MPower Software Serv. v. American Water Works ( 2019 )

J-A24003-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MPOWER SOFTWARE SERVICES, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LLC, AND MPOWER MANAGED : PENNSYLVANIA
SERVICES, LLC :
:
:
v. :
:
:
AMERICAN WATER WORKS SERVICE : No. 2598 EDA 2018
COMPANY, INC., AND VIRTUAL :
DYNAMIX, LLC :
:
:
APPEAL OF: AMERICAN WATER :
WORKS SERVICE COMPANY, INC. :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2012-8193
MPOWER SOFTWARE SERVICES, : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
LLC, AND MPOWER MANAGED : PENNSYLVANIA
SERVICES, LLC :
:
:
v. :
:
:
AMERICAN WATER WORKS SERVICE : No. 2763 EDA 2018
COMPANY, INC., AND VIRTUAL :
DYNAMIX, LLC :
:
:
APPEAL OF: MPOWER SOFTWARE :
SERVICES, LLC AND MPOWER :
MANAGED SERVICES, LLC :
Appeal from the Judgment Entered August 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2012-8193
J-A24003-19
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED NOVEMBER 20, 2019
Appellant, American Water Works Services Company, Inc. (“AW”),
appeals and Appellees, mPower Software Services, LLC and mPower Managed
Services, LLC (collectively “mPower”), cross-appeal from the August 24, 2018
judgment entered in favor of mPower following a non-jury trial.1 We affirm in
part and reverse in part.
This case involves an intricate, convoluted contract dispute. After the
non-jury trial, which lasted several weeks, the trial court issued a
comprehensive and detailed opinion containing 766 findings of fact. In the
interest of brevity, we summarize them, in most pertinent part, as follows. 2
mPower is an information technology solutions company with a principal
place of business in New Jersey, and AW is a water company with a
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 mPower Managed Services, LLC is a subsidiary of mPower Software Services,
LLC. See Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (“FFCL”), 7/1/2016, at ¶ 3.
mPower Managed Services was added as a plaintiff during trial, and the trial
court discerned that its claims and allegations were identical to those set forth
in the complaint of mPower Software Services. Id. at 2. The trial court found
that “[a]t all times during the parties’ business relations … AW made no
distinction between mPower Software Services and mPower Managed
Services, and referred to them as ‘mPower.’” Id. at ¶ 7. Similarly, “[a]t all
times, through the testimony of its own witnesses, AW acknowledged that it
used the name ‘mPower’ to mean either or both mPower Software Services
and mPower Managed Services.” Id. at ¶ 8. Thus, unless otherwise specified,
we also refer to either or both of these entities as “mPower.”
2 When necessary, in our analysis of the parties’ issues infra, we provide
further facts relevant to specific issues.
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headquarters in New Jersey. See FFCL at ¶¶ 1, 2, 6. In 2010, AW contacted
mPower and requested that it develop a business plan to determine the costs
for the total migration of AW’s computer network to a new Windows operating
system, and assist it with other issues related to infrastructure. Id. at ¶ 11.
On October 1, 2010, mPower and AW entered into a contract referred
to as the ‘Master Services Agreement’ (“MSA”), which was drafted by AW and
set forth the general terms and conditions of the work AW expected mPower
to complete. Id. at ¶¶ 12-14. Under the MSA, the parties agreed to enter
into ‘Statements of Work’ (“SOW”), which governed the terms, conditions,
scope of work, and compensation for various projects and — pursuant to AW’s
policy — could only last for a period not greater than one year. Id. at ¶¶ 20-
21. The SOWs introduced work and defined the terms for projects, and
mPower performed its actual work pursuant to the individual SOW. Id. at ¶¶
26-27. In addition, AW had a policy that any change to an SOW required a
‘Project Change Request’ (“PCR”), detailing the nature, reason, and impact of
the proposed change. Id. at ¶¶ 29-32. AW employees had the responsibility
of ensuring that a PCR was signed to cover all work performed, but not
originally included, in an SOW. Id. at ¶ 34. As a federally regulated company,
AW was required to have SOWs and PCRs in place before any vendor, including
mPower, performed work for it. Id. at ¶¶ 35, 36. In order for mPower to
begin work while the parties finalized the terms of unexecuted PCRs or SOWs,
the parties executed a ‘Letter of Intent’ (“LOI”), which was a short-term ‘work
order’ that helped them better transition between projects. Id. at ¶¶ 41, 43-
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44. Despite these policies and requirements, the parties frequently entered
into verbal agreements for work, which AW expected mPower to perform. Id.
at ¶ 39. AW authorized mPower to begin work on occasion without any signed
SOW, PCR, LOI, or other written documentation in place, and AW never
requested that mPower not perform the expected work because of any
unsigned documents. Id. at ¶¶ 46, 48.
AW was so satisfied with mPower’s initial work that it made mPower the
sole vendor for its ‘Enterprise Image Deployment’ (“EID”) project, which was
expected to last numerous years and involved transitioning AW’s computer
system to a new Windows Operating System. Id. at ¶¶ 18, 19, 24. For this
project, mPower had to work with 18 of AW’s company departments. Id. at
¶ 57.3 As part of the EID project, AW was obligated to identify an AW
employee from each of these 18 departments to work jointly with mPower
personnel to decide which applications would be kept or removed from each
of the department’s systems. Id. at ¶¶ 58-60. This process of mPower’s
meeting with an AW employee and making decisions regarding applications
would typically take a few hours, and mPower could not perform its work until
an AW employee made decisions on applications. Id. at ¶¶ 61, 62.
On or about February 21, 2012, pursuant to the MSA, the parties
executed SOW 6, the most complex and time-intensive SOW. Id. at ¶¶ 86,
87, 117. Under SOW 6, mPower was to ‘standardize’ AW’s software
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3These company departments are also known as ‘lines of business’ or ‘LOBs’.
See FFCL at ¶¶ 54, 56.
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application library — i.e., determine whether a department should keep or
retire an application — in connection with the EID project. Id. at ¶¶ 64, 91.
mPower’s standardization work pursuant to SOW 6 was a continuation of the
same work it completed pursuant to earlier SOWs — namely SOW 2 — and
some of the completion criteria under these SOWs overlapped. Id. at ¶¶ 92,
93. Accordingly, for the reasons described supra, mPower continued to have
to rely on AW’s cooperation and employees to perform its work. Id. at ¶ 120.
SOW 6 contained several notable provisions. Section 3.3 of SOW 6 set
forth that, if either party requested a change affecting schedule, quality,
resources, or price, the parties needed to complete a PCR for the change. Id.
at ¶ 95. Nevertheless, despite this language, “the parties agreed by conduct
and verbally[] to operate without signed PCRs.” Id. at ¶ 96. Additionally,
Section 5.0 of SOW 6 governed ‘Milestones and Deliverables,’ which were
completion criteria or tangible objects that the parties could identify to
demonstrate that mPower completed work, met the milestones, and was
entitled to payment. Id. at ¶¶ 105, 108. In short, the work product that AW
purchased from mPower constituted a deliverable, and the completion of a
task comprised a milestone. Id. at ¶ 109. Specifically, Section 5.1 of SOW 6
addressed ‘Milestones,’ and provided that “[u]pon completion of each
milestone, [mPower] will issue a milestone completion letter … for approval
by [AW]. [mPower] will invoice [AW] for each milestone payment upon receipt
of the respective executed milestone completion letter.” Id. at ¶ 106
(footnote omitted; some brackets added). Because of this provision, AW
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completely controlled the process of approving milestone completion letters.
Id. at ¶ 112.
Under SOW 6, AW agreed to pay mPower approximately $3.7 million.
Id. at ¶ 116. AW insisted that mPower agree to perform SOW 6 on a fixed-
price basis, where mPower had to provide certain deliverables and milestones
before it would receive payment. Id. at ¶¶ 118, 119. Thus, SOW 6 required
mPower to incur substantial up-front costs, as it “was a back-loaded contract
that withheld all payment to mPower until AW gave its final approval of the
milestones, even when work was completed.” Id. at ¶ 122.
In December of 2011, after mPower and AW had already negotiated and
drafted the majority of SOW 6’s terms, AW hired Fred Lamb. Id. at ¶¶ 123,
124. Lamb served as the ‘Lead Technical Manager’ of SOW 6, which resulted
in Lamb’s being in charge of SOW 6, and acting as the gatekeeper in
determining whether mPower completed its work. Id. at ¶¶ 125, 127. After
Lamb reviewed mPower’s work under SOW 6, he would report and provide
updates to Phyllis Garelick, the ‘Project Manager’ for SOW 6. Id. at ¶¶ 103,
128. At the time Lamb joined AW, mPower and AW had already established
and followed a process for the standardization work mPower was performing
under SOW 2 and SOW 6. Id. at ¶ 129. However, in August of 2011,
employees at AW became concerned that the EID project was over budget,
though it was through no fault of mPower. Id. at ¶¶ 130-32.4
____________________________________________
4Indeed, in January of 2012, the EID project was over budget by about $1.1
million. FFCL at ¶ 131.
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While mPower was working on the EID project, AW was concurrently
performing work on another, separate project that would impact AW’s entire
computer environment and all of its employees, known as the ‘Business
Transformation’ (“BT”) project. Id. at ¶¶ 133-34, 136. In addition to the EID
project, Lamb was also in charge of this BT project. Id. at ¶ 135. Lamb,
Garelick, and other AW employees conveyed to mPower that the BT project
was a higher priority to AW than the EID project. Id. at ¶ 138. The BT project
cost AW about $300 million while the EID project cost it only around $3.7
million. Id. at ¶ 139.
The BT project had an accelerated timeline, and AW fell behind schedule
on it. Id. at ¶¶ 140-41. AW set the launch date for the BT project as August
1, 2012. Id. at ¶ 159. Because AW did not possess the personnel or
capabilities to complete such a large, complex project independently, AW
transferred mPower personnel working on the EID project to the BT project.
Id. at ¶¶ 142, 143. Lamb had asked mPower if it could allocate some of its
resources (namely, people and their time) away from the EID project to the
BT project, and mPower agreed to do so. Id. at ¶¶ 152, 153. In addition,
AW pulled away various people at AW from the EID project to the BT project,
even though those people were supposed to be working on the EID project or
otherwise assisting mPower. Id. at ¶¶ 146, 147. The diversion of mPower
personnel to assist on the BT project, as well as the lack of availability of AW
employees to collaborate with mPower on the standardization process,
obstructed mPower’s ability to complete its work under SOW 6. See id. at ¶¶
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147-63. During this time, it also became increasingly difficult for mPower to
finish and receive payment for its work, as AW controlled the process of
approving milestone completion letters and invoices. Id. at ¶ 164.
Due to the stress of the BT project and the higher-than-expected cost
of the EID project, soon after Lamb took control of SOW 6 and the BT project,
AW developed a plan to remove mPower and deprive it of its contracts. Id.
at ¶¶ 166, 167. AW purposefully began taking steps to hinder mPower’s ability
to complete its contracted work, while simultaneously securing mPower’s help
on the BT project. Id. at ¶ 169. AW’s plan aimed to prevent mPower from
collecting money AW owed to it pursuant to, inter alia, the MSA, SOWs, and
PCRs, as AW received mPower’s free labor on the BT project. Id. at ¶ 170.
To effect this plan, AW (i) changed previously agreed-upon objectives and
processes;5 (ii) obstructed mPower’s ability to complete work;6 (iii) failed to
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5 More specifically, “[w]hen Lamb became in charge of the EID project, he
repeatedly changed the scope and objectives for [the] completion of the
project without signed PCRs.” FFCL at ¶ 172 (footnote omitted). “mPower
performed the work outside the scope of the parties’ agreed[-]upon projects,
at the requests of Lamb.” Id. at ¶ 180. “Lamb threatened mPower by saying
that [its] SOW ‘was at risk’ if [it was] not completing work AW requested that
it complete, which was not part of SOW 6.” Id. at ¶ 191 (footnote omitted).
6 For instance, “knowing that its approval was required before mPower could
issue milestone completion letter[s] and invoices, AW refused to provide
requisite approvals for payment.” FFCL at ¶ 199. In fact, in May of 2012,
“AW instructed mPower to stop submitting certain milestone completion
letters, despite mPower[’s] having completed the work.” Id. at ¶ 203
(footnote omitted). Additionally, “Lamb’s … spontaneous requested edits,
changes, or revisions obstructed mPower’s ability to submit milestone letters
to receive payment.” Id. at ¶ 208.
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timely provide essential resources;7 and (iv) failed, or otherwise intentionally
disregarded, its obligation to maintain control over its project governance.8
Id. at ¶ 171.
Notwithstanding AW’s efforts to obstruct mPower’s work, mPower and
its personnel continued to act in good faith and made reasonable attempts to
collaborate with AW to finish requested work to the satisfaction of the
contracts and AW. Id. at ¶¶ 254, 255. Several AW employees testified that
mPower acted in good faith, and worked in a timely and sufficient manner.
Id. at ¶ 261. In addition, the testimony of mPower staff established that
working with Lamb and other AW personnel was extremely difficult and
unpleasant. Id. at ¶ 259.
On July 31, 2012, the day before the BT project’s launch date, mPower
employees arrived at AW’s premises, where AW unexpectedly terminated
mPower “for convenience” and escorted its employees off the premises. Id.
at ¶ 286. On that same day, AW sent a termination letter to mPower, where
it informed mPower that the termination was effective August 14, 2012. Id.
at ¶¶ 288-93. Nevertheless, in addition to immediately escorting mPower
employees off the premises on July 31, 2012, AW confiscated their computers,
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7 By way of example, “AW hindered and otherwise delayed mPower’s ability
to complete its work by not providing information and people necessary for
mPower to be able to complete the work.” FFCL at ¶ 221 (footnote omitted).
8To elaborate, “[d]espite only being the Tech Lead on SOW 6, AW purposefully
allowed Lamb to singularly and independently interpret, enforce, change, and
approve project deliverables and payments to mPower.” FFCL at ¶ 247.
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and denied them access to any work relating to their projects with AW. Id.
at ¶ 293. Although mPower requested access to computers and other devices
containing their work, AW did not grant it. Id. at ¶ 302.
In the attachments to the termination letter AW sent to mPower, AW
stated that it owed mPower only $351,362 for the work it completed, which
represented only a fraction of the amount AW actually owed mPower. Id. at
¶¶ 297, 298. Because of AW’s obstructive conduct, mPower did not entirely
finish its work under SOW 6, but had completed nearly all of it. Id. at ¶¶ 300,
301. The termination letter and its attachments did not mention that mPower
had an inability to finish work or that mPower should pay back money for work
it poorly performed. Id. at ¶ 303.
Thereafter, mPower and AW engaged in the dispute
resolution/escalation process outlined in the MSA. Id. at ¶ 304. During one
of the final meetings between the parties, AW told mPower that “if [mPower]
decided to pursue [its claim] legally, [AW] would make it long, painful,
expensive [and] would tell [mPower’s] vendors or clients that [its] the type of
vendor that likes to sue them.” Id. at ¶ 305 (footnote omitted; some brackets
added).
Notwithstanding this threat, on September 17, 2012, mPower Software
Services filed a complaint against AW, wherein it alleged causes of actions for
breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and unjust
enrichment. Id. at 1. AW subsequently filed an Answer, New Matter, and
Counterclaims to mPower’s complaint, advancing causes of action for breach
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of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing, and fraudulent
inducement. Id.9 Prior to trial, the trial court dismissed mPower’s unjust
enrichment claim, and AW withdrew its fraudulent inducement claim. Id. at
2. The non-jury trial began on January 19, 2016, and the parties proceeded
to present 12 live witnesses, 7 witnesses by deposition designations, and
around 400 total exhibits. Id. at 1.
On July 1, 2016, the trial court rendered its verdict, finding in favor of
mPower and against AW with respect to mPower’s breach of contract and
breach of duty of faith and fair dealing claims. Additionally, the trial court
found in favor of mPower and against AW with respect to AW’s remaining
counterclaims. As a result, it awarded mPower damages in the total amount
of $2,244,549.00, and ordered that “all statutory interest is to be included on
the foregoing damages from August 1, 2012, to the date [j]udgement [sic] is
entered.” See Order, 7/1/2016, at 1.10 Moreover, the trial court awarded
mPower legal fees and expenses, and directed it to file an itemized accounting
of all fees and costs it incurred. Id. at 3.
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9 mPower then filed a third-party complaint against Virtual Dynamix, LLC —
who it had hired to do certain work — averring causes of action against it for
contractual indemnification, common law indemnification, breach of contract,
and contribution. FFCL at 2; see id. at ¶¶ 480-85. At trial, via a motion for
nonsuit, the trial court dismissed all claims against Virtual Dynamix. Id. at 2.
Virtual Dynamix did not file an appellate brief in this matter, as it discerned
that none of the issues on appeal pertains to it.
10 In that order, the trial court also provided a breakdown of how it reached a
total of $2,244,549.00 in damages.
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Following the entry of its verdict on July 1, 2016, the trial court
summarized the post-trial procedural history of this matter, as follows:
On July 11, 2016, mPower filed an [i]temized [a]ccounting of [a]ll
[f]ees and [c]osts as directed by this [c]ourt’s July 1, 2016
[o]rder. Also on July 11, 2016, mPower filed a [m]otion for [p]ost-
[t]rial [r]elief to [m]old the [v]erdict to [i]nclude [p]re-[j]udgment
and [p]ost-[j]udgment [i]nterest.[11] On July 15, 2016, AW filed
a [m]otion for [p]ost-[t]rial [r]elief.
On July 21, 2016, AW filed an [a]nswer to [mPower’s] [m]otion to
[m]old the [v]erdict to [i]nclude [p]re-[j]udgment and [p]ost-
[j]udgment [i]nterest.
On August 1, 2016, AW filed a [r]esponse in [o]pposition to
[mPower’s] [f]ee [a]pplication. On September 9, 2016, this
[c]ourt entered two separate [o]rders denying both mPower’s and
AW’s [m]otions for [p]ost-[t]rial [r]elief. On September 12, 2016,
this [c]ourt entered an [o]rder awarding mPower reasonable
attorney[s’] fees in the amount of [$3,596,071.35,] and costs in
the amount of [$445,806.16,] incurred in connection with this
litigation.
On September 23, 2016, mPower filed a praecipe to [e]nter
[j]udgment against AW pursuant to this [c]ourt’s July 1, 2016 and
September 12, 2016 [o]rders. On September 27, 2016, the Bucks
County Prothonotary entered judgment in the amount of
[$6,844,620.49] against AW.26 This [c]ourt had not yet ruled on
mPower’s [p]ost-[t]rial [m]otion to [m]old the [v]erdict to include
[p]re-[j]udgment and [p]ost-[j]udgment [i]nterest.
26This [j]udgment amount was entered based on mPower’s
September 23, 2016 praecipe to [e]nter [j]udgment and
miscalculated the pre-judgment interest by applying it until
September 23, 2016[,] instead of July 1, 2016, the date this
[c]ourt entered its [v]erdict.
On October 4, 2016, AW filed a [p]etition to [s]trike the
[j]udgment entered on September 27, 2016.27
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11 In addition to mPower’s motion to mold the verdict to include pre-judgment
and post-judgment interest, mPower separately filed a motion for post-trial
relief, raising other issues.
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27 [T]his [c]ourt did not render a decision on AW’s October
4, 2016 [p]etition to [s]trike [j]udgment because this
[c]ourt determined it no longer had jurisdiction to consider
it once AW filed its [n]otice of [a]ppeal with the Superior
Court on October 7, 2016. On December 14, 2016, AW filed
an additional [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the Superior Court of
the letter [o]rder[,] dated November 15, 2016, where this
[c]ourt declined to take action on AW’s [m]otion to [s]trike
[j]udgment. [] 3876 EDA 2016.[12]
On October 7, 2016, AW filed a [n]otice of [a]ppeal to [the]
Superior Court of this [c]ourt’s September 12, 2016 [o]rder
granting mPower reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.28 Also on
October 7, 2016, AW filed a separate [n]otice of [a]ppeal to the
Superior Court of this [c]ourt’s [v]erdict in favor of mPower. 29 On
October 25, 2016, mPower filed a [n]otice of [c]ross [a]ppeal from
several [o]rders and [j]udgments entered during the litigation.30
28 3156 EDA 2016.
29 3157 EDA 2016. On November 18, 2016, [the Superior
Court quashed] AW’s appeal at … 3157 EDA 2016, stating it
is duplicative and unnecessary as an appeal had already
been taken at … 3156 EDA 2016. The Superior Court
directed AW to raise any issue contained in the appeal at …
3157 EDA 2016 within the appeal at … 3156 EDA 2016.
30 3541 EDA 2016.
On January 5, 2017, this [c]ourt filed an [o]pinion in [s]upport of
its [v]erdict and [o]rders in this case under Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
On February 1, 2017, the Honorable Judge Diane Gibbons entered
a [s]upplemental [Rule] 1925(a) [o]pinion addressing four of
mPower’s appeal issues pertaining to issues raised regarding
orders Judge Gibbons issued during the pre-trial phase of this
case.
On March 17, 2017, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania entered a
quashal order on AW and mPower’s [a]ppeals. On October 23,
2017, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania remanded this matter
to the Superior Court for an explanation of the rationale
underlying the quashal order dated March 17, 2017.34
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12 We quashed this appeal on March 16, 2017.
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34 354 MAL 201[7].
On November 28, 2017, the Superior Court entered an [o]rder in
response to the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s request for its
rationale. The Superior Court explained it quashed the [a]ppeals
by AW and mPower because a final judgment had not been
entered on the docket since this [c]ourt had not yet ruled on
mPower’s [m]otion to [m]old the [v]erdict to include [p]re-
[j]udgment and [p]ost-[j]udgment [i]nterest.
On April 3, 2018, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania entered an
[o]rder [d]enying the [p]etition for [a]llowance of [a]ppeal.
On August 7, 2018, this [c]ourt entered judgment in favor of
mPower and against AW on the [o]rders dated July 1, 2016[,] and
September 12, 2016[,] in the amount of [$6,814,079.90].37
37 This [c]ourt’s August 7, 2018 [o]rder included: (1) the
[v]erdict for $2,244,549.00; (2) [p]re[-]judgment interest
(statutory) from … August 1, 2012 … until the July 1, 2016
[v]erdict totaling $527,652.99; (3) [l]egal fees of
$3,596,071.75; and (4) expenses of $445,806.16. This
[o]rder allowed [mPower] to make one or more additional
applications to be reimbursed by [AW].
On August 7, 2018, this [c]ourt also entered an [o]rder on
mPower’s [m]otion for [p]ost-[t]rial [r]elief to mold the July 1,
2016 [v]erdict to [i]nclude [p]re-[j]udgment and [p]ost-
[j]udgment [i]nterest. This [c]ourt [o]rdered the [v]erdict to be
molded with pre-judgment interest in the amount of
[$527,652.99,] and post-judgment interest that shall accrue on
the total judgment of [$2,722,201.99,] at the rate of [6%] per
annum beginning October 23, 2017 until the date the judgment is
satisfied.39[, 13]
39This [c]ourt [o]rdered that mPower is not entitled to post-
judgment interest for the period beginning September 27,
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13The trial court also directed that post-judgment interest shall accrue on the
$4,041,877.91 in fees and costs it awarded.
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2016 (the date mPower improperly praeciped the July 1,
2016 [v]erdict) to October 23, 2017.[14]
On August 24, 2018, the Office of the Prothonotary entered
[j]udgment on the August 7, 2018 [o]rders.40
40[T]he Office of the Prothonotary vacated this [c]ourt’s
September 27, 2016 judgment in favor of mPower.
TCO at 3-6 (headings, some footnotes, and some citations omitted).
On September 5, 2018, AW filed a timely notice of appeal from the
August 24, 2018 judgment, docketed at 2598 EDA 2018. With its notice of
appeal, AW simultaneously filed a concise statement of errors complained of
on appeal pursuant to Rule 1925(b). In addition, on September 19, 2018,
mPower filed a timely notice of cross appeal, docketed at 2763 EDA 2018, and
a Rule 1925(b) concise statement. The trial court issued its Rule 1925(a)
opinion on December 7, 2018.
Presently, AW advances the following three issues on appeal:
1. Where the parties had a written agreement that included a
comprehensive procedure for modifying it, did the trial court err
in disregarding that contract and mixing tort and contract
principles such that it (a) awarded damages for which there was
no record support; (b) awarded damages related to unpleaded
and unproven oral contracts; and (c) concluded that the same
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14 Later, however, the trial court acknowledged that it “erred in both of its
August 7, 2018 [o]rders when it ended the period of post-judgment interest
on October 23, 2017[,] instead of April 3, 2018.” Trial Court Opinion (“TCO”),
12/7/2018, at 19. It explained that “AW should not be required to pay post-
judgment interest on either the verdict or the attorney[s’] fees and expenses
for the dates between September 27, 2016 (when mPower improperly
praeciped this [c]ourt’s July 1, 2016 verdict) and April 3, 2018 (when the
[Pennsylvania] Supreme Court denied the appeal petition and remitted the
case to the Superior Court for remand to this [c]ourt).” Id.
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conduct constituted both a breach of contract and a breach of the
duty of good faith and fair dealing?
2. Did the trial court err in awarding all requested costs and
attorneys’ fees when such an award was (a) not authorized by the
parties’ contract or applicable law; and (b) disproportionate,
unreasonable, and predicated on assumptions that were not borne
out in the opinion by the judge who oversaw the pretrial process?
3. Did the trial court err when it included post-judgment interest
for a portion of the time when, due to [mPower’s] filing of a
defective praecipe, the trial court could not enter a valid judgment
that could be reviewed on appeal?
AW’s Brief at 5.
mPower raises the following three issues on appeal:
[1.] Did the trial court err in calculating post-judgment interest
where (a) post-judgment [interest] is mandatory and not subject
to a trial court’s discretion; and (b) AW’s conduct caused a
nineteen month delay?
[2.] Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it awarded
mPower damages for packaging only 29 applications, where the
competent evidence establishes mPower packaged 135
applications?
[3.] Alternatively, if this Court determines the trial court erred in
awarding mPower damages under an oral contract theory, did the
trial court err by dismissing mPower’s unjust enrichment claim and
denying mPower’s Motion to Amend its Complaint?
mPower’s Brief at 2-3.
We will address AW’s issues first. At the outset, we acknowledge that
New Jersey substantive law applies to this case. See FFCL at 95 n.636 (stating
that the MSA provides that it should be “interpreted, construed, and governed
by the laws of the State of New Jersey without regard to conflict of law
principles thereof”).
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AW’s First Issue
In its first issue, AW claims that “[t]he damages award was contrary to
the MSA, the record, and the applicable law.” AW’s Brief at 22 (unnecessary
capitalization and emphasis omitted). In sum, it argues:
As for the verdict, it rests on errors of fact and law. Factually,
[the trial court] erred by (a) awarding damages twice for the same
task; (b) awarding damages for tasks never completed; and (c)
awarding damages for work completed pursuant to a contract
(SOW 2) that was not at issue. Legally, [the trial court] erred by
(a) awarding damages for supposed “oral contracts” that were
neither pleaded nor proved; and (b) imposing liability for the exact
same conduct under both the law of contract and the duty of good
faith and fair dealing.
Id. at 20 (emphasis in original). We address each of these contentions in
turn.
We apply the following standard of review:
Our appellate role in cases arising from non[-]jury trial verdicts is
to determine whether the findings of the trial court are supported
by competent evidence and whether the trial court committed
error in any application of the law. The findings of fact of the trial
judge must be given the same weight and effect on appeal as the
verdict of a jury. We consider the evidence in a light most
favorable to the verdict winner. We will reverse the trial court
only if its findings of fact are not supported by competent evidence
in the record or if its findings are premised on an error of law.
However, where the issue … concerns a question of law, our scope
of review is plenary.
The trial court’s conclusions of law on appeal originating from a
non-jury trial “are not binding on an appellate court because it is
the appellate court’s duty to determine if the trial court correctly
applied the law to the facts” of the case.
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Allegheny Energy Supply Co., LLC v. Wolf Run Min. Co., 53 A.3d 53, 60-
61 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citation and brackets omitted).15
In part (a) of AW’s first issue, AW insists that the trial court awarded
damages for which there was no record support. AW’s Brief at 5. To begin,
AW alleges that the trial court “double-counted damages related to three
different SOW 6 projects, thereby inflating the verdict by $496,076.” Id. at
23. With respect to the initial SOW 6 project that AW challenges — called the
“Application Standardization” project — AW says that SOW 6, as originally
structured, “required mPower … to perform several different functions for the
computer applications in each of [AW’s] 18 lines of business.” Id.16 AW
argues that the trial court “awarded $410,076 ($22,782 for each of the 18
lines of business) based on the mistaken assumption that mPower had
completed the entire standardization project under the original terms of SOW
6.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). However, AW asserts that,
“[i]nstead of 18 completed sets of already-standardized applications, the
parties agreed that mPower … would provide [AW] with a documented process
for performing application standardization and would demonstrate that
process across three lines of business.” Id. at 24 (footnote omitted; emphasis
____________________________________________
15Both parties agree that the standard of review of the law of the forum, i.e.,
Pennsylvania, applies. See AW’s Brief at 4; mPower’s Brief at 1. Accordingly,
we employ it.
16 We reiterate that the lines of business, or LOBs, are company departments
at AW. See FFCL at ¶¶ 54, 56, 57.
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in original). It explains that, “[c]onsequently, rather than the 18
standardization-related milestones in SOW 6 …, the [Standardization Process]
PCR contained only four milestones…. mPower … should not have been paid
under both the original (superseded) SOW and the PCR that supplanted it.”
Id. (footnote omitted; emphasis in original).17
The evidence that AW points to does not convince us that the trial court
erred in finding that the Standardization Process PCR did not replace the
original standardization terms of SOW 6. In its principal brief, AW directs us
to two of mPower’s exhibits containing versions of the Standardization Process
PCR. See AW’s Brief at 24 (referencing mPower’s Exhibits 43 and 46). AW
emphasizes that these PCRs contained only 4 milestones, instead of the
original 18 milestones. Id. However, in the ‘Description of Change’ section
of these PCRs, there is no indication that the original milestone requirements
were replaced, which supports the trial court’s finding that the Standardization
Process PCR was in addition to the original standardization work under SOW
6. See mPower’s Exhibits 43 and 46. Further, the ‘Reason for the Change’
section of these PCRs conveys that this revision was made because the
“[p]revious requirements for delivery of an Application Standardization model
were not comprehensive enough to accommodate new [AW] requirements for
____________________________________________
17The trial court determined that the value of mPower’s work pursuant to the
Standardization Process PCR amounted to a total of $407,837. See FFCL at
120.
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an end-to-end process.” Id. This reasoning also does not convince us that
the Standardization Process PCR totally supplanted the original
standardization work under SOW 6.18 Thus, competent evidence supports the
trial court’s finding, and no relief is due on this basis.
Next, for the other two SOW 6 projects that AW complains of, AW argues
that “with regard to the ‘Enterprise Image’ and ‘Application Remediation’
milestones, the parties agreed that a different ‘T&M SOW’ should replace both
of those milestone categories.” AW’s Brief at 25 (footnote omitted). It
contends that, “[a]lthough the court awarded … $119,000 for the T&M SOW,
it also awarded the full value of both the Enterprise Image milestone and
Application Remediation milestone that the T&M SOW had replaced. That
inflated the verdict by $86,000.” Id. (emphasis in original; footnote omitted).
We deem this issue waived. Although AW claims to have preserved it
in its post-trial motion, see id. at 23 n.14, the citation it provides does not
demonstrate that it raised this specific issue therein. See Crespo v. Hughes,
167 A.3d 168, 181 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“Pa.R.Civ.P. 227.1 requires parties to
file post-trial motions in order to preserve issues for appeal. If an issue has
not been raised in a post-trial motion, it is waived for appeal purposes.”)
____________________________________________
18The evidence that AW relies on in its reply brief also does not persuade us.
See AW’s Reply Brief at 4. mPower’s Exhibit 89 is an August 15, 2012
calendar entry — i.e., made after AW had terminated mPower — by AW’s
Phyllis Garelick. Further, AW’s citation to mPower’s Exhibit 251, which states
that “implementation of the activities associated with these milestones … will
be replaced by the milestones listed in this change request[,]” appears to refer
to a different set of milestones, namely URM1-URM18. See id. at 4 n.3;
mPower’s Exhibit 251.
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(citations omitted); see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e) (“Where under the applicable
law an issue is not reviewable on appeal unless raised or preserved below, the
argument must set forth, in immediate connection therewith or in a footnote
thereto, either a specific cross-reference to the page or pages of the statement
of the case which set forth the information relating thereto as required by
Pa.R.A.P. 2117(c), or substantially the same information.”). Accordingly, AW
has waived this claim by not raising it in its post-trial motion.
In addition to its double damages argument, AW asserts that the trial
court also awarded damages for which there was no record support because
the trial court “awarded damages related to work that was never completed.”
AW’s Brief at 26 (unnecessary capitalization, emphasis, and footnote omitted).
AW says that “SOW 6 did not obligate [AW] to pay for work related to
milestones that were not completed[,]” and claims that the trial court
“awarded damages that related to milestones for which mPower … never
provided the required contractual deliverables or satisfied the required
completion criteria.” Id. (footnote omitted)
To support this argument, AW meagerly cites one case in a footnote for
the principle that “it is not the function of the court to rewrite or revise an
agreement when the intent of the parties is clear. Stated differently, the
parties cannot expect a court to present to them a contract better than or
different from the agreement they struck between themselves.” Id. at 28
n.34 (citing Quinn v. Quinn, 137 A.3d 423, 429 (N.J. 2016)). AW does not
specifically address, nor provide a legal argument countering, the trial court’s
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rationale that, “[u]nder contract law, a party who breaches a contract is liable
for all of the natural and probable consequences of the breach of contract.”
FFCL at 98 (citing Totaro, Duffy, Cannova, and Co., L.L.C. v. Lane,
Middleton & Co., L.L.C., 921 A.2d 1100, 1107 (N.J. 2007)); see, e.g., id.
at 102 (“AW, by and through its employees (including Lamb), by its actions,
conduct, and words, completely disregarded and breached the written terms
of the MSA, PCR, and SOW contracts, including SOW 6.”); id. at 112 (“AW
breached SOW 6 by obstructing mPower’s ability to complete the Peripheral
Library work. mPower performed this work near completion. … AW obstructed
mPower’s ability to complete this work by not giving mPower the ability to get
its resources through AW’s security lab and not providing the necessary
servers”). It also does not respond to the trial court’s findings that mPower
would have completed the contract in its entirety but for AW’s efforts in
precluding them from doing so. See, e.g., FFCL at 108 (“AW failed to review
certain applications which kept mPower from completely finishing the work. …
But for AW’s conduct (or lack thereof), all of the Standardization work under
these Milestones would have been completed.”). Accordingly, we consider this
argument waived, as AW’s discussion lacks any meaningful legal analysis
rebutting the trial court’s reasoning. See In re S.T.S., JR., 76 A.3d 24, 41-
42 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“It is well settled that the argument portion of an
appellate brief must be developed with pertinent discussion of the issue, which
includes citations to relevant authority. … [M]ere issue spotting without
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analysis or legal citation to support an assertion precludes our appellate
review of a matter.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Additionally, AW states that there was no record support for the trial
court’s awarding “$23,600 in damages for the supposed breach of a contract
(SOW 2) that was neither breached nor even at issue.” AW’s Brief at 28
(unnecessary capitalization, emphasis, and footnote omitted). AW avers that
mPower’s “[c]omplaint and [a]mended [c]omplaint both affirmatively alleged
that SOW 2 had been paid in full[,]” and that “its own witness at trial testified
that it was seeking damages only under SOW 6, not SOW 2.” Id. (citations
and footnote omitted). AW additionally observes that the trial court ruled that
it was only allowing evidence regarding SOW 2 as “background necessary to
understand SOW 6.” Id. at 28-29 (citations omitted). Thus, AW contends
that the trial court erred in this respect.
Again, we consider this argument waived. AW makes no attempt in its
principal brief to explain why it believes that the $23,600 in damages arose
from work mPower pursued under SOW 2. Id. at 28-29. Instead, it treats it
as an indisputable conclusion, and argues that those damages cannot stand
because mPower did not plead or pursue damages under SOW 2. Id. In
contrast, the trial court represented that it awarded damages because a verbal
contract existed between the parties to build certain computers, not due to
SOW 2. See FFCL at 106 (“AW verbally directed … mPower to perform the
work, mPower explicitly agreed to perform the offered work…, and the parties
knew the terms of the agreement as they were ascertainable with reasonable
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certainty.”) (footnotes and internal quotation marks omitted).19 Likewise,
mPower argues that the trial court’s award of damages of $23,600 arose from
a breach of a PCR, not SOW 2. mPower’s Brief at 39. Because AW does not
adequately articulate why it contends that the $23,600 in damages were
awarded pursuant to SOW 2, we decline to review this issue.
Commonwealth v. Beshore, 916 A.2d 1128, 1140 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“We
shall not develop an argument for [the appellant], nor shall we scour the
record to find evidence to support an argument; consequently, we deem this
issue waived.”).
In part (b) of its first issue, AW argues that the trial court “awarded
damages related to unpleaded and unproven oral contracts….” AW’s Brief at
5. It contends that “oral contracts were never alleged in an operative
pleading[,]” and that “[a]t no time before or during trial did [AW] have any
reason to believe that an oral-contract theory of liability was at issue in this
action.” Id. at 31, 33-34. Additionally, AW states that, “even if [mPower]
had pleaded claims under supported oral contracts, such claims would have
been irreconcilably inconsistent with the written contract” given the PCR
process it required. Id. at 34 (emphasis in original). Last, AW says that,
“even if we pretend that there had not been a written contract, or that the law
allowed the court to simply ignore that contract, [the trial court] still erred
because [it] made no meaningful attempt to explain what the material terms
____________________________________________
19The trial court seemingly relied on the December 15, 2011 PCR to establish
that mPower charged $675 to build a machine. FFCL at 106-07.
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of the supposed oral contracts were, let alone when and how the parties had
agreed to them.” Id. at 35.
Regarding AW’s claim that mPower did not allege oral contracts in its
operative pleading, AW cites to McShea v. City of Philadelphia, 995 A.2d
334 (Pa. 2010), which provides:
Pennsylvania is a fact-pleading state. As a minimum, a pleader
must set forth concisely the facts upon which his cause of action
is based. The complaint must not only apprise the defendant of
the claim being asserted, but it must also summarize the essential
facts to support the claim.
[Pa.R.C.P.] 1019(a) requires that “[t]he material facts on which a
cause of action or defense is based shall be stated in a concise
and summary form.” Pa.R.C.P. 1019(a). “Each cause of action
and any special damage related thereto shall be stated in a
separate count containing a demand for relief.” Id., 1020(a).
McShea, 995 A.2d at 339-40 (some internal citations and quotation marks
omitted); see also AW’s Brief at 30.
Further, we observe that,
[w]hile our rules require the pleading of all material facts upon
which claims are based, there is no requirement to plead the
evidence upon which the pleader will rely to establish those facts.
We have long recognized that “the line between pleading facts and
evidence is not always bright[,]” but distilled the specificity
requirement into two conditions that “must always be met: [t]he
pleadings must adequately explain the nature of the claim to the
opposing party so as to permit him to prepare a defense and they
must be sufficient to convince the court that the averments are
not merely subterfuge.” To assess whether a claim has been pled
with the requisite specificity, the allegations must be viewed in the
context of the pleading as a whole.
Commonwealth by Shapiro v. Golden Gate Nat’l Senior Care LLC, 194
A.3d 1010, 1029-30 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations omitted).
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The Supreme Court of New Jersey has identified the essential elements
for a breach of contract claim as follows:
[F]irst, that “[t]he parties entered into a contract containing
certain terms”; second, that “plaintiff[s] did what the contract
required [them] to do”; third, that “defendant[s] did not do what
the contract required [them] to do[,]” defined as a “breach of the
contract”; and fourth, that “defendant[s’] breach, or failure to do
what the contract required, caused a loss to the plaintiff[s].”
See, e.g., Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 139 A.3d 57, 64 (N.J. 2016)
(citations omitted; brackets in original).
Here, in mPower’s complaint, it alleged, inter alia, that AW sought “to
impose burdensome and expensive obligations on mPower notwithstanding
that they were not mPower’s responsibility under SOW 6….” Complaint,
9/17/2012, at ¶ 28(d). mPower averred that “Lamb … routinely imposed and
required revisions and changes which added no value to the work performed
and improperly disapproved of work, which had been approved by others
within various business units of [AW].” Id. at ¶ 31. Further, it advanced that
AW “continued to change the scope and objectives for completion of the
project through [PCRs]. [AW,] however, impeded the progress or ability to
formally execute the PCRs. During this time, mPower continued to work in
good faith to complete the work which was represented in the PCRs.” Id. at
¶ 38. It asserted that, “[b]y reason of [AW’s] obstruction, interference, bad
faith and breaches of contract…, mPower has directly and proximately been
caused … the following harm and damages: b. [v]alue of work performed
pursuant to SOW 6 and agreed-upon project changes….” Id. at ¶ 49(b). In
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its first count — entitled breach of contract — mPower claims that AW “further
breached SOW 6 by orally agreeing to changes to the scope of the work where
it directed mPower to proceed with the work and then failed to execute PCRs
associated with such work.” Id. at ¶ 61.
We determine that these allegations adequately plead breach of written
and oral contracts. Specifically, the complaint provided that the parties orally
agreed to certain project changes but AW failed to execute corresponding
PCRs, mPower worked in good faith to complete the agreed-upon project
changes, AW impeded mPower’s work and refused to pay it for such work, and
mPower suffered damages as a result.
AW insists that, even if mPower had pleaded claims under oral contracts,
such claims would have been inconsistent with the written contract. AW’s
Brief at 34. To support this argument, AW references one case — Coolidge
& Sickler v. Regn, 80 A.2d 554, 557 (N.J. 1951) — for the principle that “in
the construction of contracts … the court must, if possible, ascertain and give
effect to the mutual intent of the parties.” AW’s Brief at 34-35. We consider
this single citation insufficient to support the argument lodged by AW, and
therefore deem this issue waived. See In re S.T.S., JR., supra.
Nevertheless, even if not waived, AW has not convinced us that the trial
court erred in determining that “mPower and AW, as sophisticated business
organizations, expressly and by conduct agreed to work outside of the written
contracts. Lamb testified that AW, by its actions and words, was aware,
consented to, and expected mPower to perform work based on unsigned PCRs,
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contrary to the requirements and terms of the MSA and SOW 6.” FFCL at 99;
see also FFCL 99-101 (setting forth testimony of Lamb). Moreover, the trial
court aptly observed:
AW and mPower were at all times aware of what was required
under the signed and unsigned PCRs, whether the terms were
fulfilled, and the price for the work. The parties were working
together prior to SOW 6. They had familiarity with each other —
so much so that AW represented that the parties can operate with
agreements (often verbal or through e-mail) created outside of
the formal PCR process. The parties’ familiarity with each other,
AW employees’ admissions that contracts were created outside
[of] the formal PCR process and enforceable, and voluminous
documentation supporting the existence of these agreements,
substantiates a finding that contracts were executed outside the
formal PCR process, the terms of the contracts were reasonably
certain, and the parties were aware of the terms of the respective
contracts.
FFCL at 103. Thus, no relief is due.
We also reject AW’s contention that the trial court “erred because it
made no meaningful attempt to explain what the material terms of the
supposed oral contracts were, let alone when and how the parties had agreed
to them.” AW’s Brief at 35. We consider this issue waived, again, for lack of
development, as AW does not elaborate on this assertion. See id.; see also
In re S.T.S., JR., supra.
The last piece of AW’s first issue challenges the trial court’s holding that
AW’s conduct breached both a contract and a duty of good faith and fair
dealing. AW’s Brief at 35. AW claims that “it is well-settled law that a breach
of good faith and fair dealing claim must be predicated on conduct that is
separate and apart from the conduct that allegedly breached the contract
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itself. Otherwise the good faith and fair dealing claim would be wholly
redundant.” Id. at 35-36 (citations omitted). In addition, it says that “the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot override an express
term in a contract.” Id. at 36 (quoting Wade v. Kessler Inst., 798 A.2d
1251, 1259 (N.J. 2002)). AW argues that “[t]he trial court ignored these
principles, using the duty of good faith and fair dealing as a sort of general
damages enhancer for what [it] recognized as breaches of contract even for
claims made under SOW 6.” Id. (footnote omitted). Further, it states that
the trial court’s “finding regarding [AW’s] invoking of its termination rights
under the MSA are a prime example of how the court relied on the same
conduct (AW’s conduct in invoking termination rights under the MSA) to find
breaches of both the written contract (the MSA) and the implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.” Id. at 36-37 (footnote omitted; emphasis in
original).
Again, AW has waived this issue. AW did not raise this specific issue in
its post-trial motion. See Crespo, supra; see also Pa.R.A.P. 2119(e). In its
brief, it claims it preserved this issue in paragraph 25 of its post-trial motion.
See AW’s Brief at 35 n.54. There, however, AW requested that, if the trial
court were not to grant it a new trial, “the [c]ourt should modify the FFCL and
the [o]rder to specify, with respect to each contract: (a) whether the [c]ourt
concludes that [AW] breached an express contractual term (and, if so, which
one) (in other words, if liability is predicated on Count I) or whether [AW’s]
liability is predicated on a breach of an implied contractual term of good faith
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and fair dealing (Count II); and (b) the damages attributable to each Count….”
AW’s Post-Trial Motion, 7/15/2016, at ¶ 25. This issue — and the relief
requested — is different than the argument AW raises in its brief, asserting
that the trial court “ignored New Jersey law when it held that the same conduct
constituted both a breach of a written contract (the MSA) and a violation of
the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing[,]” and used the duty of good
faith and fair dealing “as a sort of general damages enhancer….” AW’s Brief
at 35, 36 (emphasis in original). “Even when a litigant files post-trial motions
but fails to raise a certain issue, that issue is deemed waived for purposes of
appellate review.” Diamond Reo Truck Co. v. Mid-Pacific Industries,
Inc., 806 A.2d 423, 428 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). Consequently,
this argument is also waived.
Nevertheless, even if not waived, we would reject AW’s argument. In
its brief, AW focuses its argument on how the termination of mPower cannot
support both a breach of contract and a breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. See AW’s Brief at 36-37. In doing so, AW fails to address the
other conduct on which the trial court relied to find a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing aside from termination, such as AW’s changing
previously agreed-upon objectives and processes, and obstructing mPower’s
ability to complete its work. See FFCL at 139. For instance, the trial court
examined AW’s exercise of discretion over the parties’ contract, and found
that, inter alia, AW exploited the contract because “AW knew that if mPower
was close to completing a milestone, AW could invoke its power over the
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milestone approval and payment process to deny payment.” Id. at 145-46;
see also id. at ¶¶ 199-200 (“Knowing that its approval was required before
mPower could issue milestone completion letters and invoices, AW refused to
provide requisite approvals for payment. AW purposefully exploited [its]
control over the milestone approval process so that mPower would not get
paid for its work. This allowed AW to avoid having to pay mPower for the
already over budget EID project.”); id. at 137 (observing that “the covenant
permits inquiry into a party’s exercise of discretion expressly granted by a
contract’s terms”) (citing Seidenberg v. Summit Bank, 791 A.2d 1068 (N.J.
Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002)). AW does not offer a specific argument addressing
why it believes its unreasonable and disingenuous use of its discretion in
reviewing and approving milestones — which it had the ability to exercise
under the literal terms of the MSA, see FFCL at ¶¶ 106, 112 — is not a breach
of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. Thus, we would not conclude that
the trial court erred on this basis.
AW’s Second Issue
In AW’s second issue, it argues that “[t]he awards of costs and
attorneys’ fees were contrary to law, prohibited by the MSA, and unreasonable
in amount[.]” AW’s Brief at 38 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis
omitted). In support of this three-pronged argument, AW first advances that
“[t]he trial court should not have awarded attorneys’ fees because the MSA
authorized an award of ‘costs,’ not ‘fees.’” Id. (unnecessary capitalization,
emphasis, and footnote omitted). Second, it says that “[t]he trial court should
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not have awarded costs because the MSA’s preconditions were not met.” Id.
at 45 (unnecessary capitalization, emphasis, and footnote omitted). Finally,
it complains that “[t]he trial court should not have awarded attorneys’ fees or
costs that were disproportionate or unreasonable.” Id. at 51 (unnecessary
capitalization, emphasis, and footnote omitted).
In the first prong of its argument, AW explains that the trial court erred
in concluding that the parties had contracted for the shifting of attorneys’ fees
in Section 2.4.3 of the MSA. See id. at 39-40. The Supreme Court of New
Jersey has explained:
In general, New Jersey disfavors the shifting of attorneys’ fees.
However, a prevailing party can recover those fees if they are
expressly provided for by statute, court rule, or contract. When
the fee-shifting is controlled by a contractual provision, the
provision should be strictly construed in light of our general policy
disfavoring the award of attorneys’ fees.
Litton Industries, Inc. v. IMO Industries, Inc., 982 A.2d 420, 427-28
(N.J. 2009) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
Here, the relevant provision of the MSA — Section 2.4.3 — provides:
If any fees remain unpaid sixty (60) calendar days after AW’s
receipt of an invoice, Contractor will notify AW in writing of the
late payments and, in Contractor’s discretion, the dispute
resolution procedures delineated in Section 13 shall begin to
resolve payment of such fees. In the event that such matter
remains unresolved following completion of the dispute resolution
process delineated in Section 13, then the parties may resolve
such dispute through litigation, the losing party bearing all
costs of such litigation.
mPower’s Exhibit 42 at 3 (emphasis added).
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In awarding $3,596,071.75 in attorneys’ fees to mPower under Section
2.4.3, the trial court explained:
Central to the dispute regarding mPower’s attorney[s’] fees is the
meaning of the phrase “all costs of … litigation” in [Section] 2.4.3.
At the hearing on mPower’s Fee Petition, AW argued that “all
costs” referenced in [Section] 2.4.3 excludes reasonable
attorney[s’] fees. AW pointed out that [Section] 10.1 [of the
MSA], regarding indemnification, provided for indemnification for
“damages or expenses (including reasonable court costs and
reasonable attorney’s fees)….” AW asserts that because
“reasonable attorney’s fees” were included in [Section] 10.1, but
not [Section] 2.4.3, “all costs of … litigation” in [Section] 2.4.3
cannot be interpreted to include attorney[s’] fees.
This [c]ourt finds AW’s argument unpersuasive. The plain
meaning of the language in [Section] 2.4.3 shows that “all costs
of … litigation” must be interpreted to include reasonable
attorney[s’] fees. To start, the term “costs” is synonymous with
“expenses.” Me[r]riam[-]Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate
Dictionary defines “costs” to include: “expenses incurred in
litigation; esp those given by the law or court to the prevailing
party against the losing party.” Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary
definitions of “costs” include:
3. (pl.) The expenses of litigation, prosecution, or other
legal transaction, esp. those allowed in favor of one party
against the other.
[Section] 10.1 clearly intends for reasonable attorney[s’] fees to
be treated as “expenses.” As “costs” and “expenses” are
synonymous, and the MSA identifies reasonable attorney[s’] fees
as expenses, attorney[s’] fees are necessarily included in “all costs
of … litigation.” Further, [Section] 10.1 uses the term “court
costs” while [Section] 2.4.3 merely uses the term “costs.” Thus,
if the parties intended to limit “all costs” in [Section] 2.4.3 to
solely court costs, the provision would have (or should have)
specifically said so. There is no reasonable interpretation of “all
costs of … litigation” that excludes reasonable attorney[s’] fees.
The language of [Section] 2.4.3 makes no distinction between
costs and attorney[s’] fees and provides no basis for doing so.
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Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2017, at 17-18 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in
original).
On appeal, AW argues that the trial court erred because New Jersey
courts “strictly construe” contractual fee-shifting provisions. See AW’s Brief
at 39 (citations omitted). It argues that the language of Section 2.4.3, “which
refers only to ‘costs’ and omits any reference to ‘fees,’ cannot fairly be
construed as overriding the American Rule.” Id. at 40. AW contends that
“[i]t is not enough to refer to the ‘costs’ of litigation. ‘Costs’ do not ordinarily
include ‘attorneys’ fees.’ So when parties want to agree to adopt the English
Rule, they need to say so expressly.” Id. at 41. AW further points out that
“the parties did insert language authorizing an award of attorney[s’] fees when
describing two types of disputes to which they did want fee-shifting to
apply[,]” specifically Sections 10.1 and 10.2. Id. (emphasis in original).20
Thus, AW insists that “the parties thought that an award of attorneys’ fees
should be available only in the specific circumstances that they had identified
in Sections 10.1 and 10.2 of the MSA, and not in other circumstances such as
those at issue here.” Id. at 42 (internal citations omitted).
____________________________________________
20 Section 10.2 — which was raised by AW below but not mentioned by the
trial court in its analysis, supra — governs indemnification for intellectual
property claims, and states that “Contractor shall pay all liabilities,
losses, costs, damages and expenses (including reasonable attorneys’
fees) incurred in connection with any such claims or actions….” mPower’s
Exhibit 42 at 12 (emphasis added).
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We agree with AW. New Jersey law requires that the contract expressly
provide for the recovery of attorneys’ fees. See Litton, supra. Here, Section
2.4.3 fails to do so expressly, and — at best — Section 2.4.3 is ambiguous on
this matter. Accordingly, we reverse the award of attorneys’ fees.21
In the second prong of its argument, AW conveys that “the trial court
should not have awarded costs because the MSA’s preconditions were not
met.” AW’s Brief at 45 (unnecessary capitalization, emphasis, and footnote
omitted). AW claims that, pursuant to Section 2.4.3, supra, and the dispute
resolution procedure described in the MSA, mPower had to meet six
preconditions before receiving an award of costs, including, inter alia, that
mPower’s invoice was received by AW and remained unpaid for 60 days, which
mPower failed to do. Id. at 45-46. It further complains that the trial court
“awarded costs that did not arise out of ‘such litigation’ of ‘such dispute[,]’”
such as costs related to mPower’s defending AW’s counterclaim and
prosecuting its claim against VDX. Id. at 48. In addition, AW insists that, “to
the extent fees related to work done in furtherance of claims (or damages)
that were outside of the parties’ written contract…, Section 2.4.3 cannot even
be said to apply.” Id. at 49. It also says that, even if some costs were
____________________________________________
21 mPower argues that, “[w]hile the trial court correctly found mPower’s
attorneys’ fees recoverable under the MSA, should this Court find otherwise,
mPower should still be entitled to attorneys’ fees pursuant to New Jersey’s
frivolous litigation statute.” mPower’s Brief at 65 (footnote omitted).
However, mPower does not demonstrate to us that it raised this issue before
the trial court, and we will not address it in the first instance. Notwithstanding,
nothing in this memorandum precludes mPower from attempting to raise it on
remand.
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properly awarded, mPower did not submit competent evidence to support its
request, and AW argues that the trial court “should not have created a
potentially perpetual process for seeking costs that are incurred after
judgment is entered.” Id. at 50.
In addressing these issues, the trial court explained:
[Section] 2.4.3 does include several conditions precedent to
granting the prevailing party “all costs of … litigation.” Namely,
that the dispute involve invoices unpaid to mPower for over 60
days, and that mPower complete the dispute resolution process
detailed in Section 13 of the MSA prior to incurring legal fees. AW
argues that mPower is not entitled to any fees under [Section]
2.4.3 because: (1) the dispute is not over mPower invoices unpaid
for 60 days, and mPower did not submit any written notice of late
payment to AW; and (2) that mPower failed to fully complete the
dispute resolution procedures outlined in Section 13 of the MSA
before commencing this litigation. Even if mPower did not fully
comply with the conditions precedent in [Section] 2.4.3, this is
not a bar to mPower’s recovery … under [Section] 2.4.3. Under
New Jersey law, a party must be excused from performance of a
condition precedent where “its performance is prevented or
hindered by a breach of the obligor’s duty of good faith and fair
dealing.”27 A party must also be estopped from asserting
noncompliance with a condition precedent as a defense where that
party’s conduct made performance of the condition precedent
impossible.28
27 See Allstate Redevelopment Corp. v. Summit
Associates, Inc., 502 A.2d 1137, 1140 (N.J. Super. App.
Div. 1985).
28See Antonelli Const. v. Milstead, 112 A.2d 608, 612
(N.J. Super. Law Div. 1955) (finding defendant waived
condition precedent where defendant’s conduct rendered
performance of condition precedent impossible).
The FFCL includes a detailed analysis of how AW, in bad faith,
engaged in obstructive, and evasive conduct designed to prevent
mPower from submitting milestone letters and other required
documentation to be paid for [its] work. … The FFCL additionally
outlines how mPower attempted to engage in dispute resolution
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procedures prior to commencing litigation. However, mPower’s
efforts were pointless, as AW never intended to participate in the
dispute resolution process in good faith. Thus, to the extent
mPower did not comply with the conditions precedent in [Section]
2.4.3, it was AW’s conduct that caused the noncompliance, and
mPower was excused from performance.
Lastly, AW argues that mPower cannot recover [costs] incurred in
connection with AW’s counterclaims under the MSA. However,
upon a plain reading of [S]ection … 2.4.3, there is no basis for
treating AW’s counterclaims differently than mPower’s claims. As
stated above, [Section] 2.4.3 provides for the reimbursement of
“all costs of such litigation” to the prevailing party. AW’s
counterclaims arose from the same MSA under which mPower
brought its claims for breach of contract and breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing. The phrase “all costs of such litigation”
includes not only mPower’s affirmative claims, but any
counterclaims or crossclaims that arise in connection as well.
Nothing in the language of [Section] 2.4.3 indicates an intention
to limit [Section] 2.4.3 to litigation of mPower’s affirmative claims
against AW.
…
As was outlined in the FFCL…, AW’s [c]ounterclaims had no merit
and were unsupported by credible evidence at trial. … AW’s
counterclaims put invoices directly at issue by averring that
mPower failed to adhere to the milestone completion process
before submitting invoices for work. In sum, AW’s
[c]ounterclaims were frivolous and propounded solely to impede
mPower’s pursuit of its own claims. There is no reason, legally or
factually, that mPower would not be entitled to reimbursement for
defending AW’s counterclaims.
Further, mPower is also entitled to [costs] incurred with [its] third-
party claim against VDX. The genesis of mPower[’s] third-party
claim against VDX was AW’s frivolous counterclaims against
mPower…. Had AW not initiated the meritless counterclaims
against mPower…, mPower … would not have initiated the third-
party claim against VDX. Under these circumstances (where AW
is driving up the costs of litigation)[,] there is no reason, factually,
legally, or logically, that mPower … would not be entitled to
reimbursement of … costs for its third-party claims against VDX.
Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2017, at 18-20 (footnotes omitted).
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We agree with the trial court’s analysis.22 We also deem the
$445,806.16 in costs awarded reasonable, as AW does not proffer a developed
argument on this claim to convince us otherwise. See AW’s Brief at 49-50
(discussing purported problems with evidence presented relating to amount
of attorneys’ fees, not costs). We additionally reject AW’s argument that the
trial court should not have created a “potentially perpetual process for seeking
costs” incurred after judgment was entered, as the language of Section 2.4.3
does not support that litigation was considered complete at the time judgment
was entered. See id. at 50; see also Section 2.4.3, supra (stating that “the
parties may resolve such dispute through litigation, the losing party bearing
all costs of such litigation”). Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s award of
costs to mPower.
Finally, AW argues that “[t]he trial court should not have awarded
attorneys’ fees or costs that were disproportionate or unreasonable.” AW’s
Brief at 51 (unnecessary capitalization, emphasis, and footnote omitted). AW
claims that the trial court’s award was “grossly disproportionate to the actual
amount in controversy.” Id. As AW’s argument primarily relates to the
amount of attorneys’ fees awarded, not costs, we do not address this issue.
See id. at 51, 52 (advancing that “many of the entries for fees did not provide
____________________________________________
22We also note that AW does not present legal authority to rebut the trial
court’s conclusion that mPower was excused from performing the conditions
precedent. See AW’s Brief at 45-51; AW’s Reply Brief at 26-27.
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any basis for awarding fees” and pointing out the items for which mPower had
recovered attorneys’ fees).
AW’s Third Issue & mPower’s First Issue
In its third and final issue, AW argues that that the trial court awarded
the wrong amount of post-judgment interest on the verdict and cost award.
Id. at 54. Because mPower also raises an issue relating to post-judgment
interest in its cross-appeal, we address both issues together. See mPower’s
Brief at 2.
With respect to post-judgment interest, the trial court explained the
award, and the rationale behind it, as follows:
On July 1, 2016, this [c]ourt entered a [v]erdict in favor of
mPower. On July 11, 2016, mPower filed a [p]etition to [m]old
the [v]erdict to include pre- and post-judgment interest. On July
11, 2016, mPower also filed a [p]etition for attorney[s’] fees and
costs. On September 12, 2016, this [c]ourt entered an order
directing AW to reimburse mPower for its reasonable legal fees
and expenses. Despite this [c]ourt[’s] having not yet ruled on
mPower’s [p]ost-[t]rial [m]otion to [m]old the [v]erdict, mPower
filed a praecipe with the Prothonotary to enter the judgment in its
favor.
On September 27, 2016, based on that praecipe, the Prothonotary
entered a void judgment in mPower’s favor. The [p]ost-[t]rial
[m]otion to [m]old the [v]erdict was still outstanding and
therefore there was no final judgment for the Superior Court to
consider on appeal. It was not until April 3, 2018 (after [the
Pennsylvania] Supreme Court denied the [p]etition to [a]ppeal)
that this case was remanded to this [c]ourt for this [c]ourt to
make the judgment final by ruling on the [m]otion to [m]old the
[v]erdict.
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Pennsylvania law requires a judgment for a specific sum of money
to bear post-judgment interest.[23] 42 Pa.C.S. § 8101 states,
“[e]xcept as otherwise provided by another statute, a judgment
for a specific sum of money shall bear interest at the lawful rate
from the date of the verdict or award, or from the date of the
judgment, if the judgment is not entered upon a verdict or
award.[”]
A judgment is “[a] court’s final determination of the rights and
obligations of the parties in a case.”88 On the first [a]ppeal, the
Superior Court determined that there was no final judgment
entered in this case because mPower’s [p]ost-[t]rial [m]otion was
pending in the trial court when mPower filed a praecipe to enter
judgment.
88 JUDGMENT, Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014).
“Post[-]judgment interest serves two important functions — it
compensates the judgment creditor for the loss of the use of the
money until the judgment is paid and it acts as an incentive for
the judgment debtor to pay the judgment promptly.”90 During the
time this case was in the appellate courts through error, AW could
not pay the judgment[;] therefore[,] the second function of post[-
]judgment interest, incentive for prompt payment, was not
possible.
90 Lockley[, 66 A.3d at 327].
An improper praecipe of the judgment resulted in approximately
19 months of “delay” in the appellate courts where those appellate
courts did not and could not examine the merits of this case. It
would defy justice to allow mPower to benefit from its own error
and AW should not have to pay interest during a time period when
appellate review of the case was not proper.
____________________________________________
23 In applying Pennsylvania law, the trial court explained that “[p]re- and post-
judgment interest are procedural matters governed by the forum state’s laws.
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has explicitly held that ‘post-judgment
interest is properly characterized as a matter of procedure, rather than one of
substantive law. As a result, Pennsylvania courts should look to Pennsylvania
law when assessing post-judgment interest…[.]’” TCO at 16-17 (quoting
Lockley v. CSX Transp. Inc., 66 A.3d 322, 327-28 (Pa. Super. 2013)).
Neither party disputes that Pennsylvania law should apply here.
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Typically, post-judgment interest should accrue from the date of
the verdict until the day the judgment is paid. If the losing party
decides to appeal the trial court’s verdict, that party has chosen
to delay payment in the hopes that the appellate courts will
reverse the trial court’s decision. In this case, the delay of the
appeal, and therefore payment by AW, was not caused by AW’s
own choice to appeal, but by mPower’s improper praecipe.
Post-judgment interest shall restart accrual on April 3, 2018, the
date the Supreme Court denied the [p]etition for [a]ppeal and
remanded this case to this [c]ourt. As of that date, this case was
before this [c]ourt to rule on the [m]otion to [m]old the
[v]erdict[,] and AW could then decide either to pay mPower the
judgment it had been awarded or to appeal for a second time.
Justice requires AW be exempt from paying post-judgment
interest during the delay caused by mPower’s improper praecipe,
from September 27, 2016 to April 3, 2018.
TCO at 20-22 (footnotes omitted).
As mentioned supra, both parties claim that the trial court erred in some
respect when calculating post-judgment interest. See AW’s Brief at 54;
mPower’s Brief at 71. We consider mPower’s argument first.
mPower argues that the trial court erred by disallowing “post-judgment
interest between September 27, 2016 (the date of mPower’s original praecipe
for judgment) and April 3, 2018 (the date the [Pennsylvania] Supreme Court
denied AW’s petition for allowance of appeal)….” mPower’s Brief at 70. It
argues that “post-judgment interest is mandatory and not subject to
discretion where a verdict is entered for a sum certain.” Id. at 71 (citations
omitted; emphasis in original). Further, it states that, “[n]otwithstanding, if
a court is permitted to use discretion, mPower respectfully contends the trial
court erred in not taking into account that it was AW’s actions, particularly
through its initial duplicative notices of appeal and subsequent filings, that
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prevented the trial court from having jurisdiction to rule on mPower’s [m]otion
to [m]old [v]erdict.” Id. at 72.
We agree with mPower that the trial court erred in disallowing post-
judgment interest. To the extent a trial court may deny post-judgment
interest in cases of injustice, mPower’s conduct did not warrant the trial court’s
eliminating post-judgment interest for the nineteen-month appeal period, as
a great deal of the blame for the delay falls on AW.
Specifically, to rebut mPower’s argument that post-judgment interest is
mandatory where damages are ascertainable under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8101, AW
cites to the case Printed Terry Finishing Co., Inc. v. City of Lebanon, 399
A.2d 732 (Pa. Super. 1979), in which this Court determined that post-
judgment interest on a reduced verdict following a new trial on damages
should not run from the date of the original verdict when the new trial was
necessitated because of the misconduct of the verdict winner’s counsel. Id.
at 732. In a previous appeal in that case, this Court had ordered a new trial
on damages after the verdict winner’s counsel “was seen shaking or holding
the hand of a juror and whispering in the juror’s ear or kissing her on the
cheek” prior to the jury’s returning a verdict on damages. See id. at 732-33.
In rendering a decision on whether post-judgment interest should run from
the date of the original verdict or the later, reduced verdict, we observed that:
[F]rom our review of the law of interest on verdicts and
judgments, we have determined that the factors relevant to our
determination include: (1) whether the party causing delay acted
in good faith, (2) whether the new trial on damages was required
because we considered the original verdict “wiped out,” and (3)
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whether the party causing the delay had the benefit and use of
the verdict amount during the delay.
Id. at 734-35 (internal citation omitted). We reasoned that, “[w]hile [the
other party] has had full use and benefit of the smaller amount pending the
outcome of the new trial on damages, we fail to see why, in fairness, [the
verdict winner] should have the benefit of interest running from the date of a
verdict in which we had absolutely no confidence because of [the verdict
winner’s] own attorney’s actions.” Id. at 735. We further noted that “the
actions of [the verdict winner’s] attorney rendered the original verdict a
nullity.” Id. Accordingly, we reversed the order of the trial court, which had
added interest from the date of the original verdict. Id.
Unlike the circumstances in Printed Terry Finishing, the original
verdict in the case sub judice was not rendered a nullity or ‘wiped out’
following the quashed appeals. Furthermore, for the reasons set forth below,
we do not agree with the trial court that mPower caused the lengthy delay or
failed to act in good faith.
To begin, the facts demonstrate that AW was substantially responsible
for causing the lengthy delay. Following the improper entry of judgment on
September 27, 2016, AW filed a petition to strike the judgment on October 4,
2016, arguing that the judgment awarded mPower relief not authorized by the
trial court’s orders. On October 7, 2016, before the trial court disposed of its
petition to strike, AW filed two notices of appeal. As a result, the trial court
explained that, “[u]pon AW’s filing of [a] [n]otice of [a]ppeal, this [c]ourt
determined that it no longer had jurisdiction to consider AW’s [p]etition to
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[s]trike [j]udgment.” Trial Court Opinion, 1/5/2017, at 4. Consequently, on
November 15, 2016, the trial court “circulated a letter to all parties advising
that it would not consider AW’s [p]etition to [s]trike [j]udgment for lack of
jurisdiction.” Id. While mPower should not have filed the improper praecipe,
AW’s filing of a notice of appeal while its petition to strike remained pending
instigated the lengthy delay. As soon as AW filed its notice of appeal, the trial
court determined that it was divested of jurisdiction to act on the petition to
strike and remedy the defective judgment. Moreover, by filing the petition to
strike in the first place, AW recognized that mPower’s praecipe was
inappropriate, yet it proceeded to divest the trial court of jurisdiction anyway
by appealing.24
Additionally, after this Court quashed all of the parties’ appeals, AW filed
an application for panel and en banc reargument for the appeal docketed at
3156 EDA 2016, arguing that this appeal was taken from an order granting
attorneys’ fees, which it said was ancillary to the judgment and separately
appealable. This Court denied AW’s application. Thereafter, on May 24, 2017,
AW filed a petition for allowance of appeal to our Supreme Court, which the
____________________________________________
24 We reject AW’s argument that it filed its October 7, 2016 notices of appeal
as a precaution. See AW’s Brief at 12 (“[AW] moved to strike the defective
judgment, but, when the judgment was not stricken and no briefing was
scheduled, filed a protective notice of appeal….”) (citations omitted). As
mPower points out, “[j]ust three days after AW filed its petition to strike the
original judgment, AW filed duplicative notices of appeal …. [] AW still had
nearly three weeks to file an appeal from the judgment. If AW was
concerned about losing any appellate rights, it could have filed its petition on
an emergency basis. AW did not do so.” mPower’s Reply Brief at 15
(emphasis added; citations omitted).
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Court denied on April 3, 2018. Again, mPower did not cause this nearly year-
long delay, but rather AW did.
It is also unclear that mPower acted in bad faith in filing the praecipe.
While it was improper for it to do so, mPower explains it “entered judgment
before the trial court ruled on the [m]otion to [m]old [v]erdict because the
[m]otion was ministerial and did not request any substantive relief, as the trial
court had already awarded ‘all statutory interest.’” mPower’s Reply Brief at
14 (citation omitted).25 Further, it did not believe it had to file any motion
regarding post-judgment interest because it thought the trial court was
required by statute to award post-judgment interest. Id.; see also mPower’s
Brief at 71 (stating that “a plain reading of [42 Pa.C.S. § 8101] establishes
that post-judgment interest is mandatory and not subject to discretion where
a verdict is entered for a sum certain”) (emphasis in original; citations
omitted). In contrast to the verdict winner’s attorney in Printed Terry
Finishing, who failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for his encounter
with the juror, mPower proffers a plausible justification for its actions. See
Printed Terry Finishing, 399 A.2d at 735. Accordingly, we determine that
____________________________________________
25 We note, however, that the trial court had awarded pre-judgment interest
to mPower in its verdict, not post-judgment interest. Order, 7/1/2016, at 1.
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the trial court erred in disallowing post-judgment interest between September
27, 2016 and April 3, 2018.26
mPower’s Second Issue
In mPower’s second issue, it contends that the trial court “abused its
discretion when it found mPower packaged only 29 applications, as the
competent evidence establishes mPower packaged 135 applications.”
mPower’s Brief at 73 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).27
mPower avers that “[t]he competent evidence at trial establishes mPower
packaged [77] applications that (a) passed UAT and/or (b) were being used
in AW’s live network, which necessarily means the application was successfully
packaged.” Id. at 74 (citations omitted). Furthermore, mPower claims that
AW “obstructed mPower’s ability to meet packaging milestones[,]” and that
the trial court should have awarded it “damages associated with packages
____________________________________________
26 Given this disposition, we need not address AW’s last issue, in which it asks
us to correct an error in the trial court’s post-judgment interest award. See
AW’s Brief at 54 (noting that the trial court “mistakenly awarded interest for
six months of the nineteen-month period, and it awarded interest on the
award of costs and attorneys’ fees for the entire nineteen months”).
27 By way of background, mPower explains that:
Under SOW 6, mPower was to package applications…. After
packaging, an application moved to AW’s virtual environment
where it would be tested twice — unit testing (“UT”) (by mPower)
and then, user acceptance testing (“UAT”) (by AW). A packaged
application qualified for payment when it successfully passed UAT.
A package was “deemed accepted” if AW did not UAT it within
fifteen days.
mPower’s Brief at 73 (internal citations omitted).
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mPower could have completed prior to the end of the fourteen day termination
notice period if AW had not obstructed mPower from meeting the milestone
completion criteria.” Id. at 74, 75. In addition, it states that “mPower
packaged [58] applications that were either (a) sent to UAT or (b) prevented
from being sent to UAT due to AW’s failure to timely provide necessary
equipment.” Id. at 75 (citations omitted).
No relief is due. While mPower cites to various exhibits and testimony
in support of its argument, it does not adequately articulate how exactly that
evidence supports a finding that mPower packaged 135 applications. See
mPower’s Brief at 74, 75. Instead, it generally says what the exhibit is,
without clearly explaining to us the information contained therein and the
number of packaged applications it purportedly proves. Accordingly, we see
no reason to disturb the trial court’s finding that mPower packaged 29
applications.
mPower’s Third Issue
In mPower’s final issue, it asserts that, “if this Court determines mPower
is not entitled to damages for out-of-scope work performed pursuant to
requests from AW, the trial court erred by dismissing mPower’s unjust
enrichment claim and denying mPower’s motion to amend its complaint.”
mPower’s Brief at 75 (unnecessary capitalization and emphasis omitted).
Given our disposition, we need not address this issue.
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Conclusion
In sum, we affirm the trial court’s verdict in favor of mPower in the
amount of $2,244,549.00. We also affirm the trial court’s award of
$445,806.16 in costs, but reverse its award of $3,596,071.75 in attorneys’
fees, as they should not have been awarded pursuant to Section 2.4.3 of the
MSA. Finally, we reverse the trial court’s award of post-judgment interest to
the extent it disallowed post-judgment interest between September 27, 2016
and April 3, 2018. We direct the trial court to award post-judgment interest
for this time period.
Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded.
Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/20/19
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