Com. v. Sanger, C. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S07021-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    :
    CHRISTOPHER WESLEY SANGER                  :
    :
    Appellant               :   No. 1099 MDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered June 1, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Bradford County Criminal Division at
    No(s): CP-08-CR-0000005-2016
    BEFORE:      OLSON, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and PELLEGRINI*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.:                  FILED: MAY 22, 2019
    Christopher Wesley Sanger appeals from the judgment of sentence
    entered following his pleas of guilty to Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police
    Officer, Flight to Avoid Apprehension, Trial or Punishment, and two counts of
    Recklessly Endangering Another Person (“REAP”).1 Sanger argues the court
    erred in finding he was not eligible for enrollment in the Recidivism Risk
    Reduction Incentive (“RRRI”) Program, 61 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4501-4512. We
    affirm.
    The facts that gave rise to the instant charges are as follows. In
    December 2015, Sanger was allegedly in violation of parole and an arrest
    warrant was issued. See Affidavit of Probable Cause, 12/15/15, at 1-2; Bill of
    ____________________________________________
    *    Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    1   See 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 3733(a); 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 5126(a), 2705.
    J-S07021-19
    Particulars, 1/27/16 (incorporating Affidavit of Probable Cause). Bradford
    County Deputy Sheriff Brian Wibirt received information that Sanger was
    driving a gray sedan in a particular area, and he located the car in the parking
    lot of a Burger King. He began to speak with Sanger, who was sitting in the
    driver’s seat, and ordered him to exit the car. Rather than comply, Sanger
    drove away. Deputy Wibirt and Deputy Daniel Bush pursued Sanger until his
    speed reached approximately 100 miles per hour. Sanger was ultimately
    arrested and charged with the above offenses, to which he later pled guilty.
    On September 28, 2016, the court sentenced Sanger to 24 months in a
    State Intermediate Punishment (“SIP”) program.2 The court noted that Sanger
    had previously pled guilty to first-degree felony burglary. The sentencing order
    stated, “Further, it is noted that the defendant’s previous burglary conviction
    was charged as no person being present.” Order, 9/28/16.
    Sanger was expelled from the SIP program and the court revoked the
    SIP sentence and resentenced Sanger to an aggregate of 40 to 144 months’
    in prison. The sentencing order specified that Sanger was not eligible for an
    RRRI sentence. In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the trial court explained that it
    found Sanger ineligible for an RRRI sentence because he had a history of
    violent behavior, as established by his previous conviction for first-degree
    burglary and his instant convictions for Fleeing or Attempting to Elude a Police
    Officer and REAP. See Trial Court Opinion, filed 10/17/18, at 2 (unpaginated).
    ____________________________________________
    2   See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 4101-4108.
    -2-
    J-S07021-19
    Sanger filed this appeal. He presents the question of “[w]hether [he]
    should have received a recommendation for [an RRRI] sentence.” Sanger’s
    Br. at 3. He argues that because his original sentencing order states that his
    “previous burglary conviction was charged as no person being present,” he
    does not have a history of violent behavior and is eligible for an RRRI sentence.
    Id. at 7-9.
    A court imposing a sentence of total confinement must determine
    whether the defendant is an “eligible offender” under the RRRI statute. 42
    Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b.1); 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505.3 “A challenge to a court’s failure
    to impose an RRRI sentence implicates the legality of the sentence.”
    Commonwealth v. Finnecy, 
    135 A.3d 1028
    , 1033 (Pa.Super. 2016).
    Whether a defendant is eligible under the RRRI statute is a question of law,
    over which we have plenary and de novo review. 
    Id.
    One of the requirements for RRRI eligibility is that the defendant “not
    demonstrate a history of present or past violent behavior.” 61 Pa.C.S.A. §
    4503. Our Supreme Court determined in 2014 that a conviction for first-
    degree burglary demonstrates “violent behavior” for RRRI eligibility purposes.
    See Commonwealth v. Chester, 
    101 A.3d 56
    , 65 (Pa. 2014). The Court has
    also concluded that a single burglary conviction does not amount to a “history”
    of violent behavior. See Commonwealth v. Cullen-Doyle, 
    164 A.3d 1239
    ,
    ____________________________________________
    3 Only if the defendant has previously been sentenced to two or more RRRI
    sentences does the court have discretion not to impose another RRRI
    sentence. 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9756(b.1); 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4505(c)(3).
    -3-
    J-S07021-19
    1242-44 (Pa. 2017). However, the Court noted that the burglary statute,
    including the grading provision, was amended in 2012 to differentiate between
    instances where the building entered was actually occupied at the time of
    entry and whether it was “adapted” for overnight accommodation. Chester,
    101 A.3d at 58 n.1.
    Based on these decisions, Sanger argues that his previous burglary
    conviction did not qualify as “violent behavior” because no persons were
    present at the time of the burglary. However, we need not delve into this
    question because Sanger pled guilty to REAP, which is sufficient on its own to
    disqualify him from the RRRI.
    In addition to excluding those offenders who demonstrate a history of
    present or past violent behavior, the RRRI statue excludes those offenders
    who have been found guilty of a “personal injury crime” as defined under the
    Crime Victims Act, codified at 18 P.S. § 11.103. See 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503.
    That Act’s definition of “personal injury crime” includes “[a]n act, attempt, or
    threat to commit an act which would constitute a misdemeanor or felony under
    . . . 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] Ch[apter] 27[.]” 18 P.S. § 11.103.4 The statute defining
    REAP, 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2705, falls within Chapter 27, and classifies REAP as a
    second-degree misdemeanor. REAP is therefore a “personal injury crime”
    under the definition established by the Crime Victims Act, and a defendant
    ____________________________________________
    4 The RRRI statute specifically excludes a conviction for simple assault under
    18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701, as a third-degree misdemeanor, as grounds for RRRI
    ineligibility. 61 Pa.C.S.A. § 4503.
    -4-
    J-S07021-19
    who    pleads guilty      to   REAP is     not   an RRRI eligible   offender.   See
    Commonwealth v. Garzone, L., 
    993 A.2d 1245
    , 1254 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2010)
    (stating defendant who pled guilty to REAP was not eligible for RRRI);
    Commonwealth v. Garzone, G., 
    993 A.2d 306
    , 316 n.7 (Pa.Super. 2010)
    (same).
    As Sanger pled guilty to REAP, he was ineligible for an RRRI sentence,
    and his issue merits no relief.5
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/22/2019
    ____________________________________________
    5“This Court is not bound by rationale of a trial court and may affirm the trial
    court’s order on any basis.” Commonwealth v. Wilcox, 
    174 A.3d 670
    , 674
    n.4 (Pa.Super. 2017).
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1099 MDA 2018

Filed Date: 5/22/2019

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024