Roth, M. v. Marshall, R. ( 2019 )

J-A23043-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
MARK J. ROTH AND MICHELLE A. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
ROTH, HUSBAND AND WIFE, : PENNSYLVANIA
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
:
:
RICHARD B. MARSHALL, BRYCE C. :
MARSHALL AND RICHARD B. :
MARSHALL, II : No. 563 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment Entered April 3, 2019
in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Civil Division at No(s): 2017 GN 3490
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 21, 2019
Mark J. Roth and Michelle A. Roth, husband and wife (collectively, “the
Roths”), appeal from the judgment entered against them and in favor of
Richard B. Marshall, Bryce C. Marshall and Richard B. Marshall, II (collectively,
the Marshalls”). We affirm.
The trial court set forth the facts underlying the instant appeal in its
April 3, 2019, Opinion, which we adopt for the purpose of this appeal. See
Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/19, at 3-26.
On December 15, 2017, the Roths filed a Complaint for Injunctive Relief,
alleging that the Marshalls had interfered with the flow of water, which ran
through a pipe, onto the Roths’ property. The Marshalls filed an Answer, New
Matter and Counterclaim. Following a non-jury trial, the trial court found in
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favor of the Marshalls and against the Roths. The Roths filed Post-Trial
Motions, which the trial court denied. After the entry of Judgment, the Roths
filed the instant timely appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
Concise Statement of matters complained of on appeal.
The Roths present the following claims for our review:
I. Whether the [trial] court erred by failing to enforce [the
Roths’] water rights under the deed of November 16, 1927,
which prohibited the grantors, their successors and assigns,
from diverting the stream of water flowing to the lands
conveyed under the deed?
II. Whether the [trial] court erred by failing to find that [the
Roths] were entitled to an injunction as a matter of law, as
the enforcement of a restrictive covenant cannot be
compensated by monetary damages[,] and the [Roths] had
otherwise satisfied the requirements for injunctive relief?
See Brief for Appellant at 4.
We keep in mind the applicable standard of review:
In equity matters, appellate review is based on a determination
by the appellate court of such questions as whether (1) sufficient
evidence supports the findings of the judge; (2) the factual
inferences and legal conclusions based on those findings are
correct; and (3) there has been an abuse of discretion or an error
of law. Generally, in an appeal from a trial court sitting in equity,
the standard of review is rigorous. The function of this Court on
an appeal from an adjudication in equity is not to substitute its
view for that of the lower tribunal; our task is rather to determine
whether a judicial mind, on due consideration of all of the
evidence, as a whole, could reasonably have reached the
conclusion of that tribunal.
Omicron Sys., Inc. v. Weiner, 860 A.2d 554, 557-58 (Pa. Super. 2004)
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Moreover, we are “bound by
the trial court’s determination concerning the credibility of witnesses and
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weight to be accorded the evidence.” Marchetti v. Karpowick, 667 A.2d
724, 726 (Pa. Super. 1995) (citation omitted).
“[W]hen reviewing the grant or denial of a final or permanent injunction,
an appellate court’s review is limited to determining whether the trial court
committed an error of law.” Buffalo Twp. v. Jones, 813 A.2d 659, 663-64
(Pa. 2002).
Ultimately, the grant or denial of a permanent injunction will turn
on whether the trial court properly found that the party seeking
the injunction established a clear right to relief as a matter of law.
Accordingly, … appellate review in these cases is whether the
lower court committed an error of law in granting or denying the
permanent injunction. Our standard of review for a question of
law is de novo. Our scope of review is plenary.
Id. at 664 n.4 (citations omitted).
The Roths first claim that the trial court erred by failing to enforce their
water rights, as described under a November 16, 1927, deed (“the 1927
Deed”). Brief for Appellant at 12. The Roths assert that the 1927 Deed
prohibited the grantors, their successors and assigns from diverting a stream
of water flowing to the lands conveyed under the deed, including the property
that is now theirs. Id. The Roths argue that the lack of the covenant in their
own deed does not defeat their rights, as their rights were previously recorded
in the chain of title. Id. at 12-14. The Roths further contend that the lack of
a metes and bounds discription does not defeat their claim, as the Marshalls
have never disputed the location of the stream. Id. at 14. In addition, the
Roths take issue with the trial court’s differentiation between the natural flow
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of the stream, and the “manmade” portions, as the 1927 Deed made no such
differentiation. Id. at 15. The Roths also dispute the trial court’s conclusion
that they merely have a license to the water from the stream. Id. at 16.
In its Opinion filed on October 29, 2018, the trial court determined that
the 1927 Deed reserved for the grantors, not the grantees, the perpetual use
of the water. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/29/18, at 21-23. The trial court
further concluded that, “[b]ecause no document of record in [the Roths’] chain
of title grants them any right to divert water from [the Marshalls’] property to
their own for personal uses, their claim is barred by the affirmative defense of
[the] Statute of Frauds, 33 P.S. § 1 ….” Id. at 23.
In its Amended Opinion filed on April 3, 2019, the trial court additionally
analyzed the language set forth in the 1927 Deed, and the evidence presented
by the parties. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/19, at 26-30. Based upon this
analysis, the trial court ultimately concluded that the Roths were not entitled
to injunctive relief, as they “have not met their burden of establishing that
they are entitled to claim any rights in the water flowing through [the
Marshalls’] property and, as a result, their request for injunctive relief must
be denied.” See id. at 36. We agree with the sound reasoning of the trial
court, as set forth in its October 29, 2018, and April 3, 2019 Opinions, and
affirm on this basis with regard to the Roths’ first claim. See Trial Court
Opinion, 10/29/18, at 21-23; Trial Court Opinion, 4/3/19, at 26-36.
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The Roths next claim that the trial court improperly failed to enforce the
restrictive covenant contained in the 1927 Deed and denied them injunctive
relief. Brief for Appellant at 17. The Roths assert that the Marshalls’ act of
terminating the flow of water to their property constituted a violation of the
restrictive covenant. Id. However, as we agree with the trial court’s
determination that there was no violation of the restrictive covenant, the
Roths are not entitled to relief on this claim.
Judgment affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/21/2019
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