Com. v. Randolph, A. ( 2019 )


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  • J-S15042-19
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA               :   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    :        PENNSYLVANIA
    Appellee                :
    :
    v.                             :
    :
    ANDRE LAMONT RANDOLPH                      :
    :
    Appellant               :      No. 1503 WDA 2018
    Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered October 9, 2018
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-26-CR-0000458-2018
    BEFORE:      GANTMAN, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and COLINS*, J.
    MEMORANDUM BY GANTMAN, P.J.E.:                            FILED MAY 10, 2019
    Appellant, Andre Lamont Randolph, appeals from the judgment of
    sentence entered in the Fayette County Court of Common Pleas, following his
    jury trial convictions for four counts each of possession of a controlled
    substance and possession with intent to deliver (“PWID”), and one count of
    possession of drug paraphernalia.1 For the following reasons, we affirm.
    The relevant facts and procedural history of this case are as follows.
    The City of Connellsville Police Department, in conjunction with the Fayette
    County Bureau of Investigation, had an ongoing investigation into a series of
    drug sales out of a residence located at 109 Gibson Terrace in Connellsville.
    Police had conducted multiple controlled drug buys at the residence and
    ____________________________________________
    1   35 P.S. §§ 780-113(a)(16), (30), and (32), respectively.
    ____________________________________
    * Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S15042-19
    learned that Appellant was the person selling drugs from the home.           On
    January 29, 2018, police received information that Appellant was going to
    leave 109 Gibson Terrace in a white Chevy truck, travel to Pittsburgh, and
    then return to the property. Based on this information, Detective Thomas
    Patton drove to the home and observed Appellant enter the front passenger
    side of a white Chevy truck. When the vehicle left the property, Detective
    Patton followed it for some time. While following the truck, Detective Patton
    observed it had an out-of-state license plate and a broken taillight.
    Police had also received information that the truck would take the
    Pennsylvania Turnpike to and from Pittsburgh.       Multiple officers stationed
    themselves at the New Stanton Interchange to await Appellant’s return. Soon
    after the truck returned to Connellsville, police effectuated a traffic stop for
    the broken taillight. Upon approaching the vehicle, Detective Patton noticed
    a strong odor of marijuana, particularly around Appellant who was sitting in
    the front passenger seat. Detective Patton asked Appellant to step out of the
    vehicle and patted Appellant down purportedly for “officer safety.” Appellant
    was wearing multiple layers of clothing, which impaired the pat-down, but
    Detective Patton felt an unidentified object hanging from Appellant’s leg. Due
    to the odor of marijuana, the unidentified object, and the circumstances
    surrounding Appellant’s involvement in the 109 Gibson Terrace investigation,
    police took Appellant into custody.    At the police station, Detective Patton
    searched Appellant before placing him in a holding cell. In Appellant’s multiple
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    layers of clothing Detective Patton found a pill bottle containing marijuana,
    four cellular phones, $6,467.00 in cash, $5.64 in coins, a flashlight, a lock, an
    inhaler, three compact discs, an ID belonging to “Cody Nicholson,” and a set
    of keys. During the inventory search, Detective Patton asked Appellant about
    the keys, and Appellant answered that the keys were to a safe.
    Given all of the circumstances, police obtained a search warrant for 109
    Gibson Terrace and discovered more contraband, including four digital scales
    and six firearms (five handguns and a sawed off shot gun).           Police also
    discovered a safe. Using the keys found on Appellant’s person, police opened
    the safe and discovered crack cocaine, heroin, marijuana, and cash.         As a
    result, the Commonwealth charged Appellant with six counts of possession of
    a firearm prohibited, four counts each of possession of a controlled substance
    and PWID, two counts of receiving stolen property, and one count each of
    possession of drug paraphernalia and possession of offensive weapons.
    On October 1, 2018, Appellant filed an omnibus pre-trial motion to
    suppress all of the evidence against him as originally derived from the Terry2
    frisk that took place outside the truck, as well as his statement regarding the
    key for the safe.        On the same day, the court suppressed Appellant’s
    statement concerning the keys but otherwise denied the motion in regard to
    the Terry frisk.      Following a trial on October 3, 2018, a jury convicted
    ____________________________________________
    2   Terry v. Ohio, 
    392 U.S. 1
    , 
    88 S. Ct. 1868
    , 
    20 L. Ed. 2d 889
    (1968).
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    Appellant of all drug-related charges and acquitted him of all firearms charges.
    The court sentenced Appellant on October 9, 2018, to twenty-four (24)
    months’ to eight (8) years’ incarceration for PWID with no further penalties
    for the remaining convictions. Appellant timely filed a notice of appeal on
    October 18, 2018. On October 19, 2018, the court ordered Appellant to file a
    concise statement of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P.
    1925(b), which Appellant timely filed on November 1, 2018.
    Appellant raises the following issue for our review:
    DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN DENYING APPELLANT’S
    MOTION TO SUPPRESS ALL EVIDENCE FOUND ON HIS
    PERSON BASED UPON THE OFFICER’S LACK OF
    JUSTIFICATION TO INSTITUTE A TERRY FRISK OF
    APPELLANT?
    (Appellant’s Brief at 7).
    Appellant argues that police lacked justification to perform the Terry
    frisk during the traffic stop.   Appellant alleges Detective Patton failed to
    articulate specific facts which would have led an objective person to believe
    Appellant was armed and dangerous and justified a pat-down search for
    weapons. Appellant asserts police stopped the vehicle he was traveling in for
    a broken taillight.   Appellant stresses Detective Patton testified he patted
    Appellant down for “officer safety,” and further testified he did not believe the
    unidentified object in Appellant’s pant leg was a weapon. Appellant maintains
    he complied with all officer demands and did not make any furtive movements
    during the stop. Appellant emphasizes that the odor of marijuana was not
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    enough to justify the pat-down. Appellant contends this illegal Terry frisk led
    to Appellant’s detention, the search of Appellant’s clothing at the police
    station, the detection of the keys to the safe, and, ultimately, the discovery
    of the contraband in the safe. Appellant concludes that all items found on
    Appellant’s person, including the keys, should have been suppressed and
    Appellant should be granted a new trial. We cannot agree.
    We review the denial of a suppression motion as follows:
    Our standard of review in addressing a challenge to a trial
    court’s denial of a suppression motion is limited to
    determining whether the factual findings are supported by
    the record and whether the legal conclusions drawn from
    those facts are correct.
    [W]e may consider only the evidence of the
    prosecution and so much of the evidence for the
    defense as remains uncontradicted when read in the
    context of the record as a whole. Where the record
    supports the findings of the suppression court, we are
    bound by those facts and may reverse only if the court
    erred in reaching its legal conclusions based upon the
    facts.
    Commonwealth v. Williams, 
    941 A.2d 14
    , 26-27 (Pa.Super. 2008) (en
    banc) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).      “It is within the
    suppression court’s sole province as factfinder to pass on the credibility of
    witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony.” Commonwealth v.
    Clemens, 
    66 A.3d 373
    , 378 (Pa.Super. 2013) (quoting Commonwealth v.
    Gallagher, 
    896 A.2d 583
    , 585 (Pa.Super. 2006)).
    Section 6308 of the Motor Vehicle Code provides:
    § 6308. Investigation by police officers
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    (b) Authority of police officer.—Whenever a police
    officer is engaged in a systematic program of checking
    vehicles or drivers or has reasonable suspicion that a
    violation of this title is occurring or has occurred, he may
    stop a vehicle, upon request or signal, for the purpose of
    checking the vehicle’s registration, proof of financial
    responsibility, vehicle identification number or engine
    number or the driver’s license, or to secure such other
    information as the officer may reasonably believe to be
    necessary to enforce the provisions of this title.
    75 Pa.C.S.A. § 6308(b). Pennsylvania law makes clear, however, that a police
    officer has probable cause to stop a motor vehicle if the officer observed a
    traffic code violation, even if it is a minor offense. Commonwealth v. Chase,
    
    599 Pa. 80
    , 89, 
    960 A.2d 108
    , 113 (2008). “[W]hen a police officer lawfully
    stops a motorist for a violation of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code, the
    officer is permitted to ask the driver to step out of the vehicle ‘as a matter of
    right.’” Commonwealth v. Boyd, 
    17 A.3d 1274
    , 1277 (Pa.Super. 2011),
    appeal denied, 
    611 Pa. 677
    , 
    29 A.3d 370
    (2011) (citation and internal
    quotation marks omitted). Due to the inherent risks where an officer confronts
    a suspect, an officer may conduct a protective search of a lawfully stopped
    suspect if there are reasonable grounds to believe the suspect may be armed
    and dangerous. 
    Terry, supra
    .
    Instantly, police had probable cause to stop the white Chevy truck,
    based on the broken taillight in violation of 75 Pa.C.S.A. § 4303 (governing
    general lighting requirements of motor vehicles operated on roadways). See
    
    Chase, supra
    . Police were also permitted to ask Appellant to step out of the
    vehicle. See 
    Boyd, supra
    . In evaluating whether police were justified in the
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    Terry frisk of Appellant, however, the record lacked evidence that police had
    reason to believe Appellant was armed and dangerous. The Commonwealth
    presented no testimony that Appellant’s clothing had any unusual bulges or
    that Appellant made furtive movements during the traffic stop.         Detective
    Patton stated he patted Appellant down for “officer safety.”        That simple
    statement alone does not rise to the level of a particularized or reasonable
    suspicion Appellant was armed and dangerous. While the odor of marijuana
    emanating from Appellant and the vehicle during the traffic stop was enough
    to suspect criminal activity, it was still not enough to justify the pat-down for
    weapons. See In Interest of S.J., 
    551 Pa. 637
    , 
    713 A.2d 45
    (1998) (holding
    Terry frisk was unjustified where, despite testimony officer detected odor of
    marijuana on appellant and witnessed appellant’s group smoking marijuana,
    officer failed to articulate specific facts to support belief that appellant was
    armed and dangerous).       Absent specific, reasonable grounds to believe
    Appellant was armed and dangerous, the pat-down of Appellant was unlawful.
    See 
    Terry, supra
    . In any event, the pat-down yielded nothing and did not
    form the sole basis for Appellant’s detention.
    Notwithstanding the unlawful frisk during the traffic stop, the officers
    already had probable cause to detain Appellant, given his strong odor of
    marijuana as well as his extensive and verified involvement in the drug activity
    at 109 Gibson Terrace.     As a result, the subsequent search of Appellant’s
    clothing at the police station constituted a valid inventory search incident to
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    his detention. See Commonwealth v. Nace, 
    524 Pa. 323
    , 327, 
    571 A.2d 1389
    , 1391 (1990), cert. denied, 
    498 U.S. 966
    , 
    111 S. Ct. 426
    , 
    112 L. Ed. 2d 411
    (1990) (stating: “[I]t is reasonable for police to search the personal
    effects of a person under lawful arrest as part of the routine administrative
    procedure at a police station house incident to booking and jailing the
    suspect”). Thus, the court properly refused to suppress the tangible evidence
    recovered. In other words, the earlier unlawful pat-down was not the sole
    cause of Appellant’s detention and did not serve to taint the physical evidence
    obtained at the police station and from the subsequent search of Appellant’s
    residence per a valid warrant. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Judgment of sentence affirmed.
    Judge Colins joins this memorandum.
    Judge Shogan concurs in the result.
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 5/10/2019
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