Com. v. Goodrick, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S36014-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    TODD PATRICK GOODRICK
    Appellant                 No. 1521 MDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence April 29, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Lebanon County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-38-CR-0000686-2014
    BEFORE: MUNDY, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.:                                 FILED MAY 11, 2016
    Appellant, Todd Patrick Goodrick, appeals from the April 29, 2015
    aggregate judgment of sentence of 23 months’ probation (as well as costs,
    fines, and restitution), imposed by the trial court after it convicted Appellant
    of theft by unlawful taking and defiant trespass.1 After careful review, we
    affirm.
    The trial court recited the facts of record presented at Appellant’s
    bench trial as follows.
    On or about November 10, 2013, employees of
    Klick Lewis (herein the Victim), located at 720 East
    Main Street, Palmyra Borough, Lebanon County,
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 3921(a) and 3503(b), respectively.
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    Pennsylvania, noticed that the dumpster used for
    scrap metal had been partially emptied over
    weekends and some evenings. The dumpster is
    owned by [the Victim]. The dumpster contained
    scrap metal which the Victim collects from its
    business and sells to third parties by weight. There
    were “No Trespassing” signs on the dumpster on the
    dates in question. The signs were reflective so that
    they could be seen at night as well as during the
    day.
    Specifically, Scott R[yan], an employee of the
    [V]ictim, testified that when he arrived at work on
    Monday morning, November 11, 2013, he noticed
    that the dumpster was not as full as it was on
    Saturday when he left the property at the close of
    business. The dumpster was approximately half to
    three quarters full on Saturday and was nearly
    empty on Monday morning. [Ryan] testified that the
    dumpster usually gets emptied about every two to
    three months. The worth of the contents varies each
    time the dumpster is emptied because the price is
    based on weight.
    The police were notified and Officer Timothy
    Langle[2] (herein Offcr. Langle) of the Palmyra Police
    Department suggested that a camera of some sort
    be installed to monitor the dumpster. [Ryan] setup
    [sic] a “trail” camera up in the trees near the
    dumpster. The camera was motion activated, so
    that when a person or anything moved within a
    certain area near the camera, it would begin
    recording and stop when activity ceased for a period
    of time. The camera was set up to capture any
    movement around the dumpster. [Ryan] printed the
    photos from the camera and provided the SD card to
    police on December 16, 2013, after items had been
    removed from the dumpster.
    ____________________________________________
    2
    The parties’ briefs and the notes of testimony from the March 10, 2015
    bench trial spell this individual’s surname “Lengle.”
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    The pictures showed a car pulling up to the
    dumpster. R[yan] testified that where the car pulled
    up, the “No Trespassing” sign would have been
    visible to someone inside the car. These pictures
    show a male wearing a ballcap climbing into the
    dumpster and removing items. Knowing that these
    thefts were occurring with some frequency, Offcr.
    Langle would go by the dumpster while he was on
    patrol at night to check as well.
    Offcr. Langle was on patrol from midnight until
    eight a.m. on December 21, 2013. He pulled into
    the Wells Fargo [B]ank parking lot and noticed a
    vehicle parked near the dumpster at the Victim’s
    business. He turned on the alley light on his patrol
    vehicle, heard someone in the dumpster, and a
    person emerged from the dumpster. Offcr. Langle
    identified [Appellant] as the person who emerged
    from the dumpster that night. [Appellant] got out of
    the dumpster and told Offcr. Langle that he had not
    seen the “No Trespassing” signs. [Appellant] stated
    that he was dumpster diving and admitted to taking
    scrap from the dumpster on previous occasions,
    including December 16th.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/15, 2-4.
    Appellant was charged with the above offenses and proceeded to a
    bench trial on March 10, 2015, after which the trial court rendered its guilty
    verdicts. Appellant immediately moved for judgment of acquittal, asserting
    that the criminal information listed November 10, 2013 as the date of the
    theft.     N.T., 3/10/15, at 37.      Appellant specifically averred that the
    Commonwealth “had no specific evidence to tie [Appellant] to the date
    charged in the information.”      Id. at 38.    Despite stating that it “had a
    problem     with   November    10th   because   nobody   tied   that   [theft]   to
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    [Appellant],” the trial court denied Appellant’s request for judgment of
    acquittal. Id. at 39.
    On April 29, 2015, the trial court sentenced Appellant to 23 months’
    probation, as well as costs of prosecution, fines, and restitution. Appellant
    filed a post-sentence motion on May 8, 2015, again raising his claim that the
    verdict was against the weight of the evidence, as well as a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim. The trial court convened a hearing on July 22, 2015, and
    denied the post-sentence motion on August 11, 2015.          Appellant filed a
    notice of appeal on September 1, 2015.3
    On appeal, Appellant presents two issues for our review.
    I.     Whether the [trial c]ourt’s verdict of guilty on the
    Theft by Unlawful Taking was against the weight of
    the evidence?
    II.    Whether the Commonwealth failed to present
    sufficient evidence that [Appellant] committed the
    theft of the scrap metal on November 10, 2013?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    In his first claim, Appellant argues that the trial court’s “verdict of
    guilty was against the weight of the evidence.”4       Appellant’s Brief at 9.
    Specifically, Appellant asserts that he was wrongfully convicted of theft
    ____________________________________________
    3
    Appellant and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
    Appellate Procedure 1925.
    4
    As indicated in our recitation of the procedural history, Appellant has
    complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 607 governing his
    challenge to the weight of the evidence.
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    because the criminal information “addresses a theft on November 10, 2013,”
    the evidence presented at trial “was solely about the theft on December 16th
    and December 21st,” and “the Commonwealth did not amend the information
    to reflect the proper date.” Id.
    The Commonwealth counters that Appellant’s claim is without merit
    because he “was provided with discovery which covered all the alleged
    thefts. … [He] also asked questions referencing all dates” and “was clearly
    aware that the Commonwealth would be presenting evidence of the
    December thefts prior to trial and managed his trial strategy accordingly.”
    Commonwealth’s Brief at 8.
    Preliminarily, we note that Appellant’s counsel did not object at trial
    when the Commonwealth began introducing testimony regarding the
    December thefts.    See, e.g., N.T., 3/10/15, at 20-21 (including, but not
    limited to, Appellant’s counsel expressly stating “no objection” to the
    Commonwealth’s introduction, through Mr. Ryan, of photographs taken
    December 16, 2013 from the trail camera).
    It is well settled that “a defendant’s failure to object to
    allegedly improper testimony at the appropriate stage ...
    constitutes waiver.” [Commonwealth v.] Molina[, 
    33 A.3d 51
    , []55 [(Pa. Super. 2011)], citing Commonwealth
    v. Redel, 
    484 A.2d 171
    , 175 (Pa. Super. 1984). … See
    also Commonwealth v. Baumhammers, 
    960 A.2d 59
    ,
    73 (Pa. 2008) (“it is axiomatic that issues are preserved
    when objections are made timely to the error or offense”);
    Commonwealth v. Powell, 
    956 A.2d 406
    , 423 (Pa.
    2008) (absence of a contemporaneous objection below
    constituted a waiver of appellant’s claim respecting the
    prosecutor’s closing argument)[.]
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    Commonwealth v. Adams, 
    39 A.3d 310
    , 319-20 (Pa. Super. 2012),
    affirmed, 
    104 A.3d 511
     (Pa. 2014).
    Instantly, although Appellant moved for judgment of acquittal on the
    basis of the November 10, 2013 date in the criminal information, he did not
    do so until after all of the testimony had concluded and the trial court
    rendered its verdicts. As such, Appellant has arguably waived his challenge
    on appeal to the litigation of the December thefts, for having failed to object
    to that testimony at the proper stage. Adams, 
    supra.
    Nonetheless, with regard to the merits, we note that when reviewing a
    weight claim we are bound by the following.
    The weight of the evidence is exclusively for
    the finder of fact who is free to believe all,
    part, or none of the evidence and to determine
    the      credibility   of    the     witnesses.
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    668 A.2d 97
    ,
    101 (1995), cert. denied, 
    117 S.Ct. 90
     (1996).
    An appellate court cannot substitute its
    judgment for that of the finder of fact.
    Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 
    445 A.2d 1203
    , 1206 (1982).        Thus, we may only
    reverse the lower court’s verdict if it is so
    contrary to the evidence as to shock one’s
    sense of justice.         Commonwealth v.
    Hawkins, 
    701 A.2d 492
    , 500 (1997), cert.
    denied, 
    118 S.Ct. 1535
     (1998).
    Commonwealth v. Small, 
    741 A.2d 666
    , 672–73
    (1999). Moreover, where the trial court has ruled on
    the weight claim below, an appellate court’s role is
    not to consider the underlying question of whether
    the verdict is against the weight of the evidence.
    Rather, appellate review is limited to whether the
    trial court palpably abused its discretion in ruling on
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    the weight claim. Commonwealth v. Tharp, 
    830 A.2d 519
    , 528 (Pa. 2003) (citations omitted).
    Commonwealth v. Champney, 
    832 A.2d 403
    , 408 (Pa. 2003) (parallel
    citations omitted), cert. denied, 
    542 U.S. 939
     (2004).
    Here, the trial court explained its rationale for rejecting Appellant’s
    weight claim as follows.
    [Appellant] was provided with discovery prior
    to trial which covered all three dates mentioned, not
    only the date of November 10, 2013.           Defense
    counsel asked questions regarding the December 16
    and 21, 2013 incidents, as well as the November 10,
    2013 incident.      While the date given in the
    information is November 10, 2013, [Appellant] was
    found in the dumpster by Officer Langle on
    December 21, 2013 and admitted to being the
    person shown on camera in the dumpster on
    December 16, 2013. The Commonwealth presented
    evidence that [Appellant] was the person who
    unlawfully removed scrap metal from the Victim’s
    dumpster on December 16 and 21 of 2013. The
    date, while not amended by the Commonwealth, is a
    formal defect in the information. It does not change
    the offense or any element of the offense charged.
    [Appellant] was aware that the Commonwealth
    would be presenting evidence regarding the
    December dates prior to trial. This [trial c]ourt finds
    that the verdict was not against the weight of the
    evidence presented because there was evidence
    presented as to the December dates.
    Trial Court Opinion, 8/11/15, at 6.
    Our   review   of    the   certified   record confirms   that   the   criminal
    information lists November 10, 2013 as the sole offense date.               Criminal
    Information, 5/5/14, at 1. In addition, November 10, 2013 was listed as an
    offense date on the criminal complaint. Criminal Complaint, 3/10/14, at 1.
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    However, the criminal complaint also lists December 21, 2013 as a date
    when Appellant “on 12/21/13 … did unlawfully take, or exercise unlawful
    control over, moveable property, scrap metal ….”    Id. at 3. Furthermore,
    the affidavit of probable cause signed by Officer Langle listed December 16,
    2013 and December 21, 2013 as offense dates. Affidavit of Probable Cause,
    3/11/14, at 1. The criminal complaint and affidavit of probable cause were
    filed prior to the criminal information.   Consequently, as the trial court
    indicated, Appellant was aware that the Commonwealth would be presenting
    evidence regarding the two December dates prior to trial.
    Pennsylvania Rule of Criminal Procedure 560 provides as follows.
    Rule 560. Information: Filing, Contents, Function
    (A) After the defendant has been held for court following a
    preliminary hearing or an indictment, the attorney for the
    Commonwealth shall proceed by preparing an information
    and filing it with the court of common pleas.
    (B) The information shall be signed by the attorney for the
    Commonwealth and shall be valid and sufficient in law if it
    contains:
    (1) a caption showing that the prosecution is carried on in
    the name of and by the authority of the Commonwealth of
    Pennsylvania;
    (2) the name of the defendant, or if the defendant is
    unknown, a description of the defendant as nearly as may
    be;
    (3) the date when the offense is alleged to have been
    committed if the precise date is known, and the day
    of the week if it is an essential element of the
    offense charged, provided that if the precise date is
    not known or if the offense is a continuing one, an
    allegation that it was committed on or about any
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    date within the period fixed by the statute of
    limitations shall be sufficient;
    (4) the county where the offense is alleged to have been
    committed;
    (5) a plain and concise statement of the essential elements
    of the offense substantially the same as or cognate to the
    offense alleged in the complaint; and
    (6) a concluding statement that “all of which is against the
    Act of Assembly and the peace and dignity of the
    Commonwealth.”
    (C) The information shall contain the official or customary
    citation of the statute and section thereof, or other
    provision of law that the defendant is alleged therein to
    have violated; but the omission of or error in such citation
    shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the
    information.
    (D) In all court cases tried on an information, the issues at
    trial shall be defined by such information.
    Comment: The attorney for the Commonwealth may
    electronically prepare, sign, and transmit the information
    for filing.
    …
    When there is an omission or error of the type referred to
    in paragraph (C), the information should be amended
    pursuant to Rule 564.
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 560 (emphasis added).
    The text emphasized above in subsection (3), although not directly
    applicable to the situation presented in this case, indicates that the
    legislature contemplated continuing offenses and flexibility in an information.
    In addition, the comment referencing amendment of an error in an
    information permissively indicates that the information should be amended,
    not that it must.
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    We agree with Appellant that “a review of cases dealing with
    information amendments could find no case on point.” Appellant’s Brief at
    10.   However, it is uncontroverted that “the purpose of a criminal
    information is to notify the defendant of the charge he has to meet.”
    Commonwealth v. McIntosh, 
    476 A.2d 1316
    , 1321 (Pa. Super. 1984),
    citing Commonwealth v. Petrillo, 
    12 A.2d 317
    , 324 (Pa. 1940). “Although
    the information is not to be read in an overly technical manner, we must
    arrest judgment where an error in the information is one that could ‘mislead
    the defendant or [that] involves an element of surprise prejudicial to the
    defendant’s efforts to prepare his defense, or precludes the defendant from
    anticipating the prosecution's proof, or impairs a substantial right.’”   
    Id.
    quoting Commonwealth v. Pope, 
    317 A.2d 887
    , 890 (Pa. 1974).
    We further find the recent commentary of our Court to be instructive.
    We stated as follows.
    It is the duty of the prosecution to “fix the date when
    an alleged offense occurred with reasonable
    certainty.”    Commonwealth v. Jette, 
    818 A.2d 533
    , 535 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation omitted). The
    purpose of so advising a defendant of the date when
    an offense is alleged to have been committed is to
    provide him with sufficient notice to meet the
    charges and prepare a defense. Commonwealth v.
    Gibbons, 
    784 A.2d 776
     (Pa. 2001).
    However, “due process is not reducible to a
    mathematical      formula,”      and      the
    Commonwealth does not always need to prove
    a specific date of an alleged crime.
    Commonwealth v. Devlin, 
    333 A.2d 888
    ,
    892 (Pa. 1975)…. Permissible leeway regarding
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    the date provided varies with, inter alia, the
    nature of the crime and the rights of the
    accused. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(B)(3), stating
    that    it  shall    be     sufficient for  the
    Commonwealth to provide in the information, if
    the precise date of an offense is not known, an
    allegation that the offense was committed on
    or about any date within the period fixed by
    the statute of limitations.
    Commonwealth v. Koehler, 
    914 A.2d 427
    , 436
    (Pa. Super. 2006).
    Commonwealth v. Riggle, 
    119 A.3d 1058
    , 1069-70 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (parallel citations omitted).   Instantly, the trial court referenced the policy
    and rationale where “the purpose of so advising a defendant of the date
    when an offense is alleged to have been committed is to provide him with
    sufficient notice to meet the charges and prepare a defense.”         
    Id.
       Our
    review of the record confirms that Appellant had sufficient notice to meet the
    charges and prepare a defense, which he in fact did present at the March 10,
    2015 bench trial. We thus find no abuse of discretion by the trial court, and
    reject Appellant’s weight claim.
    In his second issue, Appellant assails the sufficiency of the evidence,
    and repeats his argument concerning the November 10, 2013 date in the
    information relative to the December 16 and 21, 2013 dates.
    It is well-settled that when reviewing a sufficiency of the evidence
    claim, this Court must review the evidence and all reasonable inferences in
    the light most favorable to the Commonwealth as the verdict winner, and we
    must determine if the evidence, thus viewed, is sufficient to enable the fact-
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    finder to find every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.
    Commonwealth v. Goins, 
    867 A.2d 526
    , 527-528 (Pa. Super. 2004)
    (citations omitted). “The fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none of
    the evidence presented[, t]his Court may not substitute its judgment for that
    of the fact-finder, and if the record contains support for the verdict, we may
    not disturb the verdict.” 
    Id.
     (citations omitted). “A person is guilty of theft
    if he unlawfully takes, or exercises unlawful control over, movable property
    of another with intent to deprive him thereof.”      18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3921(a).
    Movable property is defined as “[p]roperty the location of which can be
    changed.” 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 3901.
    Here, the trial court recognized that Appellant’s sufficiency argument
    was “based on the date contained in the information.” Trial Court Opinion,
    8/11/15, at 7.    In rejecting Appellant’s claim, the trial court stated, “the
    verdict was based on th[e] evidence and not the date contained in the
    information.” Id. at 8. Given the facts of record and applicable standard of
    review, we apply our analysis of Appellant’s weight claim to his sufficiency
    claim, and find no abuse of discretion where there was sufficient evidence to
    support the trial court’s verdict.
    Accordingly, we decline to grant Appellant relief on his weight and
    sufficiency claims, and affirm the April 29, 2015 judgment of sentence.
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    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/11/2016
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