Fieldhouse, D. v. Metropolitan Property ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
DAVID FIELDHOUSE IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
METROPOLITAN PROPERTY AND
CASUALTY INSURANCE COMPANY
T/A/ METLIFE AUTO & HOME
Appellee No. 3056 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order September 1, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Civil Division at No(s): October Term, 2012 No. 002205
BEFORE: BOWES, J., MUNDY, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY MUNDY, J.: FILED JUNE 21, 2016
Appellant, David Fieldhouse, appeals from the September 1, 2015
order, granting the motion for summary judgment filed by Appellee,
Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company (MetLife). After
careful review, we affirm.
A prior panel of this Court summarized the relevant factual and
procedural history of this case as follows.
Fieldhouse commenced an action against
MetLife by writ of summons on October 16, 2012.
MetLife issued a rule to file a complaint upon
Fieldhouse on January 3, 2013. Fieldhouse complied
on January 24, 2013, averring that: (1) he was
involved in a motor vehicle-pedestrian accident on
June 9, 2008; (2) pending its investigation of the
accident, the police department had Fieldhouse’s
vehicle towed; (3) Fieldhouse filed a claim with his
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insurer, MetLife, for body damage to his vehicle; (4)
MetLife assigned a claims investigator, who also
cooperated with the police department’s criminal
investigation of the accident; (5) based on
information received, in part, from the claims
investigator, the police arrested Fieldhouse, and the
district attorney filed charges on October 21, 2008;
(6) the MetLife claims investigator testified at a
preliminary hearing on January 5, 2009; (7)
thereafter, the district attorney withdrew all of the
charges; (8) throughout the criminal and insurance
investigations, MetLife denied Fieldhouse property
damage benefits; and (9) MetLife denied benefits in
bad faith.
MetLife filed preliminary objections on
February 13, 2013, seeking dismissal of Fieldhouse’s
complaint for failure to conform to law or rule of
court. MetLife also demurred, raising the affirmative
defenses of statute of limitations and immunity. In
response, Fieldhouse filed preliminary objections to
MetLife’s preliminary objections. MetLife then filed
an answer.
The trial court heard both sets of preliminary
objections on April 1, 2013, and entered an order
sustaining MetLife’s demurrer and dismissing
Fieldhouse’s complaint with prejudice. The trial court
did not expressly rule on Fieldhouse’s preliminary
objections; however, it considered them moot given
its disposition of MetLife’s preliminary objections.
Fieldhouse v. Metro. Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., 102 A.3d 526 (Pa. Super.
2014) (unpublished memorandum at 1-3) (internal citations omitted).1
Fieldhouse filed a timely notice of appeal to this Court, and on April 9,
2014, this Court vacated the trial court’s order and remanded for further
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1
For consistency, we have altered the designation of Appellee as “Metlife” to
“MetLife” throughout the quotation from our prior memorandum.
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proceedings. Without expressing an opinion on the merits, we held that the
trial court erred when it sustained MetLife’s preliminary objections on a
statute of limitations theory, when such defenses must be raised as new
matter. Id. at 5-12.
On remand, MetLife filed an answer to the complaint on May 20, 2014,
including as new matter, relevant to this appeal, that Fieldhouse’s claims
were barred by the statute of limitations. On May 18, 2015, MetLife filed a
motion for summary judgment, to which Fieldhouse filed a response on June
17, 2015. On June 19, 2015, MetLife filed its own reply to Fieldhouse’s
answer. The trial court dismissed MetLife’s summary judgment motion
without prejudice on July 1, 2015, concluding that it was premature as
pleadings had not yet closed. On July 14, 2015, Fieldhouse filed his reply to
MetLife’s new matter, and that same day, MetLife filed a second motion for
summary judgment. Fieldhouse filed his answer to MetLife’s second
summary judgment motion on August 14, 2015. On September 1, 2015, the
trial court entered an order granting MetLife’s motion for summary
judgment. On September 18, 2015, Fieldhouse filed a timely notice of
appeal.2
On appeal, Fieldhouse raises the following issue for our review.
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2
Fieldhouse and the trial court have complied with Pennsylvania Rule of
Appellate Procedure 1925.
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Did the trial court commit on [sic] error of law by
summarily rendering judgment in favor of [MetLife]
and against [Fieldhouse] based on the underlying
claim of bad faith being time-barred despite
[MetLife] involving itself in the prosecution of
criminal charges against [Fieldhouse], the pursuit of
which, [Fieldhouse] asserts, had tolled the running of
the applicable statute?
Fieldhouse’s Brief at 4 (emphasis in original).
We begin by noting our well-settled standard of review pertaining to
summary judgment motions.
“[O]ur standard of review of an order granting
summary judgment requires us to determine
whether the trial court abused its discretion or
committed an error of law[,] and our scope of review
is plenary.” Petrina v. Allied Glove Corp., 46 A.3d
795, 797–798 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
“We view the record in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party, and all doubts as to the
existence of a genuine issue of material fact must be
resolved against the moving party.” Barnes v.
Keller, 62 A.3d 382, 385 (Pa. Super. 2012), citing
Erie Ins. Exch. v. Larrimore, 987 A.2d 732, 736
(Pa. Super. 2009) (citation omitted). “Only where
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
it is clear that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law will summary judgment
be entered.” Id. The rule governing summary
judgment has been codified at Pennsylvania Rule of
Civil Procedure 1035.2, which states as follows.
Rule 1035.2. Motion
After the relevant pleadings are closed, but
within such time as not to unreasonably delay
trial, any party may move for summary
judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law
(1) whenever there is no genuine issue
of any material fact as to a necessary
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element of the cause of action or defense
which could be established by additional
discovery or expert report, or
(2) if, after the completion of discovery
relevant to the motion, including the
production of expert reports, an adverse
party who will bear the burden of proof
at trial has failed to produce evidence of
facts essential to the cause of action or
defense which in a jury trial would
require the issues to be submitted to a
jury.
Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2.
“Where the non-moving party bears the
burden of proof on an issue, he may not merely rely
on his pleadings or answers in order to survive
summary judgment.” Babb v. Ctr. Cmty. Hosp.,
47 A.3d 1214, 1223 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations
omitted), appeal denied, 65 A.3d 412 (Pa. 2013).
Further, “failure of a non-moving party to adduce
sufficient evidence on an issue essential to his case
and on which he bears the burden of proof
establishes the entitlement of the moving party to
judgment as a matter of law.” Id.Thus, our responsibility as an appellate
court is to determine whether the record either
establishes that the material facts are
undisputed or contains insufficient evidence of
facts to make out a prima facie cause of
action, such that there is no issue to be
decided by the fact-finder. If there is evidence
that would allow a fact-finder to render a
verdict in favor of the non-moving party, then
summary judgment should be denied.
Id., citing Reeser v. NGK N. Am., Inc., 14 A.3d
896, 898 (Pa. Super. 2011), quoting Jones v.
Levin, 940 A.2d 451, 452–454 (Pa. Super. 2007)
(internal citations omitted).
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Cadena v. Latch, 78 A.3d 636, 638-639 (Pa. Super. 2013).
Although the trial court’s order was silent as to the grounds upon
which it granted summary judgment, the trial court explained in its Rule
1925(a) opinion that it granted summary judgment on the basis that
Fieldhouse’s complaint was barred by the statute of limitations. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/1/15, at 8. We note that our Supreme Court has explained that
“the statute of limitations begins to run as soon as a right to institute and
maintain suit arises.” Crouse v. Cyclops Indus., 745 A.2d 606, 611 (Pa.
2000) (citation omitted). “Whether a complaint is timely filed within the
limitations period is a matter of law for the [trial] court to determine.” Id.In this case, the parties agree that Fieldhouse’s bad faith claim is
governed by a two-year statute of limitations. Fieldhouse’s Brief at 9;
MetLife’s Brief at 6; see also generally 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524(7); Ash v.
Cont’l Ins. Co., 932 A.2d 877, 885 (Pa. 2007). However, the parties
dispute when the statute of limitations began to run. It is undisputed that
Fieldhouse began this action on October 16, 2012, when he filed his writ of
summons. In his complaint, Fieldhouse alleged that Andrew Keiser, an
agent for MetLife, testified at the January 5, 2009 preliminary hearing in his
criminal case which “resulted in [Fieldhouse] having to prepare a defense in
anticipation of a trial.” Fieldhouse’s Complaint, 1/24/13, at ¶ 17.
Fieldhouse alleged that MetLife acted in bad faith when Keiser “obtained
information from [him] under the guise of acting as an agent on behalf of
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[MetLife] which information was thereafter shared with, and used by, the
police authorities[.]” Id. at ¶ 23(b). Therefore, the trial court reasoned
that, based on the complaint’s allegations, the latest date the statute of
limitations could have begun to run was January 5, 2009. Trial Court
Opinion, 12/1/15, at 7. Therefore, as the statute of limitations would have
expired on January 5, 2011, the trial court concluded Fieldhouse’s October
16, 2012 writ of summons was untimely filed. Id. at 8.
On appeal, MetLife argues that the trial court correctly concluded that
the statute of limitations began to run on January 5, 2009. MetLife’s Brief at
12; Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/15, at 7. However, Fieldhouse argues that the
statute of limitations was tolled until October 18, 2010, when the
Commonwealth nolle prossed the criminal charges against him, or on
January 5, 2014, when the statute of limitations expired for the criminal
charges. Fieldhouse’s Brief at 9-10. Fieldhouse relies exclusively on this
Court’s decision in Diamon v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 372 A.2d 1218 (Pa.
Super. 1977). Fieldhouse’s Brief at 9-10. Conversely, MetLife argues that
this Court’s decision in Jones v. Harleysville Mut. Ins. Co., 900 A.2d 855(Pa. Super. 2006), appeal denied, 918 A.2d 746 (Pa. 2007), is controlling.
In Jones, this Court described Diamon and its holding as follows.
In Diamon, the appellants purchased a fire
insurance policy covering their home and some
personal property from the appellee, Penn Mutual
(Penn Mutual). A fire later ensued, destroying the
appellants’ home and furniture. Penn Mutual
rejected the appellants’ proof of loss and refused to
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pay their claim. The same day, the district attorney
filed a criminal complaint against the appellant-
husband, charging him with filing a false proof of loss
for claiming damage to furniture which had
previously been removed from the home. The
appellant-husband was found guilty of the criminal
charge, but his conviction was later reversed and the
matter nolle prossed after he secured a bulldozer
and uncovered the furniture he claimed was missing
from the rubble of his home. The appellants then
filed a complaint against Penn Mutual which was
untimely under the provisions of the applicable
policy. Nevertheless, this Court ruled that the
appellants’ action was not barred by the applicable
limitation clause. It was noted that the detective
involved in the matter signed the criminal
information “at the instigation” of Penn
Mutual’s insurance adjuster. Id. at 1222. The
limitation clause was found to be suspended when
Penn Mutual “made its mistaken charge against” the
appellant-husband. Id. at 1223. The panel
remarked that the record established that the district
attorney filed the criminal charges against the
appellant-husband “as a result of being told by [Penn
Mutual’s] adjuster that [the appellant-husband] had
attempted to cheat the company.”
Id. at 857 (emphasis added).
In Jones, the plaintiff owned property that suffered a fire on August 1,
1999, after which Jones notified the insurer of the loss. Subsequent to an
investigation, the insurance company informed Jones that her claim was
denied “based upon the defenses of arson, misrepresentation, fraud, certain
business owner policy conditions [the plaintiff’s lessee] failed to meet and its
failure to cooperate in the investigation of the claim.” Id. at 856. Soon
thereafter, the Pennsylvania State Police sent an Arson Immunity Reporting
Act request, to which the insurance company responded. Id.; see also
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generally 40 P.S. § 1610.3(a). As a result of the insurer’s cooperation,
criminal charges were instituted against Jones for arson among other
charges. Jones, supra at 856. Jones received a judgment of acquittal at
the close of the Commonwealth’s case. Id.After the criminal trial, Jones resubmitted her claim, which was denied,
and she initiated a complaint for breach of contract and bad faith. The trial
court held that Jones’ breach of contract claim was barred by the two-year
limitations clause in the policy. Jones made a similar argument to
Fieldhouse’s argument in this case, that under Diamon, “because
Harleysville took some role in the filing of the criminal charges, the limitation
clause in the contract should be suspended.” Id. at 857. This Court
affirmed, rejecting Jones’ reliance on Diamon for the following reason.
While [Jones] liken[s] the Diamon case to the
present factual situation, we agree with the trial
court and find it factually distinguishable. In the
present case [Jones] can point to no evidence of
record that Harleysville had a role in the filing
of the criminal charges, unlike the situation in
Diamon where the insurer was found to have
instigated the criminal action. The role of the
insurer in the institution of the criminal charges in
Diamon was recognized as a distinguishing fact in
McElhiney v. Allstate Ins. Co., 33 F. Supp. 2d 405(E.D. Pa. 1999) wherein the court stated: “Even if it
is the law in Pennsylvania, the bad faith conduct
alleged in Diamon involved an insurer which,
without any apparent basis, caused criminal charges
to be brought against the insured.” Id. at 408.
Here, the police investigation was an independent
one and there is no evidence that Harleysville
acted to initiate criminal charges. The
investigating trooper testified that he was not
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contacted by any agent of Harleysville; rather, he
initiated contacted [sic] with Harleysville and had the
fire marshal from Harrisburg issue a letter and
request for information to Harleysville through the
Arson Reporting Immunity Act. The trooper was
specifically questioned if “at any point in time, did
anybody from Harleysville encourage you to bring
these charges,” and he responded, “no.” Deposition
testimony of Jacob E. Andolina Jr., 7/29/03, at 21.
Id. at 857-858 (emphases added). This Court then applied the same
analysis to rejecting Jones’ claim of bad faith under the statute of limitations
at Section 5524(7).3 Id. at 858-859.
Turning to this case, Fieldhouse argues that MetLife “had a direct and
vital role in the filing and prosecution of the criminal charges” when it
“offered to share … information with the police authorities.” Fieldhouse’s
Brief at 10. Fieldhouse points this Court to an investigation report, in which
the investigating trooper stated he spoke to Detective Geliebter, whom
Keiser informed he had “information that [they] would find interesting.”
Fieldhouse’s Response to MetLife’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment,
8/14/15, Exhibit P-3, at 1. Said report also stated that “based on [the]
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3
The trial court rejected Jones’ bad faith claim on the basis that “the record
demonstrated that Harleysville conducted a reasonable investigation and had
a reasonable basis for denying the underlying claim.” Jones, supra at 858.
However, this Court rejected that rationale and affirmed on the alternative
ground that the two-year statute of limitations had expired. Id. at 858-859;
see also generally In re Estate of Strahsmeier, 54 A.3d 359, 364 n.17
(Pa. Super. 2012) (stating, “[a]s an appellate court, we may uphold a
decision of the trial court if there is any proper basis for the result reached;
thus we are not constrained to affirm on the grounds relied upon by the trial
court[]”), appeal denied, 69 A.3d 603 (Pa. 2013).
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information received from Keiser, [the trooper] applied for and received
approval for a search warrant at [Fieldhouse’s] property.” Id. Therefore, in
Fieldhouse’s view, the statute of limitations was tolled under Diamon.
Fieldhouse’s Brief at 9.
The trial court rejected Fieldhouse’s argument as to Diamon based
upon the following.
In [Diamon], the insured’s attorney advised them
that, based upon the conduct of the insurer, to
resubmit the claim would result in second
prosecution; consequently, the Superior Court of
Pennsylvania stated that if an “insurer, having
knowledge of a loss, by an act throws the insured off
his guard as to the necessity of performing some
duty enjoined by the policy, the insurer should not
be permitted to take advantage of the failure to act.”
[Diamon, supra at 1219-1220.] In the instant
case, the facts of Diamon are inapplicable as
nothing in the record besides [Fieldhouse]’s
conclusory arguments reflect any indication that he
was induced not to sue by Appellee or that Appellee
was the one who instigated the charges. See
Jones[, supra at 857]. Critically, the role of the
insurer in bringing the charges is the fact that
triggers the tolling of the statute. Here, the criminal
charges were brought at the instigation of the
Abington Township Police and the Pennsylvania State
Police.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/15, at 7-8.
After careful review of the certified record, we conclude Fieldhouse’s
argument does not warrant relief. In its motion for summary judgment,
MetLife averred that “[a]s a result of [the] accident, the Abington Police
Department conducted a criminal investigation into the circumstances of the
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accident and towed and impounded [Fieldhouse]’s vehicle.” MetLife’s
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 7/14/15, at ¶ 6. MetLife further
claimed that “[a]round that time, the Pennsylvania State Police began an
investigation into [Fieldhouse] and tampered VIN plates on the involved
vehicle.” Id. at ¶ 7. MetLife also stated that “[b]oth the Abington Police
Department and [the] Pennsylvania State Police solicited information
from [MetLife]’s agents, in particular, Andrew Keiser.” Id. at ¶ 9 (emphasis
added). In his answer to MetLife’s motion, Fieldhouse specifically responded
to these averments as “admitted.” Fieldhouse’s Response to MetLife’s
Second Motion for Summary Judgment, 8/14/15, at ¶¶ 6, 7, 9.4
There is no dispute that Keiser shared information with law
enforcement, which in turn aided them in their investigation. However,
Fieldhouse admitted to the trial court that law enforcement solicited that
information from MetLife, not the other way around. See id. at ¶ 9.
Fieldhouse has not forwarded any evidence that Keiser, or any other agent
of MetLife requested a criminal investigation or that charges be filed.
Therefore, no dispute of fact existed that MetLife did not initiate the police
investigation, which our cases hold “is the fact that triggers the tolling of the
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4
Fieldhouse denied MetLife’s allegation in paragraph 7 to the extent that the
Pennsylvania State Police’s investigation “involved any VIN ‘plates.’”
Fieldhouse’s Response to MetLife’s Second Motion for Summary Judgment,
8/14/15, at ¶ 7. However, Fieldhouse “admitted that the Pennsylvania State
Police began an investigation[.]” Id.
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statute.” Trial Court Opinion, 12/1/15, at 8; see also Jones, supra at 857-
858. As a result, we conclude that Jones applies to this case, Diamon does
not, and the statute of limitations was not tolled. Therefore, looking at the
record in the light most favorable to Fieldhouse, the statute of limitations
began to run on January 5, 2009, and expired on January 5, 2011. Thus,
Fieldhouse’s October 16, 2012 writ of summons was untimely filed under the
two-year statute of limitations, and he is not entitled to relief on appeal.
See Crouse, supra.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude the trial court properly granted
MetLife’s motion for summary judgment. See Cadena, supra. Accordingly,
the trial court’s September 1, 2015 order is affirmed.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/21/2016
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