.” Commonwealth v.
Cardwell, 105 A.3d 748, 750 (Pa. Super. 2014) (internal citation omitted).
We further note:
The scope and standard of review applied to determine the legality
of a sentence are well established. If no statutory authorization
exists for a particular sentence, that sentence is illegal and subject
to correction. An illegal sentence must be vacated. In evaluating
a trial court’s application of a statute, our standard of review is
plenary and is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed an error of law.
Commonwealth v. Dixon, 161 A.3d 949, 951 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal
citation omitted).
In his fourth issue, Appellant claims that there is “no statutory authority
to impose a 35-year minimum sentence and Pennsylvania courts lack common
law authority to impose a sentence that does not statutorily exist.” Appellant’s
Brief at 35. Although it is not entirely clear from Appellant’s argument,
Appellant appears to assert that the trial court improperly relied on Section
1102.1(a)(1) of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code in determining his minimum
sentence.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Batts II addressed how a
sentencing court should proceed following Miller when faced with re-
sentencing a juvenile offender who was originally sentenced, pre-Miller, to
life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. Our Supreme Court
explained:
For those defendants for whom the sentencing court determines
a life-without-parole sentence is inappropriate, “it is our
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determination here that they are subject to a mandatory
maximum sentence of life imprisonment as required by Section
1102(a), accompanied by a minimum sentence determined by the
common pleas court upon re[-]sentencing[.]”
Batts II, 163 A.3d at 421 (quoting Commonwealth v. Batts, 66 A.3d 286,
296-97 (Pa. 2013) (Batts I)).3 “The sentencing court should fashion a
minimum term of incarceration using, as guidance, [S]ection 1102.1(a) of the
Crimes Code.” Id. at 484.
Appellant is correct that there is no statute that mandates a 35-year
minimum sentence in his case. The Supreme Court made clear in Batts II,
however, that where a sentencing court determines that a sentence of life
imprisonment without the possibility of parole is inappropriate for a juvenile
offender who was originally sentenced to life without parole prior to Miller,
the minimum sentence is left to the trial court’s discretion on re-sentencing,
using Section 1102.1 as guidance. Id. at 421.
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3 In Batts I, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court addressed for the first time
after Miller the sentencing of a juvenile offender convicted of first-degree
murder. Noting that the United States Supreme Court in Miller declined to
place a “categorical ban” on life-without-parole sentences for juvenile
offenders, our Supreme Court in Batts I held that juvenile offenders convicted
of first-degree murder could be subject to a life-without-parole sentence only
after the sentencing court considered the criteria outlined in Miller. Id. at
296-99. Batts II followed four years later where the Supreme Court set forth
the procedure for re-sentencing juvenile offenders who were improperly
sentenced to life without parole prior to Miller.
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Section 1102.1, which the General Assembly enacted in the wake of the
Miller decision, sets forth the guidelines for sentencing those who commit
first-degree murder while under the age of 18:
(a) First degree murder.--A person who has been convicted
after June 24, 2012, of a murder of the first degree, first degree
murder of an unborn child or murder of a law enforcement officer
of the first degree and who was under the age of 18 at the time
of the commission of the offense shall be sentenced as follows:
(1) A person who at the time of the commission of the offense
was 15 years of age or older shall be sentenced to a term of
life imprisonment without parole, or a term of imprisonment,
the minimum of which shall be at least 35 years to life.
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1102.1(a)(1).
Based on our Supreme Court’s decision in Batts II, we conclude that
Appellant’s 35-year minimum sentence was legal. While Section 1102.1 is not
directly applicable to Appellant, as he pled guilty on November 1, 1995, our
Supreme Court made clear that the minimum sentence in cases such as
Appellant’s is left to the trial court’s discretion and that courts are to use
Section 1102.1 as guidance when re-sentencing juvenile offenders who were
originally sentenced to life without parole. See Batts II, 163 A.3d at 484.
Thus, the trial court properly took into consideration Section 1102.1 when it
resentenced Appellant. Because Appellant’s sentence is legal under Batts II,
we find no merit to this illegal sentence claim.
In his fifth issue, Appellant argues that his sentence is illegal because
the trial court sentenced him under Section 1102 of the Pennsylvania Crimes
Code, which he asserts is unconstitutional. Appellant contends that Section
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1102, which mandates a maximum sentence of life imprisonment for juveniles
who commit murder, cannot be severed from 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 6137(a)(1),
which states that parole may not be granted to those serving a life sentence,
which is unconstitutional as applied to juveniles under Miller.
Both this Court and our Supreme Court, as Appellant concedes, have
rejected this claim. Batts II made clear that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
had “severed the prohibition against paroling an individual sentenced to serve
life in prison in [S]ection 6137(a)(1) as applied to [juvenile] offenders” from
the mandate of Section 1102(a) that juvenile offenders convicted of murder
receive a maximum possible sentence of life imprisonment. Commonwealth
v. Seskey, 170 A.3d 1105, 1109 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citing Batts II, 163 A.3d
at 421). Accordingly, Appellant’s fifth issue is devoid of merit.
In sum, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in sentencing
Appellant, and the sentence Appellant received was legal based upon the
precedent set forth in Batts II. Because Appellant’s issues lack merit, we
affirm his judgment of sentence.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 10/30/2018
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