Com. v. Gebhardt, T. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S48040-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    THOMAS GEBHARDT                            :
    :
    Appellant               :     No. 125 EDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence November 29, 2017
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
    Criminal Division at No.: CP-39-CR-0000433-2016
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.:                             FILED OCTOBER 30, 2018
    Appellant, Thomas Gebhardt, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    imposed following his conceded violation of conditions of his parole. Appellant
    challenges the court’s imposition of a consecutive sentence instead of a
    concurrent one. Counsel has filed an Anders1 brief, and a petition to withdraw
    from representation. Counsel’s petition to withdraw is granted. Judgment of
    sentence affirmed.
    The underlying facts of this case are not in dispute. Appellant conceded
    that he violated the conditions of parole by, among other things, committing
    ____________________________________________
    1   Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967).
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S48040-18
    acts which resulted in his arrest on May 5, 2017.     (See N.T. Gagnon II
    Hearing, 11/29/17, at 2).
    On appeal, the Anders brief challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence.   Specifically, consistent with Appellant’s own statements at the
    hearing, and the argument of counsel, the Anders brief challenges the trial
    court’s decision to make his new sentence consecutive to a previously imposed
    sentence in an unrelated matter.
    At the hearing, counsel for Appellant asked the court to sentence him
    concurrently to make him eligible for parole at the same time that he was
    scheduled to become eligible on an unrelated felony sentence. (See N.T.
    Hearing, at 7; see also Anders Brief, at 9).
    Appellant also wanted to serve his sentences in county prison.       He
    blamed his numerous legal problems on drug addiction.          He asked for
    rehabilitative treatment, claiming no one had ever given him that chance.
    (See N.T. Gagnon II Hearing, 11/29/17, at 2).
    The trial court disputed Appellant’s claim. (“Do you know why that is?
    Because you blew off your Probation Officer for about six months. That’s why
    you haven’t had treatment.”). (See id. at 8). The court revoked Appellant’s
    parole, and resentenced him to serve the balance of the sentence previously
    imposed, consecutive to his sentence at Case No. 2954/2017. (See id. at
    9). The court declined to make the sentence concurrent, explaining “If I run
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    J-S48040-18
    it concurrently there is no consequence for you for this case that I put you on
    supervision for.” (Id.).
    Nevertheless, Appellant was made eligible for parole after serving one-
    third of his sentence. (See id.). Appellant was also RRRI eligible. (See id.
    at 11).
    Appellant filed a notice of appeal, on December 21, 2017.2 Counsel filed
    a petition to withdraw on March 27, 2018. Counsel also filed an Anders brief.
    The Anders brief raises two questions for our review:
    A. Whether the [trial] court abused its sentencing discretion
    when, after determination that [Appellant] had violated his
    probation, the court sentenced him to a consecutive term of
    imprisonment in a state correctional institution?
    B. May appointed counsel be permitted to withdraw after a
    conscientious review of the issues and the facts pursuant to the
    Anders case?
    (Anders Brief, at 7) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
    It is well-settled that “[w]hen considering an Anders brief, this Court
    may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first passing on
    the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 
    761 A.2d 613
    , 616
    ____________________________________________
    2 There is no indication in the record that counsel properly preserved the
    sentencing issue at the hearing or within ten days of imposition. See
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 708(E). We could find the issue waived on that basis alone.
    However, in the interests of justice and judicial economy, we will address
    Appellant’s sentencing issue, as raised in this appeal. Appellant filed a court-
    ordered statement of errors complained of on appeal, on January 24, 2018.
    The trial court filed its opinion on January 29, 2018. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    -3-
    J-S48040-18
    (Pa. Super. 2000) (citation omitted). Therefore, we will address the second
    question in the Anders brief first. Our Supreme Court has determined that:
    [I]n the Anders brief that accompanies court-appointed counsel’s
    petition to withdraw, counsel must: (1) provide a summary of the
    procedural history and facts, with citations to the record; (2) refer
    to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably supports
    the appeal; (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is
    frivolous; and (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the
    appeal is frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
    record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have
    led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
    , 361 (Pa. 2009).
    Here, counsel notes that he conducted a review of the record, and
    determined that an appeal would be wholly frivolous.             (See Petition to
    Withdraw as Counsel, 3/27/18). In addition, counsel has provided this Court
    with an Anders brief discussing the issue that could support an appeal.
    Finally, counsel states that he forwarded to Appellant a copy of the brief and
    advised him of his rights to raise issues himself or retain other counsel.3 (See
    letter of Michael E. Brunnabend, Esq. to Thomas Gebhardt, 3/27/18).
    Accordingly, on independent review, we conclude that counsel has
    substantially complied with the requirements of Anders and Santiago to
    withdraw as counsel. He has filed a petition to withdraw and an Anders brief,
    together with accompanying documentation, and provided a copy of the brief
    to Appellant along with notice of his right to raise any issues he has on his
    ____________________________________________
    3   Appellant has not responded to counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    -4-
    J-S48040-18
    own, or to retain private counsel. Therefore, we will proceed to evaluate the
    record independently in order to determine whether the appeal is in fact
    frivolous.
    In the first question of the Anders brief, counsel raises the issue of the
    discretionary aspects of Appellant’s sentence. (See Anders Brief, at 9).
    It is well-settled that appeals of discretionary aspects of a sentence are
    not reviewable as a matter of right. See Commonwealth v. McNear, 
    852 A.2d 401
    , 407 (Pa. Super. 2004). Before a challenge to the sentence will be
    heard on the merits, an appellant, in order to invoke the Court’s jurisdiction,
    must set forth in his brief a separate and concise statement of reasons relied
    upon in support of his appeal.           See Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f); see also
    Commonwealth v. Hudson, 
    820 A.2d 720
    , 727 (Pa. Super. 2003), appeal
    denied, 
    844 A.2d 551
     (Pa. 2004).
    Where the appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement sufficiently articulates the
    manner in which the sentence violates either a specific provision of the
    sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a particular
    fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process, such a statement will
    be deemed adequate to raise a substantial question so as to permit a grant of
    allowance of appeal of the discretionary aspects of the sentence.          See
    Commonwealth v. Mouzon, 
    812 A.2d 617
    , 627 (Pa. 2002) (plurality).
    Here, counsel has included in his Anders brief a statement of reasons
    relied upon in support of the request for appeal, as required by Rule 2119.
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    J-S48040-18
    (See Anders Brief, at 10).       Accordingly, we will review the statement to
    determine whether Appellant has raised a substantial question as to the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    The Rule 2119(f) statement in the Anders brief contends that the
    consecutive sentence imposed was not justified or supported “in any basis of
    law or fact.” (Id.). However, aside from an expressed preference for county
    prison instead of a state correctional institution, Appellant offers no support
    in either law or fact for his assertion of trial court error and abuse of discretion.
    (See id.). On careful review, we conclude that Appellant’s claim does not
    present a substantial question for our review.
    Sentencing is a matter vested in the sound discretion of the
    sentencing judge, and a sentence will not be disturbed on appeal
    absent a manifest abuse of discretion. In this context, an abuse
    of discretion is not shown merely by an error in judgment. Rather,
    the appellant must establish, by reference to the record, that the
    sentencing court ignored or misapplied the law, exercised its
    judgment for reasons of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will, or
    arrived at a manifestly unreasonable decision.
    Commonwealth v. Mastromarino, 
    2 A.3d 581
    , 589 (Pa. Super. 2010),
    appeal denied, 
    14 A.3d 825
     (Pa. 2011) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Anderson, 
    830 A.2d 1013
    , 1018 (Pa. Super. 2003).
    When a sentence is within the statutory limits, this Court must review
    each excessiveness claim on a case-by-case basis. In order for an appellant
    raising such a claim to state a substantial question, he must “sufficiently
    articulate[ ] the manner in which the sentence violates either a specific
    provision of the sentencing scheme set forth in the Sentencing Code or a
    -6-
    J-S48040-18
    particular fundamental norm underlying the sentencing process.”4      Mouzon,
    supra at 627.
    Here, Appellant’s Rule 2119(f) statement fails to identify any provision
    of the Sentencing Code which the trial court violated or to set forth any
    fundamental norm of the sentencing process that the trial court purportedly
    violated. Thus Appellant has failed to raise a substantial question that his
    sentence was excessive. Consequently, a review of the merits of his challenge
    to discretionary aspects of his sentence is unwarranted.
    On independent review, we find no other non-frivolous issues, which
    would warrant a review of their merits. Accordingly, the petition for leave to
    withdraw as counsel is granted, and the trial court’s judgment of sentence is
    affirmed.
    Petition to withdraw as counsel granted.        Judgment of sentence
    affirmed.
    ____________________________________________
    4An appellant’s contention that the trial court did not adequately consider a
    mitigating circumstance when imposing sentence does not raise a substantial
    question sufficient to justify appellate review of the merits of such claim. See
    Commonwealth v. Kraft, 
    737 A.2d 755
    , 757 (Pa. Super. 1999), appeal
    denied, 
    747 A.2d 366
     (Pa. 1999).
    -7-
    J-S48040-18
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 10/30/18
    -8-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 125 EDA 2018

Filed Date: 10/30/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024