Com. v. Stidfole, C. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S04023-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    CASEY MICHAEL STIDFOLE                     :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 1180 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered November 23, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lycoming County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-41-CR-0000030-2014,
    CP-41-CR-0000103-2014, CP-41-CR-0000535-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                              FILED OCTOBER 19, 2018
    Appellant, Casey Michael Stidfole, appeals from the Judgment of
    Sentence entered on November 23, 2016 in the Lycoming County Court of
    Common Pleas following the revocation of his probation. We affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this matter are as follows.
    On June 27, 2014, Appellant entered pleas of guilty to Retail Theft, Theft by
    Unlawful Taking, and Burglary.1, 2 As part of Appellant’s plea agreement, the
    Commonwealth waived Appellant’s ineligibility for the State Intermediate
    Punishment (“SIP”) program.             The trial court deferred sentencing for
    ____________________________________________
    1Appellant entered guilty pleas at docket numbers 30-2014; 103-2014; and
    535-2014.
    2 The transcript from Appellant’s guilty plea hearing does not appear in the
    record.
    J-S04023-18
    Appellant to undergo an SIP program evaluation to determine his eligibility
    for the program.
    On January 27, 2015, the court held a sentencing hearing,3 after which
    it sentenced Appellant to complete the SIP program for his conviction of
    Burglary at an unrelated docket number.4         The court also sentenced
    Appellant to one year of probation for each of these three other convictions.
    The court ordered Appellant to serve each of these terms of probation
    consecutive to one another and consecutive to his SIP sentence. One of the
    conditions of Appellant’s probation was his successful completion of the SIP
    sentence.
    On August 3, 2016, the court revoked Appellant’s SIP and probation
    sentences because he had been expelled from the SIP program. The court
    resentenced Appellant to time-served on the crime for which it imposed SIP,
    and consecutive terms of six months’ to two years’ less one day
    incarceration for his Retail Theft conviction; one year of probation for his
    Theft by Unlawful Taking conviction; and four years of probation for his
    Burglary conviction.
    On October 27, 2016, Appellant was paroled and directed to
    immediately report to the Adult Probation Office (“APO”). As conditions of
    ____________________________________________
    3 The transcript from Appellant’s January 27, 2015 sentencing hearing is not
    included in the record.
    4   Docket Number 2145-2013.
    -2-
    J-S04023-18
    his parole and probation, the court ordered Appellant, inter alia, to report to
    his AOP officer as directed, refrain from using drugs, complete the Vivitrol5
    Program, complete drug treatment, and complete the Re-entry Services
    Program.
    On November 4, 2016, Appellant was detained on probation and parole
    violations. At a hearing on November 23, 2016, Appellant admitted that he
    violated his probation and parole by using methamphetamines and cocaine.
    The APO testified that Appellant failed to report for treatment and APO visits,
    attempted to avoid his Vivitrol shot, and lied to his APO officer. The court,
    therefore, revoked Appellant’s probation and parole and sentenced Appellant
    to serve the balance of his Retail Theft sentence and a three to seven-year
    term of incarceration for his Burglary conviction.        The court vacated
    Appellant’s sentence of probation on his Theft by Unlawful Taking conviction,
    and imposed a sentence of no further penalty.
    On December 9, 2016, Appellant filed a Motion to Reconsider Sentence
    Nunc Pro Tunc, in which he alleged that the court imposed an excessive
    sentence.      In particular, Appellant complained that the court failed to
    “consider the loss of his best friend and his mother by homicide and its
    ____________________________________________
    5 Vivitrol is a non-addictive extended-release injectable drug designed to
    prevent opioid and alcohol dependence after detox by physiologically
    reducing cravings.
    -3-
    J-S04023-18
    effect on him[,]” his immediate admission that he had relapsed, and the fact
    that he turned himself in to the APO. See Motion, 12/9/16, at ¶¶ 5-6.
    On   December      12,   2016,    the    court   denied   Appellant’s   Motion.
    Appellant did not file a direct appeal from his Judgment of Sentence.
    On March 6, 2017, the trial court entered an Order on the docket
    referencing a letter Appellant had sent to the court requesting the
    reinstatement of his direct appeal rights.6 The court treated this letter as a
    Petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 9541-9546, and appointed PCRA counsel.
    On April 5, 2017, counsel filed an Amended PCRA Petition.               On June
    30, 2017, the PCRA court reinstated Appellant’s direct appeal rights nunc pro
    tunc.     This timely appeal followed.          Both Appellant and the trial court
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following two issues on appeal:
    1. The [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion by
    imposing a manifestly excessive aggregate sentence of three
    to seven years[’] incarceration following technical supervision
    violations without properly considering the general principles
    of sentencing.
    2. The [t]rial [c]ourt committed an abuse of discretion by
    imposing a sentence of total confinement following revocation
    of Appellant’s supervision without considering the record of
    Appellant’s original sentencing proceeding in violation of 42
    Pa.C.S. § 9771(d).
    ____________________________________________
    6   This letter does not appear in the certified record.
    -4-
    J-S04023-18
    Appellant’s Brief at 5.
    Appellant’s first issue challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence.    Challenges to the discretionary aspects of sentencing do not
    entitle an appellant to review as of right, and a challenge in this regard is
    properly viewed as a petition for allowance of appeal. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9781(b);
    Commonwealth         v.   Tuladziecki,   
    522 A.2d 17
    ,    18   (Pa.   1987);
    Commonwealth v. Sierra, 
    752 A.2d 910
    , 912 (Pa. Super. 2000).                  An
    appellant challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence must satisfy a
    four-part test. We evaluate: (1) whether Appellant filed a timely notice of
    appeal; (2) whether Appellant preserved the issue at sentencing or in a
    motion to reconsider and modify sentence; (3) whether Appellant’s brief
    includes a concise statement of the reasons relied upon for allowance of
    appeal; and (4) whether the concise statement raises a substantial question
    that   the    sentence    is   appropriate   under     the    Sentencing   Code.
    Commonwealth v. Carrillo-Diaz, 
    64 A.3d 722
    , 725 (Pa. Super. 2013). An
    appellant must articulate the reasons the sentencing court’s actions violated
    the Sentencing Code. Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    , 170 (Pa.
    Super. 2010); 
    Sierra, 752 A.2d at 912
    –13.
    In the instant case, Appellant did not preserve the specific challenge to
    the discretionary aspects of his sentence that he seeks to raise on appeal
    either at sentencing or in his Motion to Reconsider Sentence. In particular,
    Appellant did not raise any claim alleging an abuse of the sentencing court’s
    discretion; identify how or in what manner the court violated the sentencing
    -5-
    J-S04023-18
    code; allege that his sentence was excessive or unreasonable; or allege that
    the court failed to consider any required sentencing factor or improperly
    weighed evidence. As 
    noted supra
    , Appellant merely alleged that the court
    failed to “consider the loss of his best friend and his mother by homicide and
    its effect on him[,]” his immediate admission that he had relapsed, and that
    he turned himself in to the APO. See Motion, 12/9/16, at ¶¶ 5-6.
    Given this fatal oversight, Appellant has waived this issue on appeal.
    See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (“Issues not raised in the lower court are waived and
    cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”).7
    In his second issue, Appellant claims that the trial court erred in not
    considering the Notes of Testimony of Appellant’s original sentencing hearing
    before imposing a sentence of total confinement at his revocation hearing.
    ____________________________________________
    7 Appellant relies on Commonwealth v. Malovich, 
    903 A.2d 1247
    (Pa.
    Super. 2006), in support of his argument that he did not waive this issue on
    appeal because “the record does not reveal that he was apprised on the
    need to file post-sentence motions to preserve issues for appeal.”
    Appellant’s Brief at 16. In Malovich, the defendant sought to challenge the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence on appeal, but failed to file any post-
    sentence motion preserving the claim. This Court concluded that, because
    the sentencing court did not inform the defendant that he could file such a
    motion, the defendant’s failure to preserve his issue in a post-sentence
    motion did not result in waiver of the claim on appeal.
    Here, although the Notes of Testimony confirm that the court did not
    inform Appellant that he could or should file a post-sentence motion,
    Appellant did, in fact, file a Motion to Reconsider Sentence in which he
    attempted to challenge the discretionary aspects of his sentence on grounds
    other than those presented in his Brief to this Court. Accordingly, because
    Malovich is factually inapposite, Appellant’s reliance on it is misplaced.
    -6-
    J-S04023-18
    Appellant’s Brief at 19-21.     We find this issue similarly waived because
    Appellant did not raise it at his sentencing or in his Motion to Reconsider
    Sentence.
    Moreover, even if Appellant had not waived this issue, he would not be
    entitled to relief.    This Court’s review of the Notes of Testimony of
    Appellant’s November 16, 2016 Sentencing Hearing reveals that the
    sentencing court, which had presided over every stage of this proceeding—
    from Appellant’s original guilty plea hearing to the resentencing that is the
    subject of the instant appeal—ably and thoroughly considered the full history
    of this matter.       See Trial Ct. Op., 10/13/17, at 7-12.          The court
    acknowledged Appellant’s mental health and drug dependence issues and
    noted its repeated attempts over the course of three years to assist him in
    obtaining treatment by avoiding incarcerating Appellant when possible, and,
    when incarceration was required, in sentencing him to county jail instead of
    state prison. The court further noted its desire that Appellant “succeed in
    the various programs to which he was sentenced to complete so that he
    would be a healthy and productive member of society.”          
    Id. at 10.
       The
    court observed that, after so many failed efforts, Appellant “left the court
    with no choice but to revoke his probation[.]” 
    Id. Thus, we
    would conclude
    that, in the instant case, the sentencing court did not abuse its discretion in
    failing to refer specifically to the Notes of Testimony from Appellant’s original
    sentencing hearing.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
    -7-
    J-S04023-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/19/2018
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1180 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 10/19/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024