In Re: Adoption of L.R., Appeal of: L.R. ( 2018 )


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  • J-A20027-18
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: ADOPTION OF L.R., A MINOR         :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    CHILD                                    :         PENNSYLVANIA
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    APPEAL OF: L.R.                          :         No. 464 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Order March 2, 2018
    in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County
    Orphans' Court at No(s): No. 63-17-0648
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY MUSMANNO, J.:                        FILED DECEMBER 3, 2018
    L.R. (“Child”), born in March 2015, by his former court-appointed
    counsel,   Joyce   A.   Hatfield-Wise,   Esquire   (“Attorney   Hatfield-Wise”),
    purportedly appeals from the Order (hereinafter, the “Removal Order”) that
    disqualified Attorney Hatfield-Wise as Child’s counsel. We quash the appeal.
    While Attorney Hatfield-Wise was representing Child in early 2018
    concerning proceedings to terminate the parental rights of Child’s parents,
    counsel for Child’s mother made an oral Motion to disqualify Attorney Hatfield-
    Wise. The trial court disqualified Attorney Hatfield-Wise, finding that she had
    a conflict of interest due to her prior representation of Washington County
    Children and Youth Services (the “Agency”), in a dependency aspect of Child’s
    case in 2015. The Removal Order appointed, as Child’s new legal counsel,
    Frank Kocevar, Esquire (“Attorney Kocevar”), who had previously served as
    the guardian ad litem for Child in the dependency proceedings.         Attorney
    Hatfield-Wise timely filed a Notice of appeal from the Removal Order, along
    J-A20027-18
    with a Concise Statement of errors complained of on appeal, pursuant to
    Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
    In the brief on appeal purportedly filed on behalf of Child, 1 Attorney
    Hatfield-Wise raises two issues:
    1. Whether the trial court erred as a matter of law when it ordered
    the removal of court[-]appointed legal counsel for [Child,] … upon
    the oral motion of [Child’s m]other’s counsel[,] without any notice
    or evidence that [Attorney Hatfield-Wise’s] involvement more
    than 2 years ago was substantial, that Rule 1.11 [of the
    Pennsylvania Disciplinary Rules] inured to the benefit of parent’s
    counsel, or that [Attorney Hatfield-Wise] had any conflict of
    interest with the Agency in this matter?
    2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion when it … further
    ordered [Attorney Hatfield-Wise] to leave the courtroom and
    nearly the courthouse?
    Brief for Attorney Hatfield-Wise at 4 (emphasis omitted).
    Before we may address the merits of these issues, however, we must
    determine if the Removal Order is appealable by Attorney Hatfield-Wise, who
    purports to appeal in a representative capacity on behalf of Child. Initially, it
    is well established that an order disqualifying counsel is interlocutory and
    unappealable as to the party represented by counsel. See Middleberg v.
    Middleberg, 
    233 A.2d 889
    , 890-91 (Pa. 1967). Moreover, our Pennsylvania
    Supreme Court has clarified that an order disqualifying counsel does not
    ____________________________________________
    1  Child’s parents have not participated in this appeal. Counsel for the Agency
    filed a brief urging this panel to affirm the Removal Order. According to the
    Agency, “all lower court proceedings have been halted because of [A]ttorney
    Hatfield-Wise’s appeal to this Court[,]” which is thwarting achieving
    permanency for Child. Brief for the Agency at 3.
    -2-
    J-A20027-18
    satisfy the collateral order exception set forth at Pa.R.A.P. 313. See Vaccone
    v. Syken, 
    899 A.2d 1103
    , 1107 (Pa. 2006) (superseded on other grounds);
    see also Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 
    472 U.S. 424
    , 440 (1985)
    (same). Finally, we emphasize that upon disqualifying Attorney Hatfield-Wise
    as Child’s counsel, the trial court immediately appointed Attorney Kocevar to
    represent Child, who was familiar with Child’s case; thus, Child is neither
    unrepresented nor aggrieved. See Trial Court Opinion, 4/27/18, at 2 (finding
    that Attorney Kocevar “was very familiar with the case and this [c]ourt
    determined that we could proceed without prejudicing any party[,]” i.e., after
    the disqualification of Attorney Hatfield-Wise); accord In re N.B., 
    817 A.2d 530
    , 536 (Pa. Super. 2003) (holding that an order that denied the mother in
    a dependency matter the power to discharge court-appointed counsel in favor
    of new counsel was interlocutory and unappealable, and noting that “no right
    held by [m]other was lost by the lower court’s order denying [m]other’s
    request to change counsel[.]”). Accordingly, we quash the appeal.
    Appeal quashed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 12/3/2018
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 464 WDA 2018

Filed Date: 12/3/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024