Com. v. Hopewell, R. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S41005-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    REGINALD HOPEWELL,
    Appellant                 No. 1476 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 19, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0006515-2014
    BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.:                           FILED JUNE 24, 2016
    Appellant, Reginald Hopewell, appeals from the judgment of sentence
    of 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration, imposed after he was found guilty, following
    a non-jury trial, of possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance
    (PWID), conspiracy to commit PWID, and possession of a controlled
    substance.      Appellant solely challenges the discretionary aspects of his
    sentence. After careful review, we vacate and remand for resentencing.
    Summarizing the underlying facts of Appellant’s case is unnecessary to
    our disposition of his issue on appeal. We need only note that on December
    9, 2014, Appellant was found guilty of the above-stated offenses.      A pre-
    sentence report was prepared, and a sentencing hearing was conducted on
    ____________________________________________
    *
    Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S41005-16
    February 19, 2015.      At the outset of that proceeding, the court asked if
    defense counsel or the Commonwealth wished to present argument
    regarding the offense gravity score, prior record score, or the applicable
    sentencing guidelines. N.T. Sentencing, 2/19/15, at 3. The Commonwealth
    replied that, based on its calculations, and the information provided in the
    pre-sentence report, Appellant’s prior record score was 7 and he was
    classified as a Repeat Felony 1 and Felony 2 Offender (RFEL), making the
    standard guideline range 35 to 45 months’ imprisonment. See 
    id. at 3-4;
    see also 204 Pa. Code § 303.4(a)(2) (defining the requirements for
    classification as an RFEL offender).    Defense counsel then stated “[n]o
    argument[,]” and requested that the court impose a standard range
    sentence.   
    Id. at 4.
        At the close of the hearing, the court sentenced
    Appellant to concurrent terms of 3½ to 7 years’ incarceration for both his
    PWID and conspiracy convictions. Appellant’s conviction of possession of a
    controlled substance merged for sentencing purposes.
    Appellant retained new counsel on the same day his sentence was
    imposed, and that attorney filed a timely post-sentence motion, arguing,
    inter alia, that Appellant’s prior record score was miscalculated and he was
    not an RFEL offender.       The court ultimately denied that post-sentence
    motion, and Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. Appellant also timely
    complied with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise
    statement of errors complained of on appeal.      Herein, Appellant presents
    one issue for our review:
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    J-S41005-16
    Did the lower court incorrectly assume that Appellant’s prior
    convictions were for offenses associated with heightened prior
    record points when no evidence of record supported that
    assumption?
    Appellant’s Brief at 4.
    Appellant correctly characterizes this claim as a challenge to the
    discretionary aspects of his sentence.     See Commonwealth v. O’Bidos,
    
    849 A.2d 243
    , 253 (Pa. Super. 2004); Commonwealth v. Archer, 
    722 A.2d 203
    , 210-211 (Pa. Super. 1998) (en banc).
    An appellant must satisfy a four-part test to invoke this Court's
    jurisdiction when challenging the discretionary aspects of a
    sentence. The appellant must satisfy all of the following:
    (1) the appellant preserved the issue either by raising it at
    the time of sentencing or in a post[-]sentence motion; (2)
    the appellant filed a timely notice of appeal; (3) the
    appellant set forth a concise statement of reasons relied
    upon for the allowance of his appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    2119(f); and (4) the appellant raises a substantial
    question for our review.
    Commonwealth v. Tejada, 
    107 A.3d 788
    , 797-98 (Pa. Super. 2015)
    (citation omitted), appeal denied, 
    119 A.3d 351
    (Pa. 2015).
    Here, the trial court concludes that Appellant waived his sentencing
    claim by not objecting, at the sentencing hearing, to the calculation of his
    prior record score or his classification as an RFEL offender. See Trial Court
    Opinion, 10/7/15, at 10.     We disagree.     Appellant filed a timely post-
    sentence motion raising this issue, he filed a timely notice of appeal, he
    includes a Rule 2119(f) statement in his brief to this Court, and he presents
    a substantial question for our review.     See Commonwealth v. Johnson,
    
    758 A.2d 1214
    , 1216 (Pa. Super. 2000) (finding a substantial question was
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    J-S41005-16
    presented where the defendant claimed the sentencing court erroneously
    calculated his prior record score and, thus, misapplied the sentencing
    guidelines). Accordingly, Appellant has satisfied each prong of the test for
    invoking this Court’s jurisdiction to address his claim, and we do so herein.
    Again, Appellant argues that his prior record score was erroneously
    calculated as a 7, when it is actually a 4, and that he was improperly
    classified as an RFEL offender. The Commonwealth concedes that “[t]here
    is insufficient evidence of record to show that [Appellant] was a repeat
    felony offender….” Commonwealth’s Brief at 4. Thus, “the Commonwealth
    does not oppose a remand for resentencing.”        
    Id. Because we
    have no
    analysis by the trial court, which found Appellant’s claim waived, and
    because the Commonwealth concedes that the record supports Appellant’s
    argument, we conclude that the appropriate action is to vacate Appellant’s
    judgment of sentence and remand for the court to recalculate his prior
    record score and impose a new sentence under the correct guideline range.
    Judgment of sentence vacated.        Case remanded for resentencing.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/24/2016
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    J-S41005-16
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1476 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 6/24/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 6/25/2016