Hartenstine, R. v. Bullock, J. ( 2016 )


Menu:
  • J-A28013-15
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    ROBERT N. HARTENSTINE                            IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellant
    v.
    JERYL BULLOCK AND JAMES F. CARNEY,
    ESQUIRE
    Appellee                   No. 250 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment Entered December 23, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Montgomery County
    Civil Division at No(s): 2014-17098
    BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and SHOGAN, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.:                           FILED JUNE 03, 2016
    In this appeal, Appellant, Robert N. Hartenstine, specifically challenges
    the order entered in the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas, which
    sustained the preliminary objections filed by Appellee, James F. Carney,
    Esquire (“Attorney Carney”) and dismissed Mr. Hartenstine’s complaint for
    wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process.1 We affirm in part,
    reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The court’s order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections was
    made final by the court’s entry of default judgment against the remaining
    defendant, Jeryl Bullock, and the assessment of damages in the amount of
    $68,734.00. (See Judgment entered 12/23/14; R.R. at 137a). We discuss
    this concept more fully later in the disposition. Ms. Bullock is not a party to
    this appeal.
    J-A28013-15
    Mr. Hartenstine and Jeryl Bullock began dating around 1990. During their
    relationship, Ms. Bullock primarily lived in a mobile home on property owned
    by Mr. Hartenstine in Lower Pottsgrove Township, Pennsylvania.          Mr.
    Hartenstine resided at his home in Philadelphia throughout the relationship.
    The parties dispute when the relationship ended; Mr. Hartenstine claims the
    relationship ceased in 2000, while Ms. Bullock contends the relationship
    concluded in 2008.       Following dissolution of their   relationship, Mr.
    Hartenstine asked Ms. Bullock to pay the real estate taxes and insurance if
    she wanted to continue living in her mobile home on his property.       Ms.
    Bullock did not comply with Mr. Hartenstine’s request and, in March 2011,
    Ms. Bullock blocked his access to the property.
    On or around May 5, 2011, Mr. Hartenstine filed an eviction action
    against Ms. Bullock.   Mr. Hartenstine subsequently withdrew the eviction
    complaint while the parties attempted to reach a settlement.          When
    settlement efforts proved unsuccessful, Mr. Hartenstine filed a second
    eviction action on September 16, 2011, scheduled to be heard on October 3,
    2011. On October 3, 2011, Attorney Carney appeared in court as counsel
    for Ms. Bullock.   Before the court commenced the hearing on the eviction
    action, Attorney Carney informed the court he had filed a divorce complaint
    on September 30, 2011, on behalf of Ms. Bullock against Mr. Hartenstine.
    Attorney Carney served Mr. Hartenstine with the divorce complaint at that
    time. The divorce complaint alleged Ms. Bullock and Mr. Hartenstine were
    -2-
    J-A28013-15
    married at common law, and sought, inter alia, equitable distribution,
    alimony, and alimony pendente lite.       Based on the filing of the divorce
    complaint, the court determined the matter should proceed in family court
    and dismissed Mr. Hartenstine’s eviction complaint without prejudice.
    On January 24, 2012, Mr. Hartenstine filed preliminary objections to
    the divorce complaint, claiming the complaint failed to provide the time and
    place of the alleged common-law marriage. The court granted Ms. Bullock
    leave to amend, and on February 21, 2012, Attorney Carney filed an
    amended divorce complaint on Ms. Bullock’s behalf. The amended divorce
    complaint alleged: “The parties are married at common law on August 4,
    1995[,] in Baltimore, Maryland.” (See Amended Divorce Complaint at 1 ¶ 4,
    attached as Exhibit B to Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney
    and Ms. Bullock, filed 6/5/14; R.R. at 21a).
    On July 20, 2012, Mr. Hartenstine filed a petition for declaratory
    judgment, seeking a court ruling that no common-law marriage existed. Ms.
    Bullock filed a response on August 20, 2012. The court held hearings on the
    petition on June 10-11, 2013.      On July 8, 2013, the family court issued
    findings of fact and conclusions of law, granting Mr. Hartenstine’s request for
    declaratory relief.   The family court concluded, inter alia, that Ms. Bullock
    failed to prove she and Mr. Hartenstine uttered the necessary words of
    present intent to create a common-law marriage.          (See Family Court’s
    Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law at 2 ¶ 1, attached as Exhibit D to
    -3-
    J-A28013-15
    Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock; R.R.
    at 36a). Following the family court’s ruling, Mr. Hartenstine recommenced
    the eviction action on August 26, 2013. The court granted Mr. Hartenstine
    possession in the eviction action on September 17, 2013.
    In Mr. Hartenstine’s complaint against Ms. Bullock and Attorney
    Carney, filed on June 5, 2014, he alleged wrongful use of civil proceedings
    (in violation of the Dragonetti Act at 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8351 et seq.) and abuse
    of process. At count one (wrongful use of civil proceedings), Mr. Hartenstine
    averred, inter alia, Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock acted without probable
    cause and in a grossly negligent manner when they filed the divorce
    complaint because they claimed Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock formed a
    common-law marriage in a state that does not recognize common-law
    marriage. At count two (abuse of process), Mr. Hartenstine asserted, inter
    alia, Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock wrongfully used the divorce action as a
    tactical weapon against Mr. Hartenstine, in response to the eviction action,
    to coerce Mr. Hartenstine to drop or settle the eviction action.          Mr.
    Hartenstine also sought punitive damages at both counts of the complaint.
    On July 22, 2014, Attorney Carney filed preliminary objections based
    on legal insufficiency. Regarding the wrongful use of civil proceedings count,
    Attorney Carney claimed, inter alia, he had probable cause to initiate the
    divorce action on behalf of Ms. Bullock where there was a “legal path” to a
    finding of common-law marriage under the facts of this case, even where the
    -4-
    J-A28013-15
    court ultimately decided no common-law marriage existed. Attorney Carney
    maintained the family court’s lengthy evaluation of the arguments and
    evidence presented over the course of a two-day hearing demonstrated
    Attorney Carney had some legal basis for filing the divorce action on Ms.
    Bullock’s behalf.     Attorney Carney averred Mr. Hartenstine’s complaint
    contained no support for gross negligence.       With respect to the abuse of
    process count, Attorney Carney contended, inter alia, Mr. Hartenstine failed
    to show Attorney Carney committed any act unauthorized by the divorce
    proceeding.     Attorney Carney further moved to strike the request for
    punitive damages at both counts of the complaint where Mr. Hartenstine
    failed to allege facts demonstrating Attorney Carney acted with malice.
    The court sustained Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections on
    December 19, 2014, and dismissed Mr. Hartenstine’s claims against him.
    On December 23, 2014, the court entered default judgment against Ms.
    Bullock for her failure to respond to the complaint and assessed damages
    against her in the amount of $68,734.00.         Mr. Hartenstine timely filed a
    notice of appeal on January 7, 2015.         On January 14, 2015, the court
    ordered Mr. Hartenstine to file a concise statement of errors complained of
    on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b); he timely complied on February 3,
    2015.
    Mr. Hartenstine raises the following issues for our review:
    WAS THE ORDER APPEALED FROM A FINAL ORDER SUCH
    THAT THE PENNSYLVANIA SUPERIOR COURT HAS
    -5-
    J-A28013-15
    JURISDICTION TO HEAR THIS APPEAL?
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND/OR
    COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY SUSTAINING A
    PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO A DRAGONETTI ACT
    VIOLATION WHERE THE COMPLAINT PROPERLY PLED THE
    ABSENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE AND [ATTORNEY
    CARNEY’S] GROSS NEGLIGENCE IN FILING A DIVORCE
    ACTION EVEN THOUGH PENNSYLVANIA LAW DID NOT
    RECOGNIZE THE EXISTENCE OF A COMMON LAW
    MARRIAGE WHERE THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE OCCURRED
    IN A STATE WHICH DID NOT RECOGNIZE COMMON LAW
    MARRIAGE AND THE MARRIAGE WAS NOT OTHERWISE
    RECOGNIZED?
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND/OR
    COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY SUSTAINING A
    PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO AN ABUSE OF PROCESS
    CLAIM WHERE THE COMPLAINT PROPERLY PLED THAT
    [ATTORNEY CARNEY] INSTITUTED AND MAINTAINED A
    DIVORCE ACTION FOR THE IMPROPER PURPOSE OF
    COERCING A SETTLEMENT IN ANOTHER UNRELATED
    PENDING MATTER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A LEGALLY
    RECOGNIZABLE MARRIAGE TO SUPPORT A REQUEST FOR
    A DIVORCE?
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION AND/OR
    COMMIT AN ERROR OF LAW BY SUSTAINING A
    PRELIMINARY OBJECTION TO A DEMAND FOR PUNITIVE
    DAMAGES,   SINCE   THE  COMPLAINT    SET   FORTH
    ALLEGATIONS   OF   OUTRAGEOUS    AND   MALICIOUS
    CONDUCT INCLUDING THE SERVICE OF [A] LEGALLY
    UNSUPPORTABLE DIVORCE COMPLAINT AT AN EVICTION
    PROCEEDING?
    (Mr. Hartenstine’s Brief at 4-5).2
    In his first issue, Mr. Hartenstine argues the December 19, 2014 order
    sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections resolved all claims
    ____________________________________________
    2
    For purposes of disposition, we have reordered Mr. Hartenstine’s issues.
    -6-
    J-A28013-15
    against Attorney Carney. Mr. Hartenstine asserts the court entered a default
    judgment against Ms. Bullock on December 23, 2014, which resolved all
    claims against the sole remaining defendant, so Mr. Hartenstine can now
    challenge the court’s previous order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary
    objections.    Mr. Hartenstine concludes this Court has jurisdiction in this
    matter, and the appeal should proceed. We agree.
    “The appealability of an order directly implicates the jurisdiction of the
    court asked to review the order.” In re Estate of Considine v. Wachovia
    Bank, 
    966 A.2d 1148
    , 1151 (Pa.Super. 2009). As a result, “this Court has
    the power to inquire at any time, sua sponte, whether an order is
    appealable.”   Id.; Stanton v. Lackawanna Energy, Ltd., 
    915 A.2d 668
    ,
    673 (Pa.Super. 2007). “An appeal may be taken from: (1) a final order or
    an order certified as a final order (Pa.R.A.P. 341); (2) an interlocutory order
    as of right (Pa.R.A.P. 311); (3) an interlocutory order by permission
    (Pa.R.A.P. 312, 1311, 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 702(b)); or (4) a collateral order
    (Pa.R.A.P. 313).”    In re Estate of Cella, 
    12 A.3d 374
    , 377 (Pa.Super.
    2010) (some internal citations omitted).      Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate
    Procedure 341 defines “final orders” and states:
    Rule 341. Final Orders; Generally
    (a) General rule.          Except as prescribed in
    subdivisions (d), and (e) of this rule, an appeal may be
    taken as of right from any final order of an administrative
    agency or lower court.
    -7-
    J-A28013-15
    (b) Definition of final order.          A final order is any
    order that:
    (1)    disposes of all claims and of all parties; or
    (2)    is expressly defined as a final order by statute; or
    (3) is entered as a final order pursuant to subdivision
    (c) of this rule.
    (c) Determination of finality. When more than one
    claim for relief is presented in an action, whether as a
    claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim [or
    when multiple parties are involved,] the trial court…may
    enter a final order as to one or more but fewer than all of
    the claims [and parties] only upon an express
    determination that an immediate appeal would facilitate
    resolution of the entire case. Such an order becomes
    appealable when entered.        In the absence of such a
    determination and entry of a final order, any order…that
    adjudicates fewer than all the claims [and parties] shall
    not constitute a final order. …
    Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)-(c) (effective July 1, 2014).3        Thus, “[u]nder Rule 341, a
    final order can be one that disposes of all the parties and all the claims, is
    expressly defined as a final order by statute, or is entered as a final order
    pursuant to the trial court’s determination under Rule 341(c).”          Estate of
    Cella, supra at 378.
    “[O]rders [sustaining] preliminary objections and disposing of only
    some    but    not   all   of   the   underlying   parties…are   interlocutory   and
    ____________________________________________
    3
    This version of Rule 341 was in effect when Mr. Hartenstine filed the notice
    of appeal in this case. The current version of Rule 341 omits the prior
    subsection (b)(2), which was rescinded. The remainder of Rule 341(a)-(c) is
    substantially the same. See Pa.R.A.P. 341(a)-(c) (amended December 14,
    2015; effective April 1, 2016).
    -8-
    J-A28013-15
    unappealable.” Spuglio v. Cugini, 
    818 A.2d 1286
    , 1287 (Pa.Super. 2003).
    When a subsequent order or judgment disposes of the claims as to the
    remaining party, however, the prior interlocutory order becomes “final” and
    appealable for purposes of Rule 341.   See, e.g., Strausser v. PRAMCO,
    III, 
    944 A.2d 761
    (Pa.Super. 2008) (explaining that where multiple
    defendants in single action are removed from case in piecemeal fashion by
    separate orders sustaining those defendants’ preliminary objections, each
    order sustaining preliminary objections becomes appealable when suit is
    resolved against final defendant); B.K. ex rel. S.K. v. Chambersburg
    Hosp., 
    834 A.2d 1178
    (Pa.Super. 2003), appeal denied, 
    577 Pa. 705
    , 
    847 A.2d 1276
    (2004) (stating in action involving multiple defendants, order
    granting summary judgment as to one party becomes appealable after
    disposition of claims involving remaining parties); Gutteridge v. A.P.
    Green Services, Inc., 
    804 A.2d 643
    (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 
    574 Pa. 748
    , 
    829 A.2d 1158
    (2003) (explaining trial court order declaring case
    settled as to all remaining parties renders final for purposes of Rule 341
    prior summary judgments in favor of some defendants).
    Instantly, on March 31, 2015, this Court issued a per curiam rule to
    show cause why the appeal should not be quashed as interlocutory where
    the trial court’s December 19, 2014 order sustaining Attorney Carney’s
    preliminary objections did not resolve the claims against all parties.   Mr.
    Hartenstine responded on April 10, 2015, explaining the court’s subsequent
    -9-
    J-A28013-15
    entry of default judgment and damages against Ms. Bullock on December
    23, 2014 resolved the claims against the last remaining defendant and
    rendered the prior order final and appealable. On April 21, 2015, this Court
    discharged the rule to show cause, permitted the appeal to proceed, and
    advised Mr. Hartenstine that he should be prepared to discuss the
    jurisdictional issue on appeal. Our review of the record confirms the court’s
    December 23, 2014 entry of default judgment against Ms. Bullock resolved
    all claims against the sole remaining party, and made “final” and appealable
    the December 19, 2014 order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary
    objections.   See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1); 
    Strausser, supra
    ; 
    B.K., supra
    ;
    
    Gutteridge, supra
    . Thus, we have no jurisdictional impediments and will
    review the merits of Mr. Hartenstine’s claims.
    In his second issue, Mr. Hartenstine concedes Pennsylvania recognizes
    common-law marriages contracted on or before January 1, 2005, in which
    the party seeking to establish common-law marriage must show an instance
    where an exchange of words in the present tense was spoken with the
    specific purpose to create a legal relationship of husband and wife.     Mr.
    Hartenstine argues that under Pennsylvania law, the validity of a marriage is
    determined by the law of the place where it was celebrated; and a marriage
    invalid in the state where it was purportedly formed is invalid in all other
    states.   Mr. Hartenstine asserts Maryland does not recognize common-law
    marriage and contends Attorney Carney filed the divorce complaint on the
    - 10 -
    J-A28013-15
    fundamentally flawed premise that Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock could
    have entered into a common-law marriage in a state that does not recognize
    common-law marriage.      Mr. Hartenstine submits Attorney Carney lacked
    probable cause to file the divorce complaint because the required “words of
    present intent” allegedly took place in a state that does not recognize
    common-law marriage.     Mr. Hartenstine highlights that the court informed
    Attorney Carney during a status conference in the divorce action that
    Maryland does not recognize common-law marriage, but Attorney Carney
    continued to litigate the divorce action anyway.     Mr. Hartenstine insists
    Attorney Carney knew or should have known with the exercise of due
    diligence that Maryland does not recognize common-law marriage and any
    alleged common-law marriage entered into in Maryland would be invalid in
    Pennsylvania.
    Mr. Hartenstine also avers “conduct evidence,” including evidence of
    cohabitation and reputation in the community, is insufficient to prove he and
    Ms. Bullock entered into a common-law marriage because such evidence is
    admissible to prove common-law marriage only where one of the parties to
    the alleged marriage is unavailable to testify about the “words of present
    intent.”   Even if “conduct evidence” were admissible in this case, Mr.
    Hartenstine contends neither the divorce complaint nor the amended divorce
    complaint contained any allegation that Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock
    cohabitated or had a reputation in the community as husband and wife. Mr.
    - 11 -
    J-A28013-15
    Hartenstine emphasizes the sole basis for the supposed common-law
    marriage pled in the divorce complaint and amended divorce complaint was
    the alleged “words of present intent” exchanged in Maryland.             Mr.
    Hartenstine submits he sufficiently pled in his complaint that Attorney
    Carney acted without probable cause in filing the divorce action on behalf of
    Ms. Bullock for the wrongful purpose of obtaining a settlement in the
    underlying eviction action.   Alternatively, Mr. Hartenstine argues Attorney
    Carney was grossly negligent in filing the divorce action where he knew or
    should have known as a family law practitioner that the alleged common-law
    marriage formed in Maryland could not be valid in Pennsylvania.          Mr.
    Hartenstine concludes the trial court committed legal error when it sustained
    Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections to count one of the complaint for
    wrongful use of civil proceedings, and this Court must reverse the order
    sustaining preliminary objections. We disagree.
    The relevant scope and standard of review in examining a challenge to
    an order sustaining preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer are as
    follows:
    Our review of a trial court’s sustaining of preliminary
    objections in the nature of a demurrer is plenary.
    Such preliminary objections should be sustained only
    if, assuming the averments of the complaint to be
    true, the plaintiff has failed to assert a legally
    cognizable cause of action. We will reverse a trial
    court’s decision to sustain preliminary objections
    only if the trial court has committed an error of law
    or an abuse of discretion.
    - 12 -
    J-A28013-15
    All material facts set forth in the complaint as well as
    all inferences reasonably [deducible] therefrom are
    admitted as true for the purpose of this review. The
    question presented by the demurrer is whether, on
    the facts averred, the law says with certainty that
    no recovery is possible. Where a doubt exists as to
    whether a demurrer should be sustained, this doubt
    should be resolved in favor of overruling it.
    Regarding a demurrer, this Court has held:
    A demurrer is an assertion that a complaint does not
    set forth a cause of action or a claim on which relief
    can be granted. A demurrer by a defendant admits
    all relevant facts sufficiently pleaded in the complaint
    and all inferences fairly deducible therefrom, but not
    conclusions of law or unjustified inferences. In ruling
    on a demurrer, the court may consider only such
    matters as arise out of the complaint itself; it cannot
    supply a fact missing in the complaint.
    Where the complaint fails to set forth a valid cause of
    action, a preliminary objection in the nature of a demurrer
    is properly sustained.
    Lerner v. Lerner, 
    954 A.2d 1229
    , 1234-35 (Pa.Super. 2008) (emphasis in
    original) (internal citations omitted).
    Pennsylvania’s Dragonetti Act provides in pertinent part, as follows:
    § 8351. Wrongful use of civil proceedings
    (a)    Elements of action.—A person who takes part in
    the procurement, initiation or continuation of civil
    proceedings against another is subject to liability to the
    other for wrongful use of civil proceedings:
    (1) he acts in a grossly negligent manner or without
    probable cause and primarily for a purpose other than that
    of securing the proper discovery, joinder of parties or
    adjudication of the claim in which the proceedings are
    based; and
    - 13 -
    J-A28013-15
    (2) the proceedings have terminated in favor of the
    person against whom they are brought.
    *     *      *
    § 8352. Existence of probable cause
    A person who takes part in the procurement, initiation or
    continuation of civil proceedings against another has
    probable cause for doing so if he reasonably believes in the
    existence of the facts upon which the claim is based, and
    either:
    (1) reasonably believes that under those facts the
    claim may be valid under the existing or developing law;
    (2) believes to this effect in reliance upon the advice
    of counsel, sought in good faith and given after full
    disclosure of all relevant facts within his knowledge and
    information; or
    (3) believes as an attorney of record, in good faith
    that his procurement, initiation or continuation of a civil
    cause is not intended to merely harass or maliciously
    injure the opposite party.
    *     *      *
    § 8354. Burden of proof
    In an action brought pursuant to this subchapter the
    plaintiff has the burden of proving, when the issue is
    properly raised, that:
    (1) The defendant has procured,            initiated   or
    continued the civil proceedings against him.
    (2) The proceedings were terminated in his favor.
    (3) The defendant did not have probable cause for his
    action.
    (4) The primary purpose for which the proceedings
    were brought was not that of securing the proper
    - 14 -
    J-A28013-15
    discovery, joinder of parties or adjudication of the claim on
    which the proceedings were based.
    (5) The plaintiff has suffered damages as set forth in
    section 8353 (relating to damages).
    42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 8351(a); 8352; 8354. To withstand a demurrer, a wrongful
    use of civil proceedings complaint must at least include the factual
    allegations required to carry the burden of proof set forth at Section 8354.
    Gentzler v. Atlee, 
    660 A.2d 1378
    , 1381 (Pa.Super. 1995), appeal denied,
    
    543 Pa. 694
    , 
    670 A.2d 142
    (1995).            At this stage in the proceedings,
    however, the questions of whether the facts alleged in the complaint can be
    proved or whether the plaintiff actually suffered any damages are not before
    us; we must simply decide whether the plaintiff’s allegations make out a
    cause of action under the applicable law.      
    Id. “The existence
    of probable
    cause is a matter of law for the court to decide and is a proper objection for
    a defendant…to raise on preliminary objections.” 
    Id. at 1382.
    “A party has probable cause to bring an action when he ‘reasonably
    believes’ in the facts on which it is based and in the viability of the legal
    theory under which it is brought.”     
    Id. (emphasis in
    original).       In other
    words:
    If [the defendant] had a reasonable belief in the facts on
    which the claim was based and in the validity of the claim
    under existing or developing law, then [the plaintiff’s]
    cause of action for wrongful use cannot succeed. On the
    other hand, if [the defendant] lacked reasonable belief in
    the facts alleged or the validity of the claim under existing
    or developing law, and made the claim for an improper
    purpose, then [the plaintiff’s] cause of action for wrongful
    - 15 -
    J-A28013-15
    use may proceed.
    
    Id. Additionally: Insofar
    as attorney liability is concerned, as long as
    an attorney believes that there is a slight chance
    that his client’s claims will be successful, it is not the
    attorney’s duty to prejudge the case. Lawyers can
    safely act upon the facts stated by their clients.
    That being said, the plaintiff in a wrongful use of civil
    proceedings action need not obtain the defendant’s
    outright ‘confession’ of improper purpose; an improper
    purpose may be inferred where the action is filed without
    justification.  Thus, a claim for wrongful use of civil
    proceedings will lie if the trier of fact could reasonably
    conclude that the defendant initiated the underlying
    lawsuit without probable cause.
    Perelman v. Perelman, 
    125 A.3d 1259
    , 1264 (Pa.Super. 2015) (internal
    citations and quotation marks omitted). “[A]n attorney is entitled to rely in
    good faith upon the statement of facts made to him by his client, and is not
    under a duty to institute an inquiry for the purpose of verifying his
    statement before giving advice thereon.”       Kit v. Mitchell, 
    771 A.2d 814
    ,
    822 (Pa.Super. 2001), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 
    577 Pa. 69
    , 
    842 A.2d 368
    (2004). “Lawyers can safely act upon facts stated by their
    clients. They do not incur liability to third persons for filing civil proceedings
    when the evidence of those facts is later found not credible by the court or
    jury whose duty it is to try the case.”       Meiksin v. Howard Hanna Co.,
    Inc., 
    590 A.2d 1303
    , 1307 (Pa.Super. 1991), appeal denied, 
    528 Pa. 644
    ,
    
    600 A.2d 196
    (1991).      See also 
    Kit, supra
    (affirming grant of judgment
    notwithstanding verdict in favor of attorney on plaintiff’s wrongful use of civil
    - 16 -
    J-A28013-15
    proceedings claim; attorney had probable cause to seek enforcement of child
    support order on behalf of his client, despite attorney’s knowledge that
    plaintiff was not child’s biological father, under then-existing legal theories of
    res judicata and paternity by estoppel).            Compare Korn v. Epstein, 
    727 A.2d 1130
    (Pa.Super. 1999), appeal denied, 
    560 Pa. 707
    , 
    743 A.2d 921
    (1999) (affirming verdict against attorney for wrongful use of civil
    proceedings, where attorney had pursued individual lawyers of law firm for
    debt collection on behalf of court-reporter client; attorney lacked probable
    cause to sue individual lawyers in absence of written and signed agreement
    by lawyers to assume personal liability for law firm’s debt; attorney had
    made several comments to individual lawyers about settling debt after
    attorney filed suit; trial court could reasonably infer attorney’s pursuit of
    action amounted to improper effort to extract settlement from individual
    lawyers to    pay   debt);    
    Gentzler, supra
           (reversing order    sustaining
    attorney’s   preliminary     objections     to     plaintiff’s   wrongful   use   of   civil
    proceedings complaint, where attorney had filed lack of informed consent
    and negligence complaint against plaintiff on behalf of attorney’s client
    without probable cause or in grossly negligent manner; attorney’s lack of
    informed consent claim had no legal support where plaintiff was treating
    physician of attorney’s client and did not actually perform surgical procedure
    at issue which required obtaining client’s informed consent; attorney’s
    negligence claim also lacked legal support where attorney knew prior to
    - 17 -
    J-A28013-15
    filing suit plaintiff was not responsible for ordering administration of blood
    products to client).
    “The presence of probable cause, however, does not necessarily defeat
    the entire cause of action for wrongful use of civil proceedings, as the clear
    language of [42 Pa.C.S.A. §] 8351 permits a cause of action to be based on
    gross negligence or lack of probable cause.”       Keystone Freight Corp. v.
    Stricker, 
    31 A.3d 967
    , 973 (Pa.Super. 2011) (emphasis in original). “Gross
    negligence is defined, inter alia, as a lack of slight diligence or care, or a
    conscious, voluntary act or omission in reckless disregard of a legal duty and
    of the consequences to another party…” Hart v. O’Malley, 
    781 A.2d 1211
    ,
    1218 (Pa.Super. 2001). “Gross negligence has also been described as the
    want of even scant care and the failure to exercise even that care which a
    careless person would use.”       
    Id. (internal citation
    and quotation marks
    omitted).     See also Keystone 
    Freight, supra
    (affirming summary
    judgment in favor of executrix and her attorneys in wrongful use of civil
    proceedings suit; executrix and her attorneys had probable cause and did
    not exercise gross negligence in bringing wrongful death/survival action
    against   trucking     company,   where   they   presented   carefully   reasoned
    arguments supported by expert testimony for their claim of trucking
    company’s negligence; trucking company also failed to produce any evidence
    that executrix and attorneys commenced action for improper purpose).
    Section 1103 of the Domestic Relations Code discusses the viability of
    - 18 -
    J-A28013-15
    common-law marriage in Pennsylvania and provides:
    § 1103. Common-law marriage
    No common-law marriage contracted after January 1,
    2005, shall be valid. Nothing in this part shall be deemed
    or taken to render any common-law marriage otherwise
    lawful and contracted on or before January 1, 2005,
    invalid.
    23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103.     Prior to its abolition, “[a] common-law marriage
    [could] only [have been] created by an exchange of words in the present
    tense, spoken with the specific purpose that the legal relationship of
    husband and wife is created by such exchange.” Bell v. Ferraro, 
    849 A.2d 1233
    , 1235 (Pa.Super. 2004).           “The burden to prove a common-law
    marriage rests on the proponent of the marriage and such a claim must be
    reviewed with great scrutiny.”   
    Id. See also
    In re Estate of Rees, 
    480 A.2d 327
    (Pa.Super. 1984) (explaining that words in praesenti are usually
    required to establish common-law marriage relationship). “The common-law
    marriage contract does not require any specific form of words, and all that is
    essential is proof of an agreement to enter into the legal relationship of
    marriage at the present time.” Staudenmayer v. Staudenmayer, 
    552 Pa. 253
    , 262, 
    714 A.2d 1016
    , 1020 (1998).
    Generally, words in the present tense are required to
    prove common-law marriage.       Because common-law
    marriage cases arose most frequently because of claims
    for a putative surviving spouse’s share of an estate,
    however, we developed a rebuttable presumption in favor
    of a common-law marriage where there is an absence of
    testimony regarding the exchange of verba in praesenti.
    When applicable, the party claiming a common-law
    - 19 -
    J-A28013-15
    marriage who proves: (1) constant cohabitation; and, (2)
    a reputation of marriage which is not partial or divided but
    is broad and general, raises the rebuttable presumption of
    marriage. Constant cohabitation, however, even when
    conjoined with general reputation are not marriage, they
    are merely circumstances which give rise to a rebuttable
    presumption of marriage.
    
    Id. at 262-63,
    714 A.2d at 1020-21 (internal citations, quotation marks, and
    footnotes omitted).
    The rule permitting a court to find common-law marriage based on
    reputation and cohabitation alone is one of necessity, applied only in cases
    where other proof is unavailable. Estate of 
    Rees, supra
    . “The ‘necessity’
    that would require the introduction of evidence concerning cohabitation and
    reputation of marriage is the inability to present direct testimony regarding
    the exchange of verba in praesenti.”   
    Staudenmayer, supra
    at 
    263, 714 A.2d at 1021
    . See also 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 2209 (stating: “A person who is or
    claims to be the surviving spouse shall be a competent witness as to all
    matters pertinent to his rights under this chapter other than the creation of
    his status as the surviving spouse”); Estate of Stauffer, 
    504 Pa. 626
    , 
    476 A.2d 354
    (1984) (holding Dead Man’s Act prohibited purported wife’s
    testimony regarding exchange of “words of present intent” with her alleged
    common-law husband). In other words, the rebuttable presumption in favor
    of common-law marriage based on sufficient proof of cohabitation and
    reputation of marriage is permitted as a remedial measure, where the
    parties are otherwise unable to testify regarding the necessary “words of
    - 20 -
    J-A28013-15
    present intent.” 
    Staudenmayer, supra
    at 
    264, 714 A.2d at 1021
    .
    However, where the parties are available to testify
    regarding verba in praesenti, the burden rests with the
    party claiming a common-law marriage to produce clear
    and convincing evidence of the exchange of words in the
    present tense spoken with the purpose of establishing the
    relationship of husband and wife, in other words, the
    marriage contract.     In those situations, the rebuttable
    presumption in favor of a common-law marriage upon
    sufficient proof of constant cohabitation and reputation for
    marriage, does not arise.
    By requiring proof of verba in praesenti where both parties
    are able to testify, we do not discount the relevance of
    evidence of constant cohabitation and reputation of
    marriage.     When faced with contradictory testimony
    regarding verba in praesenti, the party claiming a
    common-law marriage may introduce evidence of constant
    cohabitation and reputation of marriage in support of his or
    her claim. We merely hold that if a putative spouse who is
    able to testify and fails to prove, by clear and convincing
    evidence, the establishment of the marriage contract
    through the exchange of verba in praesenti, then that
    party has not met its “heavy” burden to prove a common-
    law marriage, since he or she does not enjoy any
    presumption based on evidence of constant cohabitation
    and reputation of marriage.
    
    Id. (internal footnote
    omitted) (holding appellant was not entitled to
    rebuttable presumption in favor of common-law marriage through evidence
    of constant cohabitation and reputation of marriage where she was available
    to testify, and did testify (albeit unconvincingly), concerning exchange of
    “words of present intent” between parties; thus, appellant failed to meet
    burden to prove common-law marriage).
    In general, the law of the state in which a marriage is celebrated
    governs the validity of the marriage. Jewett v. Jewett, 
    175 A.2d 141
    , 142
    - 21 -
    J-A28013-15
    (Pa.Super. 1961).        Ordinarily, a marriage valid in the state where it is
    contracted is valid everywhere. Sullivan v. American Bridge Co., 
    176 A. 24
    , 25 (Pa.Super. 1935). The corollary of the general rule (if a marriage is
    invalid in the state where it is contracted then it is invalid everywhere),
    however, has been subject to some exceptions. See 
    id. (affirming grant
    of
    workers’ compensation benefits to claimant where claimant proved she
    entered    into    common-law        marriage      with   decedent;   notwithstanding
    claimant’s and decedent’s exchange of “words of present intent” in
    Maryland, which does not recognize common-law marriage, immediately
    following exchange of words, claimant and decedent constantly cohabitated
    together in New Jersey and Pennsylvania, during time when those states
    recognized common-law marriage, and held themselves out to community as
    husband and wife; evidence presented made clear that decedent recognized
    and regarded claimant as his wife).4            Compare Cooney v. W.C.A.B., 94
    ____________________________________________
    4
    In Sullivan, this Court relied on the United States Supreme Court decision
    in Travers v. Reinhardt, 
    205 U.S. 423
    , 
    27 S. Ct. 563
    , 
    51 L. Ed. 865
    (1907)
    (holding decedent and putative spouse entered into common-law marriage in
    New Jersey; following decedent and putative spouse’s invalid marriage
    ceremony in Virginia for lack of proper license, they continuously cohabitated
    as husband and wife and uniformly held themselves out as sustaining that
    relation; evidence made clear that decedent recognized putative spouse as
    his wife and held her out as such; decedent and putative spouse’s conduct
    towards each other while they lived in New Jersey was equivalent, in law, to
    declaration by each that they did, and during their joint lives were to,
    occupy relation of husband and wife; such declaration was as effective to
    establish status of marriage in New Jersey, as if it had been made by “words
    of present intent” after they became domiciled in that state).
    - 22 -
    J-A28013-15
    A.3d 425 (Pa.Cmwlth. 2014), appeal denied, ___ Pa. ___, 
    109 A.3d 680
    (2015) (affirming denial of workers’ compensation benefits to claimant
    where she failed to prove she entered into common-law marriage with
    decedent; decedent and claimant exchanged “words of present intent” in
    2003 in Wyoming, which does not recognize common-law marriage; when
    claimant and decedent moved to Pennsylvania in 2009 (cohabitating and
    holding themselves out as “husband and wife”), common-law marriage was
    already abolished; thus, decedent and claimant failed to perform acts which
    would satisfy proof of common-law marriage while in state that recognized
    common-law marriage at that time).
    Instantly, Mr. Hartenstine’s underlying eviction action against Ms.
    Bullock was scheduled to be heard on October 3, 2011.          On that date,
    Attorney Carney appeared in court as counsel for Ms. Bullock and served Mr.
    Hartenstine with a divorce complaint.       The divorce complaint alleged Ms.
    Bullock and Mr. Hartenstine were married at common law, and sought, inter
    alia, equitable distribution, alimony, and alimony pendente lite.   Based on
    the filing of the divorce complaint, the court determined the matter should
    proceed in family court and dismissed Mr. Hartenstine’s eviction complaint
    without prejudice.
    On January 24, 2012, Mr. Hartenstine filed preliminary objections to
    the divorce complaint, claiming the complaint failed to provide the time and
    place of the alleged common-law marriage. The court granted Ms. Bullock
    - 23 -
    J-A28013-15
    leave to amend, and on February 21, 2012, Attorney Carney filed an
    amended divorce complaint on Ms. Bullock’s behalf. The amended divorce
    complaint alleged: “The parties are married at common law on August 4,
    1995[,] in Baltimore, Maryland.” (See Amended Divorce Complaint at 1 ¶ 4,
    attached as Exhibit B to Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney
    and Ms. Bullock; R.R. at 21a.)
    On April 25, 2012, Ms. Bullock gave deposition testimony that on
    August 4, 1995, she and Mr. Hartenstine exchanged “words of present
    intent” at the Omni Hotel as follows: “We were sitting on the bed. We were
    holding hands and [Mr. Hartenstine] said, we are married, you are my wife.
    And I said, I will always love you. You are my husband.” (See Deposition
    testimony of Ms. Bullock at 6, attached as Exhibit C to Mr. Hartenstine’s
    Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock; R.R. at 31a.)          Ms.
    Bullock further testified that she and Mr. Hartenstine “lived together as
    husband and wife” since 1991, and that Ms. Bullock’s daughter “assumed”
    Ms. Bullock and Mr. Hartenstine were married.5 (Id. at 9; R.R. at 34a.)
    Following a two-day hearing on June 10-11, 2013,6 the family court
    issued findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 8, 2013. Specifically,
    ____________________________________________
    5
    Exhibit C to Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms.
    Bullock is only a brief excerpt of Ms. Bullock’s deposition testimony.
    6
    The certified record does not contain the notes of testimony from these
    hearings.
    - 24 -
    J-A28013-15
    the family court found:
    FINDINGS OF FACT
    1.      The parties traveled to Baltimore, Maryland for
    [Mr. Hartenstine’s] birthday with [Ms. Bullock’s] daughter
    on or about August 4, 1995.
    2.       [Ms. Bullock] contends that while they were in a
    hotel room, [Mr. Hartenstine] stated to her “we are
    married, you are my wife” to which [Ms. Bullock] replied “I
    will always love you, you are my husband.”
    3.        Several of [Mr. Hartenstine’s] close friends
    testified at the time of [the] hearing that [Ms. Bullock] and
    [Mr. Hartenstine] never referred to each other as husband
    and wife in the presence of close friends or public events.
    4.      Conversely, [Ms. Bullock and Ms. Bullock’s]
    daughter testified that the parties introduced each other as
    husband and wife at events.
    5.       [Ms. Bullock’s] daughter testified that she
    believed [Ms. Bullock] and [Mr. Hartenstine] were married
    since [Mr. Hartenstine] gave [Ms. Bullock] greeting cards
    using the word “wife” and their behavior in living together
    and sharing household and familial responsibilities. In
    fact, [Ms. Bullock’s] daughter believed [Mr. Hartenstine]
    was her biological father.
    6.       [Ms. Bullock] never told anyone she was married.
    7.     [Mr. Hartenstine] gave [Ms. Bullock] a wedding
    band sometime after 1995 which [Ms. Bullock] wore until
    2008.
    8.       One of [Mr. Hartenstine’s] friends testified that he
    never saw [Ms. Bullock] wear her wedding band.
    (However, this [c]ourt must countenance this with the fact
    that this friend saw [Ms. Bullock] on camping trips where
    jewelry [is] not customarily worn for safety purposes).
    9.       The parties lived together from 1995-2008.
    - 25 -
    J-A28013-15
    10.      During the parties’ relationship, [Ms. Bullock]
    mostly stayed on the parties’ farm and not with [Mr.
    Hartenstine].
    11.      The parties’ former housekeeper testified that she
    never saw any of [Ms. Bullock’s] clothes in the parties’
    residence.
    12.     The parties filed as single on their tax returns
    from the years 1996 to 1997.
    13.     The parties filed joint tax returns from the years
    1998 to 2008.
    (See Family Court’s Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law at 2, attached
    as Exhibit D to Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms.
    Bullock; R.R. at 36a.)   Ultimately, the family court concluded Ms. Bullock
    failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the existence of a valid
    common-law marriage.
    Significantly, at the time Attorney Carney initiated the divorce action
    on behalf of Ms. Bullock, he relied on information from his client, inter alia:
    (1) Ms. Bullock and Mr. Hartenstine exchanged “words of present intent” on
    August 4, 1995, in Baltimore, Maryland; (2) Ms. Bullock and Mr. Hartenstine
    lived together in Pennsylvania as husband and wife since 1991, and
    continued to live together in Pennsylvania after the exchange of words in
    1995; (3) Ms. Bullock’s daughter believed Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock
    were married and thought Mr. Hartenstine was her biological father; (4) Mr.
    Hartenstine gave Ms. Bullock a wedding ring sometime after 1995; and (5)
    Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock held themselves out as husband and wife at
    - 26 -
    J-A28013-15
    events.     Attorney Carney was entitled to rely in good faith on the facts
    disclosed by his client when he filed the divorce action, and to proceed with
    the divorce action so long as he believed the common-law marriage theory
    had even a slight chance of success. See 
    Perelman, supra
    ; 
    Kit, supra
    ;
    
    Meiksin, supra
    .
    Notwithstanding Mr. Hartenstine’s and Ms. Bullock’s alleged exchange
    of “words of present intent” in a state that does not recognize common-law
    marriage,    under     our   Court’s    analysis   in    Sullivan,    Attorney   Carney
    reasonably believed a marriage contracted in a state that does not recognize
    common-law       marriage      might     be    valid    in   Pennsylvania   under   the
    circumstances described by his client.                 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8352(1);
    
    Sullivan, supra
    .       In addition to relying on Sullivan, in his post-hearing
    letter brief submitted in the divorce action, Attorney Carney cited numerous
    cases from other jurisdictions to support his position. 7            (See Post-Hearing
    Letter Brief at 1-3, attached as Exhibit C to Attorney Carney’s Preliminary
    Objections, filed 7/22/14; R.R. at 93a-95a.) According to the family court’s
    findings of fact, Ms. Bullock presented evidence that she and Mr. Hartenstine
    lived together as husband and wife in Pennsylvania prior to the abolition of
    common-law marriage in 2005, and enjoyed a reputation in the community
    ____________________________________________
    7
    Attorney Carney also cites and relies on Cooney in his appellate brief. The
    Commonwealth Court had not yet decided Cooney at the time Attorney
    Carney filed the divorce action on behalf of Ms. Bullock.
    - 27 -
    J-A28013-15
    of husband and wife during that time.8             These facts might have been
    sufficient to establish common-law marriage under the law if believed by the
    fact-finder. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 1103; 
    Sullivan, supra
    .
    Likewise, the record does not indicate a complete lack of diligence by
    Attorney Carney or the failure to exercise the care even a careless person
    would use in initiating the divorce action.          See 
    Hart, supra
    .    To the
    contrary, the record shows Attorney Carney presented during the divorce
    proceedings careful arguments based on a reasonable interpretation of the
    law.   See Keystone 
    Freight, supra
    .            Thus, Mr. Hartenstine cannot show
    Attorney Carney acted without probable cause or was grossly negligent in
    ____________________________________________
    8
    Ordinarily, testimony/evidence concerning Ms. Bullock’s and Mr.
    Hartenstine’s cohabitation and reputation in the community would have been
    inadmissible where both parties to the divorce action were able to testify
    about the “words of present intent.” See 
    Staudenmayer, supra
    ; Estate
    of 
    Rees, supra
    . If Mr. Hartenstine disputed Ms. Bullock’s testimony about
    the “words of present intent,” however, the court could have considered
    cohabitation/reputation testimony. See 
    Staudenmayer, supra
    . Because
    the certified record does not contain the notes of testimony from the divorce
    action hearings, we are unable to verify whether Mr. Hartenstine disputed
    Ms. Bullock’s allegations about the “words of present intent” or even
    objected to her testimony/evidence concerning cohabitation/reputation. It is
    an appellant’s responsibility to ensure the certified record contains all
    relevant notes of testimony.      See Kessler v. Broder, 
    851 A.2d 944
    (Pa.Super. 2004), appeal denied, 
    582 Pa. 676
    , 
    868 A.2d 1201
    (2005)
    (explaining it remains appellant’s responsibility to ensure that complete
    record is produced for appeal; appellant’s failure to ensure certified record
    contains sufficient information to conduct proper review may constitute
    waiver of issues). To the extent Mr. Hartenstine complains on appeal the
    family court should not have considered evidence of cohabitation/reputation,
    that claim is not properly before this Court and we decline to comment on
    the family court’s admission of evidence in the absence of a complete record
    from those proceedings. See 
    id. - 28
    -
    J-A28013-15
    bringing or continuing the divorce claim on behalf of Ms. Bullock.      See 
    id. See also
    Kit, supra
    .              Compare 
    Korn, supra
    ; 
    Gentzler, supra
    .
    Therefore, Mr. Hartenstine’s second issue on appeal merits no relief.
    In his third issue, Mr. Hartenstine argues Attorney Carney initiated the
    divorce proceedings in response to the eviction proceedings, to coerce Mr.
    Hartenstine into settling or dropping the eviction action.    Mr. Hartenstine
    asserts Attorney Carney’s decision to serve Mr. Hartenstine with the divorce
    complaint at the hearing scheduled in the eviction proceedings was a
    calculated move designed to coerce settlement. Mr. Hartenstine emphasizes
    that his personal relationship with Ms. Bullock ended more than ten years
    before Attorney Carney initiated the divorce action.9 Mr. Hartenstine claims
    Ms. Bullock’s attempt to reach an agreement with Mr. Hartenstine after he
    began the initial eviction action demonstrates the divorce action is meritless,
    where Ms. Bullock did not contend she was Mr. Hartenstine’s common-law
    wife during those attempted negotiations. Mr. Hartenstine insists Attorney
    Carney’s attempt to extract a settlement in the eviction action by filing the
    divorce complaint constituted a perversion of legal process. Mr. Hartenstine
    maintains he suffered significant financial harm in defending the divorce
    action, as well as physical and emotional stress. Mr. Hartenstine submits he
    sufficiently pled in his complaint that Attorney Carney used legal process
    ____________________________________________
    9
    This averment contradicts Ms. Bullock’s contention that the relationship
    ended in 2008.
    - 29 -
    J-A28013-15
    primarily to accomplish a purpose for which it was not intended, and that Mr.
    Hartenstine suffered harm as a result.         Mr. Hartenstine concludes the trial
    court erred when it sustained Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections to
    count two of the complaint for abuse of process, and this Court must reverse
    the order sustaining preliminary objections. We agree.
    Pennsylvania law defines a cause of action for abuse of process as
    follows:
    The tort of “abuse of process” is defined as the use of legal
    process against another primarily to accomplish a purpose
    for which it is not designed. To establish a claim for abuse
    of process it must be shown that the defendant (1) used a
    legal process against the plaintiff; (2) primarily to
    accomplish a purpose for which the process was not
    designed; and (3) harm has been caused to the plaintiff.
    This tort differs from that of wrongful use of civil
    proceedings in that, in the former, the existence of
    probable cause to employ the particular process for its
    intended use is immaterial. The gravamen of abuse of
    process is the perversion of the particular legal process for
    a purpose of benefit to the defendant, which is not an
    authorized goal of the procedure. In support of this claim,
    the [plaintiff] must show some definite act or threat not
    authorized by the process, or aimed at an objective not
    legitimate in the use of the process...; and there is no
    liability where the defendant has done nothing more than
    carry out the process to its authorized conclusion, even
    though with bad intentions.
    Shiner v. Moriarty, 
    706 A.2d 1228
    , 1236 (Pa.Super. 1998), appeal denied,
    
    556 Pa. 711
    , 
    729 A.2d 1130
    (1998) (internal citations and quotation marks
    omitted).
    The gravamen of the misconduct for which the liability
    stated…is imposed is not the wrongful procurement of legal
    process or the wrongful initiation of criminal or civil
    - 30 -
    J-A28013-15
    proceedings; it is the misuse of process, no matter how
    properly obtained, for any purpose other than that which it
    was designed to accomplish. Therefore, it is immaterial
    that the process was properly issued, that it was obtained
    in the course of proceedings that were brought with
    probable cause and for a proper purpose, or even that the
    proceedings terminated in favor of the person instituting or
    initiating them. The subsequent misuse of the process,
    though properly obtained, constitutes the misconduct for
    which the liability is imposed….
    Rosen v. American Bank of Rolla, 
    627 A.2d 190
    , 192 (Pa.Super. 1993)
    (internal citations omitted).   “Abuse of process is, in essence, the use of
    legal process as a tactical weapon to coerce a desired result that is not the
    legitimate object of the process.” Werner v. Plater-Zyberk, 
    799 A.2d 776
    ,
    785 (Pa.Super. 2002), appeal denied, 
    569 Pa. 722
    , 
    806 A.2d 862
    (2002).
    The classic example [of abuse of process] is the initiation
    of a civil proceeding to coerce the payment of a claim
    completely unrelated to the cause of action sued upon. It
    is not enough that the defendant had bad or malicious
    intentions or that the defendant acted from spite or with
    an ulterior motive. Rather, there must be an act or threat
    not authorized by the process, or the process must be
    used for an illegitimate aim such as extortion, blackmail, or
    to coerce or compel the plaintiff to take some collateral
    action.
    Al Hamilton Contracting Co. v. Cowder, 
    644 A.2d 188
    , 192 (Pa.Super.
    1994) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).
    Instantly, Mr. Hartenstine alleged in his complaint at count two:
    44.     [Mr. Hartenstine] incorporates         the   foregoing
    paragraphs as if set forth at length herein.
    45.      As set forth more fully above, [Ms.] Bullock,
    through [Attorney] Carney, filed a Divorce Complaint
    alleging that a common-law marriage was formed in a
    - 31 -
    J-A28013-15
    state that does not recognize common-law marriage.
    [46.]    [Ms. Bullock and Attorney Carney] wrongfully
    used the Divorce Action as a tactical weapon against [Mr.]
    Hartenstine in response to the Eviction Action in an
    attempt to coerce [Mr.] Hartenstine into dropping the
    Eviction Action or making a monetary settlement.
    [47.]    [Ms. Bullock and Attorney Carney] acted
    maliciously and outrageously, and their conduct warrants
    the imposition of punitive damages.
    [48.]    [Mr.] Hartenstine suffered significant emotional
    distress over the nearly two year period which the Divorce
    Action spanned and is entitled to emotional damages.
    [49.]    [Mr.] Hartenstine suffered substantial damages as
    follows:
    a.     The payment of $56,464 in attorney’s fees;
    b.   Lost property rental from January 1, 2010 to
    September 17, 2013 of $18,400;
    c.     Lost refinancing opportunity of $5,000;
    d.    Forced liquidation of stock costing him $17,000
    due to an untimely sale and tax payment;
    e.    Mental pain and anguish that [led] to severe
    dental problems costing $12,000;
    f.   Emotional pain              that   interfered   with   his
    personal relationships.
    (See Mr. Hartenstine’s Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock
    at 10-11 ¶¶ 44-49; R.R. at 12a-13a.)10                The Complaint makes clear Mr.
    Hartenstine alleged that Attorney Carney, acting on behalf of Ms. Bullock:
    ____________________________________________
    10
    Some of the paragraph formatting in the complaint is out of order.
    - 32 -
    J-A28013-15
    (1) used legal process against Mr. Hartenstine by filing a divorce complaint
    against him on behalf of Ms. Bullock; (2) primarily to coerce Mr. Hartenstine
    to drop or settle the underlying eviction action against Ms. Bullock; and (3)
    specific harm, including but not limited to, emotional distress, lost property
    rental revenue, and attorney’s fees. See id.; 
    Shiner, supra
    .
    At this early stage in the proceedings, we must accept all facts in the
    complaint as true.       See 
    Lerner, supra
    .     The facts as alleged in Mr.
    Hartenstine’s complaint, if true, could entitle him to relief on his abuse of
    process claim against Attorney Carney, where Mr. Hartenstine specifically
    pled that Attorney Carney proceeded in the divorce action with the
    illegitimate aim to coerce or compel Mr. Hartenstine to drop or settle the
    underlying    eviction   action.   See   
    Werner, supra
    ;    Al   Hamilton
    
    Contracting, supra
    . Our determination that Attorney Carney had probable
    cause to initiate the divorce action is immaterial to whether Attorney Carney
    committed abuse of process by continuing with the divorce action for an
    illegitimate purpose.     See 
    Rosen, supra
    .     Based on Mr. Hartenstine’s
    allegations in the complaint, we cannot say the denial of relief on his abuse
    of process claim is so clear and free of doubt to sustain Attorney Carney’s
    preliminary objections. See 
    Lerner, supra
    . Accordingly, we reverse that
    part of the trial court’s order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary
    objections with respect to Mr. Hartenstine’s abuse of process claim and
    remand for further proceedings on that claim.
    - 33 -
    J-A28013-15
    In his fourth issue, Mr. Hartenstine argues Attorney Carney specializes
    in the practice of family law, and he should have known a marriage contract
    between Mr. Hartenstine and Ms. Bullock could not exist under the law
    governing common-law marriage. Mr. Hartenstine reiterates that Attorney
    Carney instituted, maintained, and prosecuted the divorce action for the
    sole, illegitimate purpose of forcing Mr. Hartenstine to settle or drop the
    eviction action.    Mr. Hartenstine contends Attorney Carney’s actions
    constitute outrageous and malicious conduct warranting punitive damages.
    Mr. Hartenstine concedes that a request for punitive damages is a derivative
    claim based on the success or failure of his wrongful use of civil proceedings
    and abuse of process claims.     Mr. Hartenstine concludes this Court must
    reverse the trial court’s order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary
    objections and reinstate Mr. Hartenstine’s claim for punitive damages at
    both counts of the complaint. We disagree.
    The Dragonetti Act provides for specific damages:
    § 8353. Damages
    When the essential elements of an action brought pursuant
    to this subchapter have been established as provided in
    section 8351 (relating to wrongful use of civil
    proceedings), the plaintiff is entitled to recover for the
    following:
    (1) The harm normally resulting from any arrest or
    imprisonment, or any dispossession or interference with
    the advantageous use of his land, chattels or other things,
    suffered by him during the course of the proceedings.
    (2) The harm to his reputation by any defamatory
    - 34 -
    J-A28013-15
    matter alleged as the basis of the proceedings.
    (3) The expense, including any reasonable attorney
    fees, that he has reasonably incurred in defending himself
    against the proceedings.
    (4) Any specific pecuniary loss that has resulted from
    the proceedings.
    (5) Any emotional distress that is caused by the
    proceedings.
    (6) Punitive damages according to law in appropriate
    cases.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 8353.
    “Punitive damages are, by definition, penal in nature, and not for the
    purpose of providing additional compensation.”      
    Hart, supra
    at 1217.
    Rather, “punitive damages are an ‘extreme remedy’ available only in the
    most exceptional circumstances.”   Doe v. Wyoming Valley Health Care
    System, Inc., 
    987 A.2d 758
    , 768 (Pa.Super. 2009).
    Punitive damages may be appropriately awarded only
    when the plaintiff has established that the defendant has
    acted in an outrageous fashion due to either the
    defendant’s evil motive or his reckless indifference to the
    rights of others. A defendant acts recklessly when his
    conduct creates an unreasonable risk of physical harm to
    another and such risk is substantially greater than that
    which is necessary to make his conduct negligent. Thus, a
    showing of mere negligence, or even gross negligence, will
    not suffice to establish that punitive damages should be
    imposed. Rather, the plaintiff must adduce evidence which
    goes beyond a showing of negligence, evidence sufficient
    to establish that the defendant’s acts amounted to
    intentional, willful, wanton or reckless conduct….
    
    Id. In determining
    whether punitive damages are warranted, “we must
    - 35 -
    J-A28013-15
    analyze whether the complaint’s allegations establish that the actor actually
    knew or had reason to know of facts which created a high risk of physical
    harm to plaintiff.   Further, the defendant must have proceeded to act in
    conscious disregard of or indifference to that risk.” Field v. Philadelphia
    Elec. Co., 
    565 A.2d 1170
    , 1182 (Pa.Super. 1989) (explaining imposition of
    punitive   damages   is   appropriate   only   where   defendant’s   conduct   is
    egregious; reversing order sustaining preliminary objections to claim for
    punitive damages where complaint alleged, inter alia, defendant deliberately
    operated nuclear plant in such manner that plaintiff was exposed to
    dangerous levels of radiation, defendant lied to plaintiff about his potential
    exposure to radiation, defendant deliberately exposed plaintiff to dangerous
    levels of radiation again several months later, and defendant caused plaintiff
    to be fired after he reported defendant’s actions to nuclear regulatory
    commission).
    Instantly, Mr. Hartenstine’s request for punitive damages derived from
    his wrongful use of civil proceedings and abuse of process claims. The trial
    court found both claims were legally insufficient, so the court sustained
    Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections to the claim for punitive damages
    based on that finding.    Due to our disposition regarding Mr. Hartenstine’s
    wrongful use of civil proceedings claim, we affirm the trial court’s order
    sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections to the claim for punitive
    damages at count one of the complaint.
    - 36 -
    J-A28013-15
    Regarding Mr. Hartenstine’s abuse of process claim at count two, Mr.
    Hartenstine does not allege facts in his complaint which rise to the level of
    conduct warranting imposition of punitive damages. (See Mr. Hartenstine’s
    Complaint against Attorney Carney and Ms. Bullock at 10-11 ¶¶ 44-49; R.R.
    at 12a-13a.) While Mr. Hartenstine describes Attorney Carney’s conduct as
    “outrageous” and “malicious,” he does not plead facts demonstrating
    Attorney Carney’s actions amounted to willful, wanton or reckless conduct.
    See 
    Doe, supra
    . Compare 
    Field, supra
    . Therefore, the extreme remedy
    of punitive damages is improper under the facts alleged at count two of the
    complaint. See 
    Doe, supra
    ; 
    Hart, supra
    ; 
    Field, supra
    . Accordingly, we
    affirm the court’s order sustaining Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections
    to the count for wrongful use of civil proceedings and for punitive damages
    at both counts of the complaint; we reverse the trial court’s order sustaining
    Attorney Carney’s preliminary objections to the abuse of process count and
    remand for further proceedings on that count of the complaint against
    Attorney Carney.
    Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part. Case remanded for
    further proceedings. Jurisdiction is relinquished.
    - 37 -
    J-A28013-15
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/3/2016
    - 38 -