Com. v. Gupton, A. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ARTHUR F. GUPTON, :
:
Appellant. : No. 731 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order, February 20, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County,
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0004847-2012.
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., KUNSELMAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED JUNE 25, 2019
Arthur F. Gupton appeals from the order denying his first petition for
relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”). 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§
9541-9546. We affirm the PCRA order, but vacate a portion of the sentence
as set forth herein.
The PCRA court has summarized the pertinent facts as follows:
In 1997, [Gupton] abducted sixteen-year-old A.S. at
gunpoint as she was walking home, drove her to a remote
garage, and raped her with a knife to her throat. She ran
home and told her mother and a family friend what
happened. They called the police and A.S. gave the arriving
officer a description of [Gupton]. She then went to the
hospital, where she submitted to a rape kit examination
which tested positive for ejaculate. [Gupton] remained a
fugitive for over fifteen years.
On January 5, 2011, Detective James Owens, a “cold
case” investigator for the Special Victims Unit of the
Philadelphia Police Department, received notification from
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the department’s DNA lab that DNA acquired from [Gupton]
matched that found in the ejaculate of the rape kit
conducted on A.S. in 1997. Detective Owens met with
[Gupton] and took a buccal swab to obtain a sample of his
DNA. The police lab tested the swab against the DNA found
in the 1997 rape kit and found that [Gupton] was the source
of the ejaculate found in A.S.’s vaginal and cervical swabs.
The Commonwealth obtained an arrest warrant for [Gupton]
on December 28, 2011, and arrested him on January 18,
2012.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/1/18, at 1-2 (citations omitted).
The PCRA court also summarized the procedural history as follows:
On October 5, 2012, a jury sitting before this Court
convicted [Gupton] of rape, kidnapping, sexual assault,
carrying a firearm without a license, corruption of a minor
and indecent assault. On May 31, 2013, this Court found
him to be a sexually violent predator and imposed
consecutive terms of imprisonment of ten to twenty years
for rape, eight to twenty years for kidnapping, three and
one-half to seven years for violating the Uniform Firearms
Act, two to five years for corruption of a minor, and no
further penalty for the remaining crimes. As part of the
hearing, the Court discussed the statute of limitations issue
with the attorneys for Commonwealth and [Gupton], and
[Gupton].
On June 10, 2013, [Gupton] filed a post-sentence motion
challenging the weight of the evidence, which the Court
denied on June 25, 2013. The following day, on June 26,
2013, [Gupton] filed an untimely second post-sentence
motion purporting to challenge the discretionary aspects of
sentencing. This untimely second post-sentence motion
was denied by operation of law [pursuant to] Pa.R.Crim.P.
720(B)(3)(a).
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Id. at 2-3 (citations omitted).1
Gupton filed a timely appeal, and this Court affirmed his judgment of
sentence on December 15, 2014. Commonwealth v. Gupton, 116 A.3d 687(Pa. Super. 2014) (unpublished memorandum). On May 12, 2015, our
Supreme Court denied Gupton’s petition for allowance of appeal.
Commonwealth v. Gupton, 116 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2015).
On April 29, 2016, Gupton filed a timely pro se PCRA petition. The PCRA
court appointed counsel, and PCRA counsel filed an amended petition on June
5, 2017. In this amended petition, Gupton contended that trial counsel was
ineffective “for failing to file a motion barring prosecution” for kidnapping and
carrying a firearm without a license “because the criminal activity alleged in
the complaint was beyond the statute of limitations.” Amended Petition,
Memorandum of Law, at 1. The Commonwealth filed a motion to dismiss
Gupton’s petition on October 10, 2017.
On December 4, 2017, the PCRA issued Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of its
intention to dismiss Chamber’s PCRA petition without a hearing. Gupton did
not file a response. By order entered February 20, 2018, the PCRA court
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1 The trial court also ordered Gupton to comply with the reporting and
registration requirements of the Sexual Offender Registration and Notification
Act (“SORNA”).
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dismissed the petition. This appeal followed.2 Both Gupton the PCRA court
have complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Gupton raises the following issue:
1. Did the trial court err by dismissing the PCRA petition
when trial counsel was ineffective for failing to assert that
the charges of kidnapping and violation of the Uniform
Firearms Act were time barred by the applicable statute
of limitations?
See Gupton’s Brief at 3.
Our scope and standard of review is well settled:
In PCRA appeals, our scope of review is limited to the
findings of the PCRA court and the evidence on the record
of the PCRA court's hearing, viewed in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party. Because most PCRA
appeals involve questions of fact and law, we employ a
mixed standard of review. We defer to the PCRA court's
factual findings and credibility determinations supported by
the record. In contrast, we review the PCRA court's legal
conclusions de novo.
Commonwealth v. Reyes-Rodriguez, 111 A.3d 775, 779 (Pa. Super. 2015)
(citations omitted).
When the PCRA court has dismissed a petitioner’s PCRA petition without
an evidentiary hearing, we review the PCRA court’s decision for an abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Roney, 79 A.2d 595, 604 (Pa. 2013). The
PCRA court has discretion to dismiss a petition without a hearing when the
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2 By order entered March 13, 2018, the PCRA court permitted PCRA counsel
to withdraw and, thereafter, appointed present counsel to assist Gupton in
this appeal.
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court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues concerning any material
fact, the defendant is not entitled to post-conviction collateral relief, and no
legitimate purpose would be served by further proceedings. Id. To obtain a
reversal of a PCRA court’s decision to dismiss a petition without a hearing, an
appellant must show that he raised a genuine issue of material fact which, if
resolved in his favor, would have entitled him to relief, or that the court
otherwise abused its discretion in denying a hearing. Commonwealth v.
Blakeney, 108 A.3d 739, 750 (Pa. 2014).
Gupton’s issue alleges the ineffective assistance of trial counsel. To
obtain relief under the PCRA premised on a claim that counsel was ineffective,
a petitioner must establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that counsel's
ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that no reliable
adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken place. Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532 (Pa. 2009). “Generally, counsel’s
performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and counsel will
only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing by the petitioner.” Id.This requires the petitioner to demonstrate that: (1) the underlying claim is
of arguable merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s act or omission prejudiced the petitioner.
Id. at 533.
As to the first prong, “[a] claim has arguable merit where the factual
averments, if accurate, could establish cause for relief.” Commonwealth v.
Stewart, 84 A.3d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc). “Whether the facts
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rise to the level of arguable merit is a legal determination.’” Id. (citing
Commonwealth v. Saranchak, 866 A.2d 292, 304 n.14 (Pa. 2005).
As to the second prong of this test, trial counsel's strategic decisions
cannot be the subject of a finding of ineffectiveness if the decision to follow a
particular course of action was reasonably based and was not the result of
sloth or ignorance of available alternatives. Commonwealth v. Collins, 545
A.2d 882, 886 (Pa. 1988). Counsel's approach must be "so unreasonable
that no competent lawyer would have chosen it." Commonwealth v. Ervin,
766 A.2d 859, 862-63 (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted).
As to the third prong of the test for ineffectiveness, “[p]rejudice is
established if there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different." Stewart, 84 A.3d at
707. “A reasonable probability ‘is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome.’” Id. (quoting Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899
A.2d 365, 370 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Finally, when considering an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
PCRA court “is not required to analyze these [prongs] in any particular order
of priority; instead if a claim fails under any necessary [prong] of the
ineffectiveness test, the court may proceed to that [prong] first.”
Commonwealth v. Tharp, 101 A.3d 736, 747 (Pa. 2014) (citations omitted).
In particular, when it is clear that the petitioner has failed to meet the
prejudice prong, the court may dispose of the claim on that basis alone,
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without a determination of whether the first two prongs have been met.
Commonwealth v. Travaglia, 661 A.2d 352, 357 (Pa. 1995).
In his attempt to establish the arguable merit of his ineffectiveness
claim, Gupton asserts that the “Ex Post Facto” and “Due Process” clauses of
both the federal and state constitutions “bar prosecution where the previously
effective statute of limitations had expired before [the Pennsylvania
legislature] enacted 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c.1)” in 2004. Gupton’s Brief at 9.
According to Gupton, “a newly enacted state law cannot be used to revive a
previously time-barred prosecution.” Id.
Gupton’s claim fails for a number of reasons. Initially, our review of
Gupton’s amended petition supports the Commonwealth’s assertion that
Gupton did not raise this constitutional issue in the petition. See
Commonwealth’s Brief at 6. Thus, Gupton inappropriately raises this issue for
the first time on appeal, and it is therefore waived. See Commonwealth v.
Edmiston, 851 A.2d 883, 889 (Pa. 2004) (explaining a claim that is not raised
in PCRA petition is waived on appeal); see also Pa.R.A.P. 302(a).
Moreover, Gupton’s claim is also waived because he has failed to
develop his constitutional claim. See Commonwealth v. Tielsch, 934 A.2d
81, 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that undeveloped claims will not be
considered on appeal). Although Gupton discusses several U.S. Supreme
Court decisions, he does not explain how their holdings apply to the
circumstances of his case. See Gupton’s Brief at 14-15.
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In Commonwealth v. Rose, 127 A.3d 794 (Pa. 2015), our Supreme
Court discussed the federal ex post facto clause as follows:
The Ex Post Facto Clause of the United States Constitution
is contained in Article [I], § 10, which provides: “No State
shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or
Law impairing the Obligations of Contracts . . . “ U.S. Const.
art. I, § 10. The definition of an ex post facto law in the
context of American law was first set forth more than two
centuries ago in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 1 L.Ed.
648 (1798), wherein Justice Chase offered the following
description of the term:
[1] Every law that makes an action, done before the
passing of the law, and which was innocent when
done, criminal; and punishes such action. [2] Every
law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than
it was, when committed. [3] Every law that changes
the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment,
than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.
[4] Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence,
and receives less, or different testimony, than the law
required at the time of the commission of the
[offense], in order to convict the offender.
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
Rose, 127 A.3d at 797-98 (footnote omitted).3 Rose involved an ex post
facto violation, but concerned the proper sentence for a defendant based on
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3 The Rose court noted that, because Pennsylvania’s ex post facto law, Article
I, § 17, provides the same protections as its federal counterpart, it did not
need to conduct a separate analysis. Rose, 127 A.3d at 798, n.11; but see
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189, 1223 (Opinion Announcing the
Judgment of the Court, Dougherty, J.) (noting that in previous decisions the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court has found some divergence between the state
and federal ex post facto clauses, and, at least in the context of sexual
offender registration, “Pennsylvania’s ex post facto clause provides even
greater protections than its federal counterpart”).
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when he committed the crime. Although Gupton relies on Rose, he fails to
explain which type of ex post facto violation he claims occurred in his case.
The deficiency in Gupton’s constitutional claim is understandable. Even
absent waiver, Gupton’s assertion that trial counsel was ineffective for failing
to challenge his kidnapping and firearm charge based on an expired statute of
limitations is meritless.
Section 5552 of the Judicial Code governs the time in which the
Commonwealth must initiate a prosecution. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552. Most
offenses are subject to a two-year statute of limitations; however, certain
enumerated offenses have five-year statutes of limitations. See 42 Pa.C.S.A.
5552(a) & (b). At issue in this case is Section 5552(c.1), which provides:
(c.1) Genetic identification evidence.—Notwithstanding
any provision of law to the contrary, if evidence of a
misdemeanor sexual offense set forth in subsection (c)(3)
or a felony offense is obtained containing human
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) which is subsequently used to
identify an otherwise unidentified individual as the
perpetrator of the offense, the prosecution of the offense
may be commenced within the period of limitations provided
for the offense or one year after the identity of the
individual is determined, whichever is later.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5552(c.1) (emphasis added).
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As noted above, Gupton claims that section 5552(c.1) cannot apply to
him because the statute of limitations for kidnapping and the firearm violation
had expired before the Pennsylvania legislature had enacted subsection (c.1)
in 2004. The trial court found no merit to this claim, and explained as follows:
[Gupton] argues that trial counsel should have petitioned
for barring prosecution for kidnapping and carrying a
firearm without a license because subsection (c.1) does not
apply to him where it was promulgated as an amendment
to § 5552 in 2004, two years after the statute of limitations
would have tolled for kidnapping under subsection (b)
[(providing a five-year statute of limitation for major
offenses)], and five years after the statute of limitations
would have tolled for carrying a firearm without a license
under subsection (a) [(providing, as a general rule, a two-
year statute of limitation for offenses)]. However, this
interpretation of subsection (c.1) is not supported by the
plain language of the statute nor by any other legal
authority. Trial counsel could not have been ineffective for
failing to adopt an interpretation of the statute that lacks
any basis in law.
In construing statutory language, “[w]ords and phrases
shall be construed according to rules of grammar and
according to their common and approved usage.” 1 Pa.C.S.
§ 1903. Additionally, when determining the intent of a
statute, it is presumed “that the General Assembly does not
intend a result that is absurd.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1)[.]
According to its plain meaning, the language of the
statute of limitations has no restriction precluding the
application of subsection (c.1) to offenses for which the
statute of limitations would have expired under some other
subsection. Such a result would contradict the very
purpose of subsection (c.1), which is to provide the
opportunity to prosecute a perpetrator who managed to hide
his identity for more than the length of the statute of
limitations, but was subsequently discovered by DNA
identification evidence. This statute was designed for
precisely cases such as this one.
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PCRA Court Opinion, 11/1/18, at 5-6 (emphasis in original; citations omitted).
We agree. The Commonwealth discovers an offense when it gains
knowledge or learns a defendant has violated a penal statute.
Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 439 A.2d 748, 750 (Pa. Super. 1982). Here,
although the offenses occurred in 1997, law officials did not identify Gupton
as the perpetrator until January 5, 2011. Thus, given the plain language
section 5552(c.1), the Commonwealth had one year from that date to
commence its prosecution of Gupton. Because the Commonwealth
commenced prosecution in December 2011, the charges at issue were not
time-barred, and trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to
pursue this meritless claim. See generally, Commonwealth v. Loner, 836
A.2d 125 (Pa. Super. 2003) (en banc).
As he did below, in arguing to the contrary, Gupton relies upon our
Supreme Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Laventure, 894 A.2d 109,
116-17 (Pa. 2006). In Laventure, the Commonwealth, four days before the
expiration of the five-year period of limitations under Section 5552(b), filed a
complaint alleging arson and other crimes against an unknown defendant,
identified only as “John Doe ‘Steve’” having an unknown address, and who
was a white male, in his thirties. Laventure, 894 A.2d at 111. Approximately
one week later, the Commonwealth identified “John Doe ‘Steve’” as Laventure,
and amended the criminal complaint accordingly. Id.
Subsequently, after Laventure filed a pre-trial motion, the trial court
dismissed the prosecution “holding that, given the generality of the description
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contained in the initial complaint and warrant, neither instrument was valid or
sufficient to support the commencement of criminal proceedings under Section
5552(b).” Id. (citation omitted). The Commonwealth filed an appeal to this
Court and a divided panel reversed. See Commonwealth v. Laventure,
858 A.2d 112 (Pa. Super. 2004). The Laventure majority concluded that
“the statute of limitations was tolled by the filing of the initial complaint and
the prompt substitution of the amended complaint and warrant.” Laventure,
894 A.2d at 114 (citation omitted).4 Upon further review, our Supreme Court
in turn reversed this Court, holding “that the initial complaint filed and warrant
issued in this case were ineffective for the purpose of tolling Section 5552(b)’s
period of limitations, and the amendments cannot be deemed to relate back
to the dates of the original documents.” Laventure, 894 A.2d at 119
(footnote omitted).
The PCRA court correctly found Gupton’s reliance on our Supreme
Court’s decision in Laventure to be misplaced:
[Gupton] misconstrues the holding of [Laventure] to
support his argument. Laventure addressed subsection (b)
of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552, whereas the instant case involves
subsection (c.1) of 42 Pa.C.S. § 5552. Subsection (b)
specifies a five or twelve year statute of limitations for
various offenses, including kidnapping and rape, whereas
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4 Judge Peter Paul Olszewski dissented because he believed the information in
the original complaint was insufficient to support the commencement of an
action, and the majority cited no case authority supporting its conclusion that
the amended complaint could “relate back” to the original complaint. See
Laventure, 858 A.2d at 117-18.
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subsection (c) addresses exceptions to those statute[s] of
limitations. In Laventure, [our Supreme Court] found that
filing an arrest warrant was insufficient where it described
the unknown [defendant] as “John Doe ‘Steve’, having an
unknown address, and who was a white male, in his
thirties.” Id. at 118-19. The question of whether or not a
description in an arrest warrant is sufficient to toll the
statute of limitations is simply not applicable in this case,
where prosecution commenced within one year of the
discovery of DNA evidence that identified a previously
unknown perpetrator. Here, the Commonwealth did not file
any complaint nor seek any warrant until it discovered
[Gupton’s] identity. The subsection of the statute of
limitations implicated in Laventure, subsection (b), had no
relevance to the instant case. Only subsection (c.1) applied
in the instant case, and no legal authority exists that
prevents its application to [Gupton’s] prosecutions for
kidnapping or carrying a firearm without a license.
PCRA Court Opinion, 11/1/18, at 6-7.
We agree. In fact, in Laventure our Supreme Court noted the trial
court’s distinguishing Laventure’s claim from “situations in which the
Commonwealth is able to furnish reasonably specific identification
characteristics or criteria of an unknown or unnamed individual, such as a
DNA profile[.]” Laventure, 894 A.2d at 111 (emphasis added).
Thus, we affirm the order denying Gupton post-conviction relief on the
ineffective assistance of counsel claim he raised in his amended petition.
As an additional matter, we address the legality of Gupton’s sentence
sua sponte. See Commonwealth v. DiMatteo, 177 A.3d 182, 191 (Pa.
2018) (holding that an illegal sentence may be reviewed in the context of a
timely PCRA petition); Commonwealth v. Randal, 837 A.2d 1211, 1214 (Pa.
Super 2003) (en banc) (explaining challenges to an illegal sentence cannot be
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waived and may be raised by Superior Court sua sponte; assuming jurisdiction
is proper, illegal sentence must be vacated).
Most recently, this Court addressed a situation in which a defendant was
designated an SVP and who was later ordered to register under SORNA, even
though he committed the sex offenses prior to the effective date of SORNA.
In Commonwealth v. Adams-Smith, 2019 WL 1997650, ___ A.3d ___ (Pa.
Super. 2019), we first discussed recent decisions by our Supreme Court in
Commonwealth v. Muniz, 164 A.3d 1189 (Pa. 2017) (declaring SORNA
unconstitutional as an ex post facto law applied to persons who committed
sex offenses prior to the effective date of SORNA, December 20, 2012), and
this Court’s subsequent decisions in Commonwealth v. Rivera-Figueroa,
174 A.3d 674 (Pa. Super. 2017) (holding Muniz created a substantive rule
that retroactively applies in the collateral context), and Commonwealth v.
Butler, 173 A.3d 1212 (Pa. Super. 2017), appeal granted, 190 A.3d 581 (Pa.
2018) (applying the federal decisions prohibiting judicial fact-finding at the
time of sentencing in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and
Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99 (2013), to the SVP process in light of
Muniz).
We then concluded:
Because [Adams-Smith] committed his offenses before the
effective date of SORNA, the increased reporting
requirements of SORNA constitute greater punishment for
[Adams-Smith]. See Muniz, supra. Thus, the imposition
of SORNA registration requirements on [Adams-Smith]
violates the ex post facto clauses of both the United States
and Pennsylvania Constitutions.
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Adams-Smith, at *7 (footnote omitted).
Here, Gupton committed his crimes in 1997, long before the legislature
enacted SORNA in 2012. Thus, like Adams-Smith, the application of SORNA’s
increased reporting requirements to Gupton violates the ex post facto clauses
of both the federal and state constitutions.
In Adams-Smith, we also noted that Adams-Smith had been
designated an SVP. We then discussed this Court’s decision in Butler, which
dealt with “the related issue concerning the validity of the process and
imposition of SVP status on a defendant.” Adams-Smith, at *8. We
observed that in reaching a decision in Butler, to conclude that the SVP
process involved unconstitutional judicial fact-finding at the time of
sentencing, “the Butler Court simply applied Alleyne and Apprendi to the
SVP process, in light of Muniz.” Id.
Therefore, even though Adams-Smith’s judgment of sentence became
final prior to this Court’s decision in Butler, the panel determined that Adams-
Smith was still entitled to relief:
Both Muniz and Butler were decided during the pendency
of [Adams-Smith’s] timely PCRA petition. Under these new
cases, [his] SVP status constitutes an illegal sentence
subject to correction. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9542 (stating
persons serving illegal sentence may obtain collateral
relief); DiMatteo, supra (noting unconstitutionality of
Section of 7508 [of the Judicial Code] in light of Alleyne
and allowing Alleyne relief in PCRA context, so long as
judgment of sentence was not final before Alleyne was
decided) (citing Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54(Pa. Super. 2015) (applying Alleyne to correct illegal
sentence in context of a timely-filed PCRA petition)).
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To quiet any conflict in the law, we now hold a PCRA
petitioner can obtain relief from an illegal sentence under
Butler, if the petition is timely filed, as long as the relevant
judgment of sentence became final after June 17, 2013, the
date Alleyne was decided. Because Butler simply applied
Alleyne principles to the SVP process, Butler did not
announce a new constitutional rule that required a [Teague
v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989)] retroactivity analysis. See
[Chaidez v. U.S.] 568 U.S. 342 (2013)]. Therefore, the
date of the Alleyne decision, not the date of the Butler
decision, controls for the purposes of obtaining PCRA relief
from the imposition of SVP status.
Adams-Smith, at *8 (emphasis in original).
Although we affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief based upon his
claim of ineffectiveness counsel, we vacated Adams-Smith’s judgment of
sentence to the extent it required registration and reporting requirements
under SORNA, and Adams-Smith’s SVP status. We remanded “the case to the
trial court to instruct [Adams-Smith] on his proper registration and reporting
requirements.” Id.Here, like Adams-Smith, both Muniz and Butler were decided during
the pendency of Gupton’s timely PCRA petition. Thus, although Gupton’s claim
of counsel’s ineffectiveness warrants no relief, we vacate his judgment of
sentence, to the extent it required SORNA compliance, as well as his
designation as an SVP. We therefore remand this case to the trial court to
instruct Gupton on his proper registration and reporting requirements. See
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9799.51-9799.75.
Order affirmed in part; SORNA requirements and SVP status vacated;
case remanded with instructions. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/25/19
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