In Re: B.J.L. ( 2023 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: B.J.L. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: YORK/ADAMS MENTAL :
HEALTH-INTELLECTUAL & :
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES :
PROGRAM :
:
: No. 932 MDA 2022
Appeal from the Order Entered June 13, 2022
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s):
2022-SU-000222
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., MURRAY, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED: FEBRUARY 21, 2023
The York/Adams Mental Health-Intellectual & Developmental Disabilities
Program (“MH-IDD”) appeals from the order, entered in the Court of Common
Pleas of York County, granting the petition to expunge records of involuntary
treatment filed by Appellee, B.J.L. Upon careful review, we vacate the order.
On July 15, 2021, B.J.L.’s daughter’s boyfriend, Michael Talley,
contacted crisis intervention at York Hospital from his home in Illinois to
request that B.J.L. be involuntarily committed. Talley spoke with crisis
counselor Megan Fisher, whose narrative report was annexed to the petition
for involuntary treatment. Talley told Fisher that B.J.L.’s husband and
daughter had gone to Missouri to care for Husband’s mother, who was in
hospice care suffering from dementia. Talley reported that B.J.L. was “manic
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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and escalating since being home alone[ and] feels betrayed since her family
went out to help her mother-in-law.” Narrative of Crisis Counselor Megan
Fisher, 7/15/21. Talley stated that B.J.L. was “texting and calling multiple
people” and “threatening to crash her car [into] a tree and/or burn the house
down.” Id. Talley alleged that B.J.L. bought a bottle of Jack Daniel’s and
“threatened to drink herself to death.” Id. B.J.L. had allegedly threatened
her daughter’s life, stating if she does not do what B.J.L. says, “she’s as good
as dead.” Id. Talley indicated that B.J.L. threatened her husband and
daughter that “there will be hell to pay, you’ll regret crossing me, you’ll wish
you were never born[.]” Id. Talley stated that B.J.L. had purchased a plane
ticket to Missouri for the following day and was concerned that she would
instigate a physical altercation, as she “has [a] previous history of domestic
violence.” Id. Talley advised Fisher that there were guns in B.J.L.’s residence
and that B.J.L.’s 15-year-old son resided with her. Id. He stated that B.J.L.
was “currently out driving around and [he] is concerned that she may harm
herself or another motorist on the road with how erratic she has been acting.”
Id. Talley stated that B.J.L. was on her way to the AT&T store to shut
everyone’s phone off and had already closed the joint bank account with
Husband and withdrew all of the money. Id.
Attached to the petition for involuntary commitment were copies of text
messages sent by B.J.L. to her daughter. In one message, B.J.L. stated “[o]r
better yet maybe I will burn this house down so he really doesn’t have
anything to come back to[].” Application for Involuntary Emergency
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Examination and Treatment, 7/15/21, at 3 (Attachments to Application). In
another message, B.J.L. stated “[i]f I wrap []this car around a pole he can
[thank] himself.” Id. Another string of texts read:
It doesn’t matter.
With no job no nothing we will lose everything.
I will end up on the streets.
And dad and grandma will be [living] with you.
I don’t even care maybe only just drop over dead because I don’t
seem to matter anyway.
He finally got what he wanted.
Id.
Finally, B.J.L. texted a photo of a bottle of Jack Daniel’s whiskey and
stated:
And now your dad doesn’t have to worry about calling or texting
me!! This will kill the pain and when I wake up he will be as much
as dead to me. And [e]ven he thinks I’m kidding maybe he should
as Shyrl, Jim and Betty how that working out for them.
I warned both of you the last time you went to M[issouri] and
treated me like this.
Id.
Based on the representations contained in the application for involuntary
treatment, which was completed by Crisis Counselor Fisher on Talley’s behalf,
a warrant was issued, directing that B.J.L. be taken to York Hospital and
examined. Upon her arrival at York Hospital, B.J.L. was examined by Michael
O. Khoury, D.O., who reported the results of his examination as follows:
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“Suicidal ideation with a plan, burning house down[,] crashing car, homicidal
ideation with a plan[.]” Id. at 7 (Physician’s Examination). Based on his
examination of B.J.L., Dr. Khoury recommended involuntary psychiatric
hospitalization; B.J.L. was subsequently admitted to the psychiatric floor of
York Hospital.1 See id.
On February 1, 2022, B.J.L. filed a petition to expunge the records of
her involuntary treatment and to restore her firearms rights pursuant to 18
Pa.C.S.A. §§ 6111.1(g)(2) and 6105(f)(1), respectively. Following a hearing,
at which B.J.L. and her son testified, the trial court issued an order expunging
the records of B.J.L.’s involuntary treatment and reinstating her firearms
rights.2 MH-IDD filed a timely notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
MH-IDD raises the following issues for our review:
1. When there was sufficient evidence relied upon by the
physician to warrant the [s]ection 302 commitment, did the [trial]
court abuse its discretion in granting the petition [for
expungement]?
2. When B.J.L. did not contest the validity of the signature on the
warrant, thereby waiving any objection in relation thereto, and
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1 On the day of her admission, K.J.L. was examined by another doctor, who
subsequently ordered her immediate release. However, K.J.L.’s swift
discharge was not a factor to be considered either by the trial court or by this
Court on appeal. See In re Vencil, 152 A.3d 235, 241 (Pa. 2017) (trial
court’s review of sufficiency of evidence supporting 302 commitment limited
to information available to physician at the time decision to commit made).
2 MH-IDD does not appeal the court’s determination with respect to B.J.L’s
firearms rights under section 6105(f)(1). See Brief of Appellant, at 6.
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when there was no evidence presented otherwise to suggest the
warrant’s signature was invalid, did the [trial] court abuse its
discretion in granting the [p]etition [for expungement]?[3]
Brief of Appellant, at 4.
“Our well-settled standard of review in cases involving a motion for
expunction is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” Commonwealth
v. Smerconish, 112 A.3d 1260, 1263 (Pa. Super. 2015). To the extent that
questions exist concerning the sufficiency of the evidence supporting B.J.L.’s
commitment, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is
plenary. In re Vencil, 152 A.3d at 241.
B.J.L. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
involuntary commitment. Pursuant to the Mental Health Procedures Act
(“MHPA”),4 a person for whom there are “reasonable grounds to believe” that
she is “severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment” may
be subjected to an involuntary examination by a physician. 50 P.S. § 7302(a).
When an individual is brought in for an examination and determination of her
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3 Here, the court sua sponte concluded that the warrant was “faulty” because
it did not bear the signature of the county administrator, Sharon Harlacher,
as required by 50 P.S. 7302(a). Rather, the warrant appears to have been
executed by an unknown individual on behalf of Administrator Harlacher.
However, B.J.L. did not challenge the validity of the warrant on this basis in
her petition to expunge. Where a trial court relies upon issues raised sua
sponte in granting relief, it inappropriately impinges upon the role of the
litigants. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Nelson, 690 A.2d 728, 730 (Pa.
Super. 1997). Accordingly, to the extent that the trial court based its
determination on the validity of the warrant, it erred. However, the court
went on to address the sufficiency of the evidence, and we will review that
determination on its own merits.
4 50 P.S. §§ 7101-7503.
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need for emergency mental health treatment, the physician must determine,
within two hours of the individual’s arrival, whether the person is in fact
“severely mentally disabled” and “in need of immediate treatment.” Id. at §
7302(b).
An individual is “severely mentally disabled” if, “as a result of mental
illness, [her] capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and discretion in the
conduct of [her] affairs and social relations or to care for [her] own personal
needs is so lessened that [she] poses a clear and present danger of harm to
others or to h[er]self.” Id. at § 7301(a). What constitutes a “clear and
present danger” is defined, in relevant part, by section 301 of the MHPA:
(1) Clear and present danger to others shall be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days the person has inflicted
or attempted to inflict serious bodily harm on another and that
there is a reasonable probability that such conduct will be
repeated. . . .
(2) Clear and present danger to h[er]self shall be shown by
establishing that within the past 30 days:
***
(ii) the person has attempted suicide and that there is the
reasonable probability of suicide unless adequate treatment
is afforded under this act. For the purposes of this
subsection, a clear and present danger may be
demonstrated by the proof that the person has made threats
to commit suicide and has committed acts which are in
furtherance of the threat to commit suicide[.]
Id. at § 7301(b). If the examining physician determines that the person is
“severely mentally disabled and in need of immediate treatment, treatment
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shall be begun immediately” and continue until “there is no longer a need for
immediate treatment,” up to 120 hours. Id. at §§ 7302(b), (d).
The Uniform Firearms Act (“UFA”) prohibits a person who has been
involuntarily committed for psychiatric treatment under section 302 from
possessing, using, controlling, selling, transferring, manufacturing, or
obtaining a license to possess a firearm. See 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 6105(c)(4).
Section 6111.1(g)(2) of the UFA provides one avenue to lift the firearm
restrictions that result from a 302 commitment, providing, in relevant part, as
follows:
A person who is involuntarily committed pursuant to section 302
of the [MHPA] may petition the court to review the sufficiency of
the evidence upon which the commitment was based. If the court
determines that the evidence upon which the involuntary
commitment was based was insufficient, the court shall order that
the record of the commitment submitted to the Pennsylvania State
Police be expunged.
Id. at § 6111.1(g)(2) (footnote omitted). “The evidence upon which the
commitment was based” is the information contained in the physician’s record
of the examination of the individual and the resultant findings.” In re Vencil,
152 A.3d at 242.
In a proceeding under section 6111.1(g)(2),
the appropriate standard of proof applicable to the physician’s
record findings is a preponderance of the evidence standard,
which is generally applicable to civil matters and has been
classified as “a more likely than not inquiry,” supported by the
greater weight of the evidence; something a reasonable person
would accept as sufficient to support a decision.
Id. at 246.
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Here, MH-IDD argues that the information included in the application for
commitment, as detailed supra, as well as the findings of Dr. Khoury following
his examination, were sufficient to support B.J.L.’s involuntary commitment.
We are constrained to agree.
The application for commitment submitted by MH-IDD asserted that
B.J.L. was severely mentally disabled and posed a clear and present danger
to others, pursuant to section 7301(b)(1), and was a suicide risk, pursuant to
section 7301(b)(2)(ii). Both subsections of the MHPA require that the
individual has taken “acts in furtherance of the threat.” 50 P.S. §§ 7301(b)(1),
(2)(ii). While B.J.L. argues that she committed no “acts in furtherance,” this
Court has repeatedly held that “engaging in the planning process constitutes
an act in furtherance of the threat to commit suicide.” In re B.W., 250 A.3d
1163, 1175 (Pa. 2021). While the record is scant regarding the specific
information gleaned by Dr. Khoury in his examination of B.J.L., his written
findings indicate that B.J.L. expressed suicidal ideation “with a plan,” which
included burning down her house and crashing her car. Although B.J.L.
subsequently denied at the hearing on her petition for expungement that she
had been suicidal, consideration of that testimony was beyond the scope of
the trial court’s review. See In re Vencil, supra (sufficiency review of
evidence supporting 302 commitment limited to information available to
physician at time of decision to commit). Moreover, the information provided
to Crisis Counselor Fisher by Talley, as well as the text messages from B.J.L.,
are consistent with Dr. Khoury’s conclusions following his examination.
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Accordingly, evaluated under the proper standard and scope of review, the
evidence was sufficient to support B.J.L.’s involuntary commitment. As such,
the trial court erred in granting her petition for expungement under section
6111.1(g)(2).
Order granting expungement of involuntary treatment records vacated.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/21/2023
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