Com. v. Davis, A. ( 2016 )


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  • J-S44022-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    ANTHONY I. DAVIS, JR.
    Appellant                    No. 2811 EDA 2015
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered August 18, 2015
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Delaware County
    Criminal Division at No: CP-23-CR-0005196-2013
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., STABILE, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.:                          FILED AUGUST 24, 2016
    Appellant, Anthony I. Davis, Jr., appeals from the August 18, 2015
    judgment of sentence imposing six to twenty-three months of incarceration
    with credit for time served and immediate probation upon completion of an
    anger management program.            Counsel has filed a brief and petition to
    withdraw pursuant to Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967) and
    Commonwealth v. Santiago, 
    978 A.2d 349
     (Pa. 2009).              We affirm the
    judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s petition to withdraw.
    On November 12, 2013, Appellant pled nolo contendere to one count
    of simple assault (18 Pa.C.S.A. § 2701) and the trial court imposed two
    years of probation.     The trial court ordered Appellant to undergo anger
    J-S44022-16
    management treatment and avoid inappropriate contact with the victim, his
    wife. On August 18, 2015, the trial court conducted a Gagnon II1 hearing,
    to address an alleged probation violation.       At that hearing, Appellant’s
    probation officer testified that Appellant contacted his wife by telephone and
    threatened to kill her. Appellant expressed remorse for the incident. The
    trial court revoked Appellant’s probation and imposed the sentence on
    appeal.
    Counsel filed an Anders Brief addressing Appellant’s contention that
    the trial court abused its discretion in sentencing Appellant to total
    confinement.     Before we address the merits, we consider the adequacy of
    counsel’s Anders/Santiago brief, which must comply with the following:
    (1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with
    citations to the record;
    (2) refer to anything in the record that counsel believes arguably
    supports the appeal;
    (3) set forth counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous;
    and
    (4) state counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is
    frivolous. Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record,
    controlling case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to
    the conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.
    Santiago, 978 A.2d at 361.
    ____________________________________________
    1
    Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 
    411 U.S. 778
     (1973).
    -2-
    J-S44022-16
    Counsel must also advise the defendant of his rights to “(1) retain new
    counsel to pursue the appeal; (2) proceed pro se on appeal; or (3) raise any
    points that the appellant deems worthy of the court’s attention in addition to
    the points raised by counsel in the Anders brief.”              Commonwealth v.
    Nischan, 
    928 A.2d 349
    , 353 (Pa. Super. 2007), appeal denied, 
    936 A.2d 40
    (Pa. 2007).     We have reviewed counsel’s filings and found them in
    compliance with the foregoing. Appellant has not responded. We therefore
    proceed to the merits.
    We now consider the trial court’s decision to sentence Appellant to
    total confinement. The following standard governs appellate review of a trial
    court’s sentencing discretion:
    [T]he proper standard of review when considering whether
    to affirm the sentencing court’s determination is an abuse of
    discretion. [A]n abuse of discretion is more than a mere error of
    judgment; thus, a sentencing court will not have abused its
    discretion unless the record discloses that the judgment
    exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of
    partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will. […] An abuse of discretion
    may not be found merely because an appellate court might have
    reached a different conclusion, but requires a result of manifest
    unreasonableness, or partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will, or
    such lack of support so as to be clearly erroneous.
    Commonwealth v. Walls, 
    926 A.2d 957
    , 961 (Pa. 2007).
    The   Judicial   Code   governs    a    trial   court’s   imposition   of   total
    confinement:
    § 9725. Total confinement
    The court shall impose a sentence of total confinement if,
    having regard to the nature and circumstances of the crime and
    -3-
    J-S44022-16
    the history, character, and condition of the defendant, it is of the
    opinion that the total confinement of the defendant is necessary
    because:
    (1) there is undue risk that during a period of probation or
    partial confinement the defendant will commit another crime;
    (2) the defendant is in need of correctional treatment that
    can be provided most effectively by his commitment to an
    institution; or
    (3) a lesser sentence will depreciate the seriousness of the
    crime of the defendant.
    42 Pa.C.S.A. § 9725.
    Instantly, Appellant was on probation with a condition of avoiding
    inappropriate behavior toward his wife. Despite having already undergone
    anger management treatment, Appellant threatened his wife’s life during an
    argument.   Based on the circumstances of Appellant’s probation violation,
    the trial court elected to incarcerate Appellant and order additional anger
    management treatment. The court believed incarceration was appropriate—
    at least until Appellant’s completion of additional anger management—
    because the court considered Appellant a threat to his wife. We discern no
    abuse of discretion.   The record supports a finding that Appellant might
    commit a crime and/or that Appellant’s anger management counseling will
    be more effective during a sentence of incarceration.        The sentence is
    appropriate under § 9725(1) and (2).
    We agree with counsel that any challenge to the trial court’s
    sentencing discretion lacks arguable merit.        We have conducted an
    independent review of the record and found no other issues of arguable
    -4-
    J-S44022-16
    merit.   We therefore affirm the judgment of sentence and grant counsel’s
    petition to withdraw.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed. Petition to withdraw granted.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 8/24/2016
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2811 EDA 2015

Filed Date: 8/24/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 12/13/2024