Com. v. Hanton, J. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
JAMES HANTON, : No. 2316 EDA 2015
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence, June 30, 2015,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No. MC-51-MD-0000682-2015
BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., OLSON AND JENKINS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JULY 08, 2016
James Hanton appeals from the judgment of sentence entered by the
Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County on June 30, 2015, after the
trial court convicted him of criminal contempt1 and sentenced him to three
to six months’ incarceration. We quash.
The trial court set forth the following:
On July 17, 2014, [appellant] was sentenced to
11 ½ to 23 months[’] incarceration, with immediate
parole, followed by 5 years[’] reporting probation for
possession with intent to deliver crack cocaine,
35 P.S. § 780-113(a)(3). On May 9, 2015,
[appellant] was charged with a summary offense for
having an open can of malt liquor beer on the
highway (MC-51-SU-0010604-2015); he was found
guilty of this offense on June 18, 2015. After his
summary arrest, [appellant] failed to report for three
scheduled probation office visits; the probation
1
42 Pa.C.S.A. § 4132(3).
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officer also wrote that it was “unclear if Subject
appeared for [] his summary hearing on June 18,
2015 [] as he is still on active Absconder Warrants.”
[Appellant] told the probation officer several times
that he could not report because of “lack of funds”
and also called to complain that he was being treated
unfairly by the probation officer. After informing this
court that [appellant] absconded from probation and
moved without informing probation, absconder
warrants were issued by probation and the probation
officer sent [appellant] notice via certified mail to his
last known address to appear before this court on
June 30, 2015.
On that date, [appellant] failed to appear and
this court found [appellant] in contempt of court; he
was sentenced to 3 to 6 months[’] incarceration. At
the hearing, the Public Defender was appointed to
represent [appellant]. After defense counsel
inquired whether the court had proof of service for
[appellant], this court apprised counsel that
probation informed the court that it served
[appellant] “at his last known address, from which
he left. That’s 1513 Tyson Avenue, Apartment B[.]”
Also, the Gagnon II Summary, dated [June] 26,
2015, noted “On June 22, 2015, this officer sent a
hearing notice for 6/30/15 via Certified Mail as per
Your Honor’s instructions.” This court cited this
information during the hearing.
On July 28, 2015, a Notice of Appeal was filed
by the Public Defender’s Office. This court checked
the court computer system immediately before
writing this Opinion and [appellant] remains on
bench warrant status.
On August 12, 2015, this court ordered the
Public Defender’s Office to file a Statement of Errors
Complained of on Appeal within 21 days of the date
of the Order. In the interim, on August 17, 2015,
the Commonwealth moved to quash the appeal due
to [appellant’s] fugitive status. On September 1,
2015, [the assistant public defender] filed a 1925(b)
Statement, nowhere in which he offers that
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[appellant] remains on bench warrant status, but
complains that this court only relied on an “e-mail”
to determine both that [appellant] absconded and
that he was served. In [the public defender’s]
“Response To The Commonwealth’s Motion to Quash
Appeal Pursuant To Pa.R.A.P. 1972(6),” filed
September 2, 2015, again, there, is no mention that
[appellant] remains on fugitive status, but instead he
argues that “. . . [appellant] is allegedly a fugitive
when the sufficiency of the record to establish that
[appellant] is a fugitive will be an issue presented in
this appeal.”
Trial court opinion, 9/11/15 at 1-3 (footnote omitted; citations to
Gagnon II summary and 6/30/15 hearing omitted).
In this direct appeal, appellant claims that the evidence was
insufficient to support his conviction for contempt for failing to appear
because there was no competent evidence that appellant had notice of the
probation violation hearing. We need not address appellant’s claim on the
merits because we quash this appeal due to appellant’s fugitive status on
appeal.
The record reflects that on August 17, 2015, the Commonwealth filed
a motion to quash this appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1972(6) because
appellant is a fugitive. The record further reflects that on September 15,
2015, this court denied that motion without prejudice to the
Commonwealth’s right to raise the issue before this panel. The
Commonwealth now raises this issue and requests that we quash this appeal
pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1972(6) because appellant is a fugitive.
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Pa.R.A.P. 1972(6) expressly provides for the quashing of an appeal
when the defendant is a fugitive. The rationale behind the dismissal of an
appeal when defendant is a fugitive rests upon the inherent discretion of
courts to refuse to hear claims of litigants who, by escaping, place
themselves beyond the jurisdiction and control of the courts and, therefore,
might not be responsive to the judgment of the courts. Commonwealth v.
Harrison, 432 A.2d 1083, 1085 (Pa.Super. 1981) (citations omitted). As
the United States Supreme Court has stated:
No persuasive reason exists why [an appellate court]
should proceed to adjudicate the merits of a criminal
case after the convicted defendant who has sought
review escapes from the restraints placed upon him
pursuant to the conviction. While such an escape
does not strip the case of its character as an
adjudicable case or controversy, we believe it
disentitles the defendant to call upon the resources
of the Court for determination of his claims.
Molinaro v. New Jersey, 396 U.S. 365, 366 (1970).
Accordingly, dismissal is the clear course of action where an escapee is
not amenable to the court’s jurisdiction. See Harrison, 432 A.2d 1083; see
also Commonwealth v. Tomlinson, 354 A.2d 254 (Pa. 1976) (appeal
dismissed sua sponte where appellant, subsequent to filing and submission
of briefs on appeal, became and remained a fugitive); In re Dixon, 422
A.2d 892 (Pa.Super. 1980) (appeal dismissed when court learned of
appellant’s fugitive status from district attorney’s office); Commonwealth
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v. Albert, 393 A.2d 991 (Pa.Super. 1978) (same); Commonwealth v.
Barron, 352 A.2d 84 (Pa.Super. 1975) (same).
Here, the Commonwealth has informed this court, and has provided
documentation to show, that appellant is a fugitive. Counsel for appellant
additionally has not asserted that appellant is no longer a fugitive. We
decline to review the sufficiency of the evidence for the court’s finding of
contempt. We, therefore, quash this appeal.
Appeal quashed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 7/8/2016
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