Term. of Par. Rights to T.L.C., Appeal of: H.R.C. , 199 A.3d 1270 ( 2018 )

J-S65029-18
2018 Pa. Super. 322
IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
RIGHTS TO T.L.C. : OF PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.R.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1026 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans' Court at No: 2018-00544
IN RE: INVOLUNTARY TEMINATION : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS TO M.S.C., A : OF PENNSYLVANIA
MINOR :
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APPEAL OF: H.R.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1027 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans' Court at No: 2018-00545
IN RE: TERMINATION OF PARENTAL : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
RIGHTS TO D.R.C., A MINOR : OF PENNSYLVANIA
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APPEAL OF: H.R.C., JR., FATHER : No. 1028 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered May 23, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lancaster County
Orphans' Court at No: 546 of 2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., STABILE, J., AND McLAUGHLIN, J.
J-S65029-18
OPINION BY STABILE, J.: FILED NOVEMBER 30, 2018
H.R.C., Jr. (“Father”), appeals from the decree entered May 23, 2018,
which terminated involuntarily his parental rights to his minor children, T.L.C.,
a female born in January 2001, M.S.C., a female born in October 2003, and
D.R.C., a male born in January 2006 (collectively, “the Children”). 1 After
careful review, we vacate as to M.S.C., affirm as to T.L.C. and D.R.C., and
remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
The record reveals that the Lancaster County Children and Youth Social
Service Agency (“the Agency” or “Petitioner”) has a lengthy history of
involvement with this family dating back to 2001. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2
(Business and Summary Testimony) at 1. Beginning in July 2014, the Agency
received numerous reports alleging severe mental health concerns for T.L.C.,
including suicidal ideation and an apparent suicide attempt. Id. at 2-3.
According to the reports, Father and Mother were failing to obtain appropriate
treatment for T.L.C., and Mother was engaging in drug use. Id. On July 14,
2016, and July 20, 2016, the Agency received reports alleging domestic
violence concerns between Father and Mother. Id. at 3-4. The Agency
received an additional report on July 25, 2016, alleging that Father and Mother
had been arrested and released on bail following a domestic violence incident.
Id. at 4. The Agency implemented a safety plan, pursuant to which the
Children were to have no contact with Father and Mother for a period of no
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1The decree also terminated involuntarily the parental rights of the Children’s
mother, D.M.C. a/k/a D.M.P. (“Mother”). Mother did not file an appeal.
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more than sixty days. Id. However, on July 27, 2016, the Agency received
a report that the Children’s caregiver under the safety plan was refusing to
care for T.L.C. due to the child’s ongoing marijuana use. Id. In addition, the
Agency received reports that Father was contacting the Children via text
messages in violation of the safety plan and that T.L.C. had returned to
Father’s home where Mother was also residing. Id. The Agency requested
and obtained temporary custody of the Children on July 27, 2016. Id.; Notes
of Testimony (“N.T.”), 5/22/18, at 82. The juvenile court adjudicated the
Children dependent on September 15, 2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 4; N.T.,
5/22/18, at 82-83. On November 16, 2017, the court changed the Children’s
permanent placement goals from reunification to placement with a permanent
legal custodian.
On March 6, 2018, the Agency filed a petition to terminate Father’s
parental rights to the Children involuntarily. The orphans’ court conducted a
termination hearing on May 22, 2018. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
court announced its intention to terminate Father’s rights. On May 23, 2018,
the court entered a decree memorializing its decision. Father timely filed
notices of appeal on June 20, 2018, along with concise statements of errors
complained of on appeal.
Father now presents the following questions for our review.
I. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred when it terminated Father’s
rights?
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II. Whether the [orphans’ c]ourt erred in finding that terminating
Father’s parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of
the [C]hildren?
Father’s Brief at 4.
We review Father’s claims mindful of the following standard of review.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Before reviewing the merits of Father’s appeal, we address sua sponte
the Children’s right to legal counsel. See In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184
A.3d 585, 588 (Pa. Super. 2018) (raising sua sponte the child’s right to legal
counsel “as children are unable to raise the issue on their own behalf due to
their minority.”).
The Children’s right to counsel derives from the Adoption Act, which
requires that children receive counsel in all contested involuntarily termination
proceedings.
(a) Child.--The court shall appoint counsel to represent the child
in an involuntary termination proceeding when the proceeding is
being contested by one or both of the parents. The court may
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appoint counsel or a guardian ad litem to represent any child who
has not reached the age of 18 years and is subject to any other
proceeding under this part whenever it is in the best interests of
the child. No attorney or law firm shall represent both the child
and the adopting parent or parents.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2313(a).
Our Supreme Court has explained that the term “counsel” in Section
2313(a) refers to an attorney directed by the child who represents his or her
legal interests. In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172, 180 (Pa. 2017). A
child’s legal interests are distinct from his or her best interests. Id. at 174.
Specifically, a child’s legal interests are synonymous with his or her preferred
outcome, while a child’s best interests are for the orphans’ court to determine.
Id. The Supreme Court has confirmed that an attorney may represent both
a child’s best interests as a guardian ad litem (“GAL”) and that child’s legal
interests as counsel pursuant to Section 2313(a), but only if no conflict exists
between the two interests. In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080, 1088 (Pa. 2018).
In the instant matter, Robert S. Cronin, Jr., Esquire, represented the
Children as both their GAL and legal counsel during the termination hearing.
The orphans’ court did not appoint separate legal counsel for any of the
Children. Accordingly, it was permissible for Attorney Cronin to represent the
Children only so long as their best interests did not conflict with their preferred
outcomes.
At the start of the termination hearing, the trial court interviewed all
three Children. Both T.L.C. and D.R.C. stated that they wanted their foster
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parents to adopt them and that they supported the termination of Father’s
parental rights. N.T., 5/22/18, at 27-28, 33, 40-41, 46-47. However, M.S.C.
expressed a contrary opinion. While M.S.C. confirmed that she wanted to
continue living in her foster home, she did not want the court to terminate
Father’s rights. She stated as follows.
THE COURT: . . . . How are things going with your resource
parents?
[M.S.C.]: It’s a little bit shaky sometimes, but getting better.
THE COURT: Do you want to continue to live there?
[M.S.C.]: Yeah.
***
THE COURT: What do you think about this issue of terminating the
rights of your parents?
[M.S.C.]: I mean, like, [I’m] not really, like, happy about it. Like,
my dad was, like, the only one I could really talk to about things
because he really understood me more than anybody else. So,
like, I would like them not to be, but I know that they’re going to
be, so it’s kind of just something that I have to deal with so --
THE COURT: Well, why do you think they’re going to be?
[M.S.C.]: Everybody is saying it is and just --
THE COURT: Who is telling you that?
[M.S.C.]: Foster parents. It just kind of seems like that’s where
things are going.
***
[By Father’s counsel:]
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Q [M.S.C.], I represent your dad. You said that you are not
happy about the termination proceeding; is that right?
A Yes.
Q And why aren’t you happy about it?
A Because I feel like my dad was the only one who got me,
and he’s not giving -- given a lot of credit for the things that he’s
done for me, because the kids who -- my older siblings, they
weren’t usually home, and I was always alone at home, and my
dad was the only one there for me through that whole time
through my depression. I would have definitely committed suicide
if it wasn’t for my dad. So that’s a big part of my life. My dad has
always been a big part of my life, and that’s just something I don’t
want to lose.
Q Have -- have you had any discussions with [the Agency
caseworker] or the foster family about not wanting to be adopted?
A Yes. I’ve expressed -- I’m sorry -- expressed my concerns
of that, but nothing has, like, been said otherwise.
Q Do you feel that you’ve -- that you have the right to say that
you don’t want to be adopted?
A Oh, yes.
Q And you haven’t said that so far?
A I told [Attorney Cronin] that I, you know, wasn’t really
interested right now, but as we go on, I think I would be
eventually, I’m just not ready yet because everything is going so
fast.
Q Do you think that your sisters[2] and your brother influence
your thinking about this?
A I think they definitely play a big part in that because I don’t
want to be split from them, because they’re the only things that
I’ve had other than my dad. So I kind of have nowhere else to
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2 The Children have other siblings who are not the subject of this appeal.
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go. So this is kind of where I have to be, and if they were getting
adopted, I know that, like it would be okay -- it would be okay for
me to just be fostered by them. Like, I know they would be okay
with it. So it’s not too much of a worry for me.
Q So you would be okay with staying with your foster parents
and not being adopted by them even if your siblings were adopted
by them?
A Yes.
***
Q If you had a choice of going back and living with -- with your
father, is that something you would like to do?
A Yes.
***
[By counsel for the Agency:]
Q So -- and correct me if I’m wrong, but what I’m hearing is
that you want to remain in the resource home because your
siblings are there, and for right now you, too, think that it’s a good
place to be, and you’re not opposed to sometime in the future
being adopted, but right now, you’re not at a place where you
want to be adopted within the next couple of weeks?
A Yes. I think that I would be, as I think I just need to solve
things with the foster family first before I make any decisions,
because I don’t want to be in a place where I feel like I can’t leave
if I feel like I’m not right to be there. So I just want to make sure
that I’m doing the right thing.
Id. at 59-60, 65-67, 79.
After the orphans’ court met with the Children, it conferred with Attorney
Cronin. The following exchange took place concerning the possible existence
of a conflict between the Children’s best interests and legal interests.
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THE COURT: Mr. Cronin, is there a conflict between your
representation of the [C]hildren, as well as being guardian ad
litem for the [C]hildren?
MR. CRONIN: Your Honor, I don’t believe there is.
THE COURT: All right. . . .
Id. at 122.
At the conclusion of the hearing, Attorney Cronin presented the following
statement on the Children’s behalf.
MR. CRONIN: Your Honor, I would agree with the majority of the
Agency solicitor’s comments.
With respect to [M.S.C.]; however, I would indicate that it’s
my understanding that she was pretty clear that she did not feel
ready to make the determination about whether she would want
to pursue an adoption at this point in time. But I do believe that
she had indicated a willingness and recognized the need to
continue to work with the current resource family, which she
recognized as a safe setting for her that provided her with the
stability to be able to work on those types of issues, to have some
sort of normal childhood.
But I would agree and support the Agency’s petition for
termination of parental rights as to all three, to provide these
children with permanency as they move forward.
Id. at 171-72.
Following Attorney Cronin’s statement, the orphans’ court explained its
decision to terminate parental rights. It addressed M.S.C.’s legal interests as
follows.
We heard from one child who is, to me ambivalent about
termination. She seemed resigned to the fact that it would
happen because of the history of the Agency and the [c]ourt with
these parents. She’s having some difficulty with the resource
parents, but everything seems to be going well. She’s optimistic
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it will get better in the future as they work out some issues that
they have. We know she’s involved with -- at least with some
charity event and seems to enjoy that.
Id. at 175.
As the above quotations demonstrate, Attorney Cronin advocated in
favor of the Children’s best interests, as well as the legal interests of T.L.C.
and D.R.C. However, he advocated in a manner directly contrary to M.S.C.’s
legal interests. While the trial court found that M.S.C. was merely ambivalent
about the termination of Father’s parental rights, the record refutes this
conclusion. M.S.C. was clear during her interview that she did not support
termination and it was an abuse of the court’s discretion to find otherwise.
Thus, because a conflict existed between M.S.C.’s best interests and legal
interests, it was not permissible for Attorney Cronin to act as both her GAL
and legal counsel. We must therefore vacate the portion of the decree
terminating Father’s parental rights as to M.S.C. and remand for a new
termination hearing during which she must have the benefit of legal counsel
directed by her and advocating in support of her preferred outcome.
We next turn our attention to the portions of the decree terminating
Father’s parental rights as to T.L.C. and D.R.C. Because no conflict existed
between those children’s best interests and legal interests, we proceed to
address the issue on the merits.
Section 2511 of the Adoption Act governs involuntary termination of
parental rights. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511. It requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
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that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, the orphans’ court terminated Father’s parental rights to T.L.C.
and D.R.C. pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). We need
agree with the court as to only one subsection of Section 2511(a) as well as
Section 2511(b) in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.
Super. 2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004). In this
case, we analyze the court’s decision pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2) and (b),
which provide as follows.
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child
to be without essential parental care, control or
subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be
remedied by the parent.
***
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(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(2), (b).
We first consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1)
repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to
be without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will
not be remedied.
In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. Super. 2003) (citation
omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that cannot
be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the contrary, those
grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental
duties.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citations
omitted).
In its opinion, the orphans’ court found that Father failed to comply with
the objectives set forth in his child permanency plan (“CPP”). Orphans’ Court
Opinion, 7/30/18, at 5 (unnumbered pages). The court explained that Father
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failed to complete mental health, drug and alcohol, and domestic violence
evaluations, as well as a parenting program. Id. at 5-6. Father tested positive
on drug screens, incurred criminal charges, failed to maintain stable housing
and income, and failed to visit the Children consistently. Id.
Father concedes that he did not complete the objectives of his CPP but
argues that he made progress toward completing those objectives and that
the orphans’ court should have afforded him more time. Father’s Brief at 6.
Father asserts that he obtained a mental health evaluation, acquired stable
housing, received income in the form of Social Security disability benefits,
maintained contact with T.L.C. and D.R.C., and was in the process of obtaining
a domestic violence evaluation, parenting classes, and drug and alcohol
evaluation. Id. at 6, 9-12. He blames his delay in completing the objectives
on several factors, including a lack of funds, a lack of transportation, not being
familiar with community resources, a family medical emergency, and being
“incarcerated for something he did not do[.]” Id. at 9-11. He also suggests
that he did not send letters to T.L.C. and D.R.C. because “he was concerned
about the caseworker reading the letters and privacy issues.” Id. at 13.
The record supports the findings of the orphans’ court. Father’s CPP
objectives included improving his mental health functioning, remaining free
from drug and alcohol abuse, remaining crime free, remaining free of domestic
violence, learning and using good parenting skills, being financially stable,
maintaining a safe home, maintaining an ongoing commitment to the
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Children, improving family relationships, and developing an understanding of
sexual victimization.3 Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 6-9.
The record reveals that Father failed to address his mental health needs.
Father failed to attend three scheduled appointments for a biopsychosocial
evaluation, on April 7, 2017, May 9, 2017, and June 13, 2017. Id. at 6. The
Agency then referred Father for a psychological evaluation and he failed to
attend two more appointments on August 31, 2017, and September 6, 2017.
Id. at 7. During the termination hearing, Agency caseworker, Caitlin Hoover,
testified that Father still had not obtained an evaluation. N.T., 5/22/18, at
93. Father left her a message only a few days prior to the hearing stating that
he intended to obtain an evaluation.4 Id.
With respect to drugs and alcohol, Father tested positive for cocaine and
amphetamines in October 2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 7. Father then failed
to attend appointments for a drug and alcohol evaluation on July 14, 2017,
and July 18, 2017. Id. Father informed the Agency in April 2018 that he had
another evaluation appointment. Id. However, to the Agency’s knowledge,
he did not attend that appointment either. Id. Ms. Hoover believed that
Father missed at least five appointments in total. N.T., 5/22/18, at 94.
____________________________________________
3Early in the Agency’s involvement with the family, it discovered that T.L.C.
and M.S.C. had been the victims of sexual abuse by a perpetrator other than
Father. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 1.
4Father testified that he completed the evaluation on May 21, 2018, only one
day before the hearing. N.T., 5/22/18, at 131.
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As for Father’s CPP objective requiring him to remain crime free, Father
was cited for driving without a license in November 2016. Petitioner’s Exhibit
2 at 7. Father failed to pay the associated fine, resulting in the issuance of a
bench warrant in June 2017. Id. Father was cited for driving an uninspected
vehicle that same month. Id. Meanwhile, Father was arrested in May 2017
and charged with a variety of crimes related to an alleged incident of domestic
violence involving Mother. Id. Father remained incarcerated5 until June 2017
and pled guilty to harassment in July 2017. Id. at 7-8. In February 2018,
Father incurred additional citations for driving without a license and driving an
unregistered and uninspected vehicle. Id. at 8. Ms. Hoover reported that, to
her knowledge, the citations remained unresolved. N.T., 5/22/18, at 95.
Relatedly, Father failed to complete his domestic violence objective.
Aside from engaging in the alleged act of domestic violence mentioned above,
Father failed to attend several domestic violence evaluation appointments.
Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 8. Father failed to attend appointments on June 8,
2017, July 20, 2017, August 17, 2017, and September 14, 2017. Id. Ms.
Hoover reported that she did not receive documentation from Father indicating
that he pursued an evaluation after that time. N.T., 5/22/18, at 96.
Father also did not complete his parenting objective, because he did not
receive the positive recommendations from service providers necessary for
the Agency to make a parenting program referral. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 8.
____________________________________________
5 Father testified that he was also incarcerated in April 2017 for unspecified
reasons. N.T., 5/22/18, at 96.
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Similarly, Father did not make sufficient progress on his other objectives for
the Agency to refer him to family therapy or to the non-offending parent group
in satisfaction of his objectives of improving family relationships and
understanding sexual victimization. Id. at 9; N.T., 5/22/18, at 101, 113.
With respect to Father’s financial stability objective, he did not provide
the Agency with any proof of income documentation. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at
8. Father claimed he was working for a temporary employment agency in
September 2017. Id. By April 2018, he reported he was not working due to
a disability. Id. As for Father’s housing, he failed to provide the Agency with
a lease or other documentation showing rent or utility payments. Id. Father
reported moving to a new residence in September 2017. Id. In April 2018,
he informed the Agency that he was living with his mother. Id. During the
termination hearing, Father testified that he had lived with his mother since
March 2017, but that he would be moving to a new residence in June 2018.
N.T., 5/22/18, at 124-25, 147-48.
Finally, Father failed to complete the objective requiring him to maintain
an ongoing commitment to the Children. Ms. Hoover testified that Father
attended only two visits with the Children before the visits were suspended.
N.T., 5/22/18, at 97. The record does not indicate how many visits Father
had the opportunity to attend or whether he attended those visits
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inconsistently.6 However, in February 2017, the juvenile court ordered that
Father would need to confirm his attendance at visits twenty-four hours in
advance. Petitioner’s Exhibit 2 at 9. The court further directed that Father
would need to arrive for visits early and test negative for illegal substances.
Id. The court cautioned Father that it would suspend his visits if he failed to
attend the next visit for any reason. Id. Father failed to attend a visit several
days later and the court suspended his visits pending completion of the
biopsychosocial evaluation mentioned previously. Id. Father continued to
have phone contact with the Children until a phone call in June 2017, during
which he stated that he had only ten months to live due to a cancer diagnosis.7
Id. After that call, the Agency prohibited all phone contact outside of a
therapeutic setting. Id. Despite this prohibition, Father attempted to contact
the Children using their cell phones and social media. Id.
Thus, the record confirms that Father is incapable of parenting T.L.C.
and D.R.C., and that he cannot or will not remedy his parental incapacity.
Father demonstrated little if any interest in achieving reunification in this case.
Father failed to complete the objectives outlined in his CPP. He missed
numerous appointments for his mental health, drug and alcohol, and domestic
violence evaluations. He also demonstrated severe instability in terms of his
____________________________________________
6 In its brief, the Agency indicates it asked the juvenile court to suspend
Father’s visits on the basis he posed a grave threat of harm to the Children.
Agency’s Brief at 6.
7 There is no indication in the record that Father has passed away.
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housing, income, and ongoing legal trouble. As a result, Father remains in no
position to provide T.L.C. and D.R.C. a safe and stable environment and
appears no closer to doing so than he did at the start of their dependency.
Father complained during the hearing that he was unable to comply with his
CPP objectives due to a lack of funds, transportation problems, and multiple
wrongful incarcerations. N.T., 5/22/18, at 130-37. He also claimed that he
was now in a position to comply with his objectives because he signed up for
a program that would pay for the necessary evaluations and parenting classes.
Id. at 141-42. The orphans’ court was free to reject Father’s testimony as
disingenuous. See In the Interest of D.F., 165 A.3d 960, 966 (Pa. Super.
2017), appeal denied, 170 A.3d 991 (Pa. 2017) (“The Orphans’ Court is free
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to
make all credibility determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence.”);
A.L.D., 797 A.2d at 340 (“[A] parent's vow to cooperate, after a long period
of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity or availability of services, may
properly be rejected as untimely or disingenuous.”). Accordingly, we discern
no abuse of discretion.
We next consider whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Father’s parental rights to T.L.C. and D.R.C. involuntarily pursuant
to Section 2511(b). The requisite analysis is as follows.
Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of parental rights
would best serve the developmental, physical, and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. As this Court has explained,
Section 2511(b) does not explicitly require a bonding analysis and
the term ‘bond’ is not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law,
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however, provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any,
between parent and child is a factor to be considered as part of
our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child
is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis,
it is nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and
should also consider the intangibles, such as the love,
comfort, security, and stability the child might have
with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court stated
that the trial court should consider the importance of
continuity of relationships and whether any existing
parent-child bond can be severed without detrimental
effects on the child.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa. Super. 2015) (quoting
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011) (quotation marks and
citations omitted)).
The orphans’ court found that the needs and welfare of T.L.C. and D.R.C.
would be best served by remaining in foster care and being adopted by their
foster parents. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 7/30/18, at 6 (unnumbered pages).
The court reasoned that T.L.C. and D.R.C. had spent twenty-two months in
foster care and that Father would not resolve his parental incapacity within a
reasonable time. Id. It observed that T.L.C. and D.R.C. are in a loving and
healthy pre-adoptive home and realize that Father did not parent them
appropriately. Id.
With respect to Section 2511(b), Father focuses his argument almost
entirely on M.S.C. Father’s Brief at 13-14. He also argues that it was contrary
to the needs and welfare of the Children collectively to terminate his parental
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rights because he was working toward completion of his CPP objectives. Id.
at 14.
The record confirms that terminating Father’s parental rights would best
serve the needs and welfare of T.L.C. and D.R.C. It is apparent, as discussed
above, that Father is nowhere near being able to provide appropriate parental
care. Moreover, T.L.C. and D.R.C. do not have a bond with Father such that
termination would cause them to suffer irreparable harm. Both children stated
to the orphans’ court that they wanted their foster parents to adopt them and
that they supported the termination of Father’s parental rights. N.T., 5/22/18,
at 27-28, 33, 40-41, 46-47. D.R.C. explained that Father and Mother are “just
not good parent[al] figures. They -- they just didn’t put us first. They put
other drugs first and [it was] just not a healthy environment.” Id. at 28.
D.R.C. further stated that Father “didn’t treat us like we were his kids” and
that he would not want to have any further contact with Father. Id. at 31-
32. T.L.C. explained that she wanted to speak with Father, but only so that
he could admit his failings and apologize “for what he has done.” Id. at 43-
44. When asked why she wanted her foster parents to adopt her before she
turns eighteen in January 2019, T.L.C. stated as follows.
For the past 17 years of my life, I feel like I’ve just been
living with -- dealing with people that I don’t really know. You
know, I -- I look at my biological parents, and I’m not angry
anymore. I’m not sad. I’m not upset, but I just -- they’re just
strangers to me. There’s no emotional connection. There’s
nothing. But with my foster family now, I -- I feel like I just -- I
finally have, you know, some chance [of] having a real family.
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Id. at 46-47. In light of this evidence, we discern no abuse of discretion by
the orphans’ court in terminating Father’s rights pursuant Section 2511(b).
Based on the foregoing, we vacate the portion of the decree terminating
Father’s parental rights as to M.S.C. and remand for a new termination hearing
to occur as soon as possible, during which M.S.C. must have legal counsel
directed by her who advocates in support of her preferred outcome. Attorney
Cronin may continue to serve as M.S.C.’s GAL, but he may not serve as legal
counsel. In addition, we affirm the portions of the decree terminating Father’s
parental rights to T.L.C. and D.R.C., as we conclude that the orphans’ court
did not abuse its discretion in that regard.
Decree vacated in part and affirmed in part. Case remanded for further
proceedings consistent with this Opinion. Jurisdiction relinquished.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 11/30/2018
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