Com. v. Figueroa, J., Jr. ( 2018 )

J-A07044-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOSE FIGUEROA, JR. :
:
Appellant : No. 1084 MDA 2017
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence June 23, 2017
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-22-CR-0003340-2017,
CP-22-CR-0003341-2017
BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OLSON, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED JUNE 22, 2018
Appellant, Jose Figueroa, Jr., appeals from the judgment of sentence
entered on June 23, 2017. We conclude that Appellant’s sentence was illegal
because he did not receive credit for time served in juvenile detention. Hence,
we modify Appellant’s judgment of sentence to reflect that he receive credit
for time spent in juvenile detention.
The factual background of this case is as follows. On April 5, 2017,
Appellant was loitering near a playground. A police officer noticed that
Appellant, then 17 years old, had a firearm tucked into his waistband. A
second officer stopped Appellant and recovered the firearm. At the conclusion
of a detention hearing, the issuing authority ordered Appellant confined in a
juvenile detention facility. Four days later, Appellant participated in the
vicious attack of three staff members at the juvenile detention facility.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A07044-18
The procedural history of this case is as follows. On April 11, 2017, the
Commonwealth filed two separate delinquency petitions in relation to the
firearm possession and the detention facility assault. On June 23, 2017,
pursuant to a plea agreement, Appellant consented to the transfer of the cases
to the adult criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County,
pled guilty to possession of a firearm without a license 1 and aggravated
assault,2 and was sentenced to an aggregate term of two to four years’
imprisonment. This timely appeal followed.3
Appellant presents one issue for our review:
Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it denied Appellant’s
request for time credit while detained at a juvenile detention
facility be applied to his sentence?
Appellant’s Brief at 3.
In his sole issue, Appellant argues that he was entitled to credit for time
spent in juvenile detention. Although Appellant frames this as a challenge to
the discretionary aspects of his sentence, “a claim based upon the failure to
give credit for time served is a challenge implicating the legality of one’s
sentence.” Commonwealth v. Dixon, 161 A.3d 949, 951 (Pa. Super. 2017)
(cleaned up). “We review the legality of a sentence de novo and our scope of
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6106(a)(1).
2 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2702(a)(2).
3Appellant and the trial court complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
Procedure 1925.
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review is plenary.” Commonwealth v. Foust, 180 A.3d 416, 422 (Pa. Super.
2018) (citation omitted).
Section 9760(1) governs credit for time served. It provides that:
Credit against the maximum term and any minimum term shall be
given to the defendant for all time spent in custody as a result of
the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as
a result of the conduct on which such a charge is based. Credit
shall include credit for time spent in custody prior to trial, during
trial, pending sentence, and pending the resolution of an appeal.
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9760(1). Pursuant to the Statutory Construction Act, when
the plain language of a statute is clear and free of all ambiguity, we must give
effect to that language. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(b); Commonwealth v.
Sattazahn, 128 A.3d 291, 295 (Pa. Super. 2015).
First, it is immaterial that most of Appellant’s confinement occurred
while awaiting disposition of the delinquency petitions. Section 9760(1)
provides that a defendant is entitled to credit “for all time spent in custody as
a result of the criminal charge for which a prison sentence is imposed or as a
result of the conduct on which such a charge is based.” 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 9760(1) (emphasis added). This highlighted clause makes clear that the
underlying conduct plays a significant role in determining if an individual is
entitled to credit for time served. In this case, Appellant’s confinement in the
juvenile detention center resulted from his possession of a firearm near the
playground and the assault on the facility staff. He ultimately pled guilty to
possessing a firearm without a license and aggravated assault stemming from
these incidents. It is abundantly clear that the conduct on which the charges
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were based resulted in Appellant’s confinement in the juvenile detention
facility. Hence, the transfer of the charges from the juvenile division to the
criminal division of the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County is
immaterial when determining if Appellant is entitled to credit for the time
spent in the juvenile detention center.
Appellant’s confinement in the juvenile detention facility also meets the
custodial requirement found in section 9760(1). Again, we turn to the
Statutory Construction Act to determine the meaning of “in custody.” “Words
and phrases shall be construed according to rules of grammar and according
to their common and approved usage[.]” 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1903; see Estate of
Wilner, 142 A.3d 796, 802 (Pa. 2016) (citation omitted) (words and phrases
in a statute are given their ordinary meaning).
The ordinary meaning of “in custody” includes confinement in a juvenile
detention facility. See, e.g. Commonwealth v. Heggins, 809 A.2d 908, 914
(Pa. Super. 2002), appeal denied, 827 A.2d 430 (Pa. 2003) (Commonwealth
conceding that a juvenile was in custody when confined in a juvenile detention
facility); Commonwealth v. Hubert, 430 A.2d 1160, 1161 (Pa. 1981)
(emphasis added) (The defendant “was a [16-year-old] . . . being held in
custody at a juvenile detention center.”); see generally National
Partnership for Juvenile Services, Desktop Guide to Quality Practice for
Working with Youth in Confinement, Feb. 11, 2015 (discussing how individuals
in juvenile detention centers are in custody). Hence, the phrase “in custody”
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in section 9760(1) is “free from all ambiguity” and includes time spent in
juvenile detention. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921. Because our inquiry ends with the
plain language of the statute, Appellant is entitled to credit for time spent in
juvenile detention as a result of the conduct for which he ultimately pled guilty.
Case law supports this interpretation of section 9760(1). This Court has
held that our General Assembly intentionally used the term “in custody” rather
than “imprisonment” and, therefore, “custody includes forms of restraint other
than imprisonment.” Commonwealth v. Druce, 868 A.2d 1232, 1236 (Pa.
Super. 2005) (cleaned up). Case law has drawn a distinction between time
voluntarily spent at an institution versus time involuntarily spent at an
institution. Commonwealth v. Toland, 995 A.2d 1242, 1250 (Pa. Super.
2010), appeal denied, 29 A.3d 797 (Pa. 2011) (“[W]hether a defendant is
entitled to credit for time spent in an [institution] turns on the question of
voluntariness.”). Our Supreme Court has held that defendants are not entitled
to credit for time voluntarily spent in an institution. E.g. Commonwealth v.
Conahan, 589 A.2d 1107, 1110 (Pa. 1991). On the other hand, this Court
has held that defendants are entitled to credit for time involuntarily spent in
an institution. E.g. Commonwealth v. Tout–Puissant, 823 A.2d 186, 190
(Pa. Super. 2003). Hence, as this Court explained in Toland, we must
examine whether Appellant’s confinement was voluntary.
There is nothing in our jurisprudence that supports drawing a line
between time spent in institutions for rehabilitative purposes versus time
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spent in institutions for other purposes.4 To the contrary, Conahan suggests
strongly that this is irrelevant when determining if an individual was “in
custody” for the purpose of section 9760(1). Conahan addressed the
discretionary awarding of credit for time spent in a substance abuse treatment
facility. Although time spent in a substance abuse facility is ipso facto
rehabilitative, our Supreme Court in Conahan explained that the discretionary
nature of the credit was based on the voluntariness of the treatment, not on
the purpose for the treatment. Conahan, 589 A.2d at 1110.
Moreover, both juvenile detention centers and adult prisons address the
rehabilitative needs of inmates. The Sentencing Code mandates that trial
courts consider the rehabilitative needs of a defendant when imposing a
sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9721(b). The Supreme Court of the United States
and our Supreme Court have similarly acknowledged that rehabilitation of
inmates is a critical component of adult prisons. Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817, 822-823 (1974); Brittain v. Beard, 974 A.2d 479, 488 (Pa. 2009).
Thus, there is only a minor rehabilitative distinction between juvenile
detention centers and adult prisons and we must focus on the voluntariness
of the confinement. In this case, the trial court ordered Appellant’s
confinement in the juvenile detention facility. Therefore, Appellant’s
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4 Although section 9760(1) conditions credit on custodial detention arising
from conduct on which a charge is based, the provision nowhere employs the
term “rehabilitative.” Likewise, our case law does not consider the term as a
determinative factor in awarding credit for time served.
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confinement was involuntary and he is entitled to credit under existing case
law.
In sum, the plain language of section 9760(1) indicates that Appellant
is entitled to credit for time spent in juvenile detention for the conduct to
which he ultimately pled guilty. Moreover, case law indicates that Appellant
is entitled to such credit for time involuntarily spent confined in the juvenile
detention facility.5 As Appellant does not challenge his convictions or the
discretionary aspects of his sentence, we modify Appellant’s judgment of
sentence to indicate that he receive credit for time spent in the juvenile
detention facility. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 706.
Judgment of sentence modified. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judge Panella concurs in the result of the memorandum.
P.J.E. Stevens files a dissenting memorandum.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 06/22/2018
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5 As we conclude Appellant is statutorily entitled to credit for the time served
in the juvenile detention center, we do not address his alternative
discretionary claim.
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