In Re: Reichle, R., Appeal of: Reichle, R. ( 2016 )

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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: ROBERT L. REICHLE, AS POWER IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
OF ATTORNEY FOR EMILY REICHLE PENNSYLVANIA
v.
MARY JUANITA LIPTAK, A/K/A JUANITA
LIPTAK, PETITIONER
APPEAL OF: ROBERT L. REICHLE No. 802 WDA 2015
Appeal from the Order Entered January 16, 2015
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
Orphans’ Court at No: 2706 of 2013
BEFORE: STABILE, DUBOW, and MUSMANNO, JJ.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED AUGUST 24, 2016
Appellant, Robert L. Reichle, appeals pro se from the order entered in
the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County dismissing exceptions to the
imposition of a surcharge on him in the amount of $497,215.11. Upon
review, we affirm.
In its Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) opinion, the trial court summarized the facts
of this case as follows.
On February 2, 2005, Emily Reichle executed a Power of
Attorney (hereinafter “POA”) granting respondent, her son,
Robert L. Reichle (hereinafter “Appellant”) the power to act as
her agent in fact. On April 29, 2013, Petitioner Mary Juanita
Liptak [(hereinafter “Appellee”)], daughter of Emily Reichle, filed
a Petition for Citation for Rule to Show Cause as to Why the
Power of Attorney Should Not File an Account Pursuant to 20
Pa.C.S.A. § 5610, requesting that this [c]ourt compel Agent to
file an accounting. On May 16, 2013, this [c]ourt entered an
Order directing Agent to file an account. The Appellant failed to
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comply with this [c]ourt’s Order to file an account, until
sanctions were imposed, fines had accumulated and
incarceration was threatened. The Appellant belatedly filed his
account on January 2, 2014. [Appellee] filed objections to the
account.
An Audit was held on February 18, 2014, and the
objections to the Account were placed on the record. The matter
preceded to trial before this [c]ourt on September 22, 2014, and
was continued to October 28, 2014, and concluded on October
29, 2014. On January 1[6], 2015, this [c]ourt entered an
Opinion and Order of [c]ourt, imposing surcharge of
$497,215.11 on Appellant.
Appellant filed timely Exceptions on February [3], 2015.
Argument was heard in open court on April 28, 2015, and the
Exceptions were denied on [May 6], 2015. On May 20, 2015,
Appellant filed an appeal from this [c]ourt’s Order [docketed May
6], 2015, which had denied Appellant’s exceptions to this
[c]ourt’s Order of January 1[6], 2015.
This [c]ourt [o]rdered Appellant to file a 1925(b)
statement of errors complained of on appeal. The Appellant filed
his 1925(b) statement on June 4, 2015.
Trial Court Opinion (T.C.O.), 7/1/15, at 1-2.
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
1. Did the trial court commit an abuse of discretion and err as a
matter of law in failing to deny standing to Mary Juanita Liptak,
sister of the Appellant?
2. Did the lower court commit an abuse of discretion and err as a
matter of law in failing to recognize that the Statute of Limitations
was a bar to any relief claimed by Mary Juanita Liptak, sister of the
Appellant?
Appellant’s Brief at 8.
Our standard of review regarding Appellant’s issues is well settled.
The findings of a judge of the orphans’ court division,
sitting without a jury, must be accorded the same weight and
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effect as the verdict of a jury, and will not be reversed by an
appellate court in the absence of an abuse of discretion or a lack
of evidentiary support.
This rule is particularly applicable to findings of fact which
are predicated upon the credibility of the witnesses, whom the
judge has had the opportunity to hear and observe, and upon
the weight given to their testimony. In reviewing the Orphans’
Court’s findings, our task is to ensure that the record is free
from legal error and to determine if the Orphans’ Court’s findings
are supported by competent and adequate evidence and are not
predicated upon capricious disbelief of competent and credible
evidence. However, we are not limited when we review the legal
conclusions that the Orphans’ Court has derived from those
facts.
In re Estate of Schultheis, 747 A.2d 918, 922 (Pa. Super. 2000) (quoting
In re Estate of Rider, 711 A.2d 1018, 1020 (Pa. Super. 1998).
Appellant first claims Appellee did not have standing to bring an action
to compel him to file an account under 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5610. Appellant,
citing In re Kilpatrick’s Estate, 84 A.2d 339 (Pa. 1951), argues it is
established that “only the personal representative of a deceased party in
interest stands in the shoes of such decedent. Legatees, spouses or next
of kin of that decedent really have no such interest.” Appellant’s Brief
at 16 (citation omitted) (emphasis added by Appellant). Appellant’s reliance
on Kilpatrick’s Estate is misplaced. In Kilpatrick’s Estate, the appellant
requested review of a confirmed final account for an estate.1 Kilpatrick’s
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1
The estate belonged to the appellant’s deceased wife’s deceased first
husband. Our Supreme Court determined that, while the appellant’s wife
was a distributee of the balance of her first husband’s account, the appellant
was not and did not have a direct interest in it. As such, our Supreme Court
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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Estate, 84 A.2d at 339. Here, we are not dealing with an estate, but rather
with the filing of an account under a power of attorney that was ordered by
a court pursuant to Section 5610. As such, Kilpatrick’s Estate is
inapposite to Appellant’s first issue.
Nonetheless, Appellant argues that Appellee does not have standing
because “at no time did [Appellee] infuse any dollar amount of money into
the corpus of the assets managed by her brother. As such, she has and had
no beneficial interest in those assets.” Appellant’s Brief at 17 (emphasis in
original). Appellant argues that while 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5610 provides that an
agent must file an account whenever directed to do so by the court, only the
principal, or principal’s agent, may ask the court to do so.2 Id. We
disagree.
Pursuant to Section 5610, “[a]n agent shall file an account of his
administration whenever directed to do so by the court and may file an
account at any other time.” 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 5610. Accordingly, as the trial
court notes, by the plain text of Section 5610, the trial court had statutory
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(Footnote Continued)
determined that the appellant did not have standing to sue his wife’s first
husband’s estate on behalf of his deceased wife. Id. at 340.
2
Although not in effect at the time the instant appeal was filed, Appellant
cites 20 Pa.C.S.A. 5601.3(d)(1) to support his argument that only the
principal may compel him to file an account. Appellant ignores that this
statute also permits a court to order disclosure by an agent. 20 Pa.C.S.A.
5601.3(d)(1) (“Except as otherwise provided in the power of attorney, an
agent shall not be required to disclose receipts, disbursements . . . unless
ordered by a court or requested by the principal . . .”).
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authority to independently order Appellant to file an account that was not
dependent upon the standing of Appellee. Although Appellee brought the
matter to the trial court’s attention, Appellant was required to file an account
because he was ordered to do so by the trial court. Appellant, therefore, is
not entitled to relief on his first issue.
With respect to Appellant’s second issue, he argues that Appellee was
barred from requesting that Appellant file an account for the period of time
prior to April 13, 2011 by the two-year statute of limitations for breach of
fiduciary duty and taking of property under 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5524. Appellant’s
Brief at 18. In support thereof, Appellant contends the petitioner had
retained the services of counsel as early as May 28, 2008 for purposes of
seeking an accounting. Yet, Appellant maintains petitioner took no action to
compel an accounting or institute any action against him for more than five
years after that date until April 13, 2013, when she initiated the present
action by the filing of her petition for a rule to show cause why an account
should not be filed by Appellant as the agent in fact for his mother.
Additionally, since petitioner was aware as early as 2008 that Appellant may
have committed some wrongdoing, Appellant maintains that the discovery
rule cannot operate here to toll the running of the statute of limitations.
Again, we disagree.
Assuming without deciding for the moment whether the two-year
statute of limitations applies to the claims upon which the orphans court
imposed a surcharge upon Appellant for transactions he conducted under the
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POA,3 see In re Estate of Moskowitz, 115 A.3d 372 (Pa. Super. 2015),
Appellant’s argument misses the mark by focusing upon the petitioner’s
knowledge. Under 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 5601(e), “an agent acting under a power
of attorney has a fiduciary relationship with the principal.” Since Appellant’s
duty ran to the principal, it was the principal’s knowledge that should have
been the focus on the applicability of the discovery rule as to any statute of
limitations question for breach of fiduciary duty. Here, Appellant focused not
upon the principal, but upon the petitioner to whom he owed no fiduciary
duty under the power of attorney. Since the principal is now dead, and
there is nothing in the record before us to suggest that the principal had any
knowledge of Appellant’s wrongful acts before she died, Appellant cannot
sustain his burden of proving that any of the surcharge claims imposed upon
him are barred by any applicable statute of limitations.4
As Appellant is not entitled to relief on either of his issues, we affirm
the order of the trial court dismissing Appellant’s exceptions.
Order affirmed.
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3
Personal representatives acting under a will and trustees acting under a
trust remain liable for all distributions made by them until court confirmation
of an account. See 20 Pa. C.S.A. §§ 3533, 7799.2. No similar statutory
provisions pertain to agents acting under a power of attorney. In the
absence of any statutory provisions pertaining to powers of attorney,
principles of law and equity apply. 20 Pa. C.S.A. § 5612.
4
In light of our disposition on the statute of limitations issue, we need not
address Appellant’s argument that the trial court improperly looked to the
doctrine of laches in denying his exceptions.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/24/2016
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