In Re: Petition of E.M.E. ( 2019 )


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  • J-A03018-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    IN RE: PETITION OF E.M.E.                 :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    :
    v.                           :
    :
    :
    THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE POLICE             :
    AND WESTMORELAND COUNTY                   :
    DEPARTMENT OF BEHAVIORAL                  :   No. 812 WDA 2018
    HEALTH AND DEVELOPMENTAL                  :
    SERVICES                                  :
    Appeal from the Order May 7, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Westmoreland County Civil Division at
    No(s): No. 5714 of 2017
    BEFORE:    BOWES, J., SHOGAN, J., and STRASSBURGER*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.:                                 FILED MAY 1, 2019
    Appellant, E.M.E., born in August of 1992, appeals from the order
    denying, in part, his petition to expunge his mental health records and restore
    his firearms rights. The trial court granted Appellant relief to possess firearms
    without risk to himself or others pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f) but refused
    to expunge his mental health records. Appellees are the Pennsylvania State
    Police and Westmoreland County Department of Behavioral Health and
    Developmental Services. Upon careful review, we affirm.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-A03018-19
    We summarize the facts of this case as follows: On February 8, 2014,
    pursuant to Section 302 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (“MHPA”),1 50
    P.S. §§ 7101–7503, Appellant was involuntarily committed at Excela Health,
    Westmoreland Regional Hospital, in Greensburg, Pennsylvania.         Application
    for Involuntary Emergency Examination and Treatment (“302 Application”),
    2/8/14, at 3; N.T., 3/1/18, at 32, 35. Appellant’s mother related that she had
    been contacted at work by the mother of Appellant’s friend, who advised that
    Appellant had threatened to kill himself earlier that evening. 302 Application,
    2/8/14, at 3. Upon returning home, Appellant’s mother found Appellant asleep
    in bed with a firearm.       As she removed the firearm, Appellant awoke and
    began destroying items in his bedroom.           Id.   She ultimately persuaded
    Appellant to go to the hospital voluntarily and drove him there.
    Dr. M. Belak evaluated Appellant upon Appellant’s arrival at the hospital
    at 12:34 a.m. on February 8, 2014. Dr. Belak documented that Appellant
    ____________________________________________
    1   Section 302 of the MHPA provides:
    for the involuntary emergency examination and treatment of a
    person not to exceed 120 hours if, upon certification of a physician
    for examination, or upon a warrant issued by a county
    administrator authorizing an examination, an examination
    conducted by a physician within two hours of arrival shows that
    the person is severely mentally disabled and in need of emergency
    treatment. 50 P.S. § 7302(a), (b).
    In re J.M.Y., 
    179 A.3d 1140
    , 1144 (Pa. Super. 2018) (en banc), appeal
    granted sub nom., In re Petition of J.M.Y., 
    194 A.3d 121
     (Pa. 2018).
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    verbally threatened hospital staff and laughed inappropriately.             302
    Application, 2/8/14, at 7.          Dr. Belak checked Box A on the form, which
    provides, in pertinent part, that the “patient is severely mentally disabled and
    in need of treatment.”        
    Id.
        Dr. Belak recommended inpatient psychiatric
    treatment.2 
    Id.
     Appellant testified that he was hospitalized for four days.
    N.T., 3/1/18, at 42.
    On November 29, 2017, Appellant filed a petition to vacate and expunge
    mental health records pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1)3 and 18 Pa.C.S. §
    6111.1(g)4 (“Petition”) to obtain various relief from the prohibition to possess
    firearms. Following a hearing5 on March 1, 2018, the trial court denied the
    petition to expunge on May 7, 2018, but granted Appellant’s request to
    ____________________________________________
    2 “[P]ursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c)(4), a person who has been involuntarily
    committed to a mental institution for inpatient care and treatment under
    sections 302, 303, or 304 of the MHPA is prohibited from possessing, using,
    controlling, selling, transferring, or manufacturing a firearm.” J.M.Y., 179
    A.3d at 1142 n.1.
    3 “Under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(f)(1), the court of common pleas, upon application
    of a person subject to prohibition under [S]ection 6105(c)(4), ‘may grant such
    relief as it deems appropriate if the court determines that the applicant may
    possess a firearm without risk to the applicant or any other person.’” J.M.Y.,
    179 A.3d at 1142 n.2.
    4  “Section 6111.1(g)(2) provides a means for expungement of records of
    [S]ection 302 involuntary commitment where the evidence was insufficient to
    justify such commitment.” J.M.Y., 179 A.3d at 1142 n.3.
    5 Appellant and Mr. Richard Kirk Matson, the Administrator of Westmoreland
    County Department of Behavioral Health and Developmental Services,
    testified at the hearing.
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    possess firearms. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. The trial court did
    not order Appellant to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement.
    Appellant raises the following issues on appeal:
    ISSUE I. Is a diagnosis of mental illness recorded within the
    examining physician’s findings the Sine Qua Non of a valid 302
    involuntary emergency examination and treatment without which
    a 302 must be held to be invalid?
    ISSUE II. Is the statutorily required designation of the
    facility essential to a valid 302?
    ISSUE III. Is clear and convincing always the standard of
    proof required for evaluating the validity of a section 302
    involuntary emergency examination and treatment when a
    petitioner avers violations of constitutional rights and violations of
    the due process protections and procedural mandates of the
    MHPA?
    ISSUE IV. Must the MHPA be strictly enforced?
    ISSUE V. Does a petitioner waive averred violations of the
    due process protections and procedural mandates of the
    Pennsylvania Mental Health Procedures Act (hereinafter “MHPA”)
    when a petitioner includes a request for expungement based on
    Section 6111.1(g) within a petition for expungement?
    Appellant’s Brief6 at 2–3.
    “Our well settled standard of review in cases involving a motion for
    expunction is whether the trial court abused its discretion.” J.M.Y., 179 A.3d
    at 1143 (citing In re Keyes, 
    83 A.3d 1016
    , 1022 (Pa. Super. 2013)). Relying
    upon Keyes and Commonwealth v. Smerconish, 
    112 A.3d 1260
     (Pa.
    ____________________________________________
    6  While Appellant’s brief is more than double the thirty-page guide set forth
    in Pa.R.A.P. 2135(a), counsel has filed a certificate of compliance that the
    word count does not exceed 14,000. Appellant’s Brief at unnumbered
    Appendix 1. Therefore, the brief is compliant with Pa.R.A.P. 2135(d).
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    J-A03018-19
    Super. 2015), the trial court determined that while the Psychological
    Assessment dated May 24, 2017, authored by psychologist Richard W. Pritts
    and presented to the court at the March 1, 2018 hearing, did not state “a
    specific opinion as to [Appellant’s] ability to safely possess a firearm,” the
    psychologist’s cover sheet of his report provided “sufficient language for the
    [c]ourt to make a determination on [the] issue.” Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18,
    at 2; N.T., 3/1/18, at 32. The trial court concluded, however, that it did not
    have the authority to expunge an involuntary commitment on that basis. Trial
    Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 3. The trial court held that it was “more likely than
    not” that the involuntary commitment was appropriate and that the court
    complied with all requirements of the MHPA. The trial court determined that
    the “numerous and general issues raised throughout the petition” were
    “vaguely pled and unsubstantiated.” 
    Id.
     at 6–7. Thus, the court entered an
    order granting Appellant the ability to possess firearms pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 6105(f) but denied expungement of Appellant’s mental health and
    involuntary commitment and treatment records. Order, 5/7/18.
    Appellant first asserts that there was no diagnosis of mental illness
    regarding Appellant on the 302 Application, and therefore, the involuntary
    emergency examination, hospitalization, and treatment Appellant underwent
    in 2014 violated the requirements of the Pennsylvania MHPA. Appellant’s Brief
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    at 15–20, 23, 27–28. In support, Appellant cites 50 P.S. §§ 7102, 7103, and
    7301.7 Those sections provide, in pertinent part, as follows:
    § 7102. Statement of policy
    It is the policy of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania to seek to
    assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are
    mentally ill, and it is the purpose of this act to establish procedures
    whereby this policy can be effected.
    * * *
    § 7103. Scope of act
    This act establishes rights and procedures for all involuntary
    treatment of mentally ill persons, whether inpatient or
    outpatient . . . .
    * * *
    § 7301. Persons who may be subject to involuntary
    emergency examination and treatment
    a) Persons Subject.--Whenever a person is severely mentally
    disabled and in need of immediate treatment, he may be made
    subject to involuntary emergency examination and treatment. A
    person is severely mentally disabled when, as a result of mental
    illness, his capacity to exercise self-control, judgment and
    discretion in the conduct of his affairs and social relations or to
    care for his own personal needs is so lessened that he poses a
    clear and present danger of harm to others or to himself.
    While the exact nature of Appellant’s first complaint is nebulous, it
    appears he is challenging the validity of his 302 commitment. Appellant cites
    In re Vencil, 
    152 A.3d 235
     (Pa. 2017), at length, but to what end is unclear.
    ____________________________________________
    7 While these sections will be amended by Act No. 2018, Oct. 24, P.L. 690,
    No. 106, effective April 22, 2019, the quoted language of the MHPA is as it
    existed when Appellant was hospitalized.
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    Appellant’s Brief at 22, 35–41. It appears that Appellant contends that when
    evaluating the evidence supporting the 302 commitment in this case, the trial
    court could not look “beyond the four corners of the FINDINGS of the
    examining physician as recorded on page 7 of 7 of the 302 Application.” Id.
    at 41. Appellant suggests that an examination of the 302 Application reveals
    that it lacked a “diagnosis of mental illness reported within the findings of the
    examining physician in the ‘FINDINGS’ section.” Id. at 14. Based on this
    claim, Appellant asserts that the record must be expunged. Id. at 15, 17, 41.
    In this case, the record establishes unequivocally that Section 302(a) of
    the MHPA was not violated. “This provision protects critical liberty interests
    and establishes the procedures by which a person may be involuntarily
    detained.”   In re A.J.N., 
    144 A.3d 130
    , 139 (Pa. Super. 2016).            After
    threatening suicide and falling asleep in bed with a firearm, Appellant,
    accompanied by his mother, voluntarily proceeded to the hospital.         Within
    sixty-five minutes of his arrival at the hospital, Dr. Belak examined Appellant
    and concluded that Appellant was severely mentally disabled and in need of
    in-patient treatment. 302 Application, 2/8/14, at 7. The trial court stated:
    [Appellant] focuses on opinions/legal arguments that the
    302 Application form does not contain a specific medical/mental
    illness diagnosis, that the “FINDINGS” section on the form does
    not verify that the physician read the statements contained in the
    “Describe in detail” section of the form and that merely placing a
    check mark in box A indicating that “The patient is severely
    mentally disabled and in need of treatment. He should be
    admitted to a facility designated by the County Administrator for
    a period of treatment not to exceed 120 hours[]” is insufficient.
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    Based on those issues and arguments, [Appellant] concludes that
    those deficiencies should result in an invalid commitment.
    This [c]ourt concludes that the 302 Application form must
    be taken and viewed in its totality as opposed to analyzing each
    section independently of each other. Page 3 of that form indicates
    that mother of [Appellant] stated that [Appellant] was drinking
    and was threatening to kill himself. His friend’s mother called
    [Appellant’s] mother at her work. She then proceeds home and
    found [Appellant] sleeping on the bed with a gun placed on the
    bed.     When she informed him that he needed to go to
    Westmoreland Hospital to get help, she stated that he started
    destroying and breaking items in his room which resulted in her
    calling 911. She further states that [Appellant] stated repeatedly
    that he wanted to kill himself, stating he had nothing to live for.
    Page 7 of the Application form actually provides new
    information under the category of Results of Examination. There
    the doctor indicates that “[Appellant] was brought to [the
    hospital] because he threatened to shoot himself.         In the
    [hospital] he made verbal threats to staff, attacked staff and
    laughed inappropriately during situation.”     The doctor then
    followed the proper requirement by indicating what treatment was
    needed and checked box A as indicated above.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 3–4.       The trial court further noted that
    Appellant proceeded to Westmoreland Hospital voluntarily, and it was only
    after the situation in the emergency room disintegrated and Appellant became
    uncooperative that “the proper administrator or delegate approved the proper
    warrant procedure.” Id. at 5; see also N.T., 3/1/18, at 42 (Q. “[W]hen your
    mother took you to the hospital, did your mother take you to the hospital
    against your will, or did you agree to go with your mother? A. I agreed to
    go.”). Thus, the trial court found that sufficient evidence existed to support
    the commitment, and therefore, expungement pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
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    § 6111.1(g)(2) was inappropriate. As our review of the record comports with
    that of the trial court, we agree and find no merit to Appellant’s first issue.
    In his second issue, Appellant contends that because Westmoreland
    Regional Hospital was not designated a treatment facility in 2014, there could
    not have been a valid involuntary examination pursuant to the MHPA.
    Appellant’s Brief at 42. The trial court expressly rejected this contention. We
    agree with the trial court’s explanation, as follows:
    As stated by the Administrator of the Westmoreland County Office
    of Behavioral Health And Developmental Services, it was testified
    that the administrator brought to the hearing all documents which
    establish, list[,] and/or identify Westmoreland Hospital as having
    been approved and designated by the administrator of
    Westmoreland County Behavioral Health and Developmental
    Services for the purpose of being a treatment facility at which a
    person could be subject to emergency examination and conformity
    with the requirements of Section 7302 of the Mental Health
    Procedures Act and Section 5100.81 (a) of the Pennsylvania Code.
    (Page 20 of transcript). This [c]ourt provided an opportunity to
    all counsel to review said documents. Further, on page 22 of the
    transcript, the witness testifies that he also brought a copy of the
    approved plan which was developed jointly by the County
    administrator [and] the facility director in order to be in
    compliance with the requirements of Section 5100.81(b) of the
    Pennsylvania Code. While specific copies of the newspaper ads or
    other documentation of publications were not produced from 2013
    or 2014, this [c]ourt does not view that as a fatal flaw. Once again
    the [c]ourt provided an opportunity for all counsel to review the
    approved plan document.
    Further, even if the facility has not been properly approved,
    nevertheless, as cited by the Pennsylvania State Police, 50 P.S.
    § 7103 states in pertinent part that “for the purpose of this act, a
    “facility” means any mental health establishment, hospital, clinic,
    institution, center, day care center, base service unit, community
    mental health center, or part thereof, that provides for the
    diagnosis, treatment, care or rehabilitation of mentally ill persons,
    whether as outpatients or inpatients.” Section 105 further states
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    that a treatment facility only requires approval of a facility by state
    or local authorities if the treatment of an individual is “... funded
    in whole or in part by public moneys....” Pennsylvania State Police
    then notes in its Memorandum that on pages 45 and 45 [sic] of
    the transcript that [Appellant] testified that at the time of his 302
    Commitment he was on his mother’s health insurance and that
    after his hospitalization he recalled paperwork arriving at the
    family home relative to this issue. As such, there is no evidence
    of record in this case that [Appellant’s] involuntary examination,
    or treatment was funded by public monies.
    Trial Court Opinion, 5/7/18, at 5–6. We conclude that Appellant’s argument
    in this regard lacks merit.
    Finally, we find that issues III through V are waived. Appellant’s brief
    is vague and nebulous regarding specific claims. In actuality, the brief is a
    hodgepodge of precepts and rhetorical musings, and it lacks specific citation
    to relevant case law in support. For example, in Issue III, Appellant posits
    that “[c]lear and convincing [is] always the standard of proof required for
    evaluating the validity of a section 302 involuntary emergency examination
    and treatment . . . .” Appellant’s Brief at 48. Appellant fails to cite any case
    law to support this averment, but more significantly, fails to connect the
    representation to the instant case. Appellant also suggests that this Court, in
    In re Jacobs, 
    15 A.3d 509
     (Pa. Super. 2011), misquoted In re Hancock,
    
    719 A.2d 1053
    , 1055 (Pa. Super. 1998), but the quoted language in the brief
    is a verbatim quotation from Hancock. Appellant’s Brief at 50.
    In Issue IV, Appellant opines, “Strict Enforcement of the requirements
    of the MHPA is required.”     Appellant’s Brief at 51.    Once again, Appellant
    presents broad legal concepts without any explanation or connection to the
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    instant case. Appellant cites multiple pages from A.J.N., 
    144 A.3d 130
    , and
    In re Chiumento, 
    688 A.2d 217
     (Pa. Super. 1997), but never suggests or
    explains their applicability to the instant case. Appellant’s Brief at 54–61.
    In Issue V, Appellant posits that “violations of constitutional rights and
    the due process protections and procedural mandates of the MHPA” cannot be
    waived. Appellant’s Brief at 63–64. Appellant fails to provide any substance
    or meaningful exposition of the law in support. Our comments in J.C.B. v.
    Pennsylvania State Police, 
    35 A.3d 792
     (Pa. Super. 2012), are particularly
    apt:
    As to [the a]ppellant’s constitutionality challenges, we find
    that these issues have been waived by [the appellant because he
    has failed to fully develop them.         See Commonwealth v.
    Tielsch, 
    934 A.2d 81
    , 93 (Pa. Super. 2007) (holding that
    undeveloped claims will not be considered on appeal). Although
    in his brief [the a]ppellant repeatedly references and presents
    some discussion regarding his constitutional challenges, such
    references and discussions are general in nature and lack specific
    assailments of the MHPA and the Pennsylvania Uniform Firearms
    Act vis á vis the federal and state constitutions. See [the
    a]ppellee Pennsylvania State Police Brief at 8–10 (explaining that
    [the a]ppellant’s constitutional claims consist of “bald assertions”
    that were not adequately raised and preserved with the trial court,
    and that [the a]ppellant has failed to provide “any real explanation
    of how the facts of [the a]ppellant’s case violated any specific
    provision of either the state or federal constitution, or even cite to
    how those provisions were applied and reviewed beyond basic
    citation”).
    Id. at 797.
    Instantly, the trial court held that Appellant’s constitutional claims were
    “vaguely pled and unsubstantiated,” and we agree.            Trial Court Opinion,
    5/7/18, at 6–7. Moreover, “[i]t is not the role of this Court to develop an
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    appellant’s argument where the brief provides mere cursory legal discussion.
    Commonwealth v. Johnson, 
    985 A.2d 915
    , 925 (Pa. 2009); In re C.R., 
    113 A.3d 328
    , 336 (Pa. Super. 2015) (This Court will not consider an argument
    where an appellant fails to “otherwise develop the issue.”).
    For all of these reasons, we affirm the May 7, 2018 order denying
    expungement of Appellant’s mental health records and granting Appellant’s
    possession of firearms without risk to himself or others pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.
    § 6105(f).
    Order affirmed.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/1/2019
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