In Re: Estate of Norris, J. Appeal of: PeoplesBank ( 2016 )


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  • J. A09013/16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN H. NORRIS,       :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    JOHN H. NORRIS LIFE INSURANCE          :           PENNSYLVANIA
    TRUST AGREEMENT                        :
    :
    APPEAL OF: PEOPLESBANK,                :         No. 1117 MDA 2015
    A CODORUS VALLEY COMPANY,              :
    TRUSTEE                                :
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 27, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Orphans’ Court Division at No. 67-08-1482
    IN RE: ESTATE OF JOHN H. NORRIS,       :     IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    JOHN H. NORRIS LIFE INSURANCE          :           PENNSYLVANIA
    TRUST AGREEMENT                        :
    :         No. 1178 MDA 2015
    APPEAL OF:                             :
    YVONNE RENEE PLOURDE GURZELL           :
    Appeal from the Order Entered May 27, 2015,
    in the Court of Common Pleas of York County
    Orphans’ Court Division at No. 6708-1482
    BEFORE: FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E., JENKINS AND PLATT,* JJ.
    MEMORANDUM BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.:                  FILED JULY 20, 2016
    PeoplesBank, a Cordorus Valley Company (“the Bank”), appeals from
    the order entered May 27, 2015, removing it as co-trustee of the John H.
    Norris inter vivos life insurance trust (“the Trust”). Yvonne Rene Plourde
    Gurzell (“Gurzell”) has cross-appealed from the same order.   After careful
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J. A09013/16
    review, we vacate the order, reinstate the Bank as co-trustee, and remand
    for further proceedings.
    The trial court has aptly summarized the history of this case, in
    relevant part, as follows:
    John H. Norris (“Decedent”) executed a Last
    Will and Testament on February 8, 2005. Decedent
    died on September 28, 2008. The York County
    Register of Wills issued Letters Testamentary on
    October 9, 2008 to Anna L. Norris, Decedent’s wife.
    The will named Anna L. Norris as executrix of the
    estate and as individual trustee of [the Trust].
    American Guaranty & Trust Company was named
    corporate trustee from the Deed of Trust signed
    February 21, 2000 and amended May 17, 2000.
    American Guaranty & Trust Company has since been
    purchased by Royal Bank of Canada Trust Company
    (“RBC”).   RBC resigned as corporate trustee on
    December 29, 2008 having never received or
    administered any trust assets. [The Bank] accepted
    the successor trusteeship on December 20, 2012.
    [The Bank] received trust assets from Mrs. Norris
    and began service on December 21, 2012.
    Decedent was survived by his wife, children
    from     his   first  marriage     and    step-children.
    Mary Florence Norris Michel, Patricia Jane Norris
    Slaughter and John C. Norris are Decedent’s children
    from his first marriage.      [Gurzell], Samantha R.
    Plourde and Jeffery James Plourde are Decedent’s
    step-children. In his will, Decedent left his personal
    and household effects, including automobiles, and
    insurance on that property to his wife, Anna Norris.
    Decedent gives the residue of the estate, real and
    personal to the trustee or trustees under the Deed of
    Trust signed February 21, 2000, as amended
    May 17, 2000 under which American Guaranty &
    Trust Company, is named as the trustee, in trust, to
    treat it as an addition to the principal subject to that
    deed as it exists at Decedent’s death. The will
    names Anna Norris as executrix with [] Gurzell as
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    replacement executor [sic] should Anna Norris not
    qualify for any reason. The will does not name any
    other beneficiaries aside from Anna Norris.
    Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at 1-2.
    Under [Paragraph XXIII(C) of the Deed of
    Trust], it is mentioned that the individual trustee is
    authorized at any time, and from time to time by an
    instrument in writing delivered to the other trustee
    serving, to remove the corporate trustee without
    stating any reason for such action, provided he or
    she simultaneously by written instrument appoints
    another corporate trustee in its place. Under D, no
    successor trustee shall be obliged to examine the
    accounts, records or acts of a previous trustee, nor
    shall any such trustee in any way or manner be
    responsible for any act or omission to act on the part
    of any such previous trustee or such individual
    trustee.    Any claim or action against any such
    trustee shall, in any event, be filed by a beneficiary
    in the appropriate court. Subparagraph E mentions
    that any individual trustee may resign at any time
    without court approval.       Under F, the fiduciaries
    serving are given the power to invest the principal
    and/or income of the trust estate in any assets or
    security. Lastly, subparagraph G provides that the
    corporate trustee shall receive compensation in
    accordance with its standard schedule of fees in
    effect while its services are performed.
    Id. at 3-4.
    On or about August 12, 2013, [the Bank]
    notified Mrs. Norris of its intent to resign as
    co-trustee. On August 14, 2013, [the Bank] filed a
    Petition for Adjudication/Statement of Proposed
    Distribution for [the Trust]. The case was listed for
    the September 11, 2013 audits with the Honorable
    Judge Penny L. Blackwell presiding. [The Bank] filed
    its accounting and gave proper notice of the audit to
    all interested parties.       At the time of the
    September 11, 2013 audit no objections were filed
    as to [the Bank]’s accounting, save for counsel for
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    John C. Norris, one of Decedent’s children,
    expressing no objections to the account itself or to
    [the Bank] withdrawing, but that a successor trustee
    should be named before [the Bank] could withdraw.
    [The Bank] agreed that Mrs. Norris should select a
    successor pursuant to the terms of the trust and that
    no selection has been made at the time by
    Mrs. Norris. [Gurzell] was also present during the
    audit as one of the beneficiaries but made no
    objections at the call of the audit or filled [sic] any
    written objections by the end of that business day.[1]
    Judge Blackwell rescheduled the matter for a
    subsequent hearing on October 1[6], 2013 to resolve
    pending matters.
    At the October 16, 2013 hearing, new petitions
    were filed and counsel for [Gurzell] entered his
    appearance.      Counsel requested an additional
    sixty days to discuss the matters pending and
    determine the issues that would be the subject of a
    hearing. The parties agreed that [the Bank] can
    remain involved for the time being, that its
    investment strategy is appropriate and that it will not
    be responsible for losses to the trust from the date of
    the close of the accounting until the date that funds
    are transferred.
    On November 18, 2013, Mrs. Norris filed a
    Petition to Appoint Successor Trustee and Authorize
    Payment of Expenses.       Counsel Trust Company
    located in York, Pennsylvania was identified as the
    1
    Gurzell takes issue with the statement that no objections were raised to
    the Bank’s Petition for Adjudication/Statement of Proposed Distribution
    presented for audit on September 11, 2013. According to Gurzell, she
    appeared in person, without counsel, and voiced her objections. (Gurzell’s
    brief at 2; notes of testimony, 9/11/13 at 3.) The trial court found that
    while Gurzell did appear at the September 11, 2013 audit hearing, she did
    not actually voice any objection to the Trust accounting. (Trial court
    opinion, 10/28/13 at 21-22.) Gurzell did not file any written objections as
    required by local rule. (Id. at 22.) While counsel for Gurzell filed a petition
    to stay the adjudication of the Bank’s accounting, no formal objections to the
    Trust accounting were actually filed. (Id. at 22.) The issue is not germane
    to the instant appeal.
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    successor trustee.    On November 7, 2013, [the
    Bank] filed an Answer to Petition to Appoint
    Successor Trustee and Authorize Payment of
    Expenses. In its Answer, [the Bank] did not object
    to the appointment of Counsel Trust as its successor
    and indicated that any issues concerning Mrs. Norris’
    loans did not preclude a confirmation of its
    accounting.[2] On November 22, 2013, [Gurzell]
    filed a Motion to Stay Executrix’s Petition to Appoint
    Successor Trustee and Authorize Payment of
    Expenses Pending Adjudication of Executrix’s
    Accounting for the Norris Trust. In [her] Petition,
    [Gurzell] alleged that Mrs. Norris should provide
    documentation as to the funding of the Marital and
    Residual Trusts and also questions some expenses
    incurred by the estate.
    On November 25, 2013, Judge Blackwell issued
    an Order directing that [the Bank]’s action to defer
    payments from the trust is deemed reasonable given
    the status of the case. In addition, it was ordered
    that no successor corporate guardian can occur
    unless all parties agree to the appointment and/or by
    order of court after a hearing. Another hearing for
    the request to stay payment was scheduled for
    July 9, 2014 before this Court.
    At the July 9, 2014 hearing this Court indicated
    that Mrs. Norris had filed an inventory and directed
    that an estate accounting should be filed within
    sixty days. [The Bank] was not permitted to resign
    until this Court could further review the record and
    see if a decision could be made. [The Bank] was
    permitted to file[] a memorandum of law addressing
    the topic of due diligence when taking trust funds.
    The memorandum of law was filed on July 17, 2014.
    On July 22, 2014, this Court stayed Mrs. Norris’
    Petition to Appoint Successor Trustee and Authorize
    Payment of Expenses pending adjudicating of the
    estate accounting. [The Bank] indicated that it is
    2
    This is a reference to a $450,000 loan from the Bank to Mrs. Norris which
    Mrs. Norris contends should be repaid from the estate. (Trial court opinion,
    10/28/15 at 4.)
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    only involved in the trust accounting and has no role
    in the estate accounting.
    On January 28, 2015, [Gurzell] filed a Motion
    to Compel Distribution for the Residuary Trust for
    litigation expenses.     A hearing was held on
    January 28, 2015 that concerned the estate
    accounting and subpoenas issued in regards to
    documents from an accountant. The parties were
    directed to come up with a case management plan
    so that the Court could address the remaining issues.
    A subsequent hearing was held on May 27, 2015.
    [The Bank] indicated that [Gurzell]’s objections dealt
    with the estate accounting not the trust accounting.
    [The Bank] requested its administration adjudicated
    so that funds could be transferred for further
    administration.    [Gurzell] alleged that the trust
    should not be transferred until the residuary trust
    accounting is reconciled. [The Bank] concurred on
    the appointment of its successor and indicated that it
    assumed no liability for its predecessor. [Gurzell]
    alleged that there were pending objections on the
    residuary trust accounting. This Court issued an
    Order removing [the Bank] as trustee and appointing
    Counsel Trust as successor trustee at the conclusion
    of the May 27, 2015 hearing.
    On June 12, 2015, [the Bank] filed a Petition
    Seeking Confirmation of Trust Accounting and
    Amendment of the Court’s May 27, 2015 Order
    Removing [the Bank] as Trustee. On June 23, 2015,
    Mrs. Norris filed an Answer to [the Bank]’s Petition
    Seeking Confirmation of Trust Accounting and
    Amendment of the Court’s May 27, 2015 Order
    Removing [the Bank] as Trustee. [The Bank] also
    filed a Notice of Appeal to the Superior Court on
    June 26, 2015 before this Court could decide its
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    June 12, 2015 Petition.[3] On July 1, 2015, this
    Court issued an Order Directing [the Bank] to File [a]
    Statement of Matters Complained [of] on Appeal.
    [The Bank] filed [its] 1925(b) statement on July 13,
    2015. A Notice of Cross-Appeal to the Superior
    Court was filed on July 9, 2015 by [] Gurzell []. On
    July 10, 2015, this Court issued an Order Directing
    [Gurzell] to File [a] Statement of Matters
    Complained [of] on Appeal. [Gurzell] filed [her]
    1925(b) statement on July 20, 2015. [The Bank]
    and [Gurzell] now appeal to the Superior Court from
    this Court’s Order issued on May 27, 2015.
    Id. at 4-7.
    The Bank has raised the following issues for this court’s review:
    A.    Did the Orphans’ Court’s removal of the
    Trustee sua sponte, without a hearing, fail to
    comply with the requirements of 20 Pa.C.S.
    §§ 3183, 3184, and 7766?
    B.    Did the Orphans’ Court’s removal of the
    Trustee sua sponte, without a hearing, violate
    the consent Order dated November 25, 2013,
    ordering that no successor corporate trustee
    shall be appointed “unless all parties agree to
    the appointment and/or by order of court after
    a hearing,” and the Order dated July 22, 2014,
    staying the appointment of a successor trustee
    pending the adjudication of the Trustee’s
    accounting?
    3
    The trial court indicates that it was inclined to amend the order of May 27,
    2015, in order to allow the Bank to resign as opposed to being removed.
    (Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at 15.) An order removing a trustee is a final
    order proper for appellate review. In re Georgiana’s Estate, 
    458 A.2d 989
    , 991 (Pa.Super. 1983), affirmed, 
    475 A.2d 744
     (Pa. 1984). Therefore,
    the Bank was required to file its appeal notice within 30 days.
    Pa.R.A.P. 903(a).
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    The Bank’s brief at 2.4
    This Court recently reaffirmed our standard of review
    of an Orphans’ Court decree:
    When reviewing a decree entered by the
    Orphans’     Court,   this   Court   must
    determine whether the record is free
    from legal error and the court’s factual
    findings are supported by the evidence.
    Because the Orphans’ Court sits as the
    fact-finder, it determines the credibility
    of the witnesses and, on review, we will
    not reverse its credibility determinations
    absent an abuse of that discretion.
    However, we are not constrained to give
    the same deference to any resulting legal
    conclusions. Where the rules of law on
    which the court relied are palpably wrong
    or clearly inapplicable, we will reverse
    the court’s decree.
    In re Estate of Hooper, 
    80 A.3d 815
    , 818
    (Pa.Super. 2013).
    When the Orphans’ Court arrives at a legal
    conclusion based on statutory interpretation, our
    standard of review is de novo and our scope of
    review is plenary. Brown v. Levy,     Pa.     , 
    73 A.3d 514
    , 517 (2013).
    In re Estate of Fuller, 
    87 A.3d 330
    , 333 (Pa.Super. 2014).
    The Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries (“PEF”) Code, Section 7766,
    “Removal of trustee,” provides, in relevant part, as follows:
    (a)   Request     to   remove     trustee;    court
    authority.--The settlor, a cotrustee or a
    beneficiary may request the court to remove a
    4
    Gurzell raises substantially the same issues on appeal and agrees with the
    Bank that the trial court’s order of May 27, 2015, removing the Bank as
    trustee, was in error.
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    trustee or a trustee may be removed by the
    court on its own initiative.
    (b)   When court may remove trustee.--The
    court may remove a trustee if it finds that
    removal of the trustee best serves the
    interests of the beneficiaries of the trust and is
    not inconsistent with a material purpose of the
    trust, a suitable cotrustee or successor trustee
    is available and:
    (1)   the trustee has committed           a
    serious breach of trust;
    (2)   lack    of   cooperation     among
    cotrustees substantially impairs the
    administration of the trust;
    (3)   the trustee has not effectively
    administered the trust because of
    the       trustee’s       unfitness,
    unwillingness or persistent failures;
    or
    (4)   there has been a substantial
    change of circumstances.         A
    corporate reorganization of an
    institutional trustee, including a
    plan of merger or consolidation, is
    not itself a substantial change of
    circumstances.
    (d)   Procedure.--The procedure for removal and
    discharge of a trustee and the effect of
    removal and discharge shall be the same as
    that set forth in sections 3183 (relating to
    procedure for and effect of removal) and 3184
    (relating    to   discharge     of    personal
    representative and surety).
    20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7766(a), (b) & (d).
    [R]emoval of a trustee is a drastic remedy which
    should be employed only when clearly necessary.
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    In Re White, 
    321 Pa.Super. 102
    , 104, 
    467 A.2d 1148
    , 1150 (1983), rev’d. on other grounds, 
    506 Pa. 218
    , 
    484 A.2d 763
     (1984). An order removing a
    trustee will only be reversed however, if there has
    been an abuse of discretion. Crawford’s Estate,
    
    340 Pa. 187
    , 190, 
    16 A.2d 521
    , 523 (1940).
    In re Francis Edward McGillick Foundation, 
    594 A.2d 322
    , 332
    (Pa.Super. 1991), reversed in part on other grounds, 
    642 A.2d 467
     (Pa.
    1994).
    Section 3183 of the PEF Code provides,
    The court on its own motion may, and on the petition
    of any party in interest alleging adequate grounds for
    removal shall, order the personal representative to
    appear and show cause why he should not be
    removed, or, when necessary to protect the rights of
    creditors or parties in interest, may summarily
    remove him. Upon removal, the court may direct
    the grant of new letters testamentary or of
    administration by the register to the person entitled
    and may, by summary attachment of the person or
    other appropriate orders, provide for the security
    and delivery of the assets of the estate, together
    with all books, accounts and papers relating thereto.
    Any personal representative summarily removed
    under the provisions of this section may apply, by
    petition, to have the decree of removal vacated and
    to be reinstated, and, if the court shall vacate the
    decree of removal and reinstate him, it shall
    thereupon make any orders which may be
    appropriate to accomplish the reinstatement.
    20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3183.
    Here, the first three subsections of 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7766(b) are clearly
    inapplicable. There is no allegation that the Bank has committed a serious
    breach of trust, that there is a lack of cooperation between the Bank and
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    Mrs. Norris as co-trustees, or that the Bank has not effectively administered
    the Trust. The trial court relied on Subsection (4), a substantial change of
    circumstances. See In re McKinney, 
    67 A.3d 824
    , 832 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (a showing that the current trustee has administered the trust in a way that
    undermined or harmed the beneficiaries’ interests is not needed for a
    no-fault removal of a trustee for a substantial change in circumstances).
    According to the trial court, the Bank’s desire to resign as corporate trustee
    is, in and of itself, a “substantial change of circumstances” which permits
    removal. (Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at 18.) We disagree. As explained
    further infra, there is a significant difference between discharge and
    removal. The PEF Code does not allow no-fault removal of a trustee anytime
    a trustee requests to resign.
    In addition, in any trustee removal action, the plain language of the
    statute requires that removal best serve the interests of the beneficiaries of
    the trust. In re McKinney, 
    67 A.3d at 831
    , citing 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7766(b).
    The trial court found that Mrs. Norris has been prejudiced by the delay in
    adjudication of the Bank’s accounting.       (Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at
    16-17.)   According to the trial court, the Trust is “at a standstill” with no
    distributions able to be made to Mrs. Norris until the issue of the Bank’s
    resignation and accounting is resolved. (Id. at 17.) However, the trial court
    acknowledges that any delay was caused by Gurzell, not the Bank. (Id. at
    16-17.)   In addition, the Bank disputes the trial court’s assertion that
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    Mrs. Norris is not receiving distributions of income from the Trust while the
    matter is stayed. (The Bank’s brief at 18 n.7.)
    Furthermore, the trial court failed to hold a hearing on the matter as
    required by 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3183, which provides that,
    The court on its own motion may, and on the petition
    of any party in interest alleging adequate grounds for
    removal shall, order the personal representative to
    appear and show cause why he should not be
    removed, or, when necessary to protect the rights of
    creditors or parties in interest, may summarily
    remove him.
    Contrary to the trial court’s reference to “Mrs. Norris’ request to remove [the
    Bank] as trustee,” Mrs. Norris never petitioned for removal of the Bank.
    (Trial court opinion, 10/18/15 at 17.) Rather, Mrs. Norris acquiesced in the
    Bank’s petition to resign by identifying a successor corporate trustee. The
    Bank was removed on the court’s own motion. There is no allegation that
    summary removal was necessary to protect the rights of creditors or parties
    in interest. In fact, as stated above, the trial court relied on Section 7766’s
    no-fault removal provision and indicated that, “this Court was inclined to
    amend its Order issued on May 27, 2015 in order to allow [the Bank] to
    resign as opposed to being removed[.]”         (Id. at 15.)     The trial court
    explicitly did not find any fault on behalf of the Bank as to its administration
    of the Trust. (Id. at 10.) Therefore, before it could be removed, the Bank
    was statutorily entitled to an evidentiary hearing.     Matter of Estate of
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    Velott, 
    529 A.2d 525
    , 527 (Pa.Super. 1987).         Summary removal was
    inappropriate and unwarranted.
    The trial court states that at the May 27, 2015 hearing, counsel were
    given the opportunity to present argument as to the Bank’s potential
    removal and appointment of Counsel Trust Company as successor trustee.
    (Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at 11.) However, the purpose of the May 27,
    2015 hearing was to address outstanding discovery motions related to
    objections to the estate accounting.      No witnesses were sworn and no
    testimony was offered on behalf of any party.     The order scheduling the
    May 27 proceeding specifically stated that no testimony would be taken. In
    addition, while the parties discussed the resignation of the Bank and
    appointment of a successor corporate trustee, the Bank’s “removal” was
    never discussed since no one had petitioned for its removal. The trial court
    failed to hold a hearing in accordance with 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3183 before
    ordering the Bank’s removal as trustee.
    We also agree that the order sua sponte removing the Bank as
    trustee was contrary to at least two prior orders of court, including the
    November 25, 2013 consent order by Judge Blackwell specifically directing
    that no successor corporate trustee can be appointed without agreement of
    all the parties and/or by order of court after a hearing. Neither contingency
    had occurred in this case; the parties had not consented to appointment of a
    successor corporate trustee, and no hearing had been held on the issue.
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    The trial court states that the Bank’s status has remained in limbo for nearly
    two years, and “This Court also highly doubts that the Honorable
    Judge Blackwell intended for [the Bank] to continue their involvement for
    nearly two years after a successor trustee was identified.”        (Trial court
    opinion, 10/28/15 at 10.)     Nevertheless, the November 25, 2013 order,
    which has never been amended or rescinded, could not be overruled by a
    court of coordinate jurisdiction. Commonwealth v. Starr, 
    664 A.2d 1326
    ,
    1331 (Pa. 1995) (“[T]his Court has long recognized that judges of coordinate
    jurisdiction sitting in the same case should not overrule each other[’s]
    decisions.”).
    Similarly, the July 22, 2014 order stayed Mrs. Norris’ Petition to
    Appoint Successor Trustee and Authorize Payment of Expenses pending
    adjudication of the Bank’s trust accounting.      There has never been an
    adjudication of the accounting.     It was improper for the trial court to
    summarily remove the Bank as trustee without lifting the stay and holding a
    hearing.
    Resignation and removal are not interchangeable.        The trial court
    correctly observes that under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7770,5 a successor trustee is
    not liable for the acts of its predecessor. (Trial court opinion, 10/28/15 at
    14.)   Therefore, the Bank is not liable for any acts or omissions of RBC.
    5
    “A successor trustee shall not be personally liable for the acts or omissions
    of the trustee’s predecessor and shall have no duty to investigate the acts or
    omissions of the predecessor.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 7770.
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    (Id.) The trial court states that, “While [the Bank’s] accounting should have
    been adjudicated, we find no reason to further discharge [the Bank] from
    liability under § 3184 when § 7770 specifically states that a successor
    trustee shall not be personally liable.”       (Id. at 15.)      However, under
    Section 3184,6 a trustee is discharged from all future liability, not only acts
    or omissions of a predecessor trustee. By removing the Bank as a trustee
    under Section 7766 instead of granting its petition for resignation following
    an   adjudication   and   discharge   under    Section   3184,   the   Bank   was
    substantially prejudiced. The removal of a trustee, even on a no-fault basis,
    does not shield the trustee from all future liability.    Resignation, following
    adjudication and discharge, shields the trustee from future liability, while
    removal does not.      Therefore, the distinction is crucial.    There were no
    grounds for removal and the Bank was entitled to an adjudication of the
    Trust accounting and discharge.
    6
    After confirmation of his final account and
    distribution to the parties entitled, a personal
    representative and his surety may be discharged by
    the court from future liability.       The court may
    discharge only the surety from future liability,
    allowing the personal representative to continue
    without surety, upon condition that no further assets
    shall come into the control of the personal
    representative until he files another bond with
    sufficient surety, as required by the register.
    20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3184.
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    Order vacated.    The Bank is hereby reinstated as corporate trustee.
    Remanded for further proceedings consistent with this memorandum.
    Jurisdiction relinquished.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 7/20/2016
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