In the Matter of A.D.W.Appeal of T.B. mother ( 2016 )

J-S20030-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
A.D.W. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.B., NATURAL MOTHER No. 1639 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree entered September 14, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 26 of 2015
IN THE MATTER OF THE ADOPTION OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
C.E.W. PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: T.B., NATURAL MOTHER No. 1640 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Decree entered September 14, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County, Orphans’
Court, at No(s): 6 of 2015
BEFORE: PANELLA, OLSON, and PLATT*, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED APRIL 20, 2016
T.B. (“Mother”) appeals from the decrees entered on September 14,
2015, granting the petition filed by the Erie County Office of Children and
Youth (“OCY” or the “Agency”) to involuntarily terminate her parental rights
to her dependent minor children, A.D.W., a male born in October 2003, and
C.E.W., a male born in September 2010 (collectively, “the Children”),
pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S20030-16
(b).1 Mother’s counsel, Attorney Justin D. Panighetti, (“Counsel”), has filed
a petition for leave to withdraw as counsel and a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We affirm, and grant Counsel’s
petition to withdraw.
In the Anders brief, Counsel set forth the factual background and
procedural history of this appeal, which OCY does not dispute.2 We will set
forth the relevant facts and procedure from Counsel’s Anders Brief.
The [C]hildren were removed from [Mother] and placed into the
temporary protective legal and physical custody of the . . .
[Agency] on February 26[], 2014.
The Shelter Care Hearing took place on March 3[], 2014. At that
time, the [trial c]ourt found there was sufficient evidence
presented to prove that return of the [C]hildren to the home
would not be in the best interest of the [C]hildren. [Mother] did
not appear for the hearing.
A Dependency Petition was filed on March 5, 2014. The petition
alleged the [C]hildren were without proper parental care or
control as it pertained to [Mother], in that she had a history with
the [A]gency, and a drug addiction which affected her ability to
parent the [] [C]hildren. Further, it was alleged A.D.W. was
diagnosed with ADHD and prescribed medication which [Mother]
filled but failed to administer to the child. Lastly, it was alleged
[that Mother] had unstable housing and had engaged in
domestic violence in the presence of the [] [C]hildren. The
[C]hildren were adjudicated dependent on March 11[], 2014.
[Mother] did not appear at that hearing.
1
On September 14, 2015, the trial court also entered decrees that
terminated the parental rights of A.D.W.’s father, D.J.W., and C.E.W.’s
father, J.C.W. Neither individual has filed any appeal in relation to those
terminations, nor is either a party to the present appeal.
2
The trial court has filed letters in regard to each case, stating that in light
of Counsel’s Anders brief, the court will not be submitting any opinion
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a).
-2-
J-S20030-16
The Dispositional Hearing took place on April 7[], 2014.
[Mother] did appear at that hearing and the [trial c]ourt ordered
her to complete inpatient treatment at White Deer Run, be
assessed for Erie County Family Dependency Treatment Court,
refrain from the use of drugs and/or alcohol and submit to
random urinalysis testing. She was also ordered to demonstrate
stable mental health, maintain safe and stable housing, obtain
employment, attend visits, and engage in parent education
classes through the Time Limited Family Reunification Program.
The initial Permanency Hearing took place on August 18, 2014.
[Mother] did not appear for that hearing. The [trial c]ourt found
minimal compliance in that [Mother] failed to complete
treatment at White Deer Run, failed to participate in an
assessment for Erie County Family Dependency Treatment
Court, failed to refrain from the use of drugs and/or alcohol and
failed to submit to random urinalysis testing. She also failed to
demonstrate stable mental health and cooperate with
recommended services. Further, she failed to obtain and/or
maintain safe and stable housing, obtain and/or maintain gainful
employment, and failed to actively engage in parent education
classes through the Time Limited Family Reunification Program.
At that time, a concurrent goal of adoption was added and a
[60-day] review was set.
A second permanency hearing was held on October 13, 2014. At
that time, [Mother] did appear and the [trial c]ourt found no
compliance with the permanency plan and that no progress had
been made toward alleviating the circumstances which
necessitated the original placement of the [Children]. . . .
On April 14[], 2015, the Agency filed two Petitions for
Involuntary Termination of Parental Rights to a Child Under the
Age of 18 Years. Therein, the Agency sought to terminate the
parental rights of [Mother] to A.D.W. and C.E.W. pursuant to 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5), (a)(8), and (b).
On September 14, 2015, the Honorable Robert A. Sambroak
presided over a hearing on the aforementioned petitions.
[Mother] did not appear. At this hearing, the following
evidence/testimony was adduced:
-3-
J-S20030-16
The [trial c]ourt heard the testimony of Sharon Slubowski,
ongoing caseworker at [OCY]. She [testified] that when she
took the case over she worked with [Mother] to remedy the
substance abuse concerns, unstable home conditions, and
domestic violence. She [testified] that at the time of the first
permanency hearing in August [] 2014, [Mother] had only
completed [20] days of the required [30-day] inpatient period
before leaving. She had also failed to attend the appointments
in which she was to be assessed to [enter] Erie County Drug
Treatment Court. Further, she had not attended her urine
screens as required. She also denied having a mental health
diagnosis despite two inpatient stays in the previous four months
and a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. She had failed to
obtain housing and employment and had only attended a few
sessions with relation to the parenting plan. Ms. Slubowski
testified that the last time she saw [Mother] was in August when
[Mother] and the natural father screamed at her and stormed
out the front door after being told the Agency was suggesting to
change the goal to adoption due to failure to comply. They
stormed out as the [C]hildren were coming in the back door for a
visit. [Mother] then failed to appear for that goal change
hearing.
A second permanency hearing was held in October [] 2014. At
that time Ms. Slubowski indicated that [Mother] again failed to
comply with the treatment plan. Ms. Slubowski testified that
nothing had changed from the time of the initial adjudication. In
fact, she testified that things had gotten worse as [Mother] had
been charged a few more times with [driving under the influence
of alcohol] and [possession of a controlled substance], leading
her to be incarcerated.
Based on these circumstances, Ms. Slubowski testified that she
believed it to be in the best interest of the [C]hildren for
[Mother’s] parental rights to be involuntarily terminated.
Anders Brief at 6-8.
On September 14, 2015, the trial court entered the decrees
involuntarily terminating Mother’s parental rights to the Children.
-4-
J-S20030-16
On October 14, 2015, Mother timely filed notices of appeal along with
statements of Counsel’s intention to file an Anders brief pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4). See In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992)
(adopting the Anders procedure to cases involving the involuntary
termination of parental rights); In the Interest of J.T., 983 A.2d 771, 772
(Pa. Super. 2009) (applying Pa.R.A.P. 1925(c)(4) to appeals involving the
termination of parental rights). On November 4, 2015, this Court, acting
sua sponte, consolidated the appeals. On December 16, 2015, Counsel filed
an Anders brief. On December 21, 2015, Counsel filed the petition to
withdraw as counsel. In the Anders brief, counsel raises the following
issues for our review:
1. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
of law when it concluded that the Agency established sufficient
grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(1)?
2. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
of law when it concluded that the Agency established sufficient
grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(2)?
3. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
of law when it concluded that the Agency established sufficient
grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(5)?
4. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
of law when it concluded that the Agency established sufficient
grounds for termination under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §2511(a)(8)?
5. Did the orphans’ court commit an abuse of discretion or error
of law when it concluded that termination of Appellant’s parental
rights was in the Children’s best interests under section (b)?
-5-
J-S20030-16
Anders Brief at 5. Mother did not file a pro se brief or retain alternate
counsel for this appeal.
Pursuant to Anders, when counsel believes an appeal is frivolous and
wishes to withdraw representation, he or she must do the following:
(1) petition the court for leave to withdraw stating that after
making a conscientious examination of the record . . ., counsel
has determined the appeal would be frivolous;
(2) file a brief referring to anything that might arguably support
the appeal, but which does not resemble a “no-merit” letter or
amicus curiae brief; and
(3) furnish a copy of the brief to defendant and advise him of his
right to retain new counsel, proceed pro se, or raise any
additional points he deems worthy of the court’s attention.
In re S.M.B., 856 A.2d 1235, 1237 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted).
In Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349 (Pa. 2009), our
Supreme Court addressed the second requirement of Anders, i.e., the
contents of an Anders brief, and required that the brief:
(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts,
with citations to the record;
(2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes
arguably supports the appeal;
(3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
and
(4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of
record, controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that
have led to the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
-6-
J-S20030-16
Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361. “After an appellate court receives an Anders
brief and is satisfied that counsel has complied with the aforementioned
requirements, the Court then must undertake an independent examination
of the record to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous.” In re
S.M.B., 856 A.2d at 1237.
With respect to the third requirement of Anders, that counsel inform
the defendant of his or her rights in light of counsel’s withdrawal, this Court
has held that counsel must “attach to their petition to withdraw a copy of the
letter sent to their client advising him or her of their rights.”
Commonwealth v. Millisock, 873 A.2d 748, 752 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Here, Counsel has complied with each of the requirements of Anders.
Counsel indicates that he conscientiously examined the record and
determined that an appeal would be frivolous. Further, Counsel’s Anders
brief comports with the requirements set forth by the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania in Santiago. Finally, the record contains a copy of the letter
that Counsel sent to Mother, stating that the Anders brief was enclosed,
advising her of her right to proceed pro se or retain alternate counsel and
file additional claims, and stating Counsel’s intention to seek permission to
withdraw. Accordingly, Counsel has complied with the procedural
requirements for withdrawing from representation. We will review Mother’s
claims on appeal regarding the termination of her parental rights.
-7-
J-S20030-16
Mother’s sole issue on appeal is whether the Agency has satisfied the
statutory grounds for termination of her parental rights under section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), with clear and convincing evidence.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 9 A.3d 1179,
1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa.
2011) (plurality opinion). As has been often stated, an abuse of
discretion does not result merely because the reviewing court
might have reached a different conclusion. Id.; see also
Samuel Bassett v. Kia Motors America, Inc., 34 A.3d 1, 51
(Pa. 2011); Christianson v. Ely, 838 A.2d 630, 634 (Pa. 2003).
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.
As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., 9 A.3d at
1190. Therefore, even where the facts could support an
opposite result, as is often the case in dependency and
termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
-8-
J-S20030-16
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. (quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003)).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under section
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b), which provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
-9-
J-S20030-16
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of
a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
- 10 -
J-S20030-16
This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights
under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but, under section 2511(b), the
focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc). We will focus on subsection 2511(a)(2) and (b).
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as
follows.
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent
has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.” . . .
[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the
parent, can seldom be more difficult than when
termination is based upon parental incapacity. The
legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act,
concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing
parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986),
quoting In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.
1978).
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
- 11 -
J-S20030-16
In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340.
The ongoing caseworker, Ms. Slubowski, testified to the following:
when she took the case over she worked with [Mother] to
remedy the substance abuse concerns, unstable home
conditions, and domestic violence. She indicated that at the
time of the first permanency hearing in August of 2014, [Mother]
had only completed [20] days of the required [30-]day inpatient
period before leaving. She had also failed to attend the
appointments in which she was to be assessed to [enter] Erie
County Drug Treatment Court. Further, she had not attended
her urine screens as required. She also denied having a mental
health diagnosis despite two inpatient stays in the previous four
months and a diagnosis of major depressive disorder. She had
failed to obtain housing and employment and had only attended
a few sessions with relation to the parenting plan. Ms.
Slubowski testified that the last time she saw [Mother] was in
August when [Mother] and the natural father screamed at her
and stormed out the front door after being told the Agency was
suggesting to change the goal to adoption due to failure to
comply. They stormed out as the [C]hildren were coming in the
back door for a visit. She then failed to appear for that goal
change hearing.
A second permanency hearing was held in October [] 2014. At
that time Ms. Slubowski indicated that [Mother] again failed to
comply with the treatment plan. Ms. Slubowski testified that
nothing had changed from the time of the initial adjudication. In
fact, she testified that things had gotten worse as [Mother] had
been charged a few more times with [driving under the influence
of alcohol] and [possessing a controlled substance], leading her
to be incarcerated.
Based on these circumstances, Ms. Slubowski testified that she
believed it to be in the best interest of the [C]hildren for
[Mother’s] parental rights to be involuntarily terminated.
- 12 -
J-S20030-16
Anders Brief at 7-8; OCY’s Brief at 2.3
The trial court assessed the evidence regarding Mother’s repeated
incapacity to parent the Children, and her inability to remedy the conditions
and causes of her incapacity to parent the Children. See N.T., 9/14/15, at
28. As there is competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record that
supports the trial court’s termination of Mother’s parental rights to the
Children under subsection (a)(2), we affirm the trial court’s decision. In re
Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at 826-27.
After we determine that the requirements of section 2511(a) are
satisfied, we proceed to review whether the requirements of subsection (b)
are satisfied. See In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1009 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc). Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the
child have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles
such as love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481,
485 (Pa. 1993)], [the Supreme] Court held that the
determination of the child’s “needs and welfare” requires
consideration of the emotional bonds between the parent and
child. The “utmost attention” should be paid to discerning the
effect on the child of permanently severing the parental bond.
In re K.M., 53 A.3d at 791.
In re: T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013).
3
As the trial court did not file an opinion, we have relied on the facts as set
forth in the Anders brief, and incorporated by OCY’s brief, as confirmed by
our careful review of the record, for ease of disposition of the appeal.
- 13 -
J-S20030-16
Ms. Slubowski testified that the termination of Mother’s parental rights
would be in the best interest of the Children, and that she would not
anticipate any negative effect on them from the termination. N.T., 9/14/15,
at 19. Ms. Slubowski also testified that there was no healthy bond between
Mother and the Children, as Mother places blame on the Children, and claims
that they are the reason why her visits were not going well. Id. at 21-22.
She described the visits between Mother and the Children as cold and
disturbing, with the Children fighting, and Mother not attempting to stop
them. Id. at 22. Ms. Slubowski testified that C.E.W. had tubes in his ears
and had been kicked out of a day care for aggression problems. Id. at 23.
She also testified that A.D.W. has been diagnosed with Post-Traumatic
Stress Disorder (“PTSD”) and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder
(“ADHD”). Id. at 23. She stated that A.D.W. is placed with his maternal
grandmother, and C.E.W. is placed with his paternal grandmother. Id. at
20. Ms. Slubowski testified that both grandmothers have been able to deal
with the Children and their needs. Id. at 24.
Michael Scott Vicander, the OCY permanency caseworker, testified that
A.D.W., who is 11 years old, has special needs, and is involved in family-
based trauma focus therapy. N.T., 9/14/15, at 25-26. A.D.W. is working
with the crime victim center, and has a blended case manager. Id. Mr.
Vicander stated that A.D.W. is placed with his maternal grandmother, who is
able to meet all of his needs. Id. Mr. Vicander testified that A.D.W. has not
- 14 -
J-S20030-16
seen Mother since Mr. Vicander assumed the case on November 14, 2014,
and he has not observed any detrimental effect on A.D.W. from not seeing
Mother, nor has he had any indication of an ongoing bond between A.D.W.
and Mother. Id. at 24, 26.
Mr. Vicander also testified that C.E.W. is placed with his paternal
grandmother, in a kinship foster home. Id. at 27. Mr. Vicander stated that
C.E.W. is a normal four-year-old and attends day care. Id. Mr. Vicander
testified that C.E.W. is doing exceptionally well in the home, and does not
have any special needs. Id. Mr. Vicander testified that C.E.W.’s paternal
grandmother is meeting all of C.E.W.’s needs. Id. Mr. Vicander stated that
he had not noticed any negative effect on C.E.W. from being away from
Mother, nor had he noticed any evidence of a bond between C.E.W. and
Mother. Id. at 27-28. Mr. Vicander stated that the termination of Mother’s
parental rights would be in the best interest of C.E.W. Id. at 28. Further,
Mr. Vicander testified that he had seen nothing that would indicate that the
termination of Mother’s parental rights would have a negative effect on
either of the Children. Id. at 26.
The trial court considered the needs and welfare of the Children, and
the lack of a bond between Mother and the Children. See N.T., 9/14/15, at
29. There is competent, clear and convincing evidence in the record to
support the conclusion that the termination of Mother’s parental rights
serves the Children’s best interests, as Mother cannot meet their needs and
- 15 -
J-S20030-16
welfare, and their foster homes are currently meeting their needs and
welfare. The evidence also supported the determination that there is no
bond between the Children and Mother that, if severed, would cause a
detrimental effect on them.
As we stated in In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108 (Pa. Super. 2010), a child’s
life “simply cannot be put on hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon
the ability to handle the responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather,
“a parent’s basic constitutional right to the custody and rearing of [her] child
is converted, upon the failure to fulfill [] her parental duties, to the child’s
right to have proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a
permanent, healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856
(Pa. Super. 2004).
We find that the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error
of law or an abuse of discretion. We, therefore, affirm the trial court’s
decision with regard to subsection (b). In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d at
826-27.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s decrees terminating Mother’s
parental rights, and we grant Counsel’s petition to withdraw as counsel.
Decrees affirmed; petition granted.
- 16 -
J-S20030-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/20/2016
- 17 -