Com. v. Sigecan, L. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
LAURENCE SIGECAN, : No. 819 WDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, April 7, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Criminal Division at Nos. CP-02-CR-0010683-2014,
CP-02-CR-0015850-2014
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., MUNDY AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED APRIL 15, 2016
Laurence Sigecan appeals the judgment of sentence entered by the
Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County that sentenced him to an
aggregate term of three years’ probation following his nolo contendere
plea to terroristic threats with intent to terrorize another, resisting arrest,
making a false report, tampering with or fabricating physical evidence, and
obstructing the administration of law.1
On May 14, 2014, the Shaler Police Department contacted the Green
Tree Borough Police Department (“Department”) and asked for assistance in
the service of a warrant on appellant who resided at 48 Robinhood Road in
1
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2706(a)(1), 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5104, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4906(a),
18 Pa.C.S.A. § 4910(1), and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5101, respectively.
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Green Tree. Lieutenant Rannigan (“Lt. Rannigan”) of the Department went
to appellant’s residence. Lt. Rannigan informed appellant of the outstanding
arrest warrant and placed appellant in custody. When appellant was taken
outside his residence, he became rigid, gritted his teeth, and stared at
Lt. Rannigan. Appellant “chest bumped” Lieutenant Rannigan and began to
push him with his body. Appellant resisted Lt. Rannigan’s efforts to get him
in the police car. Appellant started shouting profanities at Lt. Rannigan and
told him that once he got the handcuffs off, he “was going to get him.”
(Nolo contendere plea/sentencing hearing, 4/7/15 at 3-4.)
On June 11, 2014, appellant entered the Department in order to file a
criminal complaint against Lt. Rannigan. Appellant alleged that Lt. Rannigan
assaulted him on the day of the arrest. Appellant gave Department Chief
Downey photographs of his injuries allegedly caused by Lt. Rannigan.
Appellant asserted that Lt. Rannigan threw him to the ground while
appellant was handcuffed and then stomped on his back and his handcuffs
which caused injuries. On June 23, 2014, appellant submitted a written
complaint to the Department and requested an investigation. (Id. at 6-7.)
Chief Downey’s investigation included a viewing of video footage from
the Allegheny County Jail on May 15, 2014, the night of the arrest, which
showed appellant removing a credit card from his pocket and then cutting
his wrist with a slicing motion which allegedly caused the injury depicted in
the photographs. (Id. at 7.)
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On October 15, 2014, Allegheny County Detective James Smith
(“Detective Smith”) interviewed appellant who showed Detective Smith the
same photographs that he presented to Chief Downey. When confronted
with the video from the county jail, appellant changed his story and stated
that Lt. Rannigan did not throw him to the ground and did not stomp on his
back or his wrists when the handcuffs were on. He also denied cutting
himself with the credit card. (Id. at 7-8.)
Appellant was charged with aggravated assault (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2702(a)(3)), terroristic threats, resisting arrest, harassment (18 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 2709(a)(1)), and disorderly conduct (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 5503(a)(1)) for the
incident with Lt. Rannigan. He was also charged with false reports to law
enforcement, tampering with/fabricating physical evidence, and obstructing
administration of law.
On April 7, 2015, appellant entered a negotiated nolo contendere
plea to terroristic threats, resisting arrest, false reports,
tampering/fabricating physical evidence, and obstructing administration of
law for a probationary sentence. The Commonwealth dropped the
aggravated assault charge. For the harassment and disorderly conduct
charges, appellant was determined to be guilty without further penalty.
In the written plea colloquy, appellant answered “Yes” to the following
questions:
6. Have you discussed with your attorney the
elements for each charged offense?
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....
7. Have you discussed with your attorney the
factual basis of each charged offense?
....
8. Have you discussed with your attorney how the
facts in your case prove the elements of each
charged offense?
....
44. Have you and your attorney discussed the
maximum possible sentences which this Court
could impose?
Nolo contendere, explanation of defendant’s rights, 4/7/15 at 2 and 7, ¶¶
6-8, and 44.
At the nolo contendere plea/sentencing hearing on April 7, 2015, the
trial court asked appellant and his counsel the following questions:
The Court: Are you clearheaded today, sir?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Have you had enough time to speak with
your attorney about the elements of each crime to
which you are pleading no contest, the nature of the
no-contest plea and your right to have a trial?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Are you satisfied with his representation?
The Defendant: Absolutely.
....
The Court: I have in front of me a Guilty [sic] plea
colloquy. It bears your signature as well as that of
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your attorney. Did you read and understand each
question?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Did you answer each question honestly?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Was your attorney available in the event
you had any questions about this document or any
matter related to this case?
The Defendant: Yes, sir.
The Court: Mr. Bishop,[2] based on your experience
and contact with your client, do you believe he
understands the elements of each crime, the
maximum penalties allowed by law, and that he is
otherwise making a knowing, intelligent and
voluntary decision to plead guilty [sic]?
Mr. Bishop: Yes, Your Honor.
Nolo contendere plea/sentencing hearing, 4/7/15 at 3-4.
The trial court accepted the plea.
On April 17, 2015, appellant moved to withdraw his nolo contendere
plea:
6. Mr. Sigecan avers that he did not have
sufficient time to consider and evaluate his
options prior to entering his pleas on April 7,
2015. Specifically, he avers that he did not
have sufficient time to fully understand the
consequences of a plea of nolo contendere
and felt pressured by Trial Counsel to enter the
pleas.
2
Adam Bishop, Esq., served as appellant’s plea counsel.
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7. Mr. Sigecan instructed Trial Counsel to file this
timely Motion to Withdraw Nolo Contendere
Pleas, asserting that his pleas were not
knowingly, intelligently, or voluntarily made.
8. Accordingly, Mr. Sigecan respectfully requests
this Honorable Court allow him to withdraw his
pleas of nolo contendere at the
above-captioned cases.
Motion to withdraw nolo contendere pleas, 4/17/15 at 2, ¶¶ 6-8.
On April 24, 2015, the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the
nolo contendere plea. The trial court reasoned:
Here, the Trial Court determined that the totality of
the circumstances demonstrated that Appellant’s
plea was knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily
entered into, to wit: (1) Appellant completed a
written and oral plea colloquy; [] (2) Appellant
stated that he read and understood each question in
the written colloquy, and answered each question
honestly; (3) the Commonwealth placed the
negotiated plea agreements on the record and
Appellant acknowledged that that was his
understanding of the agreement; (4) Appellant
benefited from the plea agreement by the withdrawal
of the aggravated assault charge and the agreement
to a sentence of probation; (5) Appellant stated that
he was clear-headed, he had enough time to speak
with his attorney about the elements of each crime
to which he was pleading no contest, and that he
was not threatened or promised anything to force
him to plead no contest; (6) Appellant’s attorney
stated that based on his communication with
Appellant, he believed that Appellant understood the
elements of the crimes, the maximum penalties
allowed by law, and that he was making a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent plea of no contest;
(7) Appellant apologized for wasting the court’s time;
and (8) Appellant was sentenced to probation that
same day. (Plea Transcript, pp. 2-4, 6, 8-9).
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It was only after sentencing that Appellant sought to
withdraw his plea. Appellant’s disappointment with
the sentence does not amount to manifest injustice,
and appellant cannot now say that he lied under oath
during the written and oral colloquy. Given the
totality of the circumstances, it is clear that
Appellant was advised by counsel of the elements of
each crime, and the maximum penalties allowed by
law. The Trial Court properly found that Appellant
entered into a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent
plea. See Commonwealth v. Stork, 737 A.2d 789,
790-792 (Pa.Super. 1999) (affirming denial of
motion to withdraw plea because defendant failed to
establish manifest injustice and plea was voluntary
and knowing based on the totality of the
circumstances).
This claim is without merit.
Trial court opinion, 11/17/15 at 7-9.
Appellant raises the following issue before this court:
Did the plea court err in not permitting Mr. Sigecan
to withdraw his nolo contendere plea in that his plea
was not entered knowingly and voluntarily when he
was unaware and did not fully understand the nature
of the charges to which he was pleading when the
court specifically failed to advise him of all legal
elements of the alleged crimes or to inform him of
maximum and minimum penalties which was a
manifest injustice?
Appellant’s brief at 5 (capitalization omitted).
“In terms of its effect upon a case, a plea of nolo contendere is
treated the same as a guilty plea.” Commonwealth v. Miller, 748 A.2d
733, 735 (Pa.Super. 2000), citing Commonwealth v. Boatwright, 590
A.2d 15, 19 (Pa.Super. 1991). A defendant must demonstrate manifest
injustice in order to prevail on a post-sentence motion to withdraw a plea of
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nolo contendere. Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 777 A.2d 1104, 1107
(Pa.Super. 2001). A defendant can establish manifest injustice by showing
that he or she did not voluntarily tender the plea. Id. However,
disappointment by a defendant in the sentence imposed does not constitute
manifest injustice. Commonwealth v. Muhammad, 794 A.2d 378, 383
(Pa.Super. 2002).
Rule 590 of the Pennsylvania Rules of Criminal Procedure,
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590 provides in pertinent part:
Rule 590. Pleas and Plea Agreement.
....
(B) PLEA AGREEMENTS.
(1) When counsel for both sides have arrived
at a plea agreement, they shall state on
the record in open court, in the presence
of the defendant, the terms of the
agreement, unless the judge orders, for
good cause shown and with the consent
of the defendant, counsel for the
defendant, and the attorney for the
Commonwealth, that specific conditions
in the agreement be placed on the record
in camera and the record sealed.
(2) The judge shall conduct a separate
inquiry of the defendant on the record to
determine whether the defendant
understands and voluntarily accepts the
terms of the plea agreement on which
the guilty plea or plea of nolo
contendere is based.
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When a trial court determines whether a plea of nolo contendere was
tendered knowingly and voluntarily, the trial judge must ascertain the
answers to the following questions:
(1) Does the defendant understand the nature of
the charges to which he or she is pleading
guilty or nolo contendere?
(2) Is there a factual basis for the plea?
(3) Does the defendant understand that he or she
has the right to trial by jury?
(4) Does the defendant understand that he or she
is presumed innocent until found guilty?
(5) Is the defendant aware of the permissible
range of sentences and/or fines for the
offenses charged?
(6) Is the defendant aware that the judge is not
bound by the terms of any plea agreement
tendered unless the judge accepts such
agreement?
Pa.R.Crim.P. 590, Comment; Jefferson, 777 A.2d at 1107. A court must
examine the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a defendant
voluntarily entered into a plea. Commonwealth v. Allen, 732 A.2d 582,
588-589 (Pa. 1999). “When reviewing a trial court’s denial of a motion to
withdraw a plea of [nolo contendere], we will not disturb the court’s
decision absent an abuse of discretion.” Miller, 748 A.2d at 735.
“In order for a guilty plea to be constitutionally valid,
the guilty plea colloquy must affirmatively show that
the defendant understood what the plea connoted
and its consequences.” Commonwealth v.
Broadwater, 330 Pa.Super. 234, 244, 479 A.2d
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526, 532 (1984). This determination is to be made
“by examining the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the entry of the plea.” Id. Thus, even
though there is an omission or defect in the guilty
plea colloquy, a plea of guilty will not be deemed
invalid if the circumstances surrounding the entry of
the plea disclose that this defendant had a full
understanding of the nature and consequences of his
plea and that he knowingly and voluntarily decided
to enter the plea.
Commonwealth v. Fluharty, 632 A.2d 312, 314-315 (Pa.Super. 1993)
(additional citations omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Morrison, 878 A.2d 102, 108 (Pa.Super.
2005), this court stated, “To summarize, whether a defendant is aware of
the nature of the offenses depends on the totality of the circumstances and
a plea will not be invalidated premised solely on the plea court’s failure to
outline the elements of the crime at the oral colloquy.”
Appellant contends that the trial court failed to provide him with an
understanding of the charges against him because it did not explain to him
the elements of the offenses for which he was charged. He asserts that in
order to demonstrate his understanding of the charges, the record must
reflect that the elements of the crimes were explained to him in
understandable terms.
Appellant also asserts that the written colloquy could not be accepted
as sufficient to apprise him of the nature of the charges against him because
the form was a generic one that contained no specific information concerning
his particular situation.
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It is undisputed that the trial court did not outline the elements of the
crimes to appellant orally at the hearing. However, when the trial court
questioned him as to whether he had had time to speak with his attorney
concerning the elements of each crime, appellant replied that he had. He
further answered that he was “absolutely” satisfied with his counsel’s
representation. The trial court also asked him whether he read and
understood each question in the written colloquy and whether his attorney
had been available in the event he had any questions regarding the written
colloquy. Appellant answered “yes” to both questions. The trial court also
questioned his attorney as to whether appellant understood the elements of
each crime, and his attorney answered in the affirmative.
(Nolo contendere plea/sentencing hearing, 4/7/15 at 3-4.)
Further, in the written colloquy, appellant answered “yes” in response
to the questions as to whether he had discussed the elements of each
charged offense with his attorney and whether his attorney had discussed
with him how the facts in the case proved the elements of each charged
offense as well as whether his attorney discussed sentencing options.3
Given appellant’s written answers on the plea colloquy and his statements in
open court, it appears that he understood the nature of the plea bargain, the
consequences of his plea, the factual evidence which would lead to verdict of
3
At the hearing, the Commonwealth outlined the facts of the case which
appellant did not dispute.
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guilty, as well as the elements of the crimes for which he was charged.
Based on the totality of circumstances, this court is satisfied that there was
no manifest injustice that resulted in a plea that was involuntary or
unknowing even though the trial court did not explain the elements of the
crimes to appellant. See Morrison, 878 A.2d at 108.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/15/2016
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