Com. v. Vestal, N. ( 2017 )

J-S80021-16
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
NATHANIEL VESTAL
Appellant No. 1786 MDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order entered September 11, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County
Criminal Division at Nos: CP-40-CR-0001279-2011, CP-40-CR-0002528-
2012, CP-40-CR-0003806-2012, CP-40-CR-0002333-2013
BEFORE: LAZARUS, STABILE, and RANSOM, JJ.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 27, 2017
Appellant, Nathaniel Vestal, appeals from the September 11, 2015
order entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Luzerne County, denying his
petition for collateral relief pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (PCRA),
42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. Appellant, who entered into a negotiated plea on
January 21, 2014 and whose March 21, 2014 sentence included a mandatory
minimum sentence pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 7508(a)(2), contends the
PCRA court erred in determining that plea counsel was not ineffective in light
of counsel’s failure to challenge an illegal mandatory minimum sentence in
the wake of Alleyne v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). We agree.
In its Rule 1925(a) opinion, the PCRA court explained that appellate
decisions subsequent to the denial of Appellant’s PCRA petition have guided
J-S80021-16
the court’s judgment to conclude plea counsel was in fact ineffective for
failing to object to imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence. PCRA
Court Opinion, 5/11/16, at 2. The Commonwealth agrees, acknowledging
that Appellant’s case is governed by Commonwealth v. Melendez-
Negron, 123 A.3d 1087 (Pa. Super. 2015), and that PCRA counsel’s failure
to challenge Appellant’s mandatory minimum sentence post-Alleyne
constitutes ineffectiveness. Commonwealth Brief at 7.
Although Appellant seeks a remand for resentencing, or alternatively
reinstatement of his appeal rights, we agree with the PCRA court and with
the Commonwealth that this case is governed by Melendez-Negron where
we recognized “that the shared misapprehension that the mandatory
minimum sentence . . . applied to Melendez-Negron tainted the parties’
negotiations at the outset. . . . [T]he parties’ negotiations began from an
erroneous premise and therefore were fundamentally skewed from the
beginning.” Melendez-Negron, 123 A.3d at 1094. Therefore, we not only
reverse the PCRA court’s order denying Appellant’s PCRA petition, but we
also vacate his judgment of sentence and his guilty plea and remand for
further proceedings. See also Commonwealth v. Lenhoff, 796 A.2d 338,
343 (Pa. Super. 2002).
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence vacated. Guilty plea vacated.
Case remanded. Jurisdiction relinquished.
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J-S80021-16
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/27/2017
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