Adoption of: D.J., Appeal of: C.J. ( 2018 )

J-S56020-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: D.J., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: C.J., MOTHER :
:
:
:
: No. 670 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered, March 20, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,
Orphans' Court at No(s): 9-ADOPT-2018.
IN THE INTEREST OF: D.J., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: C.J., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 671 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered, March 20, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County,
Juvenile Division at No(s): CP-28-DP-0000025-2016.
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., KUNSELMAN, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY KUNSELMAN, J.: FILED DECEMBER 03, 2018
J-S56020-18
C.J. (Mother) appeals from the order that involuntarily terminated her
rights to her 5-year-old son, D.J. (Child), pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §
2511(a)(2); (a)(5); (a)(8); and (b).1, 2
As evidenced by the dual caption, Mother initially raised matters relating
to both the termination of her parental rights and the order changing the goal
of the dependency case from reunification to adoption. Mother has since
abandoned the goal change portion of her contest; in her appellate brief, she
sets forth two questions involved, both of which reference only the
termination. First, she alleges there was insufficient evidence to support the
grounds for termination under § 2511(a). Second, she alleges that even if
there were grounds, termination would not be in Child’s best interests under
§ 2511(b).
We are mindful of our well-settled standard of review:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court's decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
____________________________________________
1 The court also terminated the rights of D.S. (Father) who did not appear for
the termination hearing and does not appeal now.
2Because there was no conflict, Child’s best interests and his legal interests
were simultaneously represented by Attorney Kristen Hamilton. See N.T.,
3/20/18, at 96-97.
-2-
J-S56020-18
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101–2938, which requires a bifurcated
analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent's conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1215 (Pa. Super. 2015) (citations
omitted).
In this case, the orphans’ court terminated Mother’s parental rights
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b). We need only agree with
the orphans' court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as well
as Section 2511(b), in order to affirm. In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384
(Pa.Super.2004) (en banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).
The learned Judge Angela R. Krom authored an extensive, well-reasoned
Rule 1925(a) opinion supporting the orphans’ court decision. Upon our review
-3-
J-S56020-18
of the record, we discern no abuse of discretion. Because it thoroughly
addresses the matters raised on appeal, we adopt, as our own, the orphans’
court opinion insofar as it pertains to the termination issue.3 We direct the
parties to attach a copy of the orphans’ court opinion to this memorandum in
the event of further proceedings.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/03/2018
____________________________________________
3We redact the parties’ names from the orphans’ court opinion, but otherwise
keep intact the entirety of the document; we do not adopt that section of the
opinion addressing Mother’s abandoned goal change issue.
-4-
Circulated 11/14/2018 10:01 AM
Th
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF THE 39T11 JUDICIAL
-
DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA FRANKLIN COUNTY BRANCH
In re: Adoption of : Orphans' Court Division
D.J., a minor.
Date of Birth: 5/31/2012 No. 9 -ADOPT-2018
In the Interest of Juvenile Court Division
D.J., a. minor
Date of Birth: 5/31/2012 CP-28-DP-0000025-2016
OPINION sur Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
Before the Court is C Jbe's Notice of Appeal from the Decree
entered March 20, 2018, terminating her parental rights to D.J., her minor son.
Also before the Court is J 's Notice of Appeal from this Court's Order
of March 20, 2018, changing D.J.'s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption. As no error occurred, this Court's prior determinations should be
affirmed.
STATEMENT OF CASE
D.J. was born on May 31, 2012. J ("Mother") is the natural
mother of D.J. D S. ("Father") is the natural father of D.J.
On February 23, 2018, Franklin County Children and Youth Services ("the
Agency") filed a Petition for the Involuntary Termination of Parental. Rights
("Petition") seeking to terminate the parental rights of Mother and Father.
Concurrently, in the ongoing dependency action, the Agency requested this Court
change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption. On March 20, 2018,
this Court held a hearing ("TPR. hearing") on the Agency's Petition. Father,
represented by Attorney Michael J. Connor, failed to appear at the TPR hearing.
Mother, represented by Attorney Abigail. Salawage, appeared at the TPR hearing.
Attorney Kristen Hamilton, D.J.'s legal counsel and Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL"),
also participated in the TPR hearing.
This Court issued Decrees dated. March 20, 2018, terminating both Mother's
and Father's parental rights. Thereafter, based on the evidence presented at the
TPR hearing, this Court changed D.J.'s permanency goal from reunification to
adoption.. Mother filed a Notice of Appeal of a Children's Fast Track Appeal
, .
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 102, along with a Concise Statement of Matters Complained
on Appeal on April 19, 2018. This Court now responds to Mother s claims of error
in both the Juvenile Court and Orphans' Court matters.
FACTUAL FINDINGS
The Court will review the evidence presented at the TPR hearing before
addressing Mother's arguments.
The Agendy presented Elizabeth Johnston ("Ms. Johnston"). Ms. Johnston is
the Agency's caseworker assigned to D.J.'s case. Transcript of Proceedings of
Termination of Parental Rights Hearing, March 20, 2018, ("T.P. 3/20/18") at 6-7..
Ms. Johnston testified the Agency initially received a referral regarding D.J.'s
2
family on September 20,2015., which reported the following issues:: chronic
homelessness', substa.nce abuse2, extreme anger3, and lack of supervision. Id. at 8.
The Agency attempted to locate the family, but was unsuccessful. Id. in February
of 2016, the Agency received a second referral, which reported that D.T.'s older
sister was missing from school and, the family was living at the New Hope Shelter
in Waynesboro, PA. Id. By the end of March of 2016, the Agency successfully
located the family at the Super 8 Motel in Chambersburg, PA. Id. at 9.
On. March 3,1,2016, the Agency conducted an unannounced visit to the
hotel. Id. Upon arrival, Mother stated she was moving her family to another hotel;
Mother expressed difficulties applying for food stamps and other support
accommodations. Id. At this point, the Agency provided Mother with housing
resources. Id. On April 1, 2016, the Agency conducted a second unannounced visit
to the, hotel, and discovered Mr. L asleep, and alone with DJ. and his two
sisters. Id. Mr. L had difficulty waking up, appeared to be intoxicated, and
refused a drug test. Id. The Agency also observed bruising on D.J.'s back. As .a
result, D.J. was placed in the temporary legal and physical custody of the Agency
on April 1, 2016. Id. at 9; see also Exhibit 1.
The Agency believed the family was living in their van at this time.
2 The Agency believed Mother and her husband maw C'Mr. 1111.11') were abusing
morphine. Mother later testified she used prescription morphine for back pain, but stopped taking
it "once it seemed to be :a problem for the courts." Id. at 68-69.
3 The Agency believed Mr. 1.11111111exhibited extreme anger toward the, family.
3
After. Di. was placed in the custody of the. Agency, Mother and Father
proposed names of family members as potential resources. Id. at 10-11. The
Agency mailed kinship letters and received responses from. M
R L and EMS Hallir Id. at 11. Upon investigation, the Agency
determined MS ROM Lati, and Eh FiLand were not
appropriate resources because they lacked sufficient living space for D.J. Id.
at 11-
12. During this time period, D.J. displayed aggressive behavior in his initial
foster
home;. D.J. frequently bit, pushed, and hit other children, including his older sister
M.J. Id. DJ. also displayed traumatic behavior; he talked and screamed in, his
sleep, called himself a bad boy, and hit himself as punishment for taking blankets
and food from his sisters. Id. For these reasons, the Agency referred D.J. to
Pathways for counseling. Id.
On May 13, 2016, D.J. was adjudicated dependent and his permanency goal
was set for reunification. Id. at 10; see also Exhibits 3-4. Mother and Father were
present for this dependency hearing. Id. As a result of D.J.'s adjudication and
dependency, Mother was ordered to participate in a drug and alcohol assessment
and follow the recommendations, subrnit to random drug screens, participate in a
parental fitness, assessment and follow the recommendations, obtain and maintain
financial stability, maintain stable housing, and maintain consistent visitation with
4
E
mS
His is D.J.'s paternal grandmother. Rairriposs is Mr. 1.1111110's father.
Mother's stepfather.
4
D.J. Id. at -13. Father was ordered to participate in .a parental fitness assessment,
obtain and maintain financial stability, maintain stable housing, and maintain
consistent visitation, with D.J. Id. at 1314.
Ms. Johnston also testified regarding the services ordered for Mother. Id. at
14. Ms. Johnston confirmed Mother participated in the parental fitness
'assessment
on June 17, 2016. Id. at 14; see also Petitioner's Exhibit 15. As a result of the
parental fitness assessment, Mother 'was deemed incapable of parenting without
any treatment or services. Id. at 14. Mother was recommended to complete
outpatient therapy once per week for twenty-six weeks, maintain use of
psychotropic medications, participate in a. pain management evaluation, participate
in a dmg and alcohol evaluation, and complete parent training. Id. However,
Mother failed to accurately report Mr. LIPM's physical violence to the evaluator
at this time. Id. at 40-41.
Ms. Johnston confirmed Mother attended outpatient therapy from October of
2016 to May 18, 2017. Id. at 14-15. After May 18, 2017, Mother stopped attending
therapy due a conflict with her work schedule. In October of 2017 the Agency
reminded Mother to complete her therapy. Id.: at 15. However, Mother incorrectly
reported she completed her therapy and believed she did not need any counseling.
5 Despite Mother's assertions at the time, the Agency believed physical violence was occurring
in the household based on D.J.'s expressions and comments. Mother later testified she separated
from Mr. LIMN due to his emotional and physical. abuse. Specifically, Mr. L abused her
by choking her. Id. at 65-66, 80.
5
Id. To date, Mother has not been successfully discharged from her therapy
requirements.6 Id. Ms. Johnston also confirmed Mother completed the drug and
alcohol assessment at Pyramid Healthcare. Id. at 15-16. Mother was not required to
complete any additional services as a result of the drug and alcohol assessment. Id.
However, Ms. Johnston testified Mother did not maintain continuous use of her
psychotropic medications. Id.
Ms. Johnston testified regarding Mother's requirement to submit to random
drug screens. Id. at 16. On June 29, 2017, Mother tested positive for
Tetrahydrocannabinol ("THC") and alcohol:7Id. at 16, 35., On October 2, 2017,
Mother 'reffisedl to allow Ms. Johnston to drug test her despite being aware that a
refusal is automatically deemed :a positive result.8 Id.
Ms. Johnston testified regarding Mother's inability to obtain and maintain
financial stability. Id. at 16-17. Ms. Johnston explained Mother has changed jobs
several times throughout the period that D.J. has been in placement. Id. at 16.
Recently,. Mother applied to jobs in Maryland,, but did not provide the Agency with
any evidence of employment and financial stability. Id.
6 Mother later acknowledged she was discharged from PA Counseling due to lack of attendance.
Mother explained she had several conflicts with work and stopped attending counseling around
the middle of 2017.1d. at 62.
7 MOther later testified she smoked marijuana for celebratory purposes when she leased her
house on May 10, 2017. Id. at 63.
a
8 According to Mother, she requested to take the drug test at a later time. Id. 63, 77-78.
6
Ms. Johnston testified regarding Mother's inability to maintain consistent
visitation with D.J. Id. at 17. The Agency approved Mother for two visits per week.
between April 7, 2016 and December 5, 2017. Id. A majority of the visits were
offered at the ABC House, except for a brief period, between February
3, 2017 and
April 10, 2017. Id. at. 17-18. During this period, the visits were
only offered at the
Agency because there were concerns for the safety of the children and parent
educators at ABC. Id. In total, Mother attended only thirty-nine of the
fifty-one
offered two-hour visits. Id. at 17. Mother's last visit with D.J. at the ABC House
occurred on November 16, 2017. Id. at 18.
On December 5, 2017, Mother was discharged from the ABC House due to
lack of attendance. Id. at 18. According to Mother, she had difficulties with
transportation because she lived in Maryland and did not have a working car. Id. at
18-19. Between December 5, 2017 and March 5, 2018 Mother failed to contact the.
Agency. Id. at 18-19, 36-37. On March 5,2018, Mother called the. Agency and
requested visitation with D.J. Id. at 19. The Agency scheduled a one -hour
visitation with D.J. on March 16, 2018. Id. Ms. Johnston testified the visit went
well, however Mother was a half-hour late; Mother took pictures and played with
her children, including D.J.9 Id.
9
Ms. Johnston later testified D.J. was comfortable interacting with Mother, but does not ask to
see Mother when he is not with her. Id. at 31-32. However, Mother later testified that D.J. asked
her when he can come home. Id. at 65, 73, 89.
7
Ms. Johnston testified regarding Mother's limited participation in filial
therapy.. Id. 19-20. Mother was offered to participate in filial therapy in order to
build a stronger bond with D.J.1° Id. Mother only attended one session despite the
fact that D.J. has been in therapy for over a year. Id. at 20. Mother also
had limited
contact with D.J.'s therapist. Id. at 20, 47-48. Currently, D.J.'s foster rnother
attends therapy with D.J. Id. at 20.
Ms. Johnston further testified regarding Mother's inability to secure stable
housing. Id. Between April 4, 2016 and July of 2016, Mother lived, with various.
friends. Id. Between August 11, 2016 and October 24, 2016, Mother lived in a
homeless shelter. Id. Between October 24, 2016 and December 5, 2016, Mother
lived with friends in Waynesboro, Franklin County; Pennsylvania. Id. Between
December 5, 2016 and October 2, 2017, Mother lived with Mr. L in two
different leased houses. Id. at 21. On October 2,2017,, Mother and Mr. L
were evicted due to failure to pay rent; Mother then, separated from Mr. LI
and moved to Maryland. Id. On March 5, 2018, Mother reported she is now living
between her mother's house and a boyfriend's house. Id. As of the date of the
hearing, the Agency did not know where Mother was living. Id.
Ms. JOhnston..later testified D.J. is diagnosed with attention..deficit hyperactivity disorder
("ADHD"),.oppoSitional defiant disorder ("ODD"), borderline intellectual functioning,. and
adjustment .disorder with mixed.prohleinsof mood and conduct behavior Recently, D.J. has
diSplayed.symptorns of reactive attachment disorder ("RAD"). j4. :at 45, 47-48: Mother later
testified she only was aware of D.J.'s ODD and AHDH:diasposes. Id. at 90.
8
Ms. Johnston last testified regarding D.J.'s foster home. Id. at 27-28, 45. D.J.
has been living in his current foster home for over a year." Id. at 28. Ms.
Johnston
explained D,J. has a parent-child relationship with his: foster family;
D.J. is
affectionate towards his foster parents and enjoys living with them.
Id. Although
D.J. calls them by their first name, he reported
to. Ms. Johnston that he now shares
the last name of his foster family.12 Id. at 28-29. Ms. Johnston
also explained that
D.J.'s foster family makes arrangements with his half-sister's foster
family every
other week, so the children can see, each :other. Id. at 29.
Mother next presented herself. Id. at 55. Mother testified: regarding her
requirements to obtain and maintain financial stability and secure stable housing.
Id. Mother testified 'she does not, have a permanent residence, but receives her
mail
at her father's house, in Sabillasville, Maryland. Id. at 55-56. Mother testified she
separated from Mr L in September of 2017 and is "working on starting
over." Id. at 56-57. At this time, Mother is searching for full-time, employment to
save up: for a car and residence." Id. Mother testified she was recently hired at a,
1 ' lived in:three other foster homes prior to his current one. D.J. moved between the three
foster homes due:to challenging:and sexualized behavior. The Agency believes trauma therapy
and the placement with his current new foster helped correct this behavior.
12. Ms. Johnston later testified the foster family has a daughter in
college who 0.3,, refers to as his
sister. D.J. also refers to another child in the foster family as' brother. Id. ãt47.
13 Mother later explained she and her boyfriend J.B. are looking for a place to live together ld. at
9
temporary agency, but is waiting for a start date. '4 Id. at 57. Mother also helps her
father, with landscaping, snow removal, and mowing jobs. Id. at 57-58. If provided
more time, Mother believed she could obtain housing within a month
and a half.
Id. at 72.
Mother testified regarding, her requirement to maintain use of
psychotropic
medications. Id. at 59. Mother currently takes 20 milligrams of
Lexapro once in the
morning, one milligram of Xanax three times per day, and Trazodone
at night. Id.
Mother testified she has taken her medications since she started her therapy at
PA
Counseling. Id. Mother was initially prescribed her medications by a psychiatrist at
PA Counseling, but' currently is prescribed her medications by a doctor at Mission
of Mercy in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania.15 Id. at 59-60. Mother has no health
insurance at this time. Id. at 61.
Mother further' testified regarding her requirement to maintain consistent
visitation with D.J. Id. at 63-64. Mother explained she visited D.J. twice a week for
two hours. Id. at 64. She stopped visiting DJ. due to a lack of transportation.16 Id.
at 64-65.. Mother also addressed the Agency's concerns regarding the lack of
14 Mother explained she has reliable transportation' from her stepfather to get to this job
when she
starts.
Mother testified she meets with 'a doctor once per month and is consistently taking her
medications.
16 Mother testified she did not see or, have any contact with D.J. from November of 2017 to
March of 2018. Mother explained she lives over an hour from Chambersburg and it has been
difficult to visit D.J. without a car. Id. at 56-57, 75_
10
communication. Id. at 70. Mother testified she did not have access to a phone for a
month and. a half, but attempted to contact the Agency'eight or nine times since
November of 2017. Id. Mother testified the Agency only returned her last two
phone calls. Id. at 70, 87-89.
ISSUES RAISED
In the above -captioned Orphans' Court action, Mother alleges this Court'
decision to terminate her parental rights was not supported by clear and convincing
evidence, and therefore constituted an abuse of discretion for the following
reasons: there was insufficient evidence to determine that (1) Mother failed, to
perform parental duties for a period of at least: six months immediately preceding
the filing of the Petition; (2) Mother caused the child to be without essential
parental care, control, or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being; (3) the conditions which led to placement of the child cannot or will not be
remedied by Mother within a reasonable time; and (4) termination of Mother's
parental rights is not in, the child's best interests.
In the. above-captioned Juvenile Court action, Mother alleges this Court's
decision to change the permanency goal from reunification to adoption was not
supported by clear and convincing evidence, and was therefore an abuser of
discretion for the, following reasons:: (1) there was insufficient evidence to
determine that the child's best interests are met by a change of goal to adoption;
11
and (2) Mother could remedy the barriers to reunification if provided additional
time and services.
DISCUSSION
I. Termination of Parental Rights
The standard of review in a termination of parental rights case is well
established:
When reviewing an appeal from a decree terminating parental rights,
we are limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is
supported by competent evidence. Absent an abuse of discretion, an
error of law, or insufficient evidentiary support for the trial court's
decision, the decree must stand. Where a trial court has granted a
petition to involuntarily terminate parental rights, this Court must
accord the hearing judge's: decision the same deference that we would
give to a jury verdict. We must employ a broad, comprehensive
review of the record in, order to determine whether the trial court's
decision is supported by competent evidence.
In re S.H., 879. A2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted).
The petitioner has the burden to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the asserted grounds for seeking termination are valid in a termination of parental
rights case. In re A.S., 11 A.3d 473, 477 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). Our
appellate courts have stated the following:
The standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as testirnony
that is so clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of
fact to come to a clear conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of
the precise facts in issue. The trial court is free to believe all, part, or
none of the evidence presented and is likewise free to make all
credibility determinations and resolve: conflicts in the evidence. If
12
Th
competent evidence supports the trial court's findings, we will affirm
even if the record could also support the opposite result.
Id. (citations omitted).
Additionally, parental rights are not absolute: "[a] parent's basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of ... [his] children is converted,
upon the failure to fulfill ... parental duties, to the
children's right to have':proper
parenting and fulfillment of [the child's] potential in a permanent, healthy,
safe
environment." Tare'A.S., 11 A.3d at 478: (citation omitted). Parental rights may be
involuntarily terminated where any one subsection of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a) is
satisfied, along with consideration of 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b) provisions. In re Z.P.,
994 A.2d 1108, 1117 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted). "The statute permitting
the termination of parental rights outlines certain irreducible minimum
requirements of care that parents must provide for their children, and a parent who
cannot or will not meet the requirements within a reasonable time following
intervention by the state may properly be considered unfit and have his parental
rights terminated." Id. at 1 1_18 (citation omitted.
In the instant case, this Court found grounds for termination existed under
Sections '2'511(a)(2), (5), and (8). After engaging in the first part of the test, under
Section 2511(a), this Court also found termination would serve the, best interests of
DJ. pursuant to Section 2511(b). On appeal, Mother argues this Court's decision
was not supported by clear and convincing evidence, therefore constituting an
13
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abuse of discretion. We disagree, and will address each ground for termination in
turn.
A. Termination of Parental Rights Under Section 2511(a)(2)
In order to terminate parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2), the
following three elements must be established:
(1.)repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2:)
such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal' cannot or will not be remedied.
In re D.L.B., 166 A.3d 322, 327 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citation omitted); see also
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(0(2). Additionally; statutory grounds for termination of
parental rights due to parental incapacity that cannot be remedied are, not, limited to
affirmative misconduct; "[t]o the contrary, those grounds may include acts: of
refusal as well as incapacity to perform parental duties." Id. (citation omitted).
Here, the Agency established by clear and convincing evidence, that
Mother's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
Although Mother participated in some of the ordered services, Mother failed to
complete all of the services. Mother completed the parental fitness assessment and
followed through with some of the recommendations, but failed to follow through
with and successfully complete outpatient therapy. Citing both work conflicts and
her belief that she did not need therapy, Mother failed to attend session and was
14
unsuccessfully discharged. Mother also false1y suggested to the Agency that she
had completed her therapy requirements. To date, Mother has not successfully
completed her therapy requirements.
Mother completed the drug and alcohol assessment and was not
recommended to participate in any further treatment. However, she later failed a
drug test and refused another, knowing her refusal would be considered a positive
test by the Agency.
With respect to financial and housing stability, Mother failed to make the
necessary steps to secure permanent employment. This Court was provided with
no plan for a safe home for D.J.
Mother also failed to maintain consistent visitation and was discharged due
to lack of attendance on December 5, 2017. Mother then failed to contact, the
Agency until March 5, 2018, despite not having seen DJ. for several months. By
failing to seriously address this Court's ordered services, Mother has failed to
provide essential parental care necessary for D.J.'s physical and mental well-being.
Furthermore our appellate courts, have stated:.
Unlike. subsection (a)(1), subsection (a)(2) does not emphasize a
parent's refusal or failure to perform parental duties, but, instead
emphasizes the child's, present and future need for essential parental
care, control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-
being. Therefore, the language in subsection (a)(2) should not be read
to compel courts to ignore :a child's need for ,a stable home and strong,
continuous parental ties, which the policy of restraint in state
intervention is intended 'to protect. This is particularly so where
15
disruption of the family has already occurred and there is no
reasonable prospect for reuniting it.
In re. A.S., 11 A.3d at 478 (citing In re E.A.P., 944 A.2d 79, 82 (Pa. Super. 2008)).
In light of this standard, we heavily considered D.J.'s present and future need
for a
stable home when we terminated Mother's parental rights. A
parent must provide
their child, with safe and stable. housing. While we recognize
Mother was a victim
of Mr. L's repeated physical and emotional abuse, Mother nonetheless failed
to protect D.J. from Mr. Ls abuse. Mother didn't timely disclose the abuse,
placing her child at risk and resulting in a delay of necessary services for 'DJ.
Although Mother separated from Mr. 11111111 in September of 2017, Mother has
made little progress in securing a safe and stable home for D.J.
Stated differently, Mother's lack of significant progress over the past
twenty-two months convinces the Court she has no interest or no ability to remedy
the conditions which have kept her son out of care and custody. D.J.'s right to a.
permanent and safe environment should not be on hold indefinitely. The law
demands that ,a parent overcome obstacles in their path to meet their child's needs.
Mother has not done so. Thus, this Court did not err in, terminating Mother's
parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(0(2).
B. Termination of Parental Rights Under Sections 2511(a)(5), (8)
Pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(5), (8), parental rights may be terminated
when:
16
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(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at
least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy
those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or
assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the' child
Within, a reasonable period of time and termination of the
parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court, or under a voluntary agreement, with an agency, 12 months or
more' have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal 'or placement of the child
continue to exist and terrnination of parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
23. Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(5), (8); see also In re S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 807 (Pa. Super.
2005) (noting the analysis under subsection (8) merely requires that the conditions
leading to placement continue to, exist, whereas under subsection (5') the Court
must consider a parent's willingness 'or ability to remedy such, conditions).
Here, the Agency established by clear and convincing evidence that
Mother's parental rights should be terminated pursuant to Sections 2511(a)(5), (8).
As noted above, Mother's inability to meet D.J.'s basic need for ,a safe and secure
home led to D.J.'s continued placement with the Agency for the past twenty-two.
months. Despite Mother's participation 'in some of this Court's directives, the
conditions which led to D.J.'s placement continue to exist and Mother is unwilling
or unable to remedy the. conditions. To date, Mother has not successfully
*17
maintained visitation with D.J. or completed her therapy. Mother also has not
secured full-time employment or a permanent residence.17
Additionally, this Court strongly believes Mother: will not be able to remedy
the conditions which led to D.J.'s placement. Twenty-two months was
substantial
time to address the situation. Furthermore, Section 2511(a)(5) requires
the
termination of parental rights be in the child's best interests. As discussed
below,
the tennination of Mother's parental rights 'is in the best interests of D.J.
Thus, this Court did not err in terminating Mother's parental rights pursuant
to Sections 2511(a)(5), (8).
C. Termination of Parental Rights Under Section 2511(b)
If the Court finds the, grounds' for termination 'are satisfied pursuant to
Section 2511(a), it must proceed to an evaluation oldie child's best interests under
Section 2511(b). Section 2511(b) provides the following:
The court in terminating the rights of a parent shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare 'of the child. The rights 'of .a parent shall, not be terminated
solely on 'the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate
housing, furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be
beyond the: control of the parent. With, respect to any petition filed
pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider
any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the filing
of the petition.
17Mother did not present this Court with a plan or solution to address the financial and housing
concerns at the TPR hearing.
18
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(4 In considering, the needs and welfare of a child, the court
must examine whether terminating the natural parent's rights would destroy
something in existence that is necessary and beneficial. In re C.S., 761 A. 2d 1197,
1202 (Pa. Super. 2000).
The evidence presented at the TPR hearing convinces this Court that
termination of Mother's parental rights is in D.J.'s best interests. As discussed
above, Mother failed to obtain and maintain financial and housing stability.
Conversely, D.J.'s foster parents have provided D.J. with a safe and stable home.
Mother also failed to maintain visitation and participate in filial therapy with D.J.
Contrarily, D.J.'s foster mother actively participates in filial therapy in order to
develop a. critically important bond with D.J. We are convinced D.J. has the
necessary support from his foster parents to assist him through any' detriment as a
result of our termination of Mother's parental rights.
Furthermore, terminating Mother's parental rights would not destroy
"something in existence that is necessary and beneficial." In re C.S., 761 A.2d at
1202. It is possible that Mother and D.J. have a bond. However, this bond is not
healthy for D.J. Mother's lack of engagement demonstrates she does, not
acknowledge or understand what her son needs for healthy growth and
development. As a result of D.J.'s placement and therapy, he is now mentally and.
medically on track. This Court is convinced that the love, comfort, security, and
19
%,,
stability D.J. has with his foster parents outweigh any existing emotional bond D.J.
has developed with Mother.
Thus, this. Court did not err in terminating, Mother's, parental
rights pursuant
to Section 2511(b).
II. Goal Change from Reunification to Adoption
The standard of review for a juvenile court's permanency
determination is as
follows:
In cases involving a court's order' changing the [court -ordered]
goal ...
to adoption, our standard of review is abuse of discretion. To hold that
the trial court abused its discretion, 'we must detennine its judgment
was manifestly unreasonable, that the court disregarded the law, or
that its action was a result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill will.
While this Court is bound by the facts determined in the trial court, vve
are not tied to the court's inferences, deductions and conclusions; we
have a responsibility to ensure that the record represents a
comprehensive inquiry and that the hearing judge has applied the
appropriate legal principles to that record. Therefore, our scope of
review is broad.
In Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2017) (citations omitted). In a
change of goal proceeding, the interests of the child supersede the interests of the
parent. In re D.P., 972 A.2d 1221, 1227 (Pa. Super. 2009) (citations omitted). The
burden is on the Agency to prove the change in goal would be in the best interests
of the child. Id. (citation omitted). A juvenile must consider the following factors
regarding permanency planning:
Pursuant to § 6351(f) of the Juvenile Act, when considering a petition
for,,a goal change for a dependent child, the juvenile court is to
20
consider, inter alia: (I) the continuing necessity for and
appropriateness of the placement; (2) the extent of compliance with
the family service plan; (3) the extent of progress made towards
alleviating the circumstances which necessitated the original
placement; (4) the appropriateness and feasibility of the current
placement goal for the children; (5) a likely date by which the goal
for
the child might be achieved; (6) the child's safety; and (7)
whether the
child has been in placement for at least fifteen of the last
twenty-two
months.
In Interest of L.T., 158 A.3d at 1276-1277 (citations omitted).
Last, a juvenile
court must consider whether reasonable efforts were made
to finalize the
permanency plan in effect. Id. at 1277; see also 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 6351(0(5.1).18
Here, our changing of D.J.'s permanency goal from reunification to adoption
was held simultaneously with the termination of Mother's parental rights. The
evidence presented at the TPR hearing establishes that our changing, of D.J.'s
permanency goal from reunification to adoption is in D.J.'s best interests.
Although Mother complied with some of the directives of this Court, her
compliance was not sufficient or complete to overcome the Agency's request for
termination and change of permanency goal from reunification to adoption.
For the past twenty-two months, Mother failed to remedy the circumstances
which mandated D.J.'s continued placement. Mother also failed to provide this
Court with a plan to remedy the financial and housing concerns. It is clear to this
Court that Mother will not remedy the conditions which led to D.J. continued
18 This:COurt found the Agency made reasonable efforts to finalizethe..permanency plan in
effect.
.19
Accordingly, this Court considered the same .eliidence...for both. matters.
21
placement even if provided more time because she, has, made no strides to
complete
her therapy, maintain consistent visitation, obtain employment, and
secure safe
housing. D.J. deserves permanency and his life should not be put
on hold "in the
hope that [Mother] will summon the ability to handle
the responsibilities of
parenting." In re N.C., 909 A.2d 818, 824 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(citation omitted).
Currently, these needs are being meet by D.J.'s foster parents.
Thus, this Court' did not err by changing D.J.'s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption because the change is necessary to achieve
permanency.
CONCLUSION
In summary, grounds for' termination of Mother's parental rights were
established by clear and convincing evidence under 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§
2511(a)(2),(5), and (8). It is in D.J.'s best interests to terminate Mother's parental
rights pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). Furthermore, the evidence presented at
the TPR hearing supported our changing of D.J.'s permanency goal from
reunification to adoption. Accordingly, this Court respectfully requests the.
Superior Court affirm the tennination of Mother's parental rights and our changing
of D.J.'s permanency goal from reunification to adoption, and dismiss the instant
appeals.
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