Ault, D. v. Ault, E. and Ault, T. ( 2016 )


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  • J. A09006/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    DAVID AULT                               :    IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :          PENNSYLVANIA
    v.                    :
    :
    ETHEL H. AND THOMAS E. AULT,             :         No. 1818 MDA 2015
    :
    Appellants       :
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered October 16, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
    Civil Division at No. 2014-2108
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS AND PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                    FILED MAY 24, 2016
    Ethel1 H. Ault and Thomas E. Ault (collectively, “appellants”) appeal
    the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County that entered
    judgment in favor of David Ault in the amount of $35,506.
    On September 25, 2001, Harland E. Ault, Ethel H. Ault, Thomas E.
    Ault, Clint Frazier, in his individual capacity and as trustee of the J.H. Ault
    Trust, Jaime Ault, and David Ault, in his individual capacity and as trustee
    for Dillon Ault, a minor (collectively, referred to as the “Partnership”)
    entered into a limited partnership agreement (“Partnership Agreement”) for
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1
    Curiously, Ethel Ault’s first name is spelled “Ethyl” in certain documents
    and in the trial court caption even though she testified she spelled her name
    as “Ethel.”      (Notes of testimony, 6/24/15 at 4.)          The trial court
    acknowledged that her name was spelled incorrectly in the caption there.
    J. A09006/16
    the purpose of the ownership and management of real estate. Harland E.
    Ault and Ethel H. Ault were the general partners as well as limited partners.
    Upon the death of Harland E. Ault, Ethel H. Ault became the sole general
    partner. Each limited partner currently has an interest of 14.8221 percent.
    The Partnership entered into an agreement with S & A Homes for the
    sale of some real property owned by the Partnership. Under the terms of
    the agreement, S & A Homes made an initial payment to the Partnership and
    then annual payments for several years. In June 2013, S & A Homes made
    the last payment to the Partnership in the amount of $238,802.         In July
    2013, Ethel H. Ault wrote distribution checks to each limited partner. The
    check for David Ault, Ethel Ault’s grandson, was made payable to David Ault
    or Thomas [E.] Ault.   Thomas E. Ault is Ethel Ault’s son and David Ault’s
    father. Thomas E. Ault deposited the check into a Uniform Gifts to Minors
    custodial account for the benefit of David Ault’s three children. David Ault
    did not receive the check in the amount of $35,506.00. He learned of the
    distribution when he received the Partnership’s K-1 form in 2014.
    On or about June 4, 2014, David Ault commenced an action in the trial
    court and alleged that appellants violated the terms of the Partnership
    Agreement when the check was issued to Thomas Ault but deposited into the
    account for the benefit of David Ault’s children.     David Ault filed suit for
    $46,062 plus interest from July 2, 2013 plus costs.
    -2-
    J. A09006/16
    In answer and new matter, appellants alleged that Thomas E. Ault and
    David Ault discussed the 2013 distribution and that David Ault agreed that
    his distribution should be put in a Uniform Gifts to Minors Act custodial
    account with David Ault’s siblings, Nichole M. Mansell or Jaime J. Ault,
    appointed as custodians for the benefit of David Ault’s three children.
    Appellants requested that the complaint be dismissed.
    Initially, the case proceeded to a panel of arbitrators due to the
    amount in dispute. The arbitrators awarded judgment in favor of David Ault
    in the amount of $10,556. Appellants appealed to the trial court.
    On June 24, 2015, the trial court conducted a non-jury trial. Ethel H.
    Ault testified on cross-examination that as general partner she was the only
    person in charge of making disbursements. (Notes of testimony, 6/24/15 at
    5.) When asked why she made the July 2, 2013 distribution check payable
    to Thomas or David, she replied, “I guess that’s the way I wanted it.” (Id.
    at 6.) She further testified that she gave the check to Thomas E. Ault and
    did not tell David Ault that she wrote the check to Thomas or David. (Id. at
    6.) Although the K-1 showed a distribution of $46,062 to David Ault, Ethel
    Ault explained that the actual amount was approximately $35,000. (Id. at
    7.)
    David Ault testified that in February or March of 2014 his father,
    Thomas E. Ault, informed him that there was a distribution and that he had
    “Put it into a certificate of deposit for [David Ault’s] three children, and it
    -3-
    J. A09006/16
    turns out [David Ault’s] brother and sister were named. It was their CD and
    benefit of the children.”    (Id. at 10.)   David Ault had to pay tax on this
    distribution even though he did not receive it. (Id. at 10-11.) He testified
    that he did not authorize Ethel H. Ault to distribute the funds for which he
    was entitled in the manner that she chose to distribute them.          (Id. at
    11-12.)   On cross-examination, David Ault denied that he reached an
    agreement with his father to place his distribution into an account for the
    benefit of his children and then forgot that he made such an authorization.
    (Id. at 17-18.)
    Thomas E. Ault testified on cross-examination that he directed Ethel H.
    Ault to issue the distribution check to him or David Ault.      Thomas E. Ault
    admitted that he deposited the check based on an oral agreement with
    David Ault.     He admitted that he was estranged from his son.        (Id. at
    21-22.)   Thomas E. Ault explained how he reached the alleged oral
    agreement with David Ault:
    Well, I talked to him in May of 2013, because the
    payment was coming in June, and I said to him
    about this payment coming, you know, and I
    suggested it be put in for his children.
    He said, well, I didn’t know we had another payment
    coming.
    I said, yeah. I said, this is the final payment from
    S&A.
    He said, well, I didn’t know it was coming so it’s not
    like I’m going to miss it.
    -4-
    J. A09006/16
    
    Id. at 22.
    Thomas E. Ault explained that he took his son’s statement that he was
    not going to miss the payment as his agreement with Thomas E. Ault’s plan
    to set up an account for his grandchildren, David Ault’s children.      (Id. at
    23.) Thomas E. Ault did not inform David Ault after he opened the account
    for the minor children. (Id. at 25.) Thomas E. Ault admitted that he had no
    authority to direct Ethel H. Ault to issue the check to David Ault or
    Thomas E. Ault.       (Id. at 26.)    On direct examination, Thomas E. Ault
    testified that David Ault’s ex-wife agreed to the opening of the account for
    the children as she normally received a portion of David Ault’s distribution as
    a result of the divorce agreement. (Id. at 31.)
    On August 19, 2015, the trial court entered judgment in favor of
    David Ault in the amount of $35,506.2
    On August 31, 2015, appellants moved for post-trial relief and moved
    to modify the verdict. They asserted that David Ault was equitably estopped
    from seeking judgment against them because David Ault induced Thomas E.
    Ault to place the funds in the custodial account when he said that he would
    not miss the money and failed to object to the placement of the funds.
    On October 6, 2015, the trial court denied the motion for post-trial
    relief:
    2
    Although the total amount withdrawn and distributed according to the K-1
    was $46,062, the parties apparently agreed that the actual distribution from
    S & A Homes was $35,506.
    -5-
    J. A09006/16
    Here, [appellants] argue [David Ault] induced
    Defendant Thomas Ault to place [David Ault’s]
    distribution in a custodial account by stating that he
    would not miss the money and by failing to object to
    such placement of the funds.        The conversation
    regarding the 2013 distribution, however, did not
    rise to the level of agreement or consent. The
    conversation was not sufficiently clear as to place an
    obligation on [David Ault] to further act or speak in
    opposition to the proposal. There was conflicting
    testimony regarding the conversation, and there was
    no testimony regarding a discussion about the
    manner in which the custodial account would be
    created.    Merely stating he would not miss the
    money was insufficient to induce [appellants’]
    actions.
    Further, [appellants] were not justified in
    relying on the conversation.          The Partnership
    Agreement states “[c]ash, when available, shall be
    distributed by the general partners to all partners in
    the same ratio as profits and losses are allocated.”
    Agreement § 3.05.            Under the partnership
    agreement, Defendant Thomas Ault is a limited
    partner and does not have the authority to alter the
    distribution or to direct Defendant Ethel Ault to alter
    the distribution.     Defendant, Ethel Ault, as the
    general partner, had a duty to follow the Limited
    Partnership Agreement and dispense [David Ault’s]
    portion of the funds to him. As such, [appellants]
    were not justified in relying on the conversation with
    [David Ault].
    Trial court opinion, 10/6/15 at 2-3.
    Appellants raise the following issues for this court’s review:
    1.    Whether the trial court erred as a matter of
    law when it held that the law required an
    agreement or consent for [David Ault’s] actions
    to satisfy the element of inducement[?]
    2.    Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
    holding that [appellants] were not justified
    -6-
    J. A09006/16
    under the circumstances in relying on the
    words and actions of [David Ault][?]
    Appellants’ brief at 4.
    This court’s review of a trial court’s denial of a motion for post-trial
    relief is limited to determining whether the trial court abused its discretion or
    committed an error of law.      Paliometros v. Loyola, 
    932 A.2d 128
    , 132
    (Pa.Super. 2007).
    Initially, appellants contend that the trial court erred when it held that
    the law required an agreement or consent for David Ault’s actions to
    constitute inducement in order to satisfy the requirements of equitable
    estoppel.
    Equitable estoppel is a doctrine that prevents
    one from doing an act differently than the manner in
    which another was induced by word or deed to
    expect. A doctrine sounding in equity, equitable
    estoppel recognizes that an informal promise implied
    by one’s words, deeds or representations which leads
    another to rely justifiably thereon to his own injury
    or detriment, may be enforced in equity. [Citations
    omitted.]
    The two essential elements of equitable
    estoppel are inducement and justifiable reliance on
    that inducement. The inducement may be words or
    conduct and the acts that are induced may be by
    commission or forbearance provided that a change in
    condition results causing disadvantage to the one
    induced.    See generally, Funds for Business
    Growth, Inc. v. Woodland Marble and Tile
    Company. . . 
    278 A.2d 922
    ([Pa.] 1971); Ham v.
    Gouge . . . 
    257 A.2d 650
    ([Pa.Super.] 1969).
    The elements of equitable estoppel and the
    burden of proof required to support such a claim are
    -7-
    J. A09006/16
    well stated in Blofsen v. Cutaiar . . . 
    333 A.2d 841
                  ([Pa.] 1975).
    Equitable   estoppel    applies    to
    prevent a party from assuming a position
    or asserting a right to another’s
    disadvantage inconsistent with a position
    previously taken . . . the person inducing
    the belief in the existence of a certain
    state of facts is estopped to deny that
    the state of facts does in truth exist, over
    a different or contrary state of facts as
    existing at the same time, or deny or
    repudiate     his    acts,    conduct     or
    statements.
    ....
    It is well established . . . that the burden
    rests on the party asserting the estoppel
    to establish such estoppel by clear,
    precise and unequivocal evidence.
    
    Blofsen, 333 A.2d at 844
    .
    Novelty Knitting Mills, Inc. v. Siskind, 
    457 A.2d 502
    , 503-504 (Pa.
    1983).
    Here, appellants argue that David Ault’s statement that he would not
    miss the distribution because he did not know it was coming induced them
    to make the check payable to Thomas Ault or David Ault and to establish the
    account for David Ault’s minor children. Further, the fact that David Ault did
    not object to the idea contributed to the inducement, according to
    appellants.
    The trial court determined that David Ault’s statement that he would
    not   miss    the   money   was   insufficient   to   induce   appellants’   actions.
    -8-
    J. A09006/16
    Appellants failed to convince the trial court that they met their burden to
    establish that David Ault was equitably estopped from challenging the
    transfer of the distribution to which he was entitled to an account for his
    children. This court is satisfied after reviewing the record that there is no
    basis upon which to disturb the trial court’s conclusions. This court agrees
    with the trial court that David Ault did not induce appellants to act.
    Appellants also contend that the trial court abused its discretion when
    it found that they could not rely on the words and actions of David Ault to
    follow the course of action they did because the Partnership Agreement
    required that the general partner distribute available cash to the limited
    partners and that any change regarding the distribution was required to be
    in writing.   Because this court determines that the trial court did not err
    when it found that David Ault did not agree to the placement of his share in
    an account for his children, this court need not address in detail the
    Partnership Agreement.      However, this court notes that the trial court
    accurately stated that the Partnership Agreement required Ethel H. Ault as
    general partner to pay the distribution to David Ault, a limited partner. The
    Partnership Agreement also states that any amendment to it requires the
    written consent of all partners. Thomas E. Ault did not have authority under
    the Partnership Agreement to direct Ethel H. Ault to take David Ault’s
    distribution and make a check in the amount of the distribution to Thomas
    -9-
    J. A09006/16
    Ault or David Ault. Further, Ethel H. Ault did not have the authority to make
    that decision herself.
    Judgment affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    JosephD.Seletyn,Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/24/2016
    - 10 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1818 MDA 2015

Filed Date: 5/24/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024