Solan, D. v. Silverman ( 2017 )

J-A32044-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DAVID SOLAN AND SLM COMMERCIAL, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
INC., PENNSYLVANIA
Appellants
v.
SILVERMAN FAMILY PARTNERSHIPS,
INC., HERMAN SILVERMAN AND ANN
SILVERMAN, BUCKINGHAM GREEN I
GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, BUCKINGHAM
GREEN II GENERAL PARTNERSHIP, COLD
SPRINGS GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
GREEN ACRES GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
PLAZA ONE GENERAL PARTNERSHIP,
SOUTH MAIN STREET GENERAL
PARTNERSHIP, JEFFRA NANDAN, LEDA
MOLLY, JENNY SILVERMAN AND BINNY
SILVERMAN,
Appellees No. 1379 EDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered April 19, 2016
in the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County
Civil Division at No.: 2007-05125-30-7
BEFORE: DUBOW, J., RANSOM, J., and PLATT, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2017
Appellants, David Solan and SLM Commercial Inc., a corporation
owned and controlled by him,1 appeal from the order and bench trial verdict
____________________________________________
*
Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
J-A32044-16
which awarded them $46,157.09 as leasing commissions due from
Appellees. Appellants first asserted they were due over a million dollars
under an oral agreement. They eventually reduced this claim, in steps, to
about $333,000. They now challenge the sufficiency of the evidence for the
trial court’s reduced damages award, noting that they had already made
intermediate reductions in their demands. We affirm.
The underlying facts are substantially undisputed, even though the
parties disagree on the amounts owed. From 1995 until 2004, Appellant
Solan was employed as the general manager of numerous real estate
properties owned or controlled by Herman Silverman for himself, his family,
and related entities. As an employee, Solan received a full salary for the
performance of these services. (See Appellants’ Brief, at 5). Notably for
this appeal, Mr. Solan had a separate oral agreement with Mr. Silverman, to
receive a 3% commission for any leases, options, or renewals of Silverman
properties which he originated on his own, independently from his
employment duties. In late 2004, Mr. Silverman informed Mr. Solan that his
employment was coming to an end, and his duties would be transferred to a
management company. As the employment relationship was unwinding, Mr.
_______________________
(Footnote Continued)
1
Appellants maintain in their brief that “[f]or all intents and purposes, David
Solan and his company were one and the same, at least insofar as the
services provided[.]” (Appellants’ Brief, at 35).
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Solan claimed additional commissions for these leases. Appellees rejected
most of them.
This lawsuit stems from Appellants’ claim for unpaid commissions
under the oral contract. Mr. Solan admits on appeal that he presented
virtually no rent rolls or similar documentation to support the extent of his
claim for commissions under the oral contract. (See id. at 10). He
maintains that such leasing information “was exclusively in the possession of
the Appellees[.]” (Id.; see also id. at 22). Instead, he argues that he met
his burden of proof by presenting “multiple representative examples of
leases,” and inviting Appellees to “refute this proof.” (Id. at 11). Appellants
first claimed damages of $1,140,864.67, reduced (in stages) to
$333,648.54. Appellants argue the original claim for over a million dollars
was only a “ballpark estimate[.]” (Id. at 27.). After a bench trial, the trial
court awarded damages of $46,157.09, the amount conceded by Appellees.
This timely appeal followed the trial court’s denial of Appellants’ post-
trial motions, and the entry of the limited verdict.2
Appellants present three questions for our review:
1. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of law
and/or capriciously disbelieved and/or disregarded the evidence
in finding that Appellants did not produce sufficient evidence to
prove damages when Appellants in fact produced sufficient
evidence to prove damages with reasonable certainty?
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2
Appellants presented a timely statement of errors on May 12, 2016. The
trial court entered an opinion on July 5, 2016. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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2. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of law in
finding that Appellants were not entitled to prejudgment interest
when Appellants produced sufficient evidence to prove damages
in the form [of] prejudgment interest and only recalculated that
prejudgment interest in response to directives from the court
during trial and where that evidence was unrebutted?
3. Whether the [trial] court committed an error of law in
finding that Appellees did not violate the Pennsylvania Uniform
Fraudulent Transfer Act, a statue [sic] which permits the court to
award attorney’s fees, when Appellants produced sufficient
evidence to prove that Appellees fraudulently transferred assets?
(Appellants’ Brief, at 4) (unnecessary capitalization omitted).
Our review in a non-jury case such as this is
limited to a determination of whether the findings of the
trial court are supported by competent evidence and
whether the trial court committed error in the application
of law. Findings of the trial judge in a non-jury case must
be given the same weight and effect on appeal as a verdict
of a jury and will not be disturbed on appeal absent error
of law or abuse of discretion. When this Court reviews the
findings of the trial judge, the evidence is viewed in the
light most favorable to the victorious party below and all
evidence and proper inferences favorable to that party
must be taken as true and all unfavorable inferences
rejected.
Hart v. Arnold, 884 A.2d 316, 330–331 (Pa. Super. 2005),
appeal denied, 587 Pa. 695, 897 A.2d 458 (2006) (citations
omitted). “The [trial] court’s findings are especially binding on
appeal, where they are based upon the credibility of the
witnesses, unless it appears that the court abused its discretion
or that the court’s findings lack evidentiary support or that the
court capriciously disbelieved the evidence.” Id. (citations
omitted). “Conclusions of law, however, are not binding on an
appellate court, whose duty it is to determine whether there was
a proper application of law to fact by the lower court.” Tagliati
v. Nationwide Insurance Co., 720 A.2d 1051, 1053 (Pa.
Super. 1998), appeal denied, 559 Pa. 706, 740 A.2d 234 (1999).
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“With regard to such matters, our scope of review is plenary as it
is with any review of questions of law.” Id.We also must decide whether the trial court properly
denied Appellant’s post-trial motions. “Our standard of review
[of an order] denying a motion for a new trial is to decide
whether the trial court committed an error of law which
controlled the outcome of the case or committed an abuse of
discretion.” Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa.
Super. 2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694, 889 A.2d 87 (2005)
(citation omitted).
Christian v. Yanoviak, 945 A.2d 220, 224–25 (Pa. Super. 2008).
Here, all three of Appellants’ claims challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence. “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence . . . this Court
must determine whether the evidence and all reasonable inferences
therefrom, viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict winner, was
sufficient to enable the factfinder to find against the losing party.” Zeffiro
v. Gillen, 788 A.2d 1009, 1013 (Pa. Super. 2001) (citation omitted).
Appellants’ claim for damages is based on an oral agreement. (See
Appellants’ Brief, at 5, 10).
It [is] incumbent upon [a] plaintiff to establish the oral contract
upon which he based his claim by prima facie proof. The burden
is upon one suing for damages for a breach of contract to
establish a clear case of something agreed to. The existence of
the contract must be established by evidence which is
substantial; a mere scintilla is not enough. A verdict cannot rest
upon guess or conjecture.
Rader v. Palletz, 51 A.2d 344, 346 (Pa. Super. 1947) (citations omitted).
In this appeal, on independent review, viewed in the light most
favorable to the Appellees as verdict winners, we conclude that the evidence
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together with all reasonable inferences, was sufficient to enable the judge
sitting as factfinder to render its verdict.
Appellants by their own admission lacked evidentiary support for their
additional claims (other than records purportedly possessed by Appellees)
for commissions beyond those actually awarded. (See Appellants’ Brief, at
10). Claims without substantiation do not satisfy the burden of proof. It
was the province of the trial court sitting as factfinder to weigh the evidence
presented and assess the credibility of the witnesses. See Christian, supraat 224–25. A verdict cannot rest on guess or conjecture. See Rader,
supra at 346. Appellants’ sufficiency claims do not merit relief.
Finally, although not properly preserved as an appellate issue, we
acknowledge that counsel for Appellants has asserted a claim of judicial
bias.3 However, mere bald accusations of judicial bias are insufficient to
merit relief.
It is beyond dispute that a party to an action has the right
to request the recusal of a jurist where that party has a reason
to question the impartiality of the jurist in the cause before the
court. However, a mere recitation of unfavorable rulings against
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3
Counsel wrote:
Mr. Solan did not receive a fair trial. In my 34 years of
practice I have never witnessed such a blatant miscarriage of
justice. I have never used such strong language in any brief in
any case on any prior occasion but in this case, I believe it is
necessary and appropriate to do so.
(Appellants’ Brief, at 42).
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an attorney does not satisfy the burden of proving judicial bias,
prejudice or unfairness. Moreover, a party seeking recusal or
disqualification must raise the objection at the earliest possible
moment, or that party will suffer the consequence of being time
barred. Goodheart v. Casey, [523 Pa. 188, 199; 565 A.2d
757, 763 (Pa. 1989)]. Accord Rizzo v. Haines, 520 Pa. 484,
511, 555 A.2d 58, 71 (1989) (party who seeks recusal of a judge
must present sufficient information in a timely fashion). Our
[S]upreme [C]ourt has enunciated the rule concerning the
substance of a recusal motion as follows:
When circumstances arise during the course of a trial
raising questions of a trial judge’s bias or impartiality, it is
still the duty of the party, who asserts that a judge should
be disqualified, to allege by petition the bias, prejudice or
unfairness necessitating recusal. A failure to produce a
sufficient plea will result in a denial of the recusal motion.
* * *
The proper practice on a plea of prejudice is to
address an application by petition to the judge before
whom the proceedings are being tried. He may determine
the question in the first instance, and ordinarily his
disposition of it will not be disturbed unless there is an
abuse of discretion.
Reilly by Reilly v. SEPTA, 507 Pa. 204, 220, 489 A.2d 1291,
1299 (1985) (citations omitted). A party seeking recusal must
assert specific grounds in support of the recusal motion before
the trial judge has issued a ruling on the substantive matter
before him or her. See id., 507 Pa. at 222, 489 A.2d at 1300(party is deemed to have waived his right to have a judge
disqualified once trial is completed with the entry of a verdict).
A party may not raise the issue of judicial prejudice or bias for
the first time in post-trial proceedings. Id. at 222–23, 489 A.2d
at 1300.
Ware v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 577 A.2d 902, 904–05 (Pa. Super. 1990)
(some citations and internal quotation marks omitted; some citation
formatting provided).
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Here, counsel for Appellants not only did not file a contemporaneous
motion to recuse at trial, he declined to do so until after trial. (See
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Post[-]trial Relief, 12/28/15, at unnumbered page 7
¶ 35). On appeal, he argued against the procedure both in his brief and at
oral argument, labeling it “tactical suicide.” (Appellants’ Brief, at 12, 41).
Counsel concedes that the trial court offered him the opportunity to move
for recusal, and he declined for perceived strategic considerations. (See id.
at 41). The claim of judicial bias was not properly preserved. Accordingly, it
is waived. A claim of judicial prejudice or bias may not be raised for the first
time in post-trial proceedings. See Ware, supra at 904-05; see also
Goodheart v. Casey, supra at 763 (“Where the asserted impediment is
known to the party, and that party fails to promptly direct the attention of
the jurist to that fact, the objection is waived and the party may not
subsequently offer the objection as a basis for invalidating the judgment.”).
None of Appellants’ claims merit relief.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2017
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