In the Interest of: L.M. Appeal of: C.M., Mother ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
L.M., MINOR CHILD PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: C.M., MOTHER
No. 2935 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered August 26, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Family Court at No(s): CP-51-AP-0000523-2015
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
MEMORANDUM BY LAZARUS, J.: FILED July 1, 2016
C.M. (“Mother”) appeals from the order entered in the Court of
Common Pleas of Philadelphia County involuntarily terminating her parental
rights to her daughter, L.M., born March 2013, pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. §
2511(a)(1), (2) (5), (8) and 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).1 Mother filed a pro se
appeal and a pro se statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to
Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b).2 The court appointed counsel for Mother, and counsel
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*
Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
The court also terminated Father’s parental rights by order dated August
26, 2015. Father did not file an appeal.
2
Mother’s Rule 1925(b) statement provides:
Judge Irvine didn’t read any of my paperwork on the 9th month
of the case for L.M. [H]e never asked my side of the story. He
never lets me talk. James W. Martin never speaks. Beverly
Muldrow gave up on L.M. and didn’t want to file for appeal. DHS
worker stated that all of the DHS workers were dead and didn’t
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filed an appellate brief. Counsel filed a brief on behalf of Mother, which did
not comply with the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate Procedure. See
Pa.R.A.P. 2111-2135. On April 21, 2016, we ordered counsel to file an
appellate brief in accordance with our rules of court. Counsel has
substantially complied with this order. After our review, we affirm.
On appeal, we address whether the Department of Human Services
(DHS) met its burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence the
statutory grounds for termination, whether the trial court adequately
examined the parent-child bond and whether termination was in L.M.’s best
interests.3
Our review is governed by the following principles:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
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(Footnote Continued)
have anyone to bring in my child. CUA never showed me the
paperwork proving they had custody of my child. ARC and DHS
parenting classes and anger management didn’t give me credit
for my classes. DHS didn’t investigate their case and came to
my house eight hours after the doctor appointment. They didn’t
let me read their paperwork. They lied and said my daughter lost
weight when she weighed 13.5 pounds and ounces. I weighed
my daughter before the doctor came in. Michael Joyce said I
couldn’t be a mom without a job.
Mother’s Pro Se Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) Statement, 9/11/15.
3
We adopt Appellee’s counter-statement of questions involved because
Appellant’s Statement of Questions Presented is, in a word, inappropriate; it
does not present an issue to be resolved but merely repeats Mother’s pro se
Rule 1925(b) Statement. See note 2, supra.
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termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. As has been often
stated, an abuse of discretion does not result merely because
the reviewing court might have reached a different conclusion.
Instead, a decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion
only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness,
partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. [T]here are clear reasons for
applying an abuse of discretion standard of review in these
cases. We observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are
not equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even where
the facts could support an opposite result, as is often the case in
dependency and termination cases, an appellate court must
resist the urge to second guess the trial court and impose its
own credibility determinations and judgment; instead we must
defer to the trial judges so long as the factual findings are
supported by the record and the court’s legal conclusions are not
the result of an error of law or an abuse of discretion.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (citations
omitted). The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of
parental rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super.
2009).
Termination of parental rights is governed by section 2511 of the
Adoption Act,4 which requires a bifurcated analysis:
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4
23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2910.
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Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent's conduct satisfies the statutory
grounds for termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if
the court determines that the parent’s conduct warrants
termination of his or her parental rights does the court engage in
the second part of the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b):
determination of the needs and welfare of the child under the
standard of best interests of the child. One major aspect of the
needs and welfare analysis concerns the nature and status of the
emotional bond between parent and child, with close attention
paid to the effect on the child of permanently severing any such
bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
L.M. entered foster care at the age of six months. Mother was
restricting L.M.’s intake of formula, causing L.M. to lose weight. N.T. Goal
Change/Termination Hearing, 8/26/15, at 8. Mother was diagnosed with
severe schizophrenia, id. at 8, and was not compliant with mental health,
drug and alcohol and visitation objectives. Id. at 15-16.
At permanency review hearings in February and May of 2014, Mother
was referred to the Clinical Evaluation Unit (CEU). She did not comply with
the court’s order for a CEU assessment; she did, however, receive mental
health services and drug and alcohol services.
At the October 15, 2014 permanency review hearing, Mother was
unavailable as she was incarcerated, having been charged with aggravated
assault and possessing an instrument of crime, as well as related charges.
See Permanency Review Order, 1015/14, DHS exhibit 2. At the April 1,
2015 permanency review hearing, which Mother attended, the court referred
her again to the CEU for drug screenings and five random screens prior to
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the next court date, which was listed for a goal change/termination
proceeding.
Mother did not attend the goal change/termination proceeding on
August 26, 2015. At that hearing, DHS presented the testimony of
Caseworker Nadiyah Beard, who testified Mother was not in mental health
treatment or receiving any medication, that she refused to submit to the
court ordered random drug screens, was not currently participating in drug
and alcohol treatment, and had failed to comply with her visitation schedule.
N.T. Goal Change/Termination Hearing, 826/15, at 8-10, 17-19.
Caseworker Beard also testified to the following: Mother and L.M. are
not bonded; Mother lacks the mental stability to care for L.M.; Mother’s
mental instability has compromised L.M.’s wellbeing; and, L.M. is very
bonded to her pre-adoptive foster parent, with whom she has lived for two
years. Id. at 11, 18. Caseworker Beard testified that termination of
Mother’s parental rights would not adversely affect L.M. and that adoption
was in L.M.’s best interests. Id. at 11-12, 20.
Following the hearing, the trial court terminated Mother’s parental
rights pursuant to sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and 2511(b). “[W]e
need only agree with [the trial court’s] decision as to any one subsection [of
2511(a)] in order to affirm the termination of parental rights.” In re B.L.W.,
843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
To satisfy the requirements of section 2511(a)(1), the moving party
must produce clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at
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least the six months prior to the filing of the termination petition, which
reveals a settled intent to relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or
failure to perform parental duties. In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
510 (Pa. Super. 2006). In addition, the court shall give primary
consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and
welfare of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on
the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the control of the
parent. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b).
The court concluded that Mother failed to perform parental duties for
the child for the period of six months prior to the filing of the petition for
termination, and that no bond had developed between Mother and L.M.
The record confirms that Mother has not benefited from the treatment she
has received, and that her mental health issues, her drug and alcohol issues,
and her lack of parenting skills has rendered her incapable of parenting L.M.
and has compromised L.M.’s health and well-being. We agree with the trial
court that there are considerable uncertainties regarding Mother’s ability to
care for L.M.’s basic needs. We conclude, therefore, that DHS has met its
burden of establishing termination under section 2511(a)(1), and that
termination would best serve the developmental, physical and emotional
needs and welfare of the child. 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). See In re K.M., 53
A.3d 781, 791 (Pa. Super. 2012). See also In re E.M., 620 A.2d 481, 485
(Pa. 1993) (determination of child’s needs and welfare requires
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consideration of emotional bonds between parent and child and “utmost
attention” should be paid to discerning effect on child of permanently
severing parental bond). Our review of the record reveals that the trial
court’s decision to terminate Mother’s parental rights under sections
2511(a)(1) and (b), is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion. In re Adoption of S.P., supra.
The competent evidence in the record supports the court’s determination
that the termination of Mother’s parental rights to L.M. is in L.M.’s best
interests, and that L.M. would not suffer any harm from the termination of
Mother’s parental rights.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order termination Mother’s
parental rights to L.M.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/1/2016
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