In the Interest of: J.J. Appeal of: J.J. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.J. IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: J.J.
No. 327 MDA 2016
Appeal from the Order Entered February 12, 2016
In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County
Civil Division at No(s): 2016-0566
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., PANELLA, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY JENKINS, J.: FILED AUGUST 30, 2016
Appellant J.J. appeals from the order of the Centre County Court of
Common Pleas ordering that he be committed to outpatient treatment
through SunPointe Health, or other designated program approved by the
treatment team and Centre County MH/ID, for a period not to exceed 90
days. We affirm.
On February 10, 2016, a petition for involuntary mental health
treatment under Section 304 of the Mental Health Procedures Act of 1976
seeking the involuntary commitment of J.J. was filed. On February 11,
2016, a mental health review officer conducted a commitment hearing. That
same day, the officer recommended that the court commit J.J. to involuntary
outpatient treatment for a period not to exceed 90 days. On February 12,
2016, the trial court ordered that J.J. be committed to outpatient treatment
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for a period not to exceed 90 days. On February 16, 2016, J.J. filed a
petition for review of certification to involuntary mental health treatment.
On February 17, 2016, the trial court denied the petition. On February 24,
2016, J.J. filed a timely notice of appeal.1 Both Appellant and the trial court
complied with Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
Appellant raises the following issue on appeal:
Whether the state lacked sufficient evidence to justify a
commitment under the Mental Health Procedures Act as it
presented no evidence of overt acts which would support a
reasonable conclusion that death or serious physical
debilitation or serious bodily injury were likely imminent if
Appellant were not forced to undergo psychiatric
treatment?
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
“In reviewing a trial court order for involuntary commitment, we must
determine whether there is evidence in the record to justify the court’s
findings.” In re T.T., 875 A.2d 1123, 1126 (Pa.Super.2005) (quoting
Commonwealth ex rel. Gibson v. DiGiacinto, 439 A.2d 105, 107
(Pa.1981)). “Although we must accept the trial court’s findings of fact that
have support in the record, we are not bound by its legal conclusions from
those facts.” Id.
The Mental Health Procedures Act provides:
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1
Although Appellant’s 90-day period of involuntary commitment has ended,
Appellant’s issue is not moot because it is capable of repetition and may
evade review. See In re Woodside, 699 A.2d 1293, 1296
(Pa.Super.1997).
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§ 7304. Court-ordered involuntary treatment not to
exceed ninety days
(a) Persons for Whom Application May be Made.--(1)
A person who is severely mentally disabled and in need of
treatment, as defined in section 301(a), may be made
subject to court-ordered involuntary treatment upon a
determination of clear and present danger under section
301(b)(1) (serious bodily harm to others), or section
301(b)(2)(i) (inability to care for himself, creating a
danger of death or serious harm to himself), or
301(b)(2)(ii) (attempted suicide), or 301(b)(2)(iii) (self-
mutilation).
50 P.S. § 7304. Pursuant to the Act:
A person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of
mental illness, his capacity to exercise self-control,
judgment and discretion in the conduct of his affairs and
social relations or to care for his own personal needs is so
lessened that he poses a clear and present danger of harm
to others or to himself.
50 P.S. § 7301(a). Pursuant to section 7301(b)(2)(i), clear and present
danger to himself can be shown by establishing that within the past 30 days:
(i) the person has acted in such manner as to evidence
that he would be unable, without care, supervision and the
continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for
nourishment, personal or medical care, shelter, or self
protection and safety, and that there is a reasonable
probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious
physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless
adequate treatment were afforded under this act.
50 P.S. 7301(b)(2).
“It is well-settled that involuntary civil commitment of mentally ill
persons constitutes deprivation of liberty and may be accomplished only in
accordance with due process protections.” In re R.D., 739 A.2d 548, 554
(Pa.Super.1999) (quoting In re Hutchinson, 454 A.2d 1008, 1010
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(Pa.1982)). “The appropriate standard of proof for certification of extended
involuntary treatment is clear and convincing evidence.” In re Hancock,
719 A.2d 1053, 1056-57 (Pa.Super.1998). “Requiring clear and convincing
evidence that an individual represents a clear and present danger to himself
or others places the burden squarely on the facility or individual attempting
to commit the individual involuntarily.” Id.
The trial court found the following:
Here, the [c]ourt is satisfied that Petitioner had sufficient
evidence to justify a commitment under the Mental Health
Procedures Act. At the hearing, Dr. Timothy Derstine,
Appellant’s treating psychiatrist, testified that Appellant
suffers from schizoaffective disorder bipolar type.
Dr. Derstine testified that Appellant currently poses a
danger to himself because of nonadherence to his
treatment. Without his medication, Appellant is not safe,
and is unable to meet his basic needs without the care and
assistance of others. Dr. Derstine explained that without
the requested treatment, there is a reasonable probability
that Appellant’s deterioration will lead to disability and
debilitation within thirty days as a result of his mental
illness.
The Court accepts Dr. Derstine’s testimony as credible and
persuasive. He has been treating Appellant for
approximately four years, and recognizes that Appellant is
currently below his experienced psychiatric baseline. Dr.
Derstine also recognizes a pattern of deterioration that
involves missed appointments and medication, recurrent
phone calls to the office, followed by hospitalization.
Appellant’s condition has worsened in the past 30 days.
Appellant was hospitalized, where he received an injection
of his medication. Dr. Derstine explained that Appellant is
in a period of vulnerability of relapse because his
medication requires an oral and injectable component.
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Appellant’s candid testimony supports his need for
treatment. Appellant was unable to answer direct
questions, and his testimony indicates that he would not
continue the necessary treatment. Dr. Derstine testified
that each time there is a decomposition it is more difficult
to return to the previous baseline, and it can take up to
nine months to return to that baseline, if at all. Such facts
support a reasonable conclusion that physical debilitation
or disability were likely imminent if Appellant was not
ordered to undergo treatment.
For the forgoing reasons, the [c]ourt maintains that its
Order of March 7, 2016 was properly entered and
respectfully requests that its decision not be disturbed.
1925(a) Opinion, 3/21/2016, at 2-3.
Further, contrary to Appellant’s argument, the petitioner did not need
to establish an overt act that occurred. Rather, when involuntary treatment
is based on section 7301(b)(2), there need not be an overt act. See In re
S.C., 421 A.2d 853, 857 (Pa.Super.1980) (“If no overt act is shown,
commitment may only be justified if: ‘... the person has acted in such
manner as to evidence that he would be unable, without care, supervision
and the continued assistance of others, to satisfy his need for nourishment,
personal or medical care, shelter, or self-protection and safety, and that
there is a reasonable probability that death, serious bodily injury or serious
physical debilitation would ensue within 30 days unless adequate treatment
were afforded under the act.’ 50 P.S. § 7301(b)(2)”); In Re S.B., 777 A.2d
454, 457-59 (Pa.Super.2000).
The record supports the trial court’s finding that clear and convincing
evidence established that physical debilitation or disability were likely if
Appellant did not undergo treatment.
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Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/30/2016
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