Commonwealth v. Ford ( 2016 )


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  • J-A29018-15
    
    2016 PA Super 122
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA,                      IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee
    v.
    LEON DATAWN FORD,
    Appellant                  No. 1669 WDA 2014
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence September 15, 2014
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-02-CR-0003273-2013
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., BOWES AND MUSMANNO, JJ.
    OPINION BY BOWES, J.:                                      FILED JUNE 14, 2016
    Leon DaTawn Ford appeals from the judgment of sentence of a
    determination of guilt without further penalty after the court found him
    guilty of summary violations of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323, failure to stop at a stop
    or yield sign, and 75 Pa.C.S. § 3714, careless driving. After careful review,
    we affirm.
    The Commonwealth initially charged Appellant via criminal complaint
    with   two   counts   of   aggravated   assault,   three    counts   of   recklessly
    endangering another person (“REAP”), and one count each of failing to yield
    and reckless driving. The affidavit of probable cause in support of the
    complaint, however, referenced Appellant failing to stop at a stop sign. At
    Appellant’s preliminary hearing, the Commonwealth orally added a count for
    J-A29018-15
    failing to stop as well as the charges of resisting arrest and escape.        The
    escape charge was dismissed at the preliminary hearing, but the remaining
    charges were bound over for trial.               Prior to trial, the Commonwealth
    succeeded in having the escape charge reinstated.1 Appellant proceeded to
    a jury trial on the non-summary counts. The criminal information described
    the § 3323 charges as failing to yield at two separate counts.           The trial
    transpired from September 2, 2014 through September 15, 2014.
    The evidence at trial was as follows. Pittsburgh Police Officers Michael
    Kosko and Andrew Miller observed Appellant traveling at a high rate of speed
    ____________________________________________
    1
    The Commonwealth did not follow Pa.R.Crim.P. 544, as it pertains to
    reinstituting charges after they have been dismissed. We add that in
    Commonwealth v. Weigle, 
    997 A.2d 306
     (Pa. 2010), our Supreme Court
    held that it was improper to set forth, in a criminal information under
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(B)(5), a charge that had been dismissed at a preliminary
    hearing.    Rule 560(B)(5) permits the Commonwealth to include in its
    criminal information a crime that was not charged that is cognate to an
    offense charged in the criminal complaint. The Weigle Court reasoned,
    Rule 560(B)(5) obviously was not adopted or intended to serve
    as a prosecutorial avoidance of an adverse preliminary hearing
    decision involving charges that were actually forwarded in a
    criminal complaint, only to be dismissed by a judicial officer for
    want of a prima facie case. To hold otherwise would defeat the
    purpose of the preliminary hearing procedure and make the
    Commonwealth, in essence, the sole architect and arbiter of a
    predetermined "appeal" that would substitute for the appeal it
    could have pursued, but did not.
    Id. at 315. As Appellant was not found guilty of the escape charge and the
    Commonwealth did not seek to prosecute that crime after the jury could not
    reach a verdict, we need not address whether the Commonwealth’s actions
    were improper.
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    in a gray Infiniti. The officers were traveling the wrong way down a one-way
    street in a marked cruiser when Appellant passed them.2                Officer Kosko
    turned his vehicle around and accelerated to 52 mph in a 25-mph zone to
    catch up to Appellant. He did not activate his siren or lights at that time.
    While pursuing the vehicle, Officer Miller was able to run the license plate
    and ascertain that the car was not reported stolen. After gaining ground on
    the vehicle, Officer Kosko activated his lights and siren to effectuate a traffic
    stop.    Prior to pulling Appellant over, Officer Kosko and his partner also
    believed that Appellant proceeded through two stop signs without coming to
    a stop.3 Officer Miller specifically related that Appellant “did not stop for a
    stop sign at Stanton and Meadow and, once again, at Stanton and I believe
    Sheridan.”    N.T., 9/3/14, at 449. Upon Officer Kosko turning on his siren
    and lights, Appellant activated his turn signal and pulled over immediately.
    Officer Miller radioed in the stop. Officer Kosko then exited his vehicle and
    approached the driver’s side door.             Officer Miller walked to the passenger
    side door.
    Officer Kosko asked for Appellant’s license, registration, and proof of
    insurance.     Appellant provided his license, a bill of sale, and proof of
    ____________________________________________
    2
    There is no indication in the record as to why the officers were driving the
    wrong way down a one-way street.
    3
    Officer Kosko acknowledged at trial that the affidavit of probable cause for
    arrest incorrectly indicated that Appellant proceeded through a stop sign at
    Meadow Street and St. Marie Street.
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    insurance.   According to Officer Kosko, he explained that the reason for
    pulling over Appellant was his speeding, and he could not recall whether he
    informed Appellant about not coming to a stop at two stop signs.        After
    receiving Appellant’s license, Officer Kosko returned to his cruiser to run
    Appellant’s information through a police computer inside the car.     Officer
    Miller then went to the driver’s side door and engaged in small talk with
    Appellant. Officer Kosko, after learning that there were no active warrants
    for Appellant, ran an additional check for “L. Ford.” That check resulted in
    the computer displaying that a Lamont Ford, who is unrelated to Appellant,
    had an active warrant for his arrest and the officer was able to retrieve a
    photograph of Lamont Ford.
    Officer Kosko believed that the photograph of Lamont Ford resembled
    Appellant and re-approached Appellant’s car, looked at Appellant, and
    returned to the cruiser. Officer Kosko then returned and asked Officer Miller
    to look at the photographic display of Lamont Ford in the police cruiser.
    Officer Miller returned to the police car while Officer Kosko began to ask
    Appellant if he had any brothers or siblings, and he testified that he told
    Appellant that he resembled a person with an outstanding warrant.
    After seeing the picture of Lamont Ford, Officer Miller radioed his
    fellow officer, David Derbish. Officer Derbish previously had interacted with
    Lamont Ford.     Officer Derbish was in the area and responded within
    approximately two minutes.    Both Officer Derbish and Officer Miller had a
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    conversation in Officer Miller’s cruiser regarding whether Appellant was
    Lamont Ford.      Officer Derbish indicated that he believed Appellant was
    Lamont Ford.
    Officer Derbish also maintained that when he approached Appellant’s
    car on the passenger side, he believed that he saw a bulge in Appellant’s
    pants that could have been a gun.          He motioned to Officer Miller and
    informed him of his suspicion. Officer Miller agreed that there was a bulge
    and walked back to the driver’s side of the car and asked Appellant to exit
    the vehicle. Appellant repeatedly refused and attempted to place a call on
    his cell phone. Officer Miller instructed him that he could not use the phone
    and put his hand on Appellant’s shoulder. Appellant continued to attempt to
    place a call and Officer Miller tried to take Appellant’s phone.      In total,
    Officer Miller asserted that he asked Appellant to step from the car six times.
    When Appellant reached to the right side of his body, where Officer
    Miller and Officer Derbish observed the bulge, Officer Miller tried to
    physically remove Appellant from the car. Officer Miller and Officer Derbish
    both saw Appellant reach for the gear-shift in the center console.      Officer
    Derbish then entered the passenger side of the car and attempted to
    restrain Appellant. Officer Derbish placed his knees in the front passenger
    seat and struggled with Appellant and shouted, “Stop, stop, stop.”        N.T.,
    9/4/14, at 646.    Appellant engaged the gear shift and began to drive the
    vehicle and the door closed behind Officer Derbish.       According to Officer
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    Derbish, Appellant pushed him in the chest as Appellant accelerated the car.
    Officer Derbish maintained that he feared for his life and drew his pistol from
    his holster and fired his weapon five times, striking Appellant multiple times.
    As a result of being shot, Appellant crashed the vehicle. Officer Kosko
    ran to the car, removed Appellant, and placed him in handcuffs on the
    ground.      Officer Miller also approached and radioed for medics.     Officer
    Derbish suffered minor injuries.      Appellant, however, suffered significant
    spinal injuries that resulted in paraplegia.
    Both the trial court and jury viewed a video of the traffic stop that
    began when Officer Kosko turned on his siren and lights while in pursuit of
    Appellant.    The jury found Appellant not guilty of the aggravated assault
    charges, but was unable to reach a verdict on the remaining non-summary
    counts. The trial court adjudicated Appellant guilty of one count of failing to
    stop at a stop sign and careless driving, the latter conviction constituting a
    lesser-included offense of the reckless driving count charged.
    The court entered its judgment of sentence on September 15, 2014,
    and imposed no penalty for the summary violations.            Appellant timely
    appealed and the court directed that he file and serve a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b)
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. The trial judge in this
    matter retired, and the case was reassigned to the Honorable Lester
    Nauhaus, who authored a Rule 1925(a) decision, opining that Appellant’s
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    convictions were infirm.           The Commonwealth did not seek a retrial of the
    remaining counts and nolle prossed those charges.
    The matter is now ready for this Court’s review. Appellant raises two
    issues for our consideration.
    I.      Was the verdict rendered against the weight of the
    evidence?
    II.     Was the verdict rendered supported by the sufficiency of
    the evidence?
    Appellant’s brief at 5.
    Although Appellant lists his sufficiency claim second in his statement of
    issues, he argues that position first. Moreover, since a successful sufficiency
    charge warrants discharge rather than a retrial, we address Appellant’s
    second issue first.      Commonwealth v. Stokes, 
    38 A.3d 846
     (Pa.Super.
    2011).       In reviewing a sufficiency claim, we consider the entirety of the
    evidence        introduced,         including     improperly    admitted     evidence.
    Commonwealth v. Watley, 
    81 A.3d 108
    , 113 (Pa.Super. 2013) (en banc).
    We view that evidence in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the Commonwealth. 
    Id.
     The
    evidence “need not preclude every possibility of innocence and the fact-
    finder is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence presented.” 
    Id.
    Only where “the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of
    law,   no      probability    of     fact   can    be   drawn   from   the   combined
    circumstances[,]” is a defendant entitled to relief. 
    Id.
     We do not “re-weigh
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    the evidence and substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder.”         
    Id.
    As the question of the sufficiency of the evidence is one of law, we consider
    the evidence de novo. Commonwealth v. Sanchez, 
    36 A.3d 24
    , 37 (Pa.
    2011).
    Appellant’s initial argument, though ostensibly a sufficiency of the
    evidence claim, is primarily focused on the fact that the trial court found him
    guilty of failing to stop at a stop sign when the criminal information sets
    forth the charge as failing to stop at a yield sign. Appellant argues that 75
    Pa.C.S. § 3323(c), which relates to a yield sign violation, is inapplicable
    because no yield sign existed on Appellant’s course of travel. He highlights
    that the video footage of the traffic incident does not show a yield sign and
    that no officer testified that Appellant failed to properly yield at such a sign.
    In addition, Appellant maintains that there were discrepancies between
    the testimony of Officer Kosko and Officer Miller regarding where the first
    stop sign violation transpired.      He posits that the only uncontroverted
    evidence relative to a stop sign violation shows that Appellant applied his
    brakes as he approached the first stop sign, before using his left turn signal
    and turning.   Appellant continues that video footage depicts brake lights,
    thus demonstrating that he used his brakes upon coming to the second stop
    sign in question.
    With respect to his careless driving charge, Appellant submits that
    there is no evidence that he operated his vehicle in careless disregard for the
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    safety of other persons or property. According to Appellant, “at no point is
    the Appellant’s vehicle seen driving too fast for conditions of the roadway, or
    committing any other motor vehicle code violation.” Appellant’s brief at 15.
    Appellant highlights that Judge Nauhaus, who did not preside over the trial,
    wrote in his Rule 1925(a) opinion that the officers did not use radar to
    determine if Appellant was speeding and that the video footage indicated
    that he did not go through a stop sign. In Appellant’s view, the findings of
    guilt are the result of conjecture and speculation.
    The Commonwealth counters that Appellant waived any challenge
    relative to the citation to the yield signs subsection in the criminal
    information.   It first notes that trial counsel placed on the record that
    Appellant was charged with running a stop sign. The Commonwealth adds
    that, at the close of its case, Appellant did not raise the issue by making a
    motion for judgment of acquittal. Appellant also did not challenge the stop
    sign conviction based on the criminal information discrepancy after the court
    announced its verdict or raise the issue in his post-sentence motions or at
    the hearing on that motion.
    The Commonwealth highlights that the affidavit of probable cause in
    support of the criminal complaint and the preliminary hearing transcript both
    reference Appellant committing summary stop sign violations.          Further,
    Appellant’s counsel in his own opening statement maintained that Appellant
    was charged with neglecting to come to a complete stop at a stop sign.
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    Thus, it maintains that Appellant was clearly on notice of the charge and, in
    fact, he defended against that summary offense.
    With regard to the evidence that Appellant failed to stop at a stop sign,
    the Commonwealth first notes that Officer Kosko, while acknowledging a
    mistake in describing the location of the first violation in the affidavit of
    probable cause, testified that Appellant failed to stop at two separate stop
    signs. Furthermore, Officer Miller confirmed that Appellant did not come to a
    complete stop at two stop signs.      The Commonwealth points out that the
    trial judge heard this testimony and watched a video depicting the traffic
    incident.    It correctly sets forth that the trial court was free to determine
    that Officers Kosko and Miller credibly testified that Appellant failed to stop
    at the second stop sign in question. Insofar as Appellant and Judge Nauhaus
    rely on the fact that Appellant applied his brakes, the Commonwealth
    contends that a driver may apply his brakes and still drive through a stop
    sign without stopping. The Commonwealth asserts that although Appellant
    applied his brakes, he did not come to a complete stop.
    Lastly, the Commonwealth argues that sufficient evidence existed to
    find that Appellant engaged in careless driving.     It notes that both Officer
    Kosko and Officer Miller testified that Appellant was driving at a high rate of
    speed.      Thus, the trial court was free to find this testimony credible.
    Additionally, the Commonwealth submits that police are not required to use
    a radar device to gauge speed in order to establish careless driving and that
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    the driving at an unsafe speed occurred before the video camera lights were
    activated.
    We first address the discrepancy between the criminal information and
    the charge that the trial court found Appellant guilty of violating. Appellant
    is correct that the criminal information references yield sign violations.
    However, he is entitled to no relief. Initially, we agree that this aspect of
    Appellant’s position is waived.      Although sufficiency of the evidence
    arguments need only be preserved in a Rule 1925(b) concise statement,
    Appellant’s actual argument relates to a defect in the criminal information.
    Not only did Appellant not raise this issue at any stage of the trial court
    proceedings before filing his 1925(b) statement, counsel expressly placed on
    the record that Appellant was defending against a failure to stop.      At one
    point counsel set forth, “He’s charged with stop signs. We have to get into
    this. The Court is going to have to make a decision on the stop signs. This
    is the same pursuit where he’s stopped.”        N.T., 9/4/14, at 572.      Later,
    separate defense counsel remarked to the court,
    Appellant’s counsel (Mr. Malone):      Judge, he’ll plead to going
    through the stop sign.
    Appellant’s counsel (Mr. Rabner): We’re offering a plea.
    The Court: Would it help if he plead [sic] to going through two
    stop signs?
    - 11 -
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    Id. at 768.4
    Defense counsel also questioned Appellant regarding the alleged stop
    sign violation, stating, “When you’re coming up Shetland, there would a stop
    sign governing your turn there; correct?” N.T., 9/8/14, at 1152. Appellant
    responded, “Yes.” Id. Counsel then inquired, “And did you honor that stop
    sign?”   Id.   Appellant answered in the affirmative.   Counsel continued his
    defense relative to the second stop sign violation by questioning Appellant
    further. The following exchange occurred:
    Defense Counsel:      Was there a stop sign governing that
    intersection at Stanton and Meadow?
    Appellant: Yes.
    Defense Counsel: Did you stop at that one?
    Appellant: Yes.
    Id. at 1153-54.
    In defense counsel’s closing summation, in asserting that the traffic
    stop was pretextual, he argued that Appellant did not violate the stop sign
    law, opining, “From Leon Ford’s perspective, ladies and gentleman, from
    Leon Ford’s perspective he stopped. I submit to you, tell me why. You tell
    ____________________________________________
    4
    We do not set forth the offer as grounds for finding Appellant guilty as that
    is clearly improper. Rather, it indicates that counsel was aware that the
    charge related to proceeding through a stop sign and that Appellant was on
    notice of the charge.
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    me why. ‘He went by us at a stop sign.’ But he stopped for the stop sign.”
    N.T., 9/9/14, at 1357.
    Here, Appellant was not only on notice of the stop sign violation, but
    defended against that charge.              Since there was no objection to the
    discrepancy between the charges of failure to yield, leveled in the criminal
    information, and the related charge of failing to stop at a stop sign, for
    which he was prosecuted and found guilty, this aspect of his argument is
    waived.
    Even if not waived, the defect with the criminal information, standing
    alone, does not warrant relief.                Concededly, the criminal information
    contained headings for failure to yield and described that offense, citing only
    to 75 Pa.C.S. § 3323. The criminal information did not cite § 3323(b), the
    specific provision relative to stop signs.5 However, our criminal procedural
    rules provide, “The information shall contain the official or customary citation
    of the statute and section thereof, or other provision of law that the
    defendant is alleged therein to have violated; but the omission of or error in
    such citation shall not affect the validity or sufficiency of the information.”
    Pa.R.Crim.P. 560(C). See also Commonwealth v. Grant, 
    183 A. 663
    , 666
    ____________________________________________
    5
    The stop sign and yield sign summary offenses are both contained in 75
    Pa.C.S. § 3323, but are defined in different subsections. The yield sign
    violation is contained in subsection (c).
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    (Pa.Super. 1936) (“an indictment is not defective because it does not refer
    to the act of assembly on which it was based.”).
    We find our case law discussing the amendment of a criminal
    information particularly instructive herein. In Commonwealth v. Sinclair,
    
    897 A.2d 1218
     (Pa.Super. 2006), this Court provided that, in evaluating a
    court’s decision to allow a criminal information to be amended, we examine
    whether the defendant was fully apprised of the factual scenario which
    supports the charges against him. The Sinclair Court added that when the
    crime in the original information involves the same basic elements and arises
    from the same factual situation, the defendant is deemed to be placed on
    notice of the different alleged criminal conduct.
    Here, it is beyond cavil that Appellant knew of the facts surrounding
    the failure to stop offense. The only material difference in the elements of
    the offenses is the distinction between a stop sign and a yield sign.    Had
    Appellant raised the issue, the Commonwealth could have amended the
    information because it would not have alleged a different set of events or
    resulted in Appellant having to advance a materially different defense. 
    Id. at 1221
    . In this respect, “our Supreme Court has stated that following an
    amendment, relief is warranted only when the variance between the original
    and the new charges prejudices an appellant by, for example, rendering
    defenses which might have been raised against the original charges
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    ineffective with respect to the substituted charges.”         
    Id.
     at 1223 (citing
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    727 A.2d 541
    , 543 (Pa. 1999)).
    In the present case, the charge of failing to stop at a stop sign did not
    add any new facts that Appellant did not know and the entire factual
    scenario was developed at his preliminary hearing. As discussed, Appellant
    defended against a failure to stop offense and therefore neither his defense
    strategy nor his trial preparation was implicated.       See Sinclair, 
    supra at 1223
    .       Accordingly, Appellant suffered no prejudice and is not entitled to
    relief.
    In addition, we agree that sufficient evidence existed to establish that
    Appellant failed to stop at a stop sign. As stated, supra, this Court is bound
    by the credibility determinations of the fact-finder. Both Officer Kosko and
    Officer Miller testified that Appellant ran a stop sign. The trial court viewed
    the video and heard their testimony. It observed that Appellant applied his
    brakes before the latter stop sign, but nonetheless determined that he did
    not come to a complete stop.
    This Court also reviewed the video footage, which was included in the
    certified record, of Appellant’s driving behavior before he was pulled over by
    police. That footage supports the factual findings of the trial court that, at
    the first stop sign, Appellant applied his brakes briefly before reaching the
    stop sign, and then turned left, utilizing his signal. Appellant did not bring
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    his car to a complete halt at that sign. At the second stop sign, Appellant
    slowed and applied his brakes, but again failed to stop.
    This is not a case where the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that
    no probability of fact can be drawn from it. Viewing the evidence in a light
    most favorable to the Commonwealth and based on the trial court’s
    credibility determinations, sufficient evidence was introduced to find that
    Appellant failed to stop at a stop sign.
    As it pertains to Appellant’s careless driving conviction, we find that
    Appellant’s sufficiency claim also fails.     To establish a careless driving
    violation, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that the individual drove “a
    vehicle in careless disregard for the safety of persons or property[.]”     75
    Pa.C.S. § 3714. “The mens rea requirement applicable to § 3714, careless
    disregard, implies less than willful or wanton conduct but more than ordinary
    negligence or the mere absence of care under the circumstances.’’
    Commonwealth v. Gezovich, 
    7 A.3d 300
    , 301 (Pa.Super. 2010) (internal
    quotations omitted). Officers Kosko and Miller testified that Appellant drove
    on a residential roadway at a high rate of speed. In order to catch up with
    Appellant, Officer Kosko had to drive 52 mph. This testimony, believed by
    the fact-finder, is sufficient to prove careless driving. Compare 
    id. at 303
    (finding insufficient evidence to convict the defendant of careless driving and
    opining, “There is no indication that Appellant was speeding[.]”). Moreover,
    Appellant pulled his vehicle away from a traffic stop with a police officer who
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    was attempting to prevent Appellant from driving away, kneeling on
    Appellant’s front passenger seat with the door slightly ajar. This action also
    constituted careless driving.
    Appellant also argues that his convictions were against the weight of
    the evidence. A weight claim must ordinarily be preserved in a timely post-
    sentence motion.         Commonwealth v. Lofton, 
    57 A.3d 1270
    , 1273
    (Pa.Super. 2012).6       Counsel may also raise the issue orally on the record or
    in writing prior to sentencing.        Id.; Pa.R.Crim.P. 607.   Appellant failed to
    preserve his weight issue as he did not file a post-sentence motion raising
    the allegation nor did he make an oral or written motion before sentencing.
    Therefore, the claim is waived. Lofton, supra at 1273.7
    Following submission of this matter to the panel, Appellant filed an
    application for remand for a hearing based upon the existence of after-
    discovered evidence uncovered during federal litigation that he instituted as
    a result of this incident.          Two categories of proof are presented as
    warranting remand: 1) documents supporting the fact that the three officers
    involved in this interdiction engaged in pattern of behavior designed to
    ____________________________________________
    6
    We are aware that in cases that involve only summary charges a
    defendant is not required to file a post-sentence motion to preserve such a
    challenge. See Pa.R.Crim.P. 720(D). That rule does not apply herein.
    7
    We note that Appellant’s failure in this regard was especially important
    considering that the trial court who presided in this matter retired and was
    never afforded an opportunity to address the weight claim.
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    effectuate a motor vehicle stop based upon the slightest Motor Vehicle Code
    infraction by a minority individual; and 2) reports indicating the possible
    falsity of the reason offered at trial as to why Officer Kosko was not wearing
    his body microphone during the incident. Appellant posits that the former
    evidence would have demonstrated that his traffic stop was pretextual,
    resulting in suppression, and that the latter proof would have established
    that Officer Kosko perjured himself at trial.
    A defendant can obtain a new trial based on after-discovered evidence
    if he demonstrates that the proof in question “(1) could not have been
    obtained prior to trial by exercising reasonable diligence; (2) is not merely
    corroborative or cumulative; (3) will not be used solely to impeach a
    witness's credibility; and (4) would likely result in a different verdict. The
    proposed      new     evidence    must       be   producible    and   admissible.
    Commonwealth v. Griffin, 
    2016 PA Super 81
    , 
    2016 WL 13916682016
    (April 8, 2016) (citations and quotation marks omitted).
    The evidence about pretextual stops would not have changed the
    result herein.      As noted, the objective proof supported the finding that
    Appellant failed to stop at two stop signs and exhibited careless driving. The
    officers’   subjective   motivations   for   stopping   Appellant’s vehicle   were
    irrelevant as long as the stop in question did not violate Appellant’s Fourth
    Amendment rights.        Whren v. United States, 
    517 U.S. 806
    , 813 (1996)
    (citation omitted) (“subjective intent alone does not make otherwise lawful
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    conduct illegal or unconstitutional”); accord Commonwealth v. Chase,
    
    960 A.2d 108
    , 120 (2008) (once objective validity for stop is established,
    “constitutional inquiry into the officer's motive for stopping the vehicle is
    unnecessary”). The vehicular stop herein was premised upon the existence
    of probable cause to believe that Appellant committed Motor Vehicle Code
    infractions, as was established in the dashboard video of Appellant’s driving
    behavior.   Thus, Appellant’s stop did not violate the Fourth Amendment,
    which renders Appellant’s pretext proof irrelevant.
    The body microphone issue concerns the fact that Officer Kosko stated
    at trial that he was not wearing it because he had just entered a citizen’s
    home, where the wearing of such devices are forbidden due to the Wiretap
    Law. Appellant’s proposed evidence is that, in a police report, Officer Kosko
    did not cite this excuse as a reason for failing to wear the microphone and
    that there are no records establishing that Officer Kosko entered a citizen’s
    home prior to this incident.
    Initially, we note that Appellant is merely claiming that the explanation
    at trial was not corroborated by other proof, which does not establish that it
    was, in fact, false.    Moreover, whether Officer Kosko was wearing a
    microphone is irrelevant in this appeal. The only matter before this Court
    concerns whether Appellant committed the traffic infractions, which were
    captured on the dashboard camera.       A body microphone would not have
    established perjury in that respect. Since the proof in question is unrelated
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    to Appellant’s guilt or innocence to the traffic offenses challenged on appeal,
    a hearing on after-discovered evidence on this basis is not warranted. See
    Griffin, supra.
    Appellant’s application for remand denied.       Judgment of sentence
    affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 6/14/2016
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