In Re:Adoption of: F.H. etc. minors Appeal of:M.H. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: F.H., Z.H. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
(MINOR CHILDREN) :
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
:
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APPEAL OF: M.H., FATHER :
:
: No. 1116 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Orders entered on June 26, 2015
in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County,
Orphans' Court Division, No(s): 63-15-0241; 63-15-0242
BEFORE: BOWES, OLSON, and STRASSBURGER,* JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY OLSON, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 05, 2016
M.H. (“Father”) appeals from the orders1 dated June 25, 2015, and
entered on June 26, 2015, granting the petitions filed by the Washington
County Children and Youth Social Service Agency (“CYS” or the “Agency”) to
involuntarily terminate his parental rights to his dependent, special needs
children, F.H., a female born in September of 2003, and Z.H., a male born in
* Retired Senior Judge specially assigned to the Superior Court.
1
On November 16, 2015, this Court, acting sua sponte, dismissed Father’s
appeal at Docket No. 1117 WDA 2015 as duplicative, and preserved the right
for him to assert issues properly raised at that docket number in the present
appeal.
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September of 2005 (collectively, “the Children”), pursuant to the Adoption
Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b).2 We affirm.
The trial court set forth the relevant history of this case in its
opinion. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 1-14. We adopt the trial
court’s recitation for purposes of this appeal. See id.
On July 20, 2015, Father timely filed a notice of appeal along with a
concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a)(2)(i) and (b).
In his brief on appeal, Father raises two questions for this Court’s
review, as follows:
I. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s
parental rights where [F]ather was compliant with the court-
ordered services but was unable to obtain employment or
housing that was outside of his control pursuant to § 2511(b)[?]
II. Whether the trial court improperly terminated Father’s
parental rights where testimony indicated that [F]ather had a
close bond with the [C]hild[ren] and that severing the bond
would have a detrimental effect on the [] [C]hildren[?]
Father’s Brief at 6.
In reviewing an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, we
adhere to the following standard:
[A]ppellate courts must apply an abuse of discretion standard
when considering a trial court’s determination of a petition for
termination of parental rights. As in dependency cases, our
standard of review requires an appellate court to accept the
2
C.K., the natural mother of the Children, (“Mother”), died in June of 2011.
N.T., 6/25/15, at 12.
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findings of fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if
they are supported by the record. In re: R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9
A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010). If the factual findings are
supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial court
made an error of law or abused its discretion. Id.; R.I.S., [614
Pa. 275, 284,] 36 A.3d 567, 572 (Pa. 2011) (plurality opinion)].
As has been often stated, an abuse of discretion does not result
merely because the reviewing court might have reached a
different conclusion. Id.; see also Samuel Bassett v. Kia
Motors America, Inc., 613 Pa. 371[, 455], 34 A.3d 1, 51 (Pa.
2011); Christianson v. Ely, [575 Pa. 647, 654-655], 838 A.2d
630, 634 (Pa. 2003). Instead, a decision may be reversed for an
abuse of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. Id.As we discussed in R.J.T., there are clear reasons for applying
an abuse of discretion standard of review in these cases. We
observed that, unlike trial courts, appellate courts are not
equipped to make the fact-specific determinations on a cold
record, where the trial judges are observing the parties during
the relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other
hearings regarding the child and parents. R.J.T., [608 Pa. at
28-30], 9 A.3d at 1190. Therefore, even where the facts could
support an opposite result, as is often the case in dependency
and termination cases, an appellate court must resist the urge to
second guess the trial court and impose its own credibility
determinations and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial
judges so long as the factual findings are supported by the
record and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an
error of law or an abuse of discretion. In re Adoption of
Atencio, [539 Pa. 161, 165,] 650 A.2d 1064, 1066 (Pa. 1994).
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. 309, 325-26, 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (2012).
The burden is upon the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing
evidence that the asserted grounds for seeking the termination of parental
rights are valid. In re R.N.J., 985 A.2d 273, 276 (Pa. Super. 2009).
Moreover, we have explained:
[t]he standard of clear and convincing evidence is defined as
testimony that is so “clear, direct, weighty and convincing as to
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enable the trier of fact to come to a clear conviction, without
hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.”
Id. quoting In re J.L.C., 837 A.2d 1247, 1251 (Pa. Super. 2003).
This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision regarding the
termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection of section
2511(a). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en
banc). The trial court terminated Father’s parental rights under sections
2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b). See Trial Court Opinion, at 9/2/15, at 1.
Sections 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and (b) provide as follows:
§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child may
be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at
least six months immediately preceding the filing of the
petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused or
failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence
necessary for his physical or mental well-being and the
conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency for a period of at least six months, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the
child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not
remedy those conditions within a reasonable period of
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time, the services or assistance reasonably available to
the parent are not likely to remedy the conditions which
led to the removal or placement of the child within a
reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the
child.
***
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the
parent by the court or under a voluntary agreement with
an agency, 12 months or more have elapsed from the
date of removal or placement, the conditions which led to
the removal or placement of the child continue to exist
and termination of parental rights would best serve the
needs and welfare of the child.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights of
a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The
rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511.
This Court has explained that the focus in terminating parental rights
under section 2511(a) is on the parent, but, under section 2511(b), the
focus is on the child. In re Adoption of C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999, 1008 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (en banc).
We could find that Father waived any challenge to the trial court’s
findings as to section 2511(a) and the subsections thereof by failing to
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challenge specifically that section in his concise statement and brief. See
Krebs v. United Refining Company of Pennsylvania, 893 A.2d 776, 797
(Pa. Super. 2006) (holding that an appellant waives issues that are not
raised in both his or her concise statement of errors complained of on appeal
and the Statement of Questions Involved in his or her brief on appeal).
However, given the broad language used by Appellant in his concise
statement and brief and, under an abundance of caution, we will review the
trial court’s holdings under section 2511(a). We will focus on subsection
2511(a)(2), and adopt the trial court’s discussion in its opinion as this
Court’s own.3 See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 15-20.
The Supreme Court set forth our inquiry under section 2511(a)(2) as
follows:
[Section] 2511(a)(2) provides [the] statutory ground[] for
termination of parental rights where it is demonstrated by
clear and convincing evidence that “[t]he repeated and
continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of the parent
has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental
well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by
the parent.” . . .
[The Supreme Court] has addressed incapacity sufficient for
termination under § 2511(a)(2):
A decision to terminate parental rights, never to be
made lightly or without a sense of compassion for the
parent, can seldom be more difficult than when
termination is based upon parental incapacity. The
3
We note that the trial court relied on its discussion of the facts in relation to
section 2511(a)(1) to support its analysis under section 2511(a)(2).
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legislature, however, in enacting the 1970 Adoption Act,
concluded that a parent who is incapable of performing
parental duties is just as parentally unfit as one who
refuses to perform the duties.
In re Adoption of J.J., 515 A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986),
quoting In re: William L., 383 A.2d 1228, 1239 (Pa.
1978).
In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 326-327, 47 A.3d at 827.
This Court has stated that a parent is required to make diligent efforts
towards the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental responsibilities.
In re A.L.D. 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa. Super. 2002). A parent’s vow to
cooperate, after a long period of uncooperativeness regarding the necessity
or availability of services, may properly be rejected as untimely or
disingenuous. Id. at 340.
The trial court assessed the evidence regarding Father’s repeated
incapacity to parent the Children, and his inability to remedy the conditions
and causes of his incapacity to parent the Children, at length, which we
adopt herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 9/2/15, at 9-12.
The trial court found that the repeated and continued incapacity,
abuse, neglect or refusal of Father has caused the Children to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for their physical or
mental well-being and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse,
neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied by Father. See Trial Court
Opinion, 8/26/15, at 19.
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Father contends that the trial court abused its discretion and erred as
a matter of law in terminating his parental rights when CYS failed to provide
him with reasonable efforts to promote reunification between him and the
Children prior to filing the termination petitions. Father’s Brief, at 9-10.
Specifically, Father complains that he lacked employment, despite applying
for jobs, and that he lacked housing and a vehicle, until his mother,
(“Paternal Grandmother”), gave him a vehicle at the time of the termination
hearing. Father asserts that CYS did not contact Paternal Grandmother to
inquire whether she would move back with Father when he obtained housing
or independently become a placement resource for the Children. Id. at 10.
Father states that Paternal Grandmother later moved to the Poconos to care
for an elderly friend. He complains that CYS never contacted her as a
placement resource for the Children, despite Father’s request to consider
her.
Our Supreme Court held, however, that the trial court is not required
to consider reasonable efforts in relation to a decision to terminate parental
rights under section 2511(a)(2). In the Interest of: D.C.D., ___ Pa. ___,
___, 105 A.3d 662, 675 (2014). Thus, we find his argument lacks merit.
The facts, as found by the trial court, nevertheless, support the
conclusion that CYS made reasonable efforts to reunify the Children with
Father, and Father failed to make sufficient progress with the services
offered to him. The trial court stated:
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[T]he [C]hildren were placed in foster care in 2011 due to the
parents’ drug use as well as their failure to provide appropriate
medical care and safe and appropriate housing for the
[C]hildren. Again in 2014, the [C]hildren were placed in foster
care because [Father] failed to comply with his own treatment,
failed to provide appropriate medical care, and failed to provide
[a] safe and appropriate home for the [C]hildren. For the past
thirteen (13) months [Father] proved unable to remedy these
circumstances. Furthermore, he did not consistently comply
with his own services while the [C]hildren were in placement.
For these and all of the above reasons, the [c]ourt found that
the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence that
grounds for termination under Subsection [2511] (a)(2) existed.
Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 19-21.
Although a reasonable efforts inquiry is not an element to a
termination decision under section 2511(a)(2), our review of the record
shows that there is ample evidence to support a determination that CYS
made reasonable efforts, yet Father failed to make sufficient progress with
the services provided to successfully be capable of parenting the Children.
As the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the record, and the
court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law or an abuse of
discretion, we affirm the trial court’s orders with regard to subsection
2511(a)(2). In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at 826-27.
Next, we review the termination of Father’s parental rights under
section 2511(b). Our Supreme Court recently stated as follows.
[I]f the grounds for termination under subsection (a) are met, a
court “shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child.” 23
Pa.C.S. § 2511(b). The emotional needs and welfare of the child
have been properly interpreted to include “[i]ntangibles such as
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love, comfort, security, and stability.” In re K.M., 53 A.3d 781,
791 (Pa. Super. 2012). In In re E.M., [620 A.2d 481, 485 (Pa.
1993)], this Court held that the determination of the child’s
“needs and welfare” requires consideration of the emotional
bonds between the parent and child. The “utmost attention”
should be paid to discerning the effect on the child of
permanently severing the parental bond. In re K.M., 53 A.3d at
791.
In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 628-629, 71 A.3d 251, 267 (2013).
Father asserts that there was no expert testimony regarding the bond
between the Children and him, and no evidence of a true bonding
assessment. He also asserts that the evidence presented at the hearing
indicated that there is a close bond between the Children and him. Father’s
Brief at 14. For these reasons, Father claims the trial court failed to properly
conduct its bond analysis under section 2511(b). Id.We have stated that, in conducting a bonding analysis, the court is not
required to use expert testimony, but may rely on the testimony of social
workers and caseworkers. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108, 1121 (Pa. Super.
2010). This Court has also observed that no bond worth preserving is
formed between a child and a natural parent where the child has been in
foster care for most of the child’s life, and the resulting bond with the
natural parent is attenuated. In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 764 (Pa. Super.
2008). It is appropriate to consider a child’s bond with his or her foster
parent. See In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 629-630, 71 A.3d at 268.
In addition, in In re: T.S.M., our Supreme Court set forth the process
for evaluating the existing bond between a parent and a child, and the
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necessity for the court to focus on concerns of an unhealthy attachment and
the availability of an adoptive home. The Supreme Court stated the
following:
[C]ontradictory considerations exist as to whether termination
will benefit the needs and welfare of a child who has a strong but
unhealthy bond to his biological parent, especially considering
the existence or lack thereof of bonds to a pre-adoptive family.
As with dependency determinations, we emphasize that the law
regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests
and the needs and welfare of the particular children involved.
See, e.g., R.J.T., [9 A.3d 1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)] (holding that
statutory criteria of whether child has been in care for fifteen of
the prior twenty-two months should not be viewed as a “litmus
test” but rather as merely one of many factors in considering
goal change). Obviously, attention must be paid to the pain that
inevitably results from breaking a child’s bond to a biological
parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must weigh that
injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact.
Similarly, while termination of parental rights generally should
not be granted unless adoptive parents are waiting to take a
child into a safe and loving home, termination may be necessary
for the child’s needs and welfare in cases where the child’s
parental bond is impeding the search and placement with a
permanent adoptive home.
[The Adoption and Safe Families Act of 1997, P.L. 105-89]
ASFA[,] was enacted to combat the problem of foster care drift,
where children . . . are shuttled from one foster home to
another, waiting for their parents to demonstrate their ability to
care for the children. See In re R.J.T., 9 A.3d at 1186; In re
Adoption of S.E.G., [901 A.2d 1017, 1019 (Pa. 2006)]. This
drift was the unfortunate byproduct of the system’s focus on
reuniting children with their biological parents, even in situations
where it was clear that the parents would be unable to parent in
any reasonable period of time. Following ASFA, Pennsylvania
adopted a dual focus of reunification and adoption, with the goal
of finding permanency for children in less than two years, absent
compelling reasons. See, 42 Pa.C.S. § 6301(b)(1); 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 6351(f)(9) (requiring courts to determine whether an agency
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has filed a termination of parental rights petition if the child has
been in placement for fifteen of the last twenty-two months).
In re: T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 631-632, 71 A.3d at 268-269.
In the present matter, the trial court considered the needs and welfare
of the Children, and set forth its bond-effect analysis. The trial court also
provided an explanation of why its termination decision was not based on
matters that were outside of Father’s control. We adopt the trial court’s
discussion herein. See Trial Court Opinion, 8/26/15, at 21-26. The trial
court properly considered the best interests of the Children in rendering its
decision that, although there was evidence of a bond between the Children
and Father, it was in their best interests to sever that bond. See id.; In re:
T.S.M., 620 Pa. at 631-632, 71 A.3d at 268-269.
Father testified that he loves the Children very much. N.T., 6/25/15,
at 121. As we stated in In re Z.P., a child’s life “simply cannot be put on
hold in the hope that [a parent] will summon the ability to handle the
responsibilities of parenting.” Id. at 1125. Rather, “a parent’s basic
constitutional right to the custody and rearing of his child is converted, upon
the failure to fulfill his or her parental duties, to the child’s right to have
proper parenting and fulfillment of his or her potential in a permanent,
healthy, safe environment.” In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 856 (Pa. Super.
2004). Again, as the trial court’s factual findings are supported by the
record, and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an error of law
or an abuse of discretion, we affirm the trial court’s decision with regard to
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section 2511(b). In re Adoption of S.P., 616 Pa. at 325-26, 47 A.3d at
826-27.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s orders terminating Father’s
parental rights. As we have adopted portions of the trial court’s opinion as
our own, the parties are directed to attach a copy of the trial court’s opinion
of August 26, 2015 to any future filings with this Court.
Orders affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/5/2016
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Circulated 01/29/2016 01:10 PM (-· _;_~.:\ .!..·
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS OF WASHINGTON COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA
ORPHANS' COURT DIVISION
In re: Adoption of
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F.H., 1116 WDA 2015
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Minor children. .
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OPINION '•· .
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The Court provides its opinion pursuant to Pa. R.A.P. 1925(A)(2)(ii).
Appellant M.H., Father, claims that the Court erred when it ordered his parental
rights terminated. Father contends that despite his compliance with court ordered
services he faced environmental challenges including the lack of employment and
stable housing. Father asserts that his dose bond with his children should not have
been severed because of the detrimental effect such termination will have on the
minor children.
Procedural History
On March 21, 2011, the Washington County Children & Youth Services
Agency (((The Agency") filed a petition with the Court to adjudicate F.H. (D.0.B.
9/10/03) and Z.H. (D.0.B. 9/11/05) dependent children pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. §
6391(1) and (5).
I. Adjudication
The Honorable John F. DiSalle scheduled an adjudicatory hearing for March
29, 2011 at 3:45 p.m. before Juvenile Hearing Office Dennis R. Paluso. At the first
scheduled hearing Mother C.I(. requested a continuance in order to acquire private
counsel. Mr. Paluso granted this request and recommended to the court that a new
hearing be set. On April 1, 2011, the Agency presented an Emergency Shelter
Petition that was granted by Judge DiSalle. Judge DiSalle ordered the children
temporarily placed pending a shelter care hearing. He also appointed legal counsel
for C.I(., and scheduled the shelter care hearing for April 5, 2011 before Mr.
Paluso.1
On April 5, 2011, Mr. Paluso held the emergency shelter hearing. Both
parties appeared represented by counsel. By agreement of the parties, the shelter
care hearing was converted into an adjudicatory and disposition hearing. At the
hearing, the parties stipulated to finding both Z.H. and F.H. to be dependent
children pursuant to 42 Pa. C.S.A. 6302 (1).
Mr. Paluso's findings indicated the Agency had been involved with the
family since September of 2010. The Agency alleged that M.H. was abusing
1
Prior to the March 29 hearing the children were temporarily placed in foster
care pursuant to a voluntary placement agreement between the Agency and the
parents. The voluntary placement agreement was set to expire before a
rescheduled adjudicatory hearing could be heard.
2
prescription drugs and methadone and that C.I(., who was also abusing drugs, had
left the home in July of 2010 only to return in February 2011. The family had been
unsuccessfully discharged from Justice Works Youth Care in-home services and
in-home Homemaker Services in the fall of 2010. The children's' school nurse had
complained that the children appeared malnourished and filthy in school.
Following the referral, the Agency caseworker went to the home to speak with
M.H., after which M.H. reportedly left the home with the children and broke
contact with the Agency. The Agency located M.H. outside a methadone clinic
approximately one month later. M.H. permitted the caseworker to see the children,
whom he was keeping in a hotel room, and at that time signed a voluntary
placement agreement. The caseworker referred the parents to the Justice Works
Parenting Education program, but again, the parents did not successfully follow
through with participating in the program.
F.H. suffers from holoprosencephaly-based cerebral palsy, a cephalic/cranial
birth defect that causes developmental delays and significant motor dysfunction.
She is wheelchair-bound, has required in-home nursing care, and is learning to
speak. At the time of the hearing, her parents had failed to seek medical treatment
to assist or mitigate her illness. At the time of the adjudicatory hearing, Z.H. had an
untreated eye condition. In March 2011, M.H. tested positive for benzodiazepine,
an anti-anxiety medication for which he lacked a prescription. M.H. admitted to
3
purchasing this drug illegally. At the same time, C.K. participated in drug testing
and tested positive for benzodiazepine and opiates. At that time, she had a
prescription for Vicodin and Xanax. At the time of the drug test, C.I(. showed
empty bottles of both to the agency caseworker, and she admitted that she had sold
her medication.
As of the hearing, Z.H. had missed twenty four (24) days of preschool since
November 12, 2010 and F.H. had missed eighty-eight (88) days of school for that
school year.
As part of Mr. Paluso's Adjudication and Disposition Order, he ordered
M.H. and C.I(. to each submit to random drug and alcohol testing, participate in
drug and alcohol evaluations, mental health evaluations, and a Justice Works
Youth Care Nurturing Parenting Program. He further ordered M.H. and C.I(. to
maintain safe and appropriate housing. Both parents were granted supervised
visitation two (2) hours every other week.
II. Permanency Hearings
C.K. died unexpectedly on June 7, 2011. Mr. Paluso held the initial
permanency review hearing on July 5, 2011. Since that time, M.H. had begun and
followed through on some of his ordered services, including gaining prescriptions
for his medication and attending parenting education classes. At the time of the
4
hearing, the permanency plan's primary goal was to return the children to their
parents, with a concurrent plan of adoption.
Mr. Paluso held further permanency review hearings on October 4, 2011,
January 3, 2012, March 6, 2012, April 3, 2012, May 1, 2012, and June 12, 2012.
The case was then transferred to Juvenile Hearing Officer Jessica Roberts, who
held permanency review hearings on October 12, 2011, January 11, 2013, March 8,
2013, June 7, 2013, January 27, 20142, April 4, 2014, August 4, 2014, September
8, 2014, November 3, 2014, January 5, 2015, March 9, 2015, and June 8, 2015. A
total of eighteen (18) permanency review hearings were conducted.
III. Placement
Z.H. and P.H. were placed in Agency foster care after the April 5, 2011
adjudicatory/shelter hearing. They remained in placement for approximately one
year and one month, until they were returned home to M.H. on May 11, 2012 when
the Court granted a consented-to motion presented by the Agency. They remained
home with M.H., who received in-home services, until January 31, 2014.
Following the January 27, 2014 permanency review hearing, the children
were placed first in kinship care and then in foster care because M.H. had become
unable to meet the physical and medical needs of both children and because he was
2
A review hearing was set for December 9, 2013. However, F.H. required hip surgery in December. On
November 26, 2013, the Agency, with consent of M.H., requested a continuance in order to provide F.H.
time to recuperate. The Honorable Katherine Emery granted this motion. The review hearing was pushed
to January 27, 2014.
5
facing eviction from his residence. The children remained in foster care placement
until the termination proceeding, having moved between several placement
providers due to their special treatment needs. Compliance with court ordered
services and the degree to which progress in alleviating the circumstances
necessitating placement greatly influenced these placement decisions.
IV. Compliance and Progress
As of the initial permanency review hearing on July 5, 2011, M.H. had been
moderately compliant with the permanency plan but had made little progress
towards aileviating the circumstances that had necessitated the original placement.
He had begun medication management and had undergone an intake appointment
for his mental health assessment but not followed up. He had a significant amount
of missing prescription medication. He had been inconsistent with attending
parenting education and the children's doctor appointments, but he began
consistently attending parenting education after C.K. 's death.
By the second permanency review hearing in October 2011, M.H. was
moderately compliant, participating in services, displaying a sanitary home, and
attending his mental health assessment, but was still missing medication.
By the third permanency review hearing on January.S, 2012, M.H.'s
progress and compliance had improved. He was attending almost all visitations and
doctors' appointments for the children. He had been successfully discharged from
6
several services and was taking part in drug and mental health treatment. At each
successive permanency review hearing, his visitation was increased. At the March
3, 2012 permanency review hearing, behavioral problems in Z.H. required further
services in the home of his foster parents.
On March 30, 2012, the Agency presented an emergency motion to the
Honorable Paul Pozonsky to move the children from one foster care placement to
another. The Agency's motion stated an original intent to return the children home
at that time, but due to a disagreement with the Guardian ad Litem requested
transfer to a different placement provider. Judge Pozonsky granted the motion. The
March and April 2012 permanency review hearings primarily concerned Z.H., who
was showing significant behavioral problems in his foster home. At both hearings,
M.H. was noted to be fully complying and making significant progress: He was
participating in medication management treatment, regularly attending methadone
treatment with notably good progress, attending the children's medical
appointments, keeping a clean and appropriate home, utilizing the parenting skills
taught by his previously discharged parenting education services, and attending
increased visitation. At that time, the Washington Communities Mental Health
program indicated they would advance M.H. to blended case management services
upon the return of the children to his home. M.H. was permitted overnight
visitation with the children.
7
At the March and April hearings, the issue of Z.H. 's compliance and
progress held back reunification. He had been displaying serious behavior
problems in his foster homes: in addition to verbal threats and physical aggression
directed towards his foster mother, Z.H. had to be restrained in a helmet to prevent
head injuries when he would repeatedly bang bis head into walls. A psychological
evaluation recommended Clonodine and Atomoxetine, both medications
commonly used to treat Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), as
well as wrap-around services to include twenty (20) hours per week of therapeutic
staff support, two (2) hours per week of mobile therapy, and four (4) hours per
week with a behavioral specialist. The recommended services with the behavioral
specialist were to be reduced to four (4) hours after the first month, and then Z.H.
was recommended to be further evaluated after six (6) weeks to determine if he
had a diagnosis on the autism spectrum.
At the May 1, 2012 permanency review, Mr. Paluso indicated that upon
Z.H.'s acceptance by Pressley Ridge for Family Based Therapy, the children could
return home to M.H. by way of motion. The children were returned on May 11,
2015 after the Honorable John F. DiSalle granted the Agency's motion to return
the children to M.H.'s home.
The July 10, 2012, October 12, 2012, and January 11, 2013 permanency
review hearings indicated improving outcomes: in addition to M.H. 's continued
8
full compliance and significant progress, Z.H. was responding well to his treatment
and the family had begun taking part in blended case management services. F.H.'s
pediatrician prescribed in-home nursing services to assist M.H. in caring full-time
for F.H. which began between the July and October hearings. Juvenile Hearing
Officer Jessica Roberts took over the case for Mr. Paluso on October 12, 2012.
At the March 8, 2013 permanency review hearing, Mrs. Roberts noted that
recently provided in-home service providers had resulted in "a great deal of
improvement" in the home. However, the children's truancy began to be a notable
problem, with F.H. missing thirteen (13) of the previous thirty eight (38) days of
school. The June 7, 2013 permanency review hearing similarly indicated
compliance on M.H. 's part and significant progress, indicating that while Z.H. and
F.H. had missed increasing amounts of school days, M.H. was handling Z.H. 's
refusal to attend school in an improved and appropriate manner.
A review hearing was set for December 9, 2013. However, F.H. required hip
surgery in December. On November 26, 2013, the Agency, with consent of M.H.,
requested a continuance in order to provide F.H. time to recuperate. The Honorable
Katherine Emery granted this motion. The review hearing was pushed to January
27, 2014.
At the January 27, 2014 hearing, the trajectory of the case changed
significantly. While M.H. had continued to participate in his medication
9
management and methadone treatment, he had failed to keep the children up to
date on their medical appointments and was no longer consistently attending
mental health therapy. Try-Again Homes terminated the in-home Family
Preservation services due to M.H. 's noncompliance. P.H. 's home nurse had been
reassigned to a different home and was not replaced by the service provider.
M.H. 's insurance company, before terminating his insurance, refused to cover the
cost of an in-home nurse for P.H. following her surgery. M.H. was also
inconsistent in ensuring F.H.'s follow-up care. She missed follow-up appointments
at a nutrition clinic and with her pediatrician. Z.H. 's absences had increased to
thirty (30) for the school year, and M.H. did not keep a mental health assessment
appointment for Z.H.
Furthermore, Mrs. Roberts indicated that it was an issue at the hearing
whether or not the home had sufficient food for the children and whether or not the
home continued to be a clean, safe, and appropriate environment for the children.
M.H. had sufficient income to afford his rent at that time. See H.T. 53, In. 3, H.T
78, In. 23. However, he was delinquent on several months' rent by January of
2014. See H.T. 46 In. 4. M.H. admitted that he was to be evicted on January 31,
2014. His apartment was provided to him fully furnished. See H.T. 53, In. 9. Much
of this furniture was missing at the time of his eviction. H.T. 53, ln. 14. M.H.
procured some additional replacement furniture without contacting the Agency
10
providers that assisted him in originally furnishing the apartment. See H.T. 53, 54.
Instead, he rented furniture through Rent-A-Center. See H.T. 104, 105. He
explained at the termination proceeding that this was due to F.H. being sick and
ruining the existing furniture. Id. The Court did not find this explanation credible.
See H.T. 80.
Due to the convergence of issues, M.H. asked the court to place the children
at that time. See Termination Hearing Transcript, pages 109, 132.
Mrs. Roberts ordered the children to be placed in kinship care with Patty
Papa, on January 30, 2014. After the hearing, the Agency discovered that Ms. Papa
could not take the children and requested via emergency motion to place the
children in foster care. The Court granted this motion on January 30, 2014. The
Agency requested joint signatory rights on February 27, 2014 in the event that
M.H. could not be located to provide consent for the children's medical care. The
Court granted this motion.
M.H.'s compliance and progress did not recover to the levels that existed in
2013. At the next permanency review hearing, on May 5, 2014, Mrs. Roberts
found M.H. 's compliance and progress to be minimal. He had been attending the
children's medical appointments and continuing with his methadone treatment, but
had only attended 6 of the previous twelve (12) mental health treatment sessions.
11
He had not yet secured safe and appropriate housing. He was no longer
communicating with his blended case manager.
M.H. 's compliance and progress did not increase at the August 4, September
8, and November 3, 2014 permanency review hearings. He was not able to procure
safe and appropriate housing and he continued to be inconsistent in both drug and
mental health treatment. He began visiting the children less regularly.
At the January 5, 2015, Mrs. Roberts found M.H. to have moderately
complied with the permanency plan, by re-engaging in his services and treatment.
However, he had not managed to procure housing and had no family members
willing or able to assist in caring for the children's needs. As such, his progress
remained minimal.
The Agency filed a petition to involuntarily terminate M.H.'s parental rights
on February 25, 2015.
At the March 9, 2015 Permanency Review hearing, Mrs. Roberts found
M.H.'s compliance and progress to be minimal. M.H.'s blended case manager
indicated that he had not seen M.H. in a considerable amount of time, and he
remained unemployed and without housing. He had not been regularly visiting the
children, particularly F.H.
At the June 8, 2015 permanency hearing, Mrs. Roberts again found M.H. 's
compliance and progress to be minimal, again through minimal and inconsistent .
12
mental health treatment and visitation. She wrote "The Master believes that [M.H.]
has a strong desire to be reunited with his children and love for his children;
however, he puts forth minimal effort in obtaining reunification."
Standard of Review
In an appeal from an order terminating parental rights, "[the Superior Court
is] limited to determining whether the decision of the trial court is supported by
competent evidence." In the Interest of S.H., 879 A.2d 802, 805 (Pa. Super. 2005),
appeal denied, 586 Pa. 751, 892 A.2d 824 (2005) (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d
1197, 1199 (Pa. Super. 2000)). "We are bound by the findings of the trial court
which have adequate support in the record so long as the findings do not evidence
capricious disregard for competent and credible evidence." In re M. G., 855 A.2d
68, 73 (Pa. Super. 2004) (quoting In re Diaz, 447 Pa. Super. 327, 669 A.2d 372,
375 (1995)). The trial court, not the appellate court, is charged with the
responsibilities of evaluating credibility of the witnesses and resolving any
conflicts in the testimony. Id. at 73-74; In re Adoption of A.C.H., 803 A.2d 224,
228 (Pa. Super. 2002). In carrying out these responsibilities, the trial court is free
to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. In re M. G., 855 A.2d at 73- 7 4. When
the trial court's findings are supported by competent evidence of record, we will
affirm "even if the record could also support an opposite result." In the Interest of
13
S.H., 879 A.2d at 806. Absent an abuse of discretion, an error of law, or
insufficient evidentiary support, the trial court's terniination order must stand. In re
C.A1.S., 884 A.2d 1284, 1286 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Termination
The Agency filed its petition to Terminate M.H. 's parental rights on
February 25, 2015. The Court originally scheduled the proceeding for May 13,
2015, but rescheduled the proceeding to May 6, 2015. On May 6, 2015, the Court
rescheduled the proceeding for June 25, 2015, to provide M.H. an opportunity to
participate in Termination of Parental Rights consultation services.
The Court held the termination of parental rights proceeding on June 25,
2015.
The statute permitting the termination of parental rights outlines certain
irreducible minimum requirements of care that parents must provide for their
children. A parent who cannot or will not meet the requirements within a
reasonable time following intervention by the state, may properly be considered
unfit and may properly have his or her rights terminated. In re. K.Z.S., 946 A.2d
753 (Pa. Super. 2003), citing In re B.L.L, 787 A.2d 1007 (Pa. Super. 2001).
14
The Agency requested the Court to terminate M.H. 's parental rights
pursuant to Subsections 1, 2, 5, and 8 of chapter 2511 of the Adoption Act,
enumerated below:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of at least six
months immediately preceding the filing of the petition either has
evidenced a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child
or has refused or failed to perform parental duties.
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal of
the parent has caused the child to be without essential parental care,
control or subsistence necessary for his physical or mental well-being
and the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by the parent.
(5) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency for a period of at
least six months, the conditions which led to the removal or placement
of the child continue to exist, the parent cannot or will not remedy
those conditions within a reasonable period of time, the services or
assistance reasonably available to the parent are not likely to remedy
the conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
within a reasonable period of time and termination of the parental
rights would best serve the needs and welfare of the child.
(8) The child has been removed from the care of the parent by the
court or under a voluntary agreement with an agency, 12 months or
more have elapsed from the date of removal or placement, the
conditions which led to the removal or placement of the child
continue to exist and termination of parental rights would best serve
the needs and welfare of the child.
23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8).
Pennsylvania appellate courts have observed that there is no simple or easy
definition of parental duties. Parental duty is best understood in relation to the
15
needs of a child. A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive interest in the
development of the child. A parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses more than a financial
obligation; it requires continuing interest in the child and a genuine effort to
maintain communication and association with the child. In re J.T. 983 A.2d 7711
(Pa. Super. 2009), citing In re Burns, 474 Pa. 615, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (1977).
Pursuant to Subsection (a)(l), the Court must determine if the Agency
established by clear and convincing evidence that for at least the six months prior
to the filing of the termination petition, M.H. failed to perform his parental duty or
evidenced a settled purpose to relinquish his parental rights. § 2511(a)(1), see also
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502 (Pa. Super. 2006). Furthermore, in
examining the parent's conduct, the court must look not only to the six (6) months
before the petition but also examine the totality of the circumstances of the case,
including the parent's explanation and overall circumstances. In re B., NM.1 856
A.2d 847 (Pa. Super. 2004), citing In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super.
1999).
M.H. has a clear commitment and love for his children, but the record
indicated that M.H. did not have a commitment to reunification. [The Superior
Court has] held that a parent's own feelings of love and affection for a child, alone,
16
do not prevent termination of parental rights. In. re T.111. T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa.
Super. 2013), citing In reL.M., 923 A.2d 505, 512 (Pa. Super. 2007). Z.H. and
F.H. have spent only twenty-one (21) of the preceding fifty (50) months in M.H. 's
care. The children were in foster care placement for the six months preceding the
filing of the petition.
Parental rights are not preserved by waiting for a more suitable or
convenient time to perform one's parental responsibilities while others provide the
child with his or her physical and emotional needs. In re B., N.111., 856 A.2d 847,
855, citing In re D.J.S., 737 A.2d 283, 286 (Pa. Super. 1999). A parent must
utilize all available resources to preserve the parental relationship, and must
exercise reasonable firmness in resisting obstacles placed in the path of
maintaining the parent-child relationship. In re B., N.A1., 856 A.2d at 855, citing In
re C.M.S., 832 A.2d 457, 462 (Pa. Super. 2003).
The children were placed into foster care in 2011 due to M.H. and C.K.'s
drug abuse, unsafe and inappropriate home environment, and inability to meet the
children's needs. Since the second placement of the children in January of 2014,
M.H. made little to no progress in alleviating similar circumstances. He did not
regularly participate in all of his drug or mental health treatment, he failed to
regularly attend doctor's appointments and visitation, and he could not procure
17
employment or safe and appropriate housing necessary to meet the children's
needs.
M.H. admitted his own concerns with his ability to care for Z.H. and P.H.
during a hearing before Mrs. Roberts in August of 2014. H.T. 28, ln. 19, H.T. 109,
In. 13. Furthermore, M.H. testified that he had applied for approximately "40 plus"
or "50" jobs. See H.T. 114. He did not elaborate on what jobs he had applied for or
where he had done so. The Court did not find this testimony credible.
This is not a case where the children were simply returned home to M.H.
with no services or support. The Agency did not seek termination because M.H.
lacked the financial resources to care for the children. Significant resources were
expended to provide M.H. in-home care so that he could provide for F.H. and
Z.H.'s special needs. He gained his housing with assistance from the Agency. He
was provided furniture. Z.H. had multiple service providers and P.H. had in-home
nursing care. Ultimately, M.H. did not comply with his drug or mental health
treatment, he did not ensure his children received all necessary medical care, and
he did not maintain a safe and appropriate home for the children. These
circumstances were entirely within his control. For these reasons, the Court found
that the Agency met its burden by clear and convincing evidence to prove that
grounds existed for termination pursuant to Subsection (a)(l).
18
Pursuant to Subsection (a)(2), the Court must determine that 1) M.H.'s lack
of parenting ability (the repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal of the parent) caused the children to be without essential parental care and
control, 2) that the conditions and causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect, or
refusal cannot or will not be remedied by M.H.
"(A] parent who is incapable of performing parental duties is just as
parentally unfit as one who refuses to perform the duties." In re Adoption of S.P.,
616 Pa. 309, 47 A.3d 817 (Pa. 2012), citingAdoption of J.J., 511 Pa. 590, 515
A.2d 883, 891 (Pa. 1986). As discussed above, the children were placed in foster
care in 2011 due to the parents' drug use as well as their failure to provide
appropriate medical care and safe and appropriate housing for the children. Again
in 2014, the children were placed in foster care because M.H. failed to comply with
his own treatment, failed to provide appropriate medical care, and failed to provide
safe and appropriate home for the children. For the past thirteen (13) months M.H.
proved unable to remedy these circumstances. Furthermore, he did not consistently
comply with his own services while the children were in placement. For these and
all of the above reasons, the Court found that the Agency met its burden by clear
and convincing evidence that grounds for termination under Subsection (a)(2)
existed.
19
Pursuant to Subsection (a)(S)) the court must determine if 1) the conditions
that led to the removal or placement of the children continue to exist after the
passage of six (6) months, 2) M.H. cannot or will not remedy those conditions
within a reasonable period of time, and 3) the services that are available to the
parents are not likely to remedy the conditions that led to removal.
As set forth above, the Court found that the conditions that led to the
placement of F.H. and Z.H. continued to exist and that l\1.H. failed to remedy these
conditions since placement. The services made available to M.H. have not
remedied these conditions and are not likely to do so. M.H. has been in
uninterrupted Methadone treatment for approximately seven and a half years. See
H.T. 31, 34. Testimony at the hearing indicated that his medical providers
recommended indefinite Methadone treatment. See H.T. 41.The conditions that led
to placement in 2014 were similar to those that led to placement in 2011. This
relapse indicates that despite his genuine intent to alleviate the circumstances that
necessitated placement, he is unable to correct these problems in a timely fashion.
Four years and three months is simply too long a period of time for Z.H. and F.H.
to wait.
Finally, pursuant to Subsection (a)(8), the Court must determine if 1) the
conditions that led to the removal or placement of the children continue to exist
after the passage of twelve (12) months. Once the 12-month period has been
20
established, the court must next determine whether the conditions that led to the
children's removal continue to exist, despite the reasonable good faith efforts of
[the Agency] supplied over a realistic time period. In re T.111.T., 64 A.3d 1119 (Pa.
Super. 2013), quoting In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008).
As of the filing of the petition, thirteen months had elapsed from the
placement of the children. The Court notes that while there have been varying
findings of minimal and moderate compliance since January 2014, such findings
are not as important as the findings on progress. A case may readily exist where a
party is minimally compliant but makes progress in alleviating the circumstances.
However, M.H. has made only minimal progress since January of 2014. For this,
and for all of the above mentioned reasons, the conditions that led to placement
continue to exist. It is on this basis the Court found that the Agency met its burden
under Subsection (a)(8).
In addition to establishing one of the enumerated grounds for termination,
the Court must also determine by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights best meets the needs and welfare of the children. 23 Pa. C.S.A. §
2511(b ). The law regarding termination of parental rights should not be applied
mechanically but instead always with an eye to the best interests and the needs and
welfare of the particular children involved. In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251(Pa. 2013), citing In re R.J.T., 608 Pa. 9, 9 A.3d 1179 (Pa. 2010).
21
In determining if termination best meets the needs of the children, the Court
must examine the nature and strength of the parent-child bond and the effect of the
severance of that bond. In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284 (Pa. Super. 2005).
Attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from breaking a
child's bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and we must
weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact. In re
T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 269.
In the present case, the children have not yet formed a bond with their foster
care placement providers and are not in a potentially permanent pre-adoptive
placement. However, the best interests of the children do not require the Court to
find in favor of an existing but unhealthy bond in this circumstance. A panel of the
Superior Court recently held:
(There] was no evidence presented during the hearing that
Child is bonded with his current foster family. Further, there was no
testimony as to whether or not Child's current foster placement is pre-
adoptive. However, these concerns are outweighed in the instant case
by Mother's repeated failure to remedy her parental incapacity, and by
Child's need for permanence and stability. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d
910, 920-23 (Pa Super. 2008); In re Adoption of J.M., 991 A.2d 321,
325 (Pa. Super. 2010), quoting In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502,
513 (Pa. Super. 2006). Clearly, it would not be in Child's best interest
for his life to remain on hold indefinite! y in hopes that Mother will
one day be able to act as his parent. In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825
A.2d 1266, 1276 (Pa. Super. 2003) ("A child's life simply cannot be
put on hold in the hope that the parent will summon the ability to
handle the responsibilities of parenting.")
22
In re Adoption of C.D.R., 2015 PA Super 54, 111 A.3d 1212, 1220 (Pa. Super.
2015)
The Court cannot and will not subordinate indefinitely a child's need for
permanence and stability to a parent's claims of progress and hope for the future.
In re Adoption of R.J.S., 901 A.2d 502, 513 (Pa. Super. 2006).
Both F.H. and Z.H. are special needs children. Z.H. is diagnosed with
A.D.H.D., an autism spectrum disorder, and nystagmus. He has been undergoing
treatment since 2012 with a variety of therapies and medications. See H.T. 61, 62.
P.H. has cerebral palsy and has been diagnosed with a "failure to thrive" condition.
She requires in-home care, handicap accessible housing, an enhanced diet, and
several medications. See H.T. 59, 60. M.H. 's inability to provide the children with
even the minimum of parental care underscores their need for permanence.
M.H. testified that he loved his children and that they loved him. The
evidence on the matter of the strong emotional bond between M.H. and his
children was essentially undisputed. But M.H. proved over the past several years
that even with extensive assistance, he struggled and failed to meet their needs.
Given their needs and welfare, preserving this bond will only serve to harm the
best interests of Z.H. and F.H. The Court could not, out of an effort at mercy or
eternal optimism, prolong the instability that Z.H. and F.H. have experienced in
their lives. The Court could not subject them to further uncertain temporary foster
23
placements in the hope that M.H. will eventually be able to acquire safe and stable
housing, provide for their needs, and provide for his own.
It was for these reasons that the Court found that the Agency met its burden
by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for involuntary termination of
parental rights existed pursuant to 23 Pa. C.S.A. § 2511.
M.H.'s Compliance and Circumstances
M.H., in his concise statement of errors, claims that the Court terminated his
parental rights improperly on grounds that were outside of M.H. 's control. The
termination of parental rights may not occur "solely on the basis of environmental
factors such as inadequate housing and furnishings, income, clothing and medical
care if found to be beyond the control of the parent." 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b)
"Other considerations."
M.H. was consistently noted as having minimally complied with court-
ordered services and having made minimal progress towards alleviating the
circumstances that led to placement. These findings were made at seven (7)
permanency review hearings since the children were placed into foster care. M.H.
had an opportunity to challenge these findings at each hearing, or appeal the
Court's Orders, and did not.
24
As discussed above, the circumstances that led to termination of M.H. 's
parental rights were within his control. M.H. had begun making progress to
alleviate the circumstances that resulted in the original placement when he was
complying with all court-ordered services. However, despite all of the services
placed in his home, M.H. was unable to keep up with the needs of his children,
could not provide a safe and appropriate home, and could not remain consistent
with his own treatment. As the record indicates that M.H. 's parental rights were
terminated for reasons that were within his control, the Court did not err.
Parental Bond
In his concise statement of errors, M.H. claims that the Court improperly
terminated his parental rights where testimony indicated that he had a close bond
with the children and that severing the bond would have a detrimental effect on the
minor children. "Attention must be paid to the pain that inevitably results from
breaking a child's bond to a biological parent, even if that bond is unhealthy, and
we must weigh that injury against the damage that bond may cause if left intact."
In re T.S.M., 620 Pa. 602, 71 A.3d 251, 269 (Pa. 2013).
Testimony regarding M.H. 's bond with his children was essentially
undisputed. While this bond was strong, the court considered this bond in relation
to the best needs of Z.H. and F.H. and determined that the best interests of the
25
children still required the termination of M.H. 's parental rights. As the record
supported this finding, the Court did not err.
Conclusion
At the termination proceeding, M.H. attempted to present this case as one
within the confines of§ 2511(b ); that the Agency sought to separate him from his
children due to his poverty. This is simply not the case. The Court found clear and
convincing evidence in favor of termination due to M.H. 's reoccurring, prolonged,
and irreparable inability to meet the multifaceted needs of his children.
It is for these reasons that this Court's order of termination should be
affirmed.
26