Coppola, R. v. Steel Services, Inc. ( 2019 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
RICHARD J. COPPOLA, JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
(INDIVIDUALLY) AND GOE : PENNSYLVANIA
INTERNATIONAL, LLC. :
:
Appellants :
:
:
v. :
: No. 811 EDA 2018
:
STEEL SERVICES, INC. :
Appeal from the Order Entered February 20, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Bucks County Civil Division at No(s):
2017-05726
BEFORE: LAZARUS, J., McLAUGHLIN, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY McLAUGHLIN, J.: FILED JANUARY 18, 2019
Richard J. Coppola, Jr. and Goe International, Inc. (collectively
“Appellants”) appeal from the order dismissing their Complaint against Steel
Services Inc. (“Steel Services”). The trial court found it lacked personal
jurisdiction over Steel Services because Appellants failed to establish Steel
Services had any connection to Pennsylvania. We affirm.
On August 31, 2017, Appellants filed a Notice of Appeal from a
magisterial district judge decision, which entered judgment in favor of Steel
Services. On September 21, 2017, Appellants filed a Complaint alleging a
breach of contract claim. On October 18, 2017, Steel Services filed preliminary
objections, including an objection claiming the trial court lacked personal
jurisdiction over it. Appellants filed a response.
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The facts alleged in the pleadings that are relevant to this appeal are as
follows. Steel Services is a company with a principal place of business in
Virginia. After viewing Steel Services’ website, Appellants called Steel Services
in Virginia to purchase steel products. Appellants purchased the steel products
by credit card payment over the telephone. Steel Services shipped the
merchandise from its place of business in Virginia to Appellants’ job site, also
in Virginia. Steel Services does not have an office or bank account in
Pennsylvania. It does not have a Pennsylvania telephone number and is not
registered in Pennsylvania as a foreign corporation.
On February 20, 2018, the trial court dismissed the Complaint because
it lacked personal jurisdiction over Steel Services.1 Appellants filed a Notice of
Appeal.
As a preliminary matter, we conclude that the claims as to Goe
International have been abandoned on appeal. Coppola filed the Notice of
Appeal on behalf of himself and Goe International. The 1925(b) Statement
and appellate brief list Coppola as the only appellant. All claims as to Goe
International have therefore been abandoned on appeal.2 See
Commonwealth v. Bullock, 948 A.2d 818, 823 (Pa.Super. 2008) (finding
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1 The court dismissed as moot Steel Services other preliminary objections,
which included objections in the nature of improper representation, standing,
and improper pleading.
2 Further, Coppola, a non-attorney, may not represent Goe International.
David R. Nicholson, Builder, LLC v. Jablonski, 163 A.3d 1048, 1054
(Pa.Super. 2017) (concluding “LLC entities, generally, may not proceed in
Pennsylvania courts of common pleas except through a licensed attorney”).
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claim abandoned where not developed in brief). Coppola has preserved the
claims raised on appeal in his individual capacity, which we will now address.
Coppola raises the following issues on appeal:
1. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law,
abused its discretion and denied [Coppola’s] due process
and Discovery rights by prematurely dismissing [Coppola’s]
Common Pleas Court Complaint.
2. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law,
abused its discretion and denied [Coppola’s] due process
and Discovery rights by prematurely dismissing [Coppola’s]
Common Pleas Court Complaint prior to conducting ANY
Discovery.
3. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law,
abused its discretion and denied [Coppola] due process and
Discovery rights by prematurely dismissing [Coppola’s]
Common Pleas Court Complaint prior to conducting ANY
Discovery whatsoever so as to determine [Steel Services]
personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
4. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law,
abused its discretion and denied [Coppola] due process and
Discovery rights by prematurely dismissing [Coppola’s]
Common Pleas Court Complaint prior to conducting ANY
Discovery whatsoever so as to determine the scope and
extent of [Steel Services’] interstate operations inclusive
but not limited to Pennsylvania.
5. Whether the Trial Court committed an error of law,
abused its discretion and denied [Coppola] due process and
Discovery rights by prematurely dismissing [Coppola’s]
Common Pleas Court Complaint prior to conducting ANY
Discovery whatsoever so as to determine the type, scope
and extent of [Steel Services’] contacts in Pennsylvania, it’s
internet and e-mail activities, contacts and marketing
locations.
6. Did [Steel Services’] market and operate on an interstate
basis.
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7. Is it therefore reasonable to conclude that [Steel
Services] had minimum contacts in Pennsylvania both
directly with [Coppola] and indirectly through their
Interstate operations.
8. Whether jurisdiction is appropriate in Pennsylvania.
Coppola’s Br. at 5-6. In sum, Coppola raises two claims: (1) the trial court
erred in finding it lacked jurisdiction over Steel Services; and (2) the trial court
erred in not permitting the parties to engage in discovery before dismissing
the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction.
“When preliminary objections, if sustained, would result in the dismissal
of an action, such objections should be sustained only in cases which are clear
and free from doubt.” N.T. ex rel. K.R.T. v. F.F., 118 A.3d 1130, 1134
(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting Gaboury v. Gaboury, 988 A.2d 672, 675
(Pa.Super. 2009)). “[W]hen deciding a motion to dismiss for lack of personal
jurisdiction the court must consider the evidence in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party.” Id. (quoting Gaboury, 988 A.2d at 675). “Once
the moving party supports its objections to personal jurisdiction, the burden
of proving personal jurisdiction is upon the party asserting it.” Id. (quoting
Gaboury, 988 A.2d at 675). We will reverse on order addressing preliminary
objections “only where there has been an error of law or an abuse of
discretion.” Id. (quoting Gaboury, 988 A.2d at 675).
Courts may exercise two types of personal jurisdiction – general
jurisdiction, “which is founded upon a defendant’s general activities in the
forum as evidenced by continuous and systematic contacts with the state,” or
specific jurisdiction, which “is focused upon the particular acts of the
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defendant that gave rise to the underlying cause of action.” Taylor v. Fedra
Int'l., Ltd., 828 A.2d 378, 381 (Pa.Super. 2003). “The mere presence of a
website, without more, . . . is not sufficient to subject a business to specific
jurisdiction.” Haas v. Four Seasons Campground, Inc., 952 A.2d 688, 693
(Pa.Super. 2008). Rather, the “website must target users of the forum state,
and the use of the internet website must engage the party in such a way that
the underlying transaction that gives rise to the claim occurs as a result of
using the website.” Id.
Further, the United States Supreme Court has clarified when a court
may exercise general jurisdiction:
A court may assert general jurisdiction over foreign (sister-
state or foreign-country) corporations to hear any and all
claims against them when their affiliations with the State
are so continuous and systematic as to render them
essentially at home in the forum State. The paradigm
forums in which a corporate defendant is at home, we
explained, are the corporation’s place of incorporation and
its principal place of business. The exercise of general
jurisdiction is not limited to these forums; in an exceptional
case, a corporate defendant’s operations in another forum
may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the
corporation at home in that State.
BNSF Railway Co. v Tyrell, 137 S. Ct. 1549, 1558 (2017) (citations and
internal quotations omitted).
The Supreme Court recently discussed the Fourteenth Amendment
limitations on general jurisdiction in BNSF Railway Co. v Tyrell, 137 S. Ct.
1549, 1554 (2017). There, BNSF was a railway company incorporated in
Delaware with a principal place of business in Texas. BNSF Railway Co., 137
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S. Ct. at 1554. A railway worker injured in North Dakota and another injured
in South Dakota brought suit against the railway company in Montana state
court. Id. The Montana Supreme Court determined that its state courts could
exercise personal jurisdiction over the railway because it maintained over
2,000 miles of railroad track and employed more than 2,000 workers in
Montana. Id. at 1554. The U.S. Supreme Court found these contacts
insufficient. Id. at 1559. The Court noted that the railway’s contacts with
Montana, while significant, represented a small percentage of its overall
business. See id. at 1554, 1559. Thus, it reiterated:
[A]s we observed in Daimler, the general jurisdiction
inquiry does not focus solely on the magnitude of the
defendant’s in-state contacts. Rather, the inquiry calls for
an appraisal of a corporation’s activities in their entirety; a
corporation that operates in many places can scarcely be
deemed at home in all of them.
Id. at 1559 (internal quotation marks, alterations, and citations omitted).
Coppola maintains Pennsylvania courts have personal jurisdiction based
on Steel Services’ website. Coppola’s Br.at 8.3
The website is insufficient to confer jurisdiction on Pennsylvania courts.
Regarding specific jurisdiction, the trial court found:
Appellants sought out Steel Services by viewing its website,
which is open to all and does not target Pennsylvania. Mr.
Coppola then called the company to place his order for
products to be shipped from Steel Services’ sole place of
business in Virginia to Appellants’ jobsite, which was also in
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3Coppola also claims Steel Services’ website does “interstate business with
multiple interstate locations.” Coppola’s Br.at 8. However, although the
website does list multiple locations, all locations are in Virginia.
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Virginia. Pennsylvania courts have declined to exercise
personal jurisdiction where the defendant has simply made
their information available to all those interested in it,
wherever their location. The mere presence of a website
does not and should not subject a defendant to a finding of
specific jurisdiction.
Trial Ct. Op., filed June 8, 2018, at 6. We agree and conclude the trial court
did not err or abuse its discretion in finding it lacked specific jurisdiction. Haas,
952 A.2d at 693-94 (concluding that Pennsylvania did not have specific
jurisdiction where seasonal contracts not available over computer and
customer could not purchase rights through website, but had to drive to New
Jersey to sign contract).
We further note that the website is insufficient to provide general
jurisdiction to Pennsylvania courts. There is nothing of record to suggest that
Steel Services has a presence in Pennsylvania, its website generated a
significant source of income from Pennsylvania, or that it was “essentially at
home” in Pennsylvania. BNSF, 1375 S. Ct. at 1558.
Further, there is no other information of record, beyond the website,
that would permit a finding of general or specific jurisdiction. Coppola has not
shown that Steel Services has any continuous and systematic contacts with
Pennsylvania sufficient to confer general jurisdiction. In addition, the trial
court concluded Pennsylvania lacked specific jurisdiction, reasoning that “none
of [Steel Services] purported acts giving rise to the underlying causes of action
occurred in Pennsylvania.” Trial Court Op. at 5. It noted the only contact
between the parties was communication by telephone and writing, and
Coppola called the company’s place of business in Virginia and requested that
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the products be shipped to a jobsite in Virginia. The trial court’s findings are
supported by the record, and its holding that it lacked personal jurisdiction
was not error or an abuse of discretion.
We next address Coppola’s claim that the court erred in not permitting
him to conduct discovery. Generally, we review an order concerning discovery
for an abuse of discretion standard. McNeil v. Jordan, 894 A.2d 1260, 1268
(Pa. 2006). Coppola did not seek discovery at any time prior to entry of the
order sustaining the preliminary objections. Therefore, Coppola waived the
claim. Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (providing “[i]ssues not raised in the lower court are
waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal”). Further, even if
Coppola had not waived the issue, we would conclude it lacks merit. In its
opinion pursuant to Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925(a), the
trial court found “given the uncontroverted facts and the clear law as to this
jurisdiction dispute, there was no need to open the fact record for discovery
relating to this issue.” Trial Ct. Op. at 5. This was not an abuse of discretion.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 1/18/19
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