McCarthy, J. v. Riddell, C. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S11044-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    JAMES McCARTHY AND NICOLE                :       IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    McCARTHY,                                :             PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    Appellants             :
    :
    v.                            :
    :
    CRAIG RIDDELL AND RUTH RIDDELL           :           No. 2260 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Order July 1, 2015
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County,
    Civil Division, No(s): 2014-07872
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OTT and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                         FILED APRIL 29, 2016
    James McCarthy and Nicole McCarthy (“the McCarthys”) appeal from
    the Order granting the Petition to Open and/or Strike the Judgment
    (hereinafter “the Petition to Open/Strike”) filed by Craig Riddell and Ruth
    Riddell (“the Riddells”), and striking the McCarthys’ appeal. We vacate the
    Order and remand for further proceedings.
    The trial court set forth the relevant procedural history underlying this
    appeal as follows:
    [The McCarthys] filed suit against [the Riddells] in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Montgomery County, Magisterial District 38-1-
    14, located in Hatboro, Montgomery County. The McCarthy[s]
    brought the case to resolve a dispute regarding a security
    deposit under a residential lease between the parties.[1]
    Specifically, the McCarthy[s] claimed that the Riddells failed to
    1
    The leasehold property (hereinafter “the Property”) is located in Hatboro,
    Montgomery County. The Riddells leased the Property to the McCarthys, and
    required them to pay a security deposit of $2,140 to secure the lease. At all
    relevant times, the Riddells resided in Bucks County.
    J-S11044-16
    [(1) return the McCarthys’ security deposit; or (2)] provide the
    McCarthy[s] with a written list of any damages to the [Property]
    for which the Riddells may hold the McCarthy[s] liable and
    withhold their security deposit.
    On October 15, 2014, a hearing was held before a
    [Magisterial] District Ju[dge] in Montgomery County[, the
    Honorable Paul Leo (“MDJ Leo”)]. After the October 15, 2014
    hearing, [MDJ Leo] entered judgment in favor of the McCarthy[s]
    and against [the] Riddells in the amount of … $2,285.75[].
    The McCarthy[s] never filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court
    of Common Pleas in Montgomery County. Instead, on November
    13, 2014, the McCarthy[s] filed a Notice of Appeal in the Court of
    Common Pleas of Bucks County.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 1-2 (footnote and emphasis added; footnote
    citations to record omitted).
    On November 20, 2014, the McCarthys filed a de novo Complaint
    (hereinafter, “the de novo Complaint”) in the Bucks County Court of
    Common Pleas.2       Importantly, the Riddells did not file an answer or
    preliminary objections to the de novo Complaint.
    Based upon the Riddells’ failure to respond to the de novo Complaint,
    on December 29, 2014, the McCarthys gave the Riddells Notice of Intent to
    enter a default judgment (hereinafter, “the 10-day Notice”).3 On February
    2
    Though the de novo Complaint was filed on November 20, 2014, the
    McCarthys’ counsel did not file an Affidavit of Service until December 20,
    2014. The Affidavit of Service asserted that, on December 9, 2014, the
    Riddells were served, at their last known residence in Bucks County, with a
    copy of the de novo Complaint via certified mail.
    3
    Though the 10-day Notice is contained in the certified record, it was not
    entered on the trial court’s docket. As we discuss below, the Riddells
    asserted that they never received the 10-day Notice.
    -2-
    J-S11044-16
    27, 2015, the McCarthys filed a Praecipe to enter default judgment (“the
    Praecipe”),4 based upon the Riddells’ failure to respond to the de novo
    Complaint or the 10-day Notice.           On March 9, 2015, the Bucks County
    prothonotary entered a default judgment against the Riddells in the amount
    of $9,920.00.     Also on that date, the prothonotary mailed the Riddells a
    Notice of entry of judgment, pursuant to Pa.R.C.P. 236 (hereinafter, “the
    Rule 236 Notice”).
    On March 24, 2015, the Riddells filed the Petition to Open/Strike the
    judgment entered in Bucks County.           The Riddells asserted, inter alia, that
    the judgment could not stand because the Bucks County Court of Common
    Pleas lacked jurisdiction over the appeal. The Riddells asserted that, since
    the   McCarthys    had   filed   their   initial   Complaint   before   MDJ   Leo   in
    Montgomery County, any appeal of MDJ Leo’s judgment must therefore be
    filed in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas.              Additionally, the
    Riddells averred that they “never received a ten[-]day notice of intention to
    take default judgment[, i.e., the 10-day Notice,] as certified by [the
    McCarthys’] counsel[,]” and that the Riddells “did not become aware that
    [the McCarthys] intended to or did enter default judgment by praecipe until
    they received the Rule 236 Notice following March 9, 2015.”               Petition to
    Open/Strike, 3/24/15, at ¶¶ 9-10 (some capitalization omitted).
    4
    The Praecipe was not entered on the docket until March 9, 2015.
    Additionally, the Praecipe included a certification that the McCarthys had
    served the Riddells with the 10-day Notice, at least ten days prior to the
    filing of the Praecipe.
    -3-
    J-S11044-16
    On March 26, 2015, the trial court issued a Rule upon the McCarthys
    to show cause why the Petition to Open/Strike should not be granted. The
    McCarthys timely filed a responsive Memorandum, after which the Riddells
    filed a Memorandum of Law in support of their Petition to Open/Strike.
    On July 1, 2015, the trial court issued an Order stating that upon
    consideration of the Petition to Open/Strike, the “McCarthy[s’] appeal to the
    Bucks County Court of Common Pleas is stricken in its entirety.”         Order,
    7/1/15 (some capitalization omitted).5 The McCarthys timely filed a Notice
    of Appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Concise Statement
    of errors complained of on appeal. The trial court then issued an Opinion.
    The McCarthys now present the following issues for our review:
    I.   Whether [the McCarthys’] appeal from Magisterial District
    Court was timely filed[?]
    II.   Whether venue is proper in Bucks County[?]
    III.   Whether the proceeding on appeal shall be conducted de
    novo in accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure that
    would be applicable if the action was initially commenced
    in the Court of Common Pleas[?]
    IV.   Whether [the Riddells] waived the issue of venue[?]
    V.    Whether, if there is a county of proper venue within the
    state, the action shall not be stricken[,] but shall be
    transferred to the appropriate court of that county[?]
    VI.   Whether [the Riddells] fail to raise a valid defense[?]
    Brief for Appellants at 3-4 (emphasis and capitalization omitted).
    5
    Though the July 1, 2015 Order did not specifically so state, it implicitly
    struck off the default judgment entered against the Riddells.
    -4-
    J-S11044-16
    Our standard of review of an order granting a petition to open/strike is
    well-settled:
    A petition to strike a judgment raises a question of law and relief
    thereon will only be granted if a fatal defect appears on the face
    of the record. Alternatively, a petition to open rests within the
    discretion of the trial court, and may be granted if the petitioner
    (1) acts promptly, (2) alleges a meritorious defense, and (3) can
    produce sufficient evidence to require submission of the case to
    a jury. The decision of the trial court on a petition to strike or
    open judgment will not be disturbed unless there is an error of
    law or a manifest abuse of discretion.
    Rait P’ship, L.P. v. E Pointe Props. I, Ltd., 
    957 A.2d 1275
    , 1277 (Pa.
    Super. 2008) (citations omitted); see also Northern Forests II, Inc. v.
    Keta Realty Co., 
    130 A.3d 19
    , 28 (Pa. Super. 2015).
    The McCarthys first argue that the trial court erred in ruling that their
    appeal from MDJ Leo’s judgment was untimely under the Rules of Civil
    Procedure for Magisterial District Judges (hereinafter “MDJ Civil Rules”).
    See Brief for Appellants at 13-14. We agree.
    MDJ Civil Rule 1002, which governs the time and method of appeal
    from rulings made by a magisterial district judge, provides, in relevant part,
    as follows:
    A party aggrieved by a judgment for money, or a judgment
    affecting the delivery of possession of real property arising out of
    a nonresidential lease, may appeal therefrom within thirty (30)
    days after the date of the entry of judgment by filing with the
    prothonotary of the court of common pleas a notice of appeal …,
    together with a copy of the Notice of Judgment issued by the
    magisterial district judge. …
    -5-
    J-S11044-16
    Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(A).   Rule 1002(B) governs the time and method of
    appeal from a “judgment for the delivery of possession of real property
    arising out of a residential lease[,]” and provides for a ten-day period for
    appeals to the court of common pleas. Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(B).
    In the instant case, the trial court ruled that the ten-day appeal period
    of Rule 1002(B) applied, stating
    [t]he McCarthy[s’] filing of their appeal was not timely. As
    stated, this [lawsuit] arises from a dispute over the [McCarthys’]
    security deposit [concerning] a residential lease. [] Thus, the
    McCarthy[s] had ten days to file their notice of appeal.
    [Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(B).] The McCarthy[s’] hearing on their
    [initial C]omplaint, and [the judgment issued] therefrom,
    occurred on October 15, 2014[,] in the Magisterial District Court
    of Montgomery County. The McCarthy[s] then filed their appeal
    on November 13, 2014[, 29 days after the entry of judgment,]
    in the Court of Common Pleas [of] Bucks County. Thus, under
    [MDJ Civil] Rule 1002(B), the McCarthy[s] failed to file a timely
    appeal within the ten[-]day timeframe prescribed by [Rule
    1002(B)].
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 4-5 (footnote citations reformatted to
    appear in body).
    The trial court overlooked the language in Rule 1002(B) providing that
    “[a] party aggrieved by a judgment for the delivery of possession of real
    property arising out of a residential lease may appeal therefrom within ten
    (10) days after the date of the entry of judgment ….”         Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J.
    1002(B) (emphasis added).      The judgment against the Riddells did not
    concern possession of the Property, but rather, the McCarthys’ money
    security deposit. Therefore, the instant appeal is taken from a judgment for
    -6-
    J-S11044-16
    money, and the thirty-day appeal period provided for in MDJ Civil Rule
    1002(A) applies.   See Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1002(A) (providing for a thirty-day
    appeal period for “[a] party aggrieved by a judgment for money ….”). The
    McCarthys timely filed their Notice of Appeal within thirty days.
    Next, the McCarthys challenge the trial court’s ruling that the Bucks
    County Court of Common Pleas was not the proper forum for the appeal
    because the McCarthys had filed their initial Complaint in Montgomery
    County, and any appeal of MDJ Leo’s judgment should have been filed in the
    Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas. See Brief for Appellants at 14-
    15.
    The trial court addressed this claim as follows:
    … Under [MDJ Civil] Rule 1001(2), an “appeal” is defined as “an
    appeal from a judgment to the court of common pleas.”
    [Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1001(2).] Further, pursuant to Rule 1001(5),
    the “court of common pleas” is defined as “the court of common
    pleas of the judicial district in which is located the
    magisterial district wherein the questioned action of the
    magisterial district judge took place.”            [Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J.
    1001(5) (emphasis added by trial court).] Thus, when reading
    Rule 1001 in conjunction with Rule 1002, it is clear that an
    appeal from a magisterial court must be filed in the same county
    in which [the] magisterial case took place. [See Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J.
    1002(A) (providing that an aggrieved party “may appeal []
    within thirty (30) days after the date of the entry of judgment by
    filing with the prothonotary of the court of common pleas a
    notice of appeal ….”).]
    Here, Bucks County was not the proper venue for the
    McCarthy[s’] appeal ….
    The McCarthy[s] filed their initial [C]omplaint in a
    Magisterial District Court in Montgomery County. Therefore,
    pursuant to [MDJ Civil] Rules 1001 and 1002[], the McCarthy[s]
    -7-
    J-S11044-16
    were to file their appeal in “the court of common pleas of the
    judicial district in which is located the magisterial district wherein
    the questioned action of the magisterial district judge took
    place.” [Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1001(5).] As stated, that initial case
    took place in Montgomery County. Thus, the McCarthy[s] were
    to file their appeal in Montgomery County. Therefore, their
    appeal to Bucks County was improper because Bucks County
    was not the proper venue for their appeal.
    Trial Court Opinion, 9/15/15, at 4 (footnote citations reformatted to appear
    in body).   We agree with the trial court’s analysis, and likewise determine
    that the McCarthys filed their de novo appeal in an improper venue.
    However, improper venue can be waived, which we address below in the
    McCarthys’ related third and fourth issues.
    The McCarthys argue that (1) the matter of venue in civil actions in de
    novo appeals to the Court of Common Pleas is governed by the Pennsylvania
    Rules of Civil Procedure, pursuant to MDJ Civil Rule 1007; and (2) under the
    Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, the Riddells waived any challenge to
    improper venue by failing to file preliminary objections.          See Brief for
    Appellants at 15-16. We agree.
    MDJ Civil Rule 1007 provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    Rule 1007. Procedure on Appeal
    A. The proceeding on appeal shall be conducted de novo in
    accordance with the Rules of Civil Procedure that would
    be applicable if the action was initially commenced in the
    court of common pleas.
    B. Except as otherwise provided in subdivision C, the action
    upon appeal may not be limited with respect to amount in
    controversy, joinder of causes of action or parties,
    counterclaims, added or changed averments or otherwise
    -8-
    J-S11044-16
    because of the particulars of the action before the magisterial
    district judge.
    ***
    Note: As under earlier law, the proceeding on appeal is
    conducted de novo, but the former rule that the
    proceeding would be limited both as to jurisdiction and
    subject matter to the action before the magisterial district
    judge (see Crowell Office Equipment v. Krug, 213 Pa.
    Super. 261, 
    247 A.2d 657
    (1968)[),] has not been
    retained. Under subdivision B, the court of common pleas
    on appeal can exercise its full jurisdiction and all parties
    will be free to treat the case as though it had never been
    before the magisterial district judge, subject of course to
    the Rules of Civil Procedure. …
    Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1007 (emphasis added); see also Gladstone Partners, LP
    v. Overland Enter., 
    950 A.2d 1011
    , 1014 (Pa. Super. 2008) (stating that
    “[i]n Pennsylvania, the purpose of an appeal de novo is to give a litigant a
    new trial without reference to the record established in the minor court ….”).
    Here, under MDJ Civil Rule 1007, when the McCarthys filed their de novo
    appeal in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County (albeit an improper
    venue), “the [Pennsylvania] Rules of Civil Procedure that would be applicable
    if the action was initially commenced in the court of common pleas” applied.
    Pa.R.C.P.M.D.J. 1007(A).
    Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1006, which governs venue,
    provides, in relevant part, that “[i]mproper venue shall be raised by
    preliminary objection[,] and if not so raised shall be waived ….” Pa.R.C.P.
    1006(e); see also Zappala v. Brandolini Prop. Mgmt., 
    909 A.2d 1272
    ,
    1281 (Pa. 2006). Pennsylvania Rule of Civil Procedure 1028, which concerns
    -9-
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    preliminary objections, specifically includes “improper venue,” and requires
    all preliminary objections to be raised at once and within twenty days of
    service of the preceding pleading.   Pa.R.C.P. 1026(a); see also 
    Zappala, 909 A.2d at 1281
    .
    The Riddells never filed preliminary objections to the de novo
    Complaint,6 and they therefore waived any challenge to the improper venue.
    See Pa.R.C.P. 1006(e).    Accordingly, the trial court’s Order striking the
    appeal based on improper venue cannot stand.
    Nevertheless, there remains an additional matter that the trial court
    should have addressed in ruling on the Petition to Open/Strike. The Riddells
    assert that, contrary to the McCarthys’ certification, the Riddells never
    received the 10-day Notice. See Petition to Open/Strike, 3/24/15, at ¶¶ 9-
    10; Brief for Appellees at 5, 13.    Moreover, the Riddells argued in the
    Petition to Open/Strike that they met all of the requirements to have the
    default judgment opened. See Petition to Open/Strike, 3/24/15, at ¶¶ 12-
    18; see also Memorandum of Law in Support of Petition to Open/Strike,
    4/22/15, at 7-10.   However, the trial court did not rule on these matters
    when it ordered that the McCarthys’ de novo appeal be “stricken in its
    entirety.” Thus, we deem it necessary to remand for consideration of these
    matters.
    6
    The Riddells do not dispute that they were served with the de novo
    Complaint.
    - 10 -
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    Accordingly, we vacate the Order striking the appeal and remand the
    case to the Bucks County Court of Common Pleas.7 On remand, we direct
    the trial court to address whether the Riddells have established the criteria
    for opening the default judgment, and to conduct further proceedings as
    may be necessary. See, e.g., Stabley v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 
    89 A.3d 715
    , 719 (Pa. Super. 2014) (setting forth the three elements that a
    party seeking to open a default judgment must establish, and noting that a
    petition to open a default judgment is addressed to the equitable powers of
    the court).8
    Order vacated. Case remanded for further proceedings consistent with
    this Memorandum. Superior Court jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 4/29/2016
    7
    In light of our disposition, we need not address the McCarthys’ remaining
    issues on appeal.
    8
    The trial court shall determine, inter alia, whether the Riddells were served
    with the 10-day Notice and the de novo Complaint, as well as whether “(1)
    the [P]etition to [O]pen[/S]trike was promptly filed; (2) the default can be
    reasonably explained or excused; and (3) there is a meritorious defense to
    the underlying claim.” 
    Stabley, 89 A.3d at 719
    (citation omitted).
    - 11 -
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    - 12 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2260 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 4/29/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024