Com. v. Wood, S. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant
v.
SHAWN L. WOOD
Appellee No. 670 EDA 2015
Appeal from the Order February 5, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0009244-2014
BEFORE: OTT, J., DUBOW, J., and JENKINS, J.
MEMORANDUM BY OTT, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 09, 2016
This is a Commonwealth appeal from the order1 entered February 5,
2015, in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, granting the
motion of appellee, Shawn L. Wood, to suppress the evidence recovered
during a traffic stop. When this appeal first appeared before this panel, we
determined the trial court erred in concluding the investigating officers were
not authorized to remove Wood from his vehicle and conduct a pat-down
search for weapons during the stop. See Commonwealth v. Wood, 2016
WL 1757247, *3 (Pa. Super. 2016) (unpublished memorandum).
Nevertheless, we remanded so the trial court could make additional findings
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1
In its notice of appeal, the Commonwealth properly certified that “this
order terminates or substantially handicaps the prosecution of this case,” a
prerequisite to this Court’s jurisdiction pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 311(d). Notice
of Appeal, 3/9/2015.
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as to whether or not the initial traffic stop of Wood’s vehicle was proper.
See id. The trial court subsequently complied with our directive and filed a
supplemental opinion, in which it concluded the traffic stop was illegal. For
the reasons below, we now affirm the order granting Wood’s suppression
motion.
In its supplemental opinion, the trial court summarized the relevant
facts as follows:
The evidence established that on July 13, 2014, at
approximately 8:45 p.m., Philadelphia Officer Kyle Smith and his
partner were on duty in the area of the 2000 block of 60 th
Street. Officer Smith testified that at that time and place he
spotted a 2004 white Chevy Silverado traveling north in the
southbound lane. Officer Smith’s partner signaled the driver to
let him know he was on the wrong side of the road by flashing
his lights once. According to Officer Smith, the driver did not
correct his lane of travel so Officer Smith’s partner activated the
overhead lights and pulled the vehicle over for the sole reason of
driving on the wrong side of the road.
Contrary to Officer Smith’s testimony, Jodi-Lyn Lowry
testified that she and [Wood] were headed northbound,
attempting to make a left-hand turn down a one-way street and
they never traveled on the wrong side of the road. According to
Ms. Lowry, a police car was headed southbound so they stopped
to allow the officers to go by before [] Wood made the turn
because she stated two cars could not fit.1 According to Ms.
Lowry, they waved the officer forward before making the left-
hand turn. The police flashed their lights once. Thinking they
were being giv[en] the right-[of]-way, [Wood] started to make
the turn when the police flashed their lights completely. On
cross-examination, Ms. Lowry testified that at no time was
[Wood’s] truck traveling in the wrong lane of traffic. They were
just attempting to make a left-hand turn.
[Wood] testified that his work truck is bigger than usual;
that it is like driving a U-haul. He stated that he was driving
from his friend’s house near 60th Street to go to the store. When
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he got near where he needed to make a left turn to park, he
pulled over a little bit to let a car go by. He saw the police car
behind the car he had just let go by and waved at the police car
to go before he made his turn; the police car flashed their lights
at him once. Thinking he was being given the right-[of]-way, he
went to turn and was about half-way through the turn when the
police put the lights on completely.
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1
Ms. Lowry described [Wood’s] truck as “pretty big” with
solid work tool containers on each side which made the
truck bigger than a normal truck.
Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 7/19/2016, at 2-3 (record citations
omitted).
After Wood was stopped, Officer Smith directed him to step out of his
vehicle, and asked him if there was anything in the vehicle of which the
officer should be aware. See Wood, supra, 2016 WL 1757247, at *1.
Wood responded by telling the officer he had a gun in the glove box. He
was subsequently arrested and charged with two violations of the Uniform
Firearms Act. See 18 Pa.C.S. §§ 6106(a) and 6108.
Wood filed a pre-trial suppression motion on February 5, 2015,
arguing the traffic stop was unlawful because the police did not have
reasonable suspicion or probable cause to believe he was engaged in
criminal activity. See Motion to Suppress Evidence, 2/5/2015, at ¶ 12. At
the conclusion of a suppression hearing conducted on February 15, 2015,
the trial court granted Wood’s motion to suppress. Notably, the court never
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decided whether the initial traffic stop was legal;2 rather, it found Officer
Smith had no grounds to remove Wood from his vehicle. See Trial Court
Opinion, 6/16/2015, at 6 (“Here, the Commonwealth [] failed to provide
specific facts by which to support a finding of reasonable suspicion that
criminal activity was afoot and that [Wood] had to be removed from the
vehicle.”).
When the appeal first appeared before this panel, we agreed with the
Commonwealth’s contention that the officer did not need any reasonable
suspicion of criminal activity to order Wood from his vehicle, assuming the
traffic stop was valid. See Wood, supra, 2016 WL 1757247, at *3 (stating
“it is well-settled that ‘an officer conducting a valid traffic stop may order the
occupants of a vehicle to alight to assure his own safety.’”), quoting
Commonwealth v. Reppert, 814 A.2d 1196, 1202 (Pa. Super. 2002) (en
banc ) (emphasis supplied and citations omitted). Further, we found Officer
Smith’s subsequent search of Wood’s truck was proper based upon Wood’s
own statement to the officer that he had a gun in the glove box. Id.Nevertheless, we recognized “our determination of whether Officer
Smith’s actions violated Wood’s Fourth Amendment rights [was] dependent
upon the legality of the initial traffic stop.” Wood, supra, 2016 WL
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2
See N.T., 2/5/2015, at 49 (the court stated: “I find that whether or not
the officer had the right to stop the vehicle is not necessary for me to
determine for this motion to suppress.”).
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1757247, at *3. Therefore, we remanded the case to the trial court to make
additional findings and file a supplemental opinion because (1) the court
specifically stated it had not determined “whether or not the officer had the
right to stop the vehicle,” and (2) that finding necessarily involved a
credibility determination. Id. The trial court complied with our directive,
and the issue is now before this panel for review.
When considering a trial court’s suppression ruling, we must determine
“whether the record supports the trial court’s findings of fact and whether
the trial court erred in its legal conclusions.” Commonwealth v. Enick, 70
A.3d 843, 845 (Pa. Super. 2013) (citation omitted), appeal denied, 85 A.3d
482 (Pa. 2014). If the court’s factual findings are supported by the record,
we are bound by those findings. Where, as here, it is the
Commonwealth who is appealing the decision of the suppression
court, we must consider only the evidence of the defendant's
witnesses and so much of the evidence for the prosecution as
read in the context of the record as a whole remains
uncontradicted.
Commonwealth v. Ibrahim, 127 A.3d 819, 822 (2015) (quotation
omitted), appeal denied, 138 A.3d 3 (Pa. 2016). Moreover, we emphasize
“it is exclusively within the province of the trial court to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be accorded their testimony.”
Commonwealth v. Gallagher, 896 A.2d 583, 584 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(quotation omitted).
A police officer’s statutory authority to stop a motor vehicle is codified
in Section 6308 of the Motor Vehicle Code:
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(b) Authority of police officer.--Whenever a police officer is
engaged in a systematic program of checking vehicles or drivers
or has reasonable suspicion that a violation of this title is
occurring or has occurred, he may stop a vehicle, upon request
or signal, for the purpose of checking the vehicle’s registration,
proof of financial responsibility, vehicle identification number or
engine number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
75 Pa.C.S. § 6308(b).
In interpreting this subsection, the courts of this Commonwealth have
concluded that a vehicle stop based solely on reasonable suspicion of a
motor vehicle violation “must serve a stated investigatory purpose … [since,
i]n effect, the language of Section 6308(b)—‘to secure such other
information as the officer may reasonably believe to be necessary to enforce
the provisions of this title’—is conceptually equivalent with the underlying
purpose of a Terry stop.” Commonwealth v. Feczko, 10 A.3d 1285, 1291
(Pa. Super. 2010) (en banc), appeal denied, 25 A.3d 257 (Pa. 2011). The
Feczko panel further explained:
Mere reasonable suspicion will not justify a vehicle stop
when the driver’s detention cannot serve an investigatory
purpose relevant to the suspected violation. In such an
instance, “it is encumbent [sic] upon the officer to articulate
specific facts possessed by him, at the time of the questioned
stop, which would provide probable cause to believe that the
vehicle or the driver was in violation of some provision of the
Code.” [Commonwealth v.] Gleason, 785 A.2d [983,] 989 [Pa.
2001)] (citation omitted). See also [Commonwealth v.]
Chase, 960 A.2d [108,] 116 [(Pa. 2008)] (reaffirming
Gleason’s probable cause standard for non-investigative
detentions of suspected Vehicle Code violations).
Id. (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
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In considering the present case, we must first determine whether
Officer Smith needed probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop Wood’s
vehicle. In Commonwealth v. Salter, 121 A.3d 987 (Pa. Super. 2015), a
panel of this Court outlined the parameters for this determination as follows:
[W]hen considering whether reasonable suspicion or probable
cause is required constitutionally to make a vehicle stop, the
nature of the violation has to be considered. If it is not
necessary to stop the vehicle to establish that a violation
of the Vehicle Code has occurred, an officer must possess
probable cause to stop the vehicle. Where a violation is
suspected, but a stop is necessary to further investigate whether
a violation has occurred, an officer need only possess reasonable
suspicion to make the stop. Illustrative of these two standards
are stops for speeding and DUI. If a vehicle is stopped for
speeding, the officer must possess probable cause to stop the
vehicle. This is so because when a vehicle is stopped, nothing
more can be determined as to the speed of the vehicle when it
was observed while traveling upon a highway. On the other
hand, if an officer possesses sufficient knowledge based upon
behavior suggestive of DUI, the officer may stop the vehicle
upon reasonable suspicion of a Vehicle Code violation, since a
stop would provide the officer the needed opportunity to
investigate further if the driver was operating under the
influence of alcohol or a controlled substance. Compare []
Enick, [supra,] 70 A.3d [at] 846 [] (probable cause required to
stop for failure to drive on right side of roadway),
Commonwealth v. Brown, 64 A.3d 1101, 1105 (Pa. Super.
2013) (probable cause required to stop for failure to use turn
signal), Commonwealth v. Busser, 56 A.3d 419, 424 (Pa.
Super. 2012) (probable cause required to stop for failure to yield
to emergency vehicles), and Feczko, 10 A.3d at 1291 (probable
cause required to stop for failure to maintain lanes), with
Commonwealth v. Holmes, 609 Pa. 1, 14 A.3d 89, 96–97
(2011) (reasonable suspicion sufficient to stop to investigate
front windshield obstruction), Commonwealth v. Bailey, 947
A.2d 808, 812–14 (Pa. Super. 2008) (reasonable suspicion
sufficient to stop to investigate faulty exhaust system or
muffler); see also Commonwealth v. Landis, 89 A.3d 694,
703 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that where trooper stopped
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motorist for failing to drive within a single lane—and not to
investigate possible DUI—he needed probable cause to stop).
Id. at 993 (emphasis supplied).
Here, Officer Smith testified he observed Wood “traveling northbound
in a southbound lane[,]” driving “in the wrong lane” of traffic. N.T.,
2/5/2015, at 6.3 Therefore, the officer suspected Wood committed a
violation of 75 Pa.C.S. § 3301(a)(5),4 which mandates “a vehicle shall be
driven upon the right half of the roadway except … [w]hen making a left turn
as provided in sections 3322 (relating to vehicle turning left) and 3331
(related to required position and method of turning).” 5 Because it was not
necessary to stop Wood’s vehicle to determine whether he violated Section
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3
See also id. at 8 (“He was coming northbound in the southbound lane.”);
13 (“He’s traveling northbound in the southbound lane; I’m driving
southbound; which means he’s driving on the wrong side of the road.”).
4
Officer Smith did not charge Wood with any summary vehicle violations.
5
Section 3322 provides that “[t]he driver of a vehicle intending to turn left
within an intersection … shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle
approaching from the opposite direction which is so close as to constitute a
hazard.” 75 Pa.C.S. § 3322. Further, Section 3331 states, in relevant part:
(b) Left turn.--The driver of a vehicle intending to turn left shall
approach the turn in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully
available to traffic moving in the direction of travel of the
vehicle. Whenever practicable, the left turn shall be made to the
left of the center of the intersection and so as to leave the
intersection or location in the extreme left-hand lane lawfully
available to traffic moving in the same direction as the vehicle on
the roadway being entered.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3331.
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3301(a),6 we find Officer Smith needed to possess probable cause that a
violation occurred in order to stop Wood. Salter, supra, 121 A.3d at 993.
See also Enick, supra, 70 A.3d at 846 (police officer needed probable
cause to stop vehicle for suspected violation of Section 3301, because stop
would serve no investigatory purpose).
In determining whether probable cause exists,
we must consider “whether the facts and circumstances which
are within the knowledge of the officer at the time of the arrest,
and of which he has reasonably trustworthy information, are
sufficient to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief
that the suspect has committed or is committing a crime.”
Ibrahim, supra, 127 A.3d at 824 (quotation omitted).
In its supplemental opinion, the trial court found, based on the
testimony of Lowry, that Officer Smith did not have probable cause to stop
Wood for a violation of Section 3301. The court opined:
[T]he court finds Ms. Lowry’s testimony credible – that [Wood]
was attempting to make a left-hand turn; an exception under
subsection (a)(5). If there was a momentary and minor
violation of § 3301, it was insufficient to establish probable
cause for a vehicle stop.
Trial Court Supplemental Opinion, 7/19/2016, at 3. In making this
determination, the trial court necessarily credited Lowry’s testimony that
Wood was, at all times, traveling in the correct lane on the street, and he
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6
Similar to a stop for speeding, either Wood was traveling in the wrong
lane, or he was not; nothing more could have been determined during the
vehicle stop. Salter, supra, 121 A.3d at 993.
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was stopped as he was making the left hand turn. See N.T., 2/5/2015, at
26-27. Concomitantly, the court also, necessarily, discredited Officer
Smith’s testimony that he observed Wood traveling in the wrong lane of
traffic before Wood approached the left turn.
As we stated supra, credibility determinations are within the sole
province of the trial court. Gallagher, supra. Because the trial court’s
factual findings are supported by the record, “we are bound by those
findings.” Ibrahim, supra, 127 A.3d at 822. Therefore, we find no basis to
disturb the trial court’s suppression order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 9/9/2016
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