In Re: R.L., A Minor, Appeal of: C.C. ( 2017 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: R.L., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.C., NATURAL MOTHER
No. 115 WDA 2017
Appeal from the Order dated December 19, 2016,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): CP-02-AP-0000069-2016.
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED JUNE 07, 2017
C.C. (“Mother”) appeals from the order involuntarily terminating her
parental rights to R.L. (“Child”) pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§
2511(a) and (b).1 We affirm.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The parties stipulated to the following facts with regard to the Child: 2
Child was born in September 2005. Allegheny County Office of Children,
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1
Mother identified R.S. as Child’s father. He never participated in the
proceedings. The trial court terminated his parental rights, as well as the
rights of “unknown father” via the same order terminating Mother’s parental
rights.
2
The evidentiary hearings in this case involved not only Child but four of her
younger siblings. Mother also has three other children who were not the
subject of the proceedings. Both Mother and the natural father of the three
younger children have filed appeals from the order terminating their parental
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Youth, and Families (“Agency”) sought its first emergency custody
authorization involving Child and her older siblings in 2007, but the children
were not removed. The Agency became involved again with Mother
following the birth of another child in October 2011. A family service plan
was created on December 29, 2011, but the case was closed on July 26,
2012. The Agency again implemented services for Mother’s family after the
birth of another child in September 2012.
The Agency filed a dependency petition for Child on February 7, 2013,
and Child was adjudicated dependent on May 14, 2013. Child was removed
from Mother’s custody on October 3, 2013. On October 14, 2013, KidsVoice
was appointed as educational decision maker for Child for fourteen days. On
July 30, 2015, secondary educational and medical decision-makers were
appointed for all five children.
The Agency filed a petition to terminate parental rights (“TPR petition”)
on April 13, 2016. The trial court held evidentiary hearings June 10, 2016
and September 16, 2016. At the June hearing, the Agency presented
testimony from a county health department employee and its caseworkers
who had worked with Mother and her children over the years. At the
September hearing, the Agency presented further testimony from a county
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(Footnote Continued)
rights. See Nos. 241-244 WDA 2017 (J-S31044-17) (natural father), and
Nos. 276-279 WDA 2017 (J-S31045-17) (Mother).
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health department employee, the testimony of Dr. Terry O’Hara, a
psychologist who evaluated interactions between Child and both Mother and
the foster mother, as well as the testimony of its current caseworker
assigned to the family. Although Mother was not present when the hearing
began, she appeared after a court recess and testified. At the conclusion of
her testimony and argument from counsel, the trial court took the matter
under advisement. By order dated December 19, 2016, the trial court
terminated Mother’s parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2511(a)(2), (5), (8)
and (b). This appeal follows. Both Mother and the trial court have complied
with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
ISSUE ON APPEAL
Mother raises the following issue on appeal:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion and/or err as a matter of
law in concluding that termination of [Mother’s] parental rights
would serve the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S. §2511(b)?
Mother’s Brief at 5.
LEGAL ANALYSIS
“[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard when
considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for termination of
parental rights.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012).
This standard of review requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of
fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported by
the record.” Id. “If the factual findings are supported, appellate courts
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review to determine if the trial court made an error of law or abused its
discretion.” Id. We may reverse a decision based on an abuse of discretion
“only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, partiality,
prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. We may not reverse, however, “merely
because the record would support a different result.” In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d
251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
We give great deference to the trial courts “that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.” Id. Moreover, the
trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and
is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in
the evidence. In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009). We
have explained that “[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is
defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of
the truth of the precise facts in issue.” Id. (citation omitted).
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(a)
Mother concedes that the Agency presented sufficient evidence to
terminate her parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). See Mother’s
Brief at 10. Thus, we need not discuss Section 2511(a) further.
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Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(b)
By not contesting the trial court’s findings regarding Section 2511(a),
Mother concedes her inability to parent. With respect to Section 2511(b),
she argues that the trial court erred when it “compared its perceived
benefits of [Child’s] foster mother to [Mother’s] perceived faults and applied
a fault-based analysis of [her family service plan] compliance in concluding
that termination of her parental rights would serve [Child’s] needs and
welfare.” Mother’s Brief at 9. In addition, Mother asserts that the trial court
“failed to analyze the emotional effect that termination of parental rights
would have on [Child].” Id. We disagree.
With respect to Section 2511(b), our analysis shifts focus from
parental actions in fulfilling parental duties to the effect that terminating the
parental bond will have on the child. Section 2511(b) “focuses on whether
termination of parental rights would best serve the developmental, physical,
and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” In re: Adoption of J.M.,
991 A.2d 321, 324 (Pa. Super. 2010).
In In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1287 (Pa. Super. 2005), this Court
found that “[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are
involved in the inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In addition,
the trial court “must also discern the nature and status of the parent-child
bond, with utmost attention to the effect on the child of permanently
severing that bond.” Id. The extent of the bond-effect analysis necessarily
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depends on the circumstances of the particular case. In re K.M., 53 A.3d
781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012).
When performing a needs and welfare analysis, trial courts are
permitted to consider the totality of the circumstances. In re Coast, 561
A.2d 762, 771 (Pa. Super. 1989) (en banc). The mere existence of an
emotional bond between parent and child, however, does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 267. Indeed, the bond
between parent and child must not be viewed solely from the child’s view
point; rather, a bilateral relationship must exist which emanates from the
parent’s willingness to parent appropriately. In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529,
534-35 (Pa. Super. 2008).
As noted above, this Court may not disturb the trial court’s credibility
determinations. In re M.G., supra.In the instant case, the trial court found, based primarily on Dr.
O’Hara’s evaluations, that although Mother and Child share a bond, it is not
a healthy one. The court considered the expert’s evaluation of the foster
mother’s interactions with Child and the strides Child has made while in her
care and concluded that, given the expert evidence, the benefits of adoption
by the foster mother outweighed any detriment that may be experienced by
Child upon severing Mother’s parental rights. The court explained:
This Court finds that the bond between Mother and [Child]
is an unhealthy one. Dr. O’Hara opined that [Child] was in
need of structure, stability and permanency and the he did
not have sufficient evidence that Mother was in a position
to appropriately care for [Child]. This Court could not
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agree more and has concluded that the bond between
[Child] and [Mother] is not significant enough to disrupt
the permanency that [Child] has achieved in her foster
home. Dr. O’Hara further opined that [Child] exhibited
several components of a secure attachment with her foster
mother and that [Child] reported being best cared for by
her foster mother.
Since being placed in her current foster home, [Child]
has made remarkable progress. This progress can best be
highlighted from the recommendation made by Dr. O’Hara
in 2015 versus the one made in 2016. In 2015, [Child’s]
behaviors were so out of control in school that he was
recommending that she be placed in a residential
treatment facility. In Dr. O’Hara’s most recent evaluation,
it was reported that [Child] had transitioned into a
mainstream school and had made the high honor roll. This
Court must acknowledge that the foster mother in this
case did an outstanding job addressing [Child’s] needs.
With the help of services and foster mother’s constant
support, [Child] has transformed dramatically. [Child] has
finally achieved stability and permanency that she so
desperately needed.
As such, the Court finds that the benefits of adoption
outweigh any potential detriment that accompanies
termination of [Mother’s parental] rights. It is the opinion
of this Court that [the Agency] has proven by clear and
convincing evidence that termination best suits the needs
and welfare of [Child]. For those reasons, the order of this
Court should be affirmed.
Trial Court Opinion, 2/17/176, at 19-20.
Contrary to Mother’s contentions, the trial court only compared Mother
and foster mother to the extent their actions or inactions have affected
Child’s permanency needs. Stated differently, in considering the totality of
the circumstances, the trial court concluded that the best interests of Child,
including Child’s emotional security, permanency, and stability, are best
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served by terminating Mother’s parental rights. Moreover, the court’s
analysis above clearly demonstrates that the trial court considered the
emotional effect that termination of Mother’s parental rights will have on
Child.
Our review of the record supports the trial court’s determination that
the Agency met its burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother’s parental rights should be terminated pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(b). Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/7/2017
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