Com. v. Pankotai, A. ( 2018 )


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  • J-S84006-17
    J-S84007-17
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA :                 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :                      PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                   :
    :
    :
    ANDREW WILLIAM PANKOTAI      :
    :
    Appellant      :                 Nos. 903 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 19, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-47-CR-0000063-2014
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                              :
    :
    :
    ANDREW W. PANKOTAI                         :
    :
    Appellant                :   No. 904 MDA 2017
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence May 19, 2017
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montour County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-47-CR-0000062-2014
    BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and OTT, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                FILED MARCH 21, 2018
    Appellant, Andrew William Pankotai, appeals1 from the judgments of
    ____________________________________________
    1 Because these two appeals present the same issue and argument, this Court
    hereby consolidates them sua sponte. See Pa.R.A.P. 513 (stating, “[w]here
    there is more than one appeal from the same order, or where the same
    question is involved in two or more appeals in different cases, the appellate
    court may, in its discretion, order them to be argued together in all particulars
    as if but a single appeal.”).
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    sentence entered on May 19, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas of Montour
    County. We affirm.
    The trial court summarized the procedural history of these cases as
    follows:
    On October 13, 2015, [Appellant] pleaded nolo contendere
    to Theft of Services (M-1) (18 Pa.C.S.A. §3926(a)(1)[)], Theft by
    Unlawful Taking (M-3) (18 Pa.C.S.A. §3921(a)[)] [at docket CR
    62 of 2014], and Criminal Trespass (F-3) (18 Pa.C.S.A.
    §3503(a)(1)(i)[)] [at docket CR 63 of 2014]. [Appellant’s] prior
    record score was [repeat felony offender (“RFEL”)]. The standard
    range for the Theft of Services and Criminal Trespass was 12-18
    months and for Theft by Unlawful Taking 3-6 months. On May 19,
    2017, [Appellant] was sentenced for Criminal Trespass [at CR 63
    of 2014] to not less than 12 months nor more than 36 months in
    a State Correctional Institution. [At CR 62 of 2014 h]e was
    sentenced to 6-24 months for the Theft of Services and 3-12
    months for the Theft by Unlawful Taking, each running concurrent
    to the Criminal Trespass sentence [at CR 63-2014]. [Appellant’s]
    request for reconsideration was denied without hearing.
    [Appellant] had been scheduled to appear for sentencing on
    February 3, 2016. However, he failed to appear and a bench
    warrant was issued that date. Nevertheless, [Appellant] filed via
    mail, numerous pro se (even though he had counsel), sovereign
    citizen motions which were denied by this court.           He was
    eventually detained in New Mexico on the bench warrant. He was
    also being held on a state parole board detainer for a sentence on
    an earlier case. He was brought before this court on May 19,
    2017, on the bench warrant for his sentencing that had been
    scheduled February 3, 2016. [Appellant] said he wanted to
    withdraw his plea. This court denied his request and sentenced
    [Appellant] as set for[th] above. [Appellant] appealed.
    Trial Court Opinion, 7/5/17, at 1-2.2 Appellant and the trial court complied
    ____________________________________________
    2 On September 21, 2017, the trial court issued a second opinion pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a), indicating that the July 5, 2017 opinion was inadvertently
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    with Pa.R.A.P. 1925. In both cases, Appellant presents the following issue for
    our review: “Whether the trial court erred in not granting Appellant’s pre-
    sentence motion to withdraw his nolo contendere plea.” Appellant’s Briefs at
    2.
    As noted, Appellant was directed to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement
    in both cases, and in response filed statements raising the following three
    issues:
    1. [Appellant] filed a pro se Motion seeking to withdraw his plea
    nolo contendere and going to trial in the above-referenced
    matter, but was not afforded a hearing on the same.
    2. When [Appellant] was brought to Court on May 19, 2017, he
    believed that the sole issue to be addressed would be a Bench
    Warrant. However, [Appellant] was sentenced on that date
    and still not afforded a hearing on his pending pro se Motions
    challenging jurisdiction and to withdraw his plea.
    3. [Appellant] sought Reconsideration of the plea withdrawal
    issue, but the same was denied two days later without a
    hearing or argument.
    Statements of Matters Complained of on Appeal Pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925,
    6/21/17, at 1.3
    We are mindful of the principle first stated in Commonwealth v. Lord,
    
    719 A.2d 306
     (Pa. 1998):          “in order to preserve their claims for appellate
    review, [a]ppellants must comply whenever the trial court orders them to file
    ____________________________________________
    captioned to only case CR 62 of 2014, but should have been captioned and
    docketed to CR 62 and 63 of 2014, since it addressed both cases.
    3    The Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement filed in both cases were identical.
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    a Statement of Matters Complained of on Appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
    Any issues not raised in a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement will be deemed
    waived.” Lord, 719 A.2d at 309. Appellant’s issues in his Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    statements challenge the trial court’s alleged failure to provide him a hearing
    regarding his request to withdraw his plea.4        As noted above, however,
    Appellant’s claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in failing to permit him
    to withdraw his guilty plea. Appellant’s Brief at 2. This issue, therefore, was
    not raised in Appellant’s Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statements. Accordingly, we find
    it waived.
    Even if this issue was not waived, however, we would conclude that
    Appellant’s claim lacks merit. With regard to the withdrawal of a plea of nolo
    contendere, this Court has stated the following:
    [W]e recognize that at “any time before the imposition of
    sentence, the court may, in its discretion, permit, upon motion of
    the defendant, or direct sua sponte, the withdrawal of a plea of
    guilty or nolo contendere and the substitution of a plea of not
    guilty.” Pa.R.Crim.P 591(A). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
    recently clarified the standard of review for considering a trial
    court’s decision regarding a defendant’s pre-sentence motion to
    withdraw a guilty plea:
    Trial courts have discretion in determining whether a
    withdrawal request will be granted; such discretion is
    to be administered liberally in favor of the accused;
    and any demonstration by a defendant of a fair-and-
    just reason will suffice to support a grant, unless
    ____________________________________________
    4 As will be discussed, the trial court conducted a hearing at which Appellant
    was afforded the opportunity to present his request to withdraw his plea and
    the reasons supporting such request.
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    withdrawal would work substantial prejudice to the
    Commonwealth.
    Commonwealth v. Carrasquillo, 
    631 Pa. 692
    , 
    115 A.3d 1284
    ,
    1285, 1291–92 (2015) (holding there is no per se rule regarding
    pre-sentence request to withdraw a plea, and bare assertion of
    innocence is not a sufficient reason to require a court to grant
    such request). We will disturb a trial court’s decision on a request
    to withdraw a guilty plea only if we conclude that the trial court
    abused its discretion. Commonwealth v. Gordy, 
    73 A.3d 620
    ,
    624 (Pa. Super. 2013).
    Commonwealth v. Blango, 
    150 A.3d 45
    , 47 (Pa. Super. 2016).
    The record reflects that during the May 19, 2017 hearing, prior to
    sentencing, Appellant asserted his desire to withdraw his plea of nolo
    contendere.     When asked why he wished to withdraw his plea, Appellant
    provided the following explanation:
    ‘Cause I’m not guilty of the case, I’m not guilty of the crime.
    If I was in a Court of record or Court of law, I would go
    ahead and lawfully take the charges and plead guilty to
    them, but we’re not in a Court of law or Court of record, we
    are in a business for profit. Montour County Courthouse has a
    Duns and Bradstreet number, two of them, actually, two suit
    numbers. We are an admiralty maritime Court, as you can tell the
    gold fringe black. We haven’t had a Judge since 1776, we have
    Court Administrators.
    I’m just saying right now there’s not full disclosure of my
    case and I’d like to have full disclosure. I wasn’t given a full
    discovery of the whole case. There’s three bonds I was never
    presented, the bid bond, the performance bond and the payment
    bond that you get from the GSA that starts the case out. I was
    never given the right to inspect the bonds, make sure my
    signature’s on there ‘cause my signature’s not on there, the bonds
    are voided and the case is invalid.
    Also, I have no surety. I also said the Court’s surety, the
    birth certificate has collateral. I’m a secured party creditor. I
    have filing in New York UCC offices and notices in Pennsylvania
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    and New Mexico. I have a hold harmless agreement indemnity
    bond of three hundred million dollars. I have a security -- if you’d
    like to look online, it’s all public record -- I’m actually noticed to
    the DC, the FBI, CIA, the DOJ and Homeland. They all know my
    standing as well as the Whitehouse.
    I’m not coming here to argue or disrespect the Court, I come
    here respectfully and honestly. I’m not a U.S. Citizen, I’m a non-
    citizen national. The IRS has a W-8BEN on file as a non-resident
    alien. I’m not part of the corporation of DC jurisdictional acts in
    the case here as well as the DEC. It doesn’t mean I run around
    and do what I want, I’m under God’s law, I’m under the common
    law. Not that sovereigns isn’t a people thing, I’m not a citizen to
    a government but we have a right to declare nationality as part of
    the universal declaration of human rights signed on by Obama
    through United Nations.
    I’m coming here ‘cause I wasn’t given full disclosure of the
    case and I’d like to review all the facts of the case and I’d like that
    option and that right to go ahead and do so, sir. That’s a lot to
    take in.
    N.T., 5/19/17, at 3-5 (emphasis added).
    Here, Appellant appears to be alleging that he is not subject to the
    jurisdiction in the Montour Court of Common Pleas, or of any other court, due
    to his status as a sovereign citizen.5 This Court has concluded these claims
    ____________________________________________
    5   A tenet of the sovereign citizen theory is that
    when a person is born, that person’s birth certificate (or Social
    Security card application) creates a corresponding legal fiction, or
    “strawman,” in that person’s name. This means that every person
    has a kind of dual personality; there is the “flesh-and-blood”
    person on one hand and the fictional strawman on the other. . . .
    [T]hey believe that only the strawman really operates in the
    modern commercial world (engaging in transactions, collecting
    debts, and contracting with others); accordingly, they believe the
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    lack merit. In Commonwealth v. McGarry, 
    172 A.3d 60
     (Pa. Super. 2017),
    the appellant argued that he was a “sovereign citizen” and, therefore, was not
    subject to the laws of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. 
    Id. at 66
    . In
    addressing this claim, this Court explained:
    Courts in this Commonwealth and various Federal Courts of
    Appeals have rejected sovereign citizen claims, identical to those
    raised here in a handful of unpublished decisions, as frivolous.
    See, e.g., United States v. Himmelreich, 
    481 Fed.Appx. 39
    , 40
    n.2 (3d Cir. 2012) (per curiam) (citing with approval United
    States v. Benabe, 
    654 F.3d 753
    , 767 (7th Cir. 2011)); Charlotte
    v. Hansen, 
    433 Fed.Appx. 660
    , 661 (10th Cir. 2011) (“an
    individual’s belief that her status as a sovereign citizen puts her
    beyond the jurisdiction of the courts has no conceivable validity in
    American law.”). We agree that such sovereign citizen claims are
    frivolous.
    
    Id.
    Thus, we would conclude that Appellant’s claim of being a sovereign
    citizen, and therefore not subject to the laws of this country or commonwealth,
    is frivolous. McGarry, 
    172 A.3d at 66
    . Accordingly, Appellant has failed to
    demonstrate a fair and just reason to support the grant of his plea-withdrawal
    request. Blango, 
    150 A.3d 47
    .
    Moreover, as our Supreme Court has stated, the bare assertion of
    innocence by Appellant, as made at the onset of his explanation, was
    ____________________________________________
    government has power over the strawman only, and completely
    lacks authority over the flesh-and blood person.
    Joshua P. Weir, Sovereign Citizens: A Reasoned Response to the Madness,
    
    19 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 829
     (2015).
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    insufficient to require the court to grant his request to withdraw his plea.
    Blango, 150 A.3d at 47; N.T., 5/19/17, at 3. Indeed, Appellant immediately
    thereafter acknowledged his guilt and asserted that if the common pleas court
    had jurisdiction over him, he would accept the charges and plead guilty. N.T.,
    5/19/17, at 3. Thus, if we were to address the merits of Appellant’s claim, we
    would conclude that it lacks merit. Because Appellant failed to demonstrate
    a fair and just reason to support a grant of his withdrawal request, we would
    conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Appellant’s
    request.
    Judgments of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 03/21/2018
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Document Info

Docket Number: 903 MDA 2017

Filed Date: 3/21/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 3/21/2018