Com. v. Bryant, K. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
KEVIN BRYANT,
Appellant No. 1747 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0007897-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED MAY 02, 2016
Kevin Bryant appeals from the judgment of sentence of eighteen
months’ to five years’ incarceration and two years of concurrent probation,
imposed May 11, 2015, following a bench trial resulting in his conviction for
receiving stolen property and unauthorized use of automobiles and other
vehicles.1 We affirm.
In June 2014, the owner of a 2012 Honda Accord bearing New York
license plates reported his vehicle stolen. Ten days after this report, Officer
Marlin Robinson was on regular patrol in Philadelphia, in a marked cruiser,
when he spotted Appellant driving a 2012 Honda Accord with New York
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
Respectively, see 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 3925 and 3928.
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plates. Officer Robinson ran the plates, discovered the vehicle was stolen,
and proceeded to follow the vehicle.
After three blocks, Appellant parked the car and got out, along with his
passenger. Appellant and his passenger walked away from the vehicle.
Officer Robinson exited his cruiser, apprehended Appellant, and returned
him to the Honda. As he returned, Officer Robinson discovered a Honda car
key and electronic “fob” on the ground near the vehicle. He tested these
items and confirmed that they operated the vehicle.
Neither the owner of the vehicle, nor its regular driver (the owner’s
daughter), knew Appellant or gave him permission to drive the car.
Appellant offered no explanation for his possession of it.
Appellant was arrested and charged. In May 2015, following a waiver
trial, he was convicted and sentenced as cited above. Appellant timely
appealed and filed a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.2 The trial
court issued a responsive opinion.
On appeal, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
convict him of receiving stolen property. See Appellant’s Brief at 3. We
review a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence de novo.
Commonwealth v. Robinson, 128 A.3d 261, 264 (Pa. Super. 2015) (en
banc). “[O]ur scope of review is limited to considering the evidence of
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2
With the court’s permission, Appellant also filed a supplemental statement,
raising the same issues.
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record, and all reasonable inferences arising therefrom, viewed in the light
most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner.” Id. (citation
omitted).
The crime of receiving stolen property is defined as follows:
A person is guilty of theft if he intentionally receives, retains, or
disposes of movable property of another knowing that it has
been stolen, or believing that it has probably been stolen, unless
the property is received, retained, or disposed with intent to
restore it to the owner.
18 Pa.C.S. § 3925(a). Essentially, the Commonwealth must prove (1) the
property was stolen; (2) the defendant received the property; and (3) the
defendant knew or had reason to know it had been stolen. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. Matthews, 632 A.2d 570, 572 (Pa. Super. 1993).
Mere possession of stolen property is insufficient. Id. at 571. However,
guilty knowledge may be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Robinson,
128 A.3d at 265; see also, e.g., Commonwealth v. Foreman, 797 A.2d
1005, 1012 (Pa. Super. 2002) (“A permissible inference of guilty knowledge
may be drawn from the unexplained possession of recently stolen
goods[.]”); Commonwealth v. Worrell, 419 A.2d 1199, 1202 (Pa. Super.
1980 (concluding that a defendant’s efforts to conceal his connection to
stolen property implied his guilty knowledge); Commonwealth v. Phillips,
392 A.2d 708, 710 (Pa. Super. 1978) (concluding that the absence of any
relationship between the owner of property and the defendant implied guilty
knowledge).
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Appellant contends that the Commonwealth failed to prove that he
knew or had reason to know that the vehicle he was driving was stolen. See
Appellant’s Brief at 9. Citing in support, Matthews, 632 A.2d at 571,
Appellant asserts that mere possession is insufficient to prove guilty
knowledge and that there must be “other evidence.” Appellant’s Brief at 10.
For example, according to Appellant, there was no evidence that he
discarded the Honda key in an attempt to disassociate himself from the
stolen vehicle. Rather, Appellant suggests, dropping the key may have been
an accident. See id. at 12. Thus, Appellant concludes, any inference that
he knew or had reason to know the vehicle was stolen was unwarranted and
insufficient to support his conviction. Id. at 13.
Appellant’s argument is not persuasive. In Matthews, the defendant
was stopped by police while driving a stolen vehicle. Matthews, 632 A.2d
at 571. The defendant explained that he had rented the vehicle from an
acquaintance earlier in the evening so he could perform a plumbing job. Id.
at 572. Though convicted following a trial, we vacated the defendant’s
judgment of sentence, concluding that apart from the defendant’s
possession of the stolen vehicle, the Commonwealth had offered no
additional evidence supporting an inference of guilty knowledge, and in light
of the defendant’s explanation, the evidence was insufficient. Id. at 573.
Here, the police, in a marked patrol car, followed Appellant driving the
stolen Honda for three blocks. In our view, this evidence is sufficient to
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support an inference that Appellant knew the police were following him.
Thereafter, Appellant abandoned the car and its key. In our view, these
additional facts support an inference that Appellant sought to conceal or
disassociate himself from the stolen vehicle. See Worrell, 419 A.2d at
1202. The owner of the vehicle did not know Appellant or give him
permission to operate the vehicle, further supporting an inference of guilty
knowledge. See Phillips, 392 A.2d at 710. Finally, Appellant offered no
explanation for his possession of the stolen Honda. Contra Matthews, 632
A.2d at 573. In our view, these facts, taken together, amply support an
inference that Appellant knew or had reason to know that the vehicle he was
driving was stolen. See Robinson, 128 A.3d at 265.
Appellant’s reliance upon Matthews is misplaced, and his claim is
without merit. The evidence against Appellant was sufficient to establish his
guilt for receiving stolen property. Thus, we affirm the judgment of
sentence.3
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
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3
To the extent Appellant suggests that the trial court erred in failing to draw
inferences more favorable to him, see Appellant’s Brief at 11-12, we
reiterate that our standard of review requires that we examine the record in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as verdict winner. See
Robinson, 128 A.3d at 264.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 5/2/2016
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