Com. v. Williams, E. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
ELMER WILLIAMS,
Appellant No. 1492 WDA 2015
Appeal from the PCRA Order September 14, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-25-CR-0002530-2003
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., SHOGAN and LAZARUS, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED AUGUST 11, 2016
Appellant, Elmer Williams, appeals from the order denying his serial
petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”),
42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
In July of 2003, Appellant was charged with two counts each of rape,
statutory sexual assault, indecent assault, and sexual assault, and one count
each of corruption of a minor and endangering the welfare of a child,
offenses committed against his thirteen-year–old step-daughter.1 On
November 6, 2003, Appellant entered a negotiated guilty plea to one count
each of rape, corruption of minors, and endangering the welfare of children.
N.T., 11/6/03, at 8. On February 13, 2004, the trial court sentenced
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1
The facts of the underlying convictions are not relevant to our disposition.
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Appellant to eight to sixteen years of imprisonment for rape; two to four
years for endangering the welfare of a child, consecutive to the sentence for
rape; and sixteen months to four years of imprisonment for corruption of a
minor, to be served consecutively to the sentence for endangering the
welfare of a child. N.T., 2/13/04, at 27—28. The trial court then ordered
the remainder of the charges to be nol prossed. On February 23, 2004,
Appellant filed a motion to modify or reconsider his sentence, which the trial
court denied. Appellant did not file a direct appeal.
This Court previously termed Appellant a “frequent flier” based upon
his myriad petitions filed pursuant to the PCRA. Commonwealth v.
Williams, 405 WDA 2012, 62 A.3d 458 (Pa. Super. filed October 17, 2012)
(unpublished memorandum at 3). Indeed, we noted therein that “Appellant
has so abused the system that the trial court directed the Prothonotary to
neither file nor docket any further motions or petitions filed by Appellant
pertaining to this case,” presumably without leave of court. Id. at 3 n.2.2
This Court affirmed denials of PCRA petitions filed by Appellant on at
least four prior occasions. See Commonwealth v. Williams, 1513 WDA
2004, 876 A.2d 472 (Pa. Super. filed April 4, 2005) (unpublished
memorandum); Commonwealth v. Williams, 1045 WDA 2008 (Pa. Super.
filed February 10, 2009) (judgment order); Commonwealth v. Williams,
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2
That directive apparently has been ignored. PCRA Court Opinion,
10/20/15, at 5.
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729 WDA 2009, 991 A.2d 364 (Pa. Super. filed March 2, 2010) (unpublished
memorandum); and Commonwealth v. Williams, 405 WDA 2012, 62 A.3d
458 (Pa. Super. filed October 17, 2012) (unpublished memorandum).
Appellant, pro se, filed the instant PCRA petition on August 17, 2015.
The PCRA court denied it as untimely on September 13, 2015. Appellant
filed a timely notice of appeal, and both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant raises the following issues for our review:
1. Whether the PCRA court committed reversible error by
dismissing [A]ppellant’s PCRA petition as untimely?
2. Whether the PCRA court committed a manifest injustice by
upholding the illegal sentence that’s imposed upon the
[A]ppellant?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we
consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super.
2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super.
2014) (en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence
of record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling
is free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Rykard, 55 A.3d 1177, 1183 (Pa.
Super. 2012). We grant great deference to the PCRA court’s findings that
are supported in the record and will not disturb them unless they have no
support in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Rigg, 84 A.3d 1080,
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1084 (Pa. Super. 2014). “There is no absolute right to an evidentiary
hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the
record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not
necessary.” Commonwealth v. Jones, 942 A.2d 903, 906 (Pa. Super.
2008) (citing Commonwealth v. Barbosa, 819 A.2d 81 (Pa. Super.
2003)). “[S]uch a decision is within the discretion of the PCRA court and will
not be overturned absent an abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v.
Mason, 130 A.3d 601, 617 (Pa. 2015).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). This time
requirement is mandatory and jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not
ignore it in order to reach the merits of the petition. Commonwealth v.
Murray, 753 A.2d 201, 203 (Pa. 2000). A judgment of sentence “becomes
final at the conclusion of direct review, including discretionary review in the
Supreme Court of the United States and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania,
or at the expiration of time for seeking the review.” 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(3).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
became final on March 25, 2004, thirty days after the trial court denied
Appellant’s post-sentence motion on February 24, 2004, and Appellant failed
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to file a direct appeal with this Court.3 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3); Pa.R.A.P.
903(a). Thus, a timely PCRA petition had to have been filed by March 25,
2005. Because Appellant did not file the instant PCRA petition until August
17, 2015, it is patently untimely.
As noted, the PCRA court dismissed the petition as untimely.
Nevertheless, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii),
and (iii), is met.4 “However, the PCRA limits the reach of the exceptions by
providing that a petition invoking any of the exceptions must be filed within
60 days of the date the claim first could have been presented.”
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3
The year 2004 was a leap year.
4
The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this
Commonwealth or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply
retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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Commonwealth v. Walters, 135 A.3d 589, 591 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citing
Commonwealth v. Leggett, 16 A.3d 1144, 1146 (Pa. Super. 2011), and
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2)).
Appellant challenged the legality of his sentence in his PCRA petition
and his brief to this Court. Herein, he inartfully attempts to invoke the time-
bar exception under Section 9545(b)(1)(iii), relying on Commonwealth v.
Hopkins, 117 A.3d 247 (Pa. 2015), and Alleyne v. United States, ___
U.S. ___, 133 S. Ct. 2151 (2013). Appellant’s Brief at 10. Thus, Appellant’s
citations may be characterized as an attempt to assert the “new
constitutional right” exception to the PCRA time-bar based on Alleyne.
Appellant avers that Hopkins is controlling authority. In Hopkins,
our Supreme Court held that 18 Pa.C.S. § 6317, which imposed a mandatory
minimum sentence for a drug sale or possession-with-intent-to-deliver
charge within 1,000 feet of a school, was unconstitutional. Appellant fails to
explain why Hopkins controls his mandatory sentence, whose source he
fails to identify, although it appears to have been imposed pursuant to 42
Pa.C.S. § 9718. This defect, alone, is noteworthy; Appellant’s failure to
connect Hopkins to his case prevents him from relying on the date of
Hopkins for purposes of the sixty-day rule under 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(iii). Appellant’s reliance on Hopkins, therefore, is misplaced.
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
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Hopkins relied upon Alleyne, which is the seminal case cited by
Appellant. Appellant’s Brief at 8–10. This Court explained the ruling and
impact of Alleyne in Commonwealth v. Riggle, 119 A.3d 1058 (Pa.
Super. 2015), as follows:
In Alleyne, the Supreme Court held that the constitutional jury
trial right requires any fact, other than a prior conviction, that
triggers a mandatory minimum sentence to be proven beyond a
reasonable doubt before the finder of fact. Alleyne is an
application of the Court’s prior pronouncement in Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 120 S. Ct. 2348, 147 L. Ed. 2d 435
(2000), which ruled that any fact that increases a maximum
sentence must be found by the factfinder beyond a reasonable
doubt or admitted by the defendant during his guilty plea. In
Alleyne, the United States Supreme Court expressly overruled
Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 122 S. Ct. 2406, 153
L. Ed. 2d 524 (2002), which held that a fact that involves a
mandatory minimum sentence does not implicate jury trial
rights. Alleyne also implicitly abrogated McMillan v.
Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 2411, 91 L. Ed. 2d 67
(1986), which withstood an Apprendi attack in the Harris
decision.
In Commonwealth v. Newman, 99 A.3d 86 (Pa. Super.
2014) (relying upon Commonwealth v. Watley, 81 A.3d 108,
118 (Pa. Super. 2013) (en banc)), we noted that Alleyne will be
applied to cases pending on direct appeal when Alleyne was
issued.
Riggle, 119 A.3d at 1064 (emphasis added).
Alleyne was decided on June 17, 2013. Appellant filed this fifth PCRA
petition on August 17, 2015, well more than sixty days, indeed two years
after, the date the claim could have been presented. See Commonwealth
v. Boyd, 923 A.2d 513, 517 (Pa. Super. 2007) (stating that “[w]ith regard
to [a newly] recognized constitutional right, this Court has held that the
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sixty-day period begins to run upon the date of the underlying judicial
decision.”). Therefore, Appellant cannot avail himself of 42 Pa.C.S. §
9545(b)(1)(iii).
Furthermore, while this Court has held that Alleyne applies to cases
that were on direct appeal when Alleyne was issued, we have declined to
construe that decision as applying retroactively to cases time-barred under
the PCRA. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ruiz, 131 A.3d 54, 58 (Pa.
Super. 2015), where we stated:
Even assuming that Alleyne did announce a new constitutional
right, neither our Supreme Court, nor the United States
Supreme Court has held that Alleyne is to be applied
retroactively to cases in which the judgment of sentence had
become final. This is fatal to Appellant’s argument regarding the
PCRA time-bar. This Court has recognized that a new rule of
constitutional law is applied retroactively to cases on collateral
review only if the United States Supreme Court or our Supreme
Court specifically holds it to be retroactively applicable to those
cases.
Thus, we conclude that the common pleas court was without
jurisdiction to grant relief in this matter, and it properly dismissed
Appellant’s fifth PCRA petition as untimely.
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/11/2016
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