Com. v. Akbar, H. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S48009-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :         PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    HASSAN AKBAR                                :
    :
    Appellant                :    No. 3086 EDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence August 27, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-51-CR-0007173-2009
    BEFORE:      DUBOW, J., MURRAY, J., and PLATT, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.:                             FILED SEPTEMBER 26, 2018
    Appellant, Hassan Akbar, appeals from the August 27, 2015 Judgment
    of Sentence imposed following our Supreme Court’s remand to the trial court
    for resentencing on his convictions of Aggravated Assault, Conspiracy to
    Commit Aggravated Assault, Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person,
    and Possessing Instruments of Crime (“PIC”).1
    The relevant facts and procedural history are as follows. On April 14,
    2010, a jury found Appellant guilty of the above offenses. The Commonwealth
    calculated Appellant’s prior record score as a repeat felony offender. On July
    12, 2010, the court sentenced Appellant to an aggregate term of 25 to 50
    years’ incarceration, including mandatory minimum sentences on the
    Aggravated      Assault    and     Conspiracy   to   Commit   Aggravated   Assault
    ____________________________________________
    118 Pa.C.S. § 2702(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 903(a)(1); 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(a)(1);
    and 18 Pa.C.S. § 907(a), respectively.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S48009-18
    convictions. On July 22, 2010, Appellant filed a Post-Sentence Motion. On
    November 22, 2010, the trial court entered an Order denying Appellant’s
    Motion by operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c).
    Appellant timely appealed from his Judgment of Sentence on December
    15, 2010.2      This Court affirmed Appellant’s convictions but vacated his
    Judgment of Sentence and remanded for resentencing. See Commonwealth
    v. Akbar, 
    91 A.3d 227
     (Pa. Super. filed April 30, 2014).
    On May 5, 2014, Appellant filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal. On
    March 4, 2015, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court vacated this Court’s decision,
    and remanded the matter for resentencing pursuant to Commonwealth v.
    Fields, 
    107 A.3d 738
     (Pa. 2014), which had been pending at the time this
    Court decided Appellant’s direct appeal. In Fields, our Supreme Court held
    that 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1) requires that a “second-strike offender be
    sentenced to the prescribed minimum term of incarceration for each conviction
    of a crime of violence that is part of the second strike.” Fields, 107 A.3d at
    744.
    ____________________________________________
    2 During the pendency of Appellant’s direct appeal, on November 8, 2011,
    Appellant filed a pro se Petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act
    (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546, in which he alleged that the court had
    imposed an illegal sentence pursuant to Alleyne v. United States, 
    570 U.S. 99
     (2013). The PCRA court dismissed Appellant’s Petition as premature on
    January 16, 2012.
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    J-S48009-18
    Following a resentencing hearing, on August 27, 2015, the trial court
    resentenced Appellant to the same aggregate term of incarceration, but did
    not impose any mandatory minimum sentences.3 The court acknowledged
    that this is an aggravated range sentence, but that it did not apply any
    mandatory minimum sentences.              It explained its decision to impose an
    aggravated range sentence as “necessary to keep the streets free from
    [Appellant’s] criminal activity.” Trial Ct. Op., 11/3/17, at 3.
    On August 20, 2015, Appellant filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
    Sentence, challenging the discretionary aspects of his sentence. On January
    4, 2016, the trial court entered an Order denying Appellant’s Motion by
    operation of law pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(B)(3)(c). Appellant did not file
    a direct appeal from his Judgment of Sentence.
    Appellant filed a pro se PCRA Petition on June 29, 2016, raising a claim
    of ineffective assistance of counsel and requesting the reinstatement of his
    direct appeal rights. The court appointed counsel who filed an Amended PCRA
    Petition and two Supplemental Amended PCRA Petitions. On September 18,
    2017, the PCRA court granted Appellant’s Petition and reinstated Appellant’s
    direct appeal rights.
    ____________________________________________
    3 Appellant’s sentence is comprised of a 10 to 20 year term of incarceration
    on the Aggravated Assault conviction, a consecutive 10 to 20 year term of
    incarceration on the Conspiracy conviction, and a consecutive 5 to 10 year
    term of incarceration on the Possession of a Firearm by a Prohibited Person
    conviction. The court sentenced Appellant to no further penalty on the PIC
    conviction.
    -3-
    J-S48009-18
    This timely appeal followed.          Both Appellant and the PCRA court
    complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
    Is [A]ppellant entitled to a new sentenc[ing] hearing when the
    trial court based its sentencing decision on conclusions not
    supported by the record which was the [A]ppellant was beyond
    rehabilitation and should be put in prison for as long as possible?
    In light of this[,] are there serious doubts that the trial court
    properly considered the general guidelines provided by the
    Legislature in imposing the sentence?
    Appellant’s Brief at 2.
    Appellant’s claim challenges the discretionary aspects of his sentence.
    See Commonwealth v. Lutes, 
    793 A.2d 949
    , 964 (Pa. Super. 2002) (stating
    claim that sentence is manifestly excessive challenges discretionary aspects
    of sentencing).     However, challenges to the discretionary aspects of
    sentencing   do   not     entitle   an   appellant   to   an   appeal   as   of   right.
    Commonwealth v. Sierra, 
    752 A.2d 910
    , 912 (Pa. Super. 2000). Prior to
    reaching the merits of a discretionary sentencing issue, we must determine
    whether: (1) appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal; (2) the issue was
    properly preserved at sentencing or in a motion to reconsider and modify
    sentence; (3) appellant’s brief has a fatal defect; and (4) there is a substantial
    question that the sentence is not appropriate under the Sentencing Code.
    Commonwealth v. Evans, 
    901 A.2d 528
    , 533 (Pa. Super. 2006).
    The determination of what constitutes a substantial question must be
    evaluated on a case-by-case basis. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 
    830 A.2d 1013
    , 1018 (Pa. Super. 2003). A substantial question exists “only when the
    -4-
    J-S48009-18
    appellant advances a colorable argument that the sentencing judge’s actions
    were either: (1) inconsistent with a specific provision of the Sentencing Code;
    or (2) contrary to the fundamental norms which underlie the sentencing
    process.” Sierra, supra at 912-13.
    Appellant has satisfied the first three requirements set forth above: he
    filed a timely Notice of Appeal; preserved the issue by filing a Petition to
    Reconsider Sentence; and included a separate Pa.R.A.P. 2119(f) Statement in
    his Brief to this Court.    We, thus, consider whether Appellant raised a
    substantial question.
    Appellant argues that his aggregate sentence is manifestly excessive.
    Appellant’s Brief at 7-8.   He argues that the sentencing court abused its
    discretion by imposing consecutive sentences and by allegedly failing to
    consider mitigating circumstances, i.e., the factors he deems illustrative of his
    potential for rehabilitation. Id.
    It is well-settled that a bare challenge to the imposition of consecutive
    rather than concurrent sentences does not present a substantial question
    regarding the discretionary aspects of sentence. Commonwealth v. Zirkle,
    
    107 A.3d 127
    , 133 (Pa. Super. 2014). Moreover, claims that the sentencing
    court did not adequately consider mitigating factors do not generally raise a
    substantial question. See, e.g, Commonwealth v. Moury, 
    992 A.2d 162
    ,
    175 (Pa. Super. 2010). Appellant has not advanced a “colorable argument”
    that his standard range sentence is either inconsistent with a specific provision
    of the Sentencing Code or contrary to the fundamental norms underlying the
    -5-
    J-S48009-18
    sentencing process.   Anderson, 
    supra at 1018
    .        Thus, we conclude that
    Appellant has not raised a substantial question for this Court’s review.
    Judgment of Sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 9/26/18
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 3086 EDA 2017

Filed Date: 9/26/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024