Com. v. Hale, J. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S23012-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    JUSTIN HALE
    Appellant                 No. 2883 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the PCRA Order August 6, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-48-CR-0000226-2007
    BEFORE: PANELLA, J., OTT, J., and FITZGERALD, J.*
    MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J.                                  FILED MAY 20, 2016
    Appellant, Justin Hale, appeals pro se from the order denying his
    petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”) as untimely. We
    conclude that Hale did not plead any viable exceptions to the PCRA’s timebar
    in his patently untimely petition, and therefore affirm.
    On July 10, 2007, Hale entered a negotiated open guilty plea to one
    count of felony first-degree robbery. The Commonwealth withdrew several
    other charges with the understanding that it would pursue a mandatory
    minimum sentence due to Hale’s possession of a firearm at the time of the
    robbery. On August 31, 2007, the trial court sentenced Hale to a term of
    incarceration of six to fifteen years.
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S23012-16
    Hale did not file post-sentence motions or a direct appeal. On
    September 2, 2008, Hale filed a timely first PCRA petition. The PCRA court
    appointed counsel to represent Hale, and counsel filed an amended PCRA
    petition. After a hearing, the PCRA court denied Hale’s petition. This Court
    affirmed the denial, and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania denied Hale’s
    petition for allowance of appeal on November 29, 2011.
    On June 1, 2015, Hale filed the instant PCRA petition. Shortly
    thereafter, the PCRA court filed notice of its intent to dismiss Hale’s petition
    without a hearing. Hale filed objections to the PCRA court’s notice, but the
    PCRA court dismissed his petition on August 13, 2015. This timely appeal
    followed.
    As the PCRA court dismissed Hale’s petition on timeliness grounds, we
    must address that issue before any of Hale’s other issues on appeal. See
    Commonwealth v. Gandy, 
    38 A.3d 899
    , 902 (Pa. Super. 2012) (“[A]
    question of timeliness implicates the jurisdiction of our Court.”). “The PCRA
    timeliness requirements are jurisdictional in nature and, accordingly, a court
    cannot hear untimely PCRA petitions.” Commonwealth v. Flanagan, 
    854 A.2d 489
    , 509 (Pa. 2004) (citations omitted).
    A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
    judgment of sentence becomes final. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1). Hale’s
    second PCRA petition, filed on June 1, 2015, is patently untimely, as his
    judgment of sentence became final on October 1, 2007. Thus, the PCRA
    -2-
    J-S23012-16
    court did not have “jurisdiction to grant [him] relief unless he can plead and
    prove that one of the exceptions to the time bar provided in 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
    9545(b)(1)(i)-(iii) applies.” Commonwealth v. Pursell, 
    749 A.2d 911
    , 914
    (Pa. 2000).
    Hale has not pled any viable exceptions to the timebar. See PCRA
    petition, filed 6/1/15. Hale does argue that the legality of his sentence is an
    issue that cannot be waived. See 
    id., at p.
    6.1 That is true, but that does not
    mean     the   claim    is   subject   to      review   in   an   untimely   PCRA.   See
    Commonwealth v. Jones, 
    932 A.2d 179
    , 182 (Pa. Super. 2007) (“[W]hen
    a petitioner files an untimely PCRA petition raising a legality-of-sentence
    claim, the claim is not waived, but the jurisdictional limits of the PCRA itself
    render the claim incapable of review.”). Therefore, the PCRA court correctly
    determined that it was without jurisdiction to entertain Hale’s petition.
    In his reply brief, Hale argues that he qualifies for a timeliness
    exception as he claims to have filed his petition within 60 days of learning of
    Alleyne v. United States, 
    133 S. Ct. 2151
    (U.S. 2013). However, Alleyne
    is a court decision announcing a rule of law, which is dealt with under a
    different timeliness exception. See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(1)(iii). Thus,
    Hale was required to file his petition within sixty days of date Alleyne was
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The pages of Hale’s petition are not numbered. For ease of reference we
    begin numbering the pages after the request for in forma pauperis status
    and the form order attached to the front of Hale’s petition.
    -3-
    J-S23012-16
    filed, not sixty days from when he became aware of the decision. See 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9545(b)(2). Furthermore, this Court has held that Alleyne is not
    a decision upon which a petitioner may establish an exception to the PCRA’s
    timebar. See Commonwealth v. Miller, 
    102 A.3d 988
    , 995 (Pa. Super.
    2014). As a result, Hale’s appeal merits no relief.
    Order affirmed. Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/20/2016
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2883 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 5/20/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 5/20/2016